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This thesis examines the systemic securitisation of migration, the production of liminality and 
associated vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a refugee camp context against a global backdrop. The 
camp has been conceived as a total institution that presents forms of physical, mental and other 
expressions of encampment inimical to freedoms. As such, three interlocking formulations of 
encampment, which is a measure of securitisation, arise. The first manifestation of encampment arises 
from the practice of the interminable spatial confinement of refugees in developing countries that has 
resulted in what is technically known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). The second expression 
is the onshore and offshore immigration detention system in Western countries. The third manifestation 
of encampment is symbolic and constitutes the self or externally imposed patterns of settlement in 
migrant enclaves in developed and developing countries.  
 
In recent times, international migration has provoked concerns over insecurity in refugee-hosting 
states. Beyond the animated public discourse, the tenor of securitisation has further necessitated the 
use of extraordinary means of refugee containment that include confinement in ‘camps’. Indeed, some 
camps have become politicised and militarised spaces where sections of refugee populations have 
developed extreme views and exerted political influence in their homelands and host states. 
Encampment therefore not only presents humanitarian concerns but also raises significant security 
challenges for host states and beyond. The thesis examines vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a camp 
environment that closely interacts with the global system.  
 
The Somali protracted refugee situation at Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya, the thesis case study, 
is an archetype of encampment. The elusive actualisation of durable solutions to the Somali refugee 
problem has placed them in a state of limbo, technically referred to as the liminal state. The thesis 
traces the historical roots of conflict and forced displacement in Somalia. Further, the study traces the 
Somali migration trajectory from the homeland to the first host state, Kenya, and concludes the journey 
in the third countries of resettlement in the West. The research further employs a broad-brush 
approach and provides examples from other camps and countries to complement the case study and 
advance its arguments. It is argued that the conditions in a camp in concert with latent ‘external’ factors 
present sources of vulnerability to radicalisation, particularly in contexts in which polarisation, terrorism 
and other forms of political violence are already prevalent. It is further argued that as intersubjective 
constructs, securitisation may create vulnerabilities to radicalisation while radicalisation may expand 
opportunities for securitisation. 
 
Significantly, radicalisation in the context of migration does not occur in a vacuum but in a synergistic 
dynamic that summons a range of actors and drivers in securitised speech-act. By examining the 
interface of pre-encampment, encampment and post-encampment, the thesis demonstrates that the 
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camp is a social entity that interacts with other systems. Notably, the continued adoption of ahistorical 
and reductionist approaches in the analysis of radicalisation in migrant contexts, and in counter-
terrorism remain void as long as broader contextual factors and actors in other sub-systems that drive 
radicalisation are neglected. In adopting this approach, the research addresses the gap of 
technological advancements, ahistoricity and broader-context reductionism in dominant scholarship 
on radicalisation among refugees. The thesis’ contribution is therefore the development of an analytical 
framework that examines the dynamic and evolutionary character of deep-rooted structural drivers of 
radicalisation. The inter-subjective construction of radicalisation – of the refugee – in public space, 
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‘We have asked the UNHCR to relocate the refugees in three months, failure to which we shall 
relocate them ourselves. The way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after 
the Garissa University terrorist attack……The refugee camps are being used as breeding 
grounds for terrorists.’ (ABC, 2015; Gettleman, 2017) 
 
‘…they (terrorists) stayed in the (Dadaab) refugee camp. They assembled their arms there.’ 
(Gouby, 2015) 
 
These statements are accredited to William Ruto, Kenya’s deputy president, and Ali Korane, the former 
chairman of the Kenya Refugee Affairs Commission, respectively. The utterances were delivered in 
the aftermath of the April 2015 terrorist attack at Garissa University in Kenya that claimed the lives of 
148 people. Subsequently, Al Shabaab, an affiliate of Al Qaeda in Somalia claimed responsibility for 
the brazen attack. These statements conceive and depict the camp as constituting an existential threat 
to the state. More broadly, the discourse represents a pattern of the securitisation of transnational 
migration that has gained global traction in recent years. At the core of securitisation is the 
convergence between internal and external security that has transgressed the border between ‘inside 
and outside, state and society, sovereignty and identity’ (Bigo, 2000, 322). Notably, the securitisation 
of migration has subsumed the construction of identity and the threat of radicalisation, resulting in the 
conflation of migrants with terrorism. In light of this background, an examination of the social 
construction of threat around the representation of the refugee and camp structure, and potential 
vulnerabilities is important (p. 323; see also Balzacq et al., 2016, 495). 
 
This thesis examines the systemic securitisation of migration, the production of liminality and 
associated vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a refugee camp context against a global backdrop. The 
examination of these three elements answers the key research question: what are the vulnerabilities 
to and dynamics of radicalisation in a refugee camp context that closely interacts with the global 
system? In recent times, international migration has provoked concerns over insecurity in refugee 
hosting states. Beyond the animated public discourse, the tenor of securitisation has further 
necessitated the use of extraordinary means of refugee containment that includes confinement in 
camps. Indeed, existing scholarship (Ek and Karadawi, 1991, Hanafi and Long, 2010; Sanyal, 2011; 
Eleftheridaou, 2018) suggests that some camps have become politicised and militarised spaces where 
marginal refugee populations have developed extreme views and exerted political influence. This 
thesis contends that radicalisation in the context of migration does not occur in a vacuum. 
Radicalisation blooms in a synergistic dynamic that summons a range of actors and drivers in 
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securitised discursive (‘radicalisation of public discourse’) and nondiscursive practices. As such, the 
camp is a social entity that interacts with other systems. 
 
The study has adopted five levels of analysis namely, individuals, subunits, units, international 
subsystems and international systems. These scales have been adapted from Buzan et al.’s (1998, 5-
6) security analysis framework and form part of the thesis conceptual framework. Individuals represent 
the subjects while subunits are organised groups of subjects within units that may include lobbies or 
bureaucracies. Units are cohesive and autonomous and are a collection of individuals, communities 
or organisations for example, states and transnational organisations. International subsystems are 
collectivised units in the international system that are territorially cohesive. They include continental 
and regional economic blocks such as the African Union, ASEAN and OECD. The international system 
represents the entire globe, while some levels are crosscutting. The thesis therefore proposes a 
conceptual framework (see Figure 1) that consolidates key concepts and guides the examination of 
specific agents and structural conditions at micro, meso and macro systems to provide insights on 
vulnerabilities to radicalisation. 
 
This thesis traces the journey of Somali refugees hosted in Kenya and establishes links with their 
resettlement experience in the West. In spatial terms, the thesis examines (1) Dadaab Refugee 
Complex, the thesis case study (2) in North Eastern Province in Kenya, the host state (3) Somalia, 
refugees’ country of origin {conflict history} (4) African continental dynamics (5) Links to the global 
system. In adopting this approach, the research addresses the gap of technological advancements, 
ahistoricity and reductionism in dominant scholarship on radicalisation among refugees. The thesis 
argues that the understanding of radicalisation and the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation 
interventions are likely to remain limited as long as broader contextual drivers and actors in other 
subsystems that drive radicalisation persist. In so doing, the thesis demonstrates the plurality and 
intersubjective construction of radicalisation in the public space beyond the immediate migrant sphere. 
 
The camp has been conceived as a total institution that presents forms of physical, mental and other 
expressions of encampment inimical to freedoms. As such, three interlocking formulations of 
encampment, which is a measure of securitisation, emerge. The first manifestation of encampment 
arises from the practice of the interminable spatial confinement of refugees in developing countries 
that has resulted in what is technically known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). The second 
expression is the onshore and offshore immigration detention system in Western countries. The third 
manifestation of encampment is symbolic and constitutes the self or externally imposed patterns of 




This thesis argues that intersubjective securitisation, at the core of the radicalisation of public discourse 
on migration has influenced policies on migration that include encampment. Encampment, whether 
from PRS or other forms of detention is a securitisation measure aimed at the containment of refugees, 
typically under deplorable conditions. This depraved state of human security, which violates basic 
freedoms creates a humanitarian gap that models a zone of social, political, economic and other forms 
of exclusion. The duality of the camp as a zone of protection and exclusion breeds liminality or the 
state of limbo. Liminality within the asylum seeker context has been conceived as the state of limbo 
arising from the interaction of adverse structural conditions across different sub-systems. Encampment 
may intensify the liminal state, which begins at the pre-encampment stage during a period of crisis, in 
this case the Somali conflict era. The liminal state spawns both risks and opportunities that attracts 
various forms of coping leading to several pathways, that may include radicalisation. The conditions 
at the camp in concert with latent ‘external’ factors present sources of vulnerability to radicalisation, 
particularly in contexts in which polarisation, terrorism and other forms of political violence are already 
prevalent.  
 
The emerging central thesis therefore states that the encampment of refugees as a measure of 
securitisation violates human freedoms, inflames the liminal state and creates vulnerabilities to 
potential radicalisation in conflict-habituated contexts. The expression of liminality, an overarching 
theme in the thesis, is evident in dissatisfaction with settlement outcomes. It is further argued that as 
intersubjective constructs, securitisation may create vulnerabilities to radicalisation while radicalisation 
may expand opportunities for securitisation. This introductory chapter sets the background on the 
refugee protection regime, the responsibility to protect and the quest for durable solutions. More 
importantly, it examines the transformation of the international migration landscape and establishes 
the relationship between migration and security.    
 
1.2 The Migration-Security Nexus 
 
The academic literature on radicalisation though limited, has primarily focused on the exploration of 
significant factors that stimulate the trajectory towards radicalised expressions of individuals. While 
existing literature (Betz, 2005; Bokhari et al., 2006; Alonso, 2012) has largely focused on why 
radicalisation happens, there has been less focus on how individuals progressively adopt beliefs and 
behaviour that support and, in some instances, culminate into acts of terrorism and other forms of 
political violence. A preponderance of research on terrorism has grown to currently include group, 
network, organisational, mass movement, socio-cultural and international contexts. However, the 
dynamics of that process remains poorly understood. While there is growing literature on migrant 
communities, the body of literature on refugees (Schmid, 2016; Eleftheridaou, 2018; Haer & Hecker, 
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2018; Sumpter & Franco, 2019) is only just emerging and exploratory. Moreover, existing literature on 
radicalisation can be described as largely conceptual rather than empirical (Borum, 2011, 14-15). 
 
The effort to understand radicalisation must examine the process by which people come to adopt 
beliefs that justify and compel violence, and how they progress or not from thinking to action. In 
addition, any useful framework should employ an integrated micro, meso and macro level analysis that 
captures individual and societal dynamics (Veldhuis and Staun’s, 2009). The rationalisation of radical 
beliefs as antecedents for terrorism, while compelling, is not generalisable. Most individuals who hold 
radical beliefs do not necessarily engage in acts of terror. Similarly, many terrorists who pursue a 
cause may possess only a cursory grasp of the ideology they subscribe to and may not radicalise in 
the conventional sense. Ideology and action are therefore not always connected. In the same way, the 
development of extremist beliefs that justify violence is a potential pathway to radicalisation, but 
undoubtedly not the only way. As such, there is no single terrorist profile, contextual blueprint or direct 
pathways and mechanisms for radicalisation (Bokhari et al, 2006). 
 
Existing scholarship has advanced the understanding on the process of radicalisation but is yet to 
develop generally accepted paradigms or established theories (Wiktorowicz, 2005; della Porta, 2009; 
Guibernau, 2010; Fishman, 2010; Gad, 2012; Kundnani, 2015; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; 
Eleftheriadou, 2018). Crenshaw (2000) maintains that while the incident-driven character of research 
and concept definition are still enduring challenges, the quest for a comprehensive theoretical 
framework remains particularly elusive. Since 9/11, the focus on the historical context of terrorism has 
shifted to reflect the incident-driven character of contemporary research. This skewed focus from 
historical perspectives runs the risk of neglecting the important dynamics that punctuate the systemic 
evolutionary character of violence-prone contexts that can provide vital insights and lessons on conflict 
patterns and trends. Accordingly, the description of (1) the systemic and intersubjective dynamics of 
radicalisation in the context of securitisation of migration (2) and the interconnectedness of elements 
at micro, meso and macro levels, from a historical and technological perspective, constitute the most 
important contributions of this thesis. The research aims to fill the gaps of ahistoricity, acontextuality, 
acomplexity, adynamism and the dearth of empiricism. It achieves this by analysing radicalisation 
within the broader context in which it incubates and ultimately (or not) emerges alongside the dynamic 
and evolutionary character of historical, political, social, economic, technological and other contexts.  
 
The relationship between displacement and insecurity is incontrovertible. Existing literature has 
explored the drivers of radicalisation and militancy in migrant communities and refugee camps in 
Tanzania, DRC, Pakistan, Lebanon, among other countries (Crisp, 1999; Sanyal, 2011; Afifi et al., 
2013; Afifi et al., 2016; Haer & Hecker, 2018). An important example that sets the context is the 
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establishment of Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist group, in 2006. Fatah al-Islam is reported to have been 
hosted in several Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Palestinians have been hosted in some of these 
camps for over 60 years since 1948 (Ramadan, 2009, 154-55). Following their banishment from 
Beddawi and Burj al-Barajneh camps, the group established a new base in Nahr el-Bared camp. In 
contrast to other camps, the absence of a security committee at Nahr el-Bared guaranteed operation 
without detection (Ramadan, 2009, 154). A fairly similar pattern of Islamism was established in Ain al 
Hilweh, the largest camp hosting Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Rougier, 2007, 2, 225). In 2007, 
the Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam took refuge in Nahr al-Bared camp and engaged the Lebanese army 
in a military offensive. The onslaught which started on suspicion of a bank robbery escalated to the 
cities of Beirut and Tripoli. The battle at the camp lasted for over three months, claimed multiple 
casualties, displaced 6,000 families and destroyed essential infrastructure (ICG, 2009, 11).  
 
The ensuing debate on the origins of the Islamist group linked the militants to the refugee camp. The 
group is claimed to have been established in the camp, and conscripted members and provided 
training within the camp precincts. Other reports attribute the rise of the group to the Syrian and Saudi 
Arabian governments’ attempts to destabilise Lebanon. At the same time, some accounts claim that 
Fatah al-Islam was linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq and had been deployed to Lebanon to form a Sunni 
jihadist front against Israel, as a rival to Shiite Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist resistance 
group and also a political party with seats in the Lebanese parliament. The group, based in Lebanon 
and sponsored by Iran, is also recognised as an international terrorist organisation. The organisation 
provides military support and basic services in parts of Lebanon and has also been labelled as Syria’s 
proxy due to its interference in Lebanese affairs. Other sources have drawn links between Fatah al-
Islam with the Palestinian Fatah al-Intifada movement (Ramadan, 2009, 154-161).  
 
The battle between the Lebanese army and Fatah al-Islam at Nahr el-Bared camp deeply fractured 
relations between the Lebanese and Palestinians. The Lebanese eventually attributed the Islamist 
organisations’ resilience and lethality to the acquiescence and complicity of the camp’s inhabitants. 
After the incident, the Lebanese military conducted regular military operations, sometimes with brutal 
force with the aim to restore social order (ICG, 2009, 12). In hindsight, the Cairo Agreement of 1969 
sought to uphold Lebanon’s sovereignty while guaranteeing the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) liberty to operate on Lebanese soil. In reality, the agreement legitimated Palestinian militaristic 
presence in Lebanon and destabilised the country. Consequently, Lebanon disengaged from the 
camps, which then became extraterritorial zones under the exclusive administration of armed 
Palestinian factions (Ramadan, 2009, 157-59). While the Palestinian experience is noteworthy, this 
thesis acknowledges the contextual nuances between refugee camps. Beyond regional dynamics, the 
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thesis goes further to address camp and global level dynamics that existing scholarship has either 
addressed independently or reductively.   
 
While refugees have been characterised as at-risk groups, prevailing camp conditions conversely 
lends them vulnerable to extreme political views and activity. Refugees in protracted crises often feel 
deprived not only of the future but also the past. As such, they are not presumably neutral and benign 
entities completely detached from past and evolving developments in their homelands. They tend to 
maintain a strategic approach to issues, hold on to past experiences, adapt them to their new 
conditions and develop them further within the camp context and beyond. Ek and Karadawi (1991, 
196) and Loescher and Milner (2008, 34-35) contend that refugees can exert political influence in their 
countries of origin from within a camp setting by disseminating political messages and self-mobilising. 
Further, armed opposition groups can exploit an environment of dissatisfaction and aimlessness for 
the recruitment of refugees into their ranks or engagement in terrorist activities. 
 
The International Crisis Group (2009) report highlights the role of limited economic opportunities and 
social exclusion in fuelling anger and disillusionment among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This, 
the report continues, creates a viable environment for radicalism and militancy. Other scholarship has 
expanded the understanding of radicalisation in refugee camps within the backdrop of the state of 
governance in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Hanafi and Long (2010) have shifted attention from 
common explanations on ‘bare life’ hinged on socio-economic conditions to examine the ‘political life’ 
in these camps. This thesis examines both dimensions. The pervasive crisis of conventional 
governance in these camps has occasioned the emergence of ‘alternative mentalities of government’ 
or ‘governmentalities’. While these governmentalities have positively regulated camp behaviour, they 
have also contributed to the spread of Islamism and inhibited formal governance structures (Hanafi & 
Long, 2010, 135).  
 
The crisis of governance is characterised by several factions vying for power and influence, and their 
representation in various committees. Poor governance, inexperience, clientelism, factional infighting 
and weakened legitimacy in and out of the camp often expose the veneer of cooperation. In the 
absence of formal authority, Islamist movements are permitted to preserve social order in the camp. 
This predominantly stems from a shared notion of morality within Islamic tenets that operate as 
‘mentalities of governance’. In addition, the instrumentalisation of the camp committees is evident. 
Lebanese securocrats, for instance, expect camp committees to deliver wanted persons without the 
provision of matching resources (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 139-142, 152). Ultimately, the dire state of 
affairs in the camp springs from the failure of neo-liberal policies to contain the Palestinians coupled 




Scholarship in the field of migration and security has been particularly instructive on how flight and 
disempowerment can cause disaffection within a camp setting. Some scholars (Ek & Karadawi, 1991, 
196; Loescher & Milner, 2008, 33-39; Horst, 2018, 444) have argued that camp conditions may propel 
previously apolitical individuals to become politically active. Significantly, the impact of armed conflict 
disproportionately affects active political subjects and at the same time moulds politically conscious 
subjects. The initial stream of refugees fleeing armed conflict typically includes politically active families 
(Horst, 2018, 444), as is evident among the Togolese refugees in Benin who had a militant or political 
past (Lecadet, 2016, 194).  
 
In making the case for the nexus between security, PRS and state response, the World Refugee 
Survey (Loescher et al, 2008, 37, 55) contends that in times of conflict, states tend to securitise refugee 
issues as a basis to remodel their immigration policies. On her part, Beydoun (2010, 35) submits that 
the pathological fear of politicisation and militarisation of refugees may be the driving factor that 
compels states to adopt an isolationist policy. This security-focused isolationist policy, punctuated by 
continuous rights violations, provokes the contestation of their expulsion from the political realm (Fresia 
& von Kanel, 2016, 254) and may galvanise individuals towards (non)violent radicalisation. Ek and 
Karadawi (1991, 196) explain that some refugees are either actively involved in the conflict that 
triggered their flight or act as a broad political constituency that challenges the power structure in their 
original homelands. Armed factions and ideologues may infiltrate the camp to target the host country, 
with disgruntled youth in the camps providing a rich source for recruitment. This conflict spill-over to 
the host country transforms the camp into a political base, with or without host government support as 
fighting rages among opposing factions.  
 
Clearly, camps not only present new problems but can also aggravate existing security challenges. 
The thesis will demonstrate that the Somali protracted refugee situation is both a source and 
consequence of insecurity (Loescher et al., 2008, 3-4; Loescher & Milner, 2008, 33-39) beyond the 
Dadaab refugee camp microcosm. Crenshaw (2000, 417-18), a luminary in the field of terrorism posits 
that such synergies constitute good theoretical bases for the contextual analysis of the dynamics of 
radicalisation. In identifying an important gap, Loescher et al. (2008, 15) and Milner (2011, 18-19) 
validate this view by suggesting that the interconnectedness of elements at the micro-camp level and 
beyond is not yet understood. The potential for insurgency by armed groups or political factions using 
camps as operational bases is deserving of similar attention. 
 
The combination of deplorable camp conditions, weapons and idle frustrated youth provides a potent 
cocktail for camp volatility. Further, a protracted liminal existence creates a chronic state of uncertainty, 
increases vulnerability (Wendling, 2008, 1) to crime and violence, facilitates the emergence of ethno-
political factions, and increases the risk for recruitment into armed violence or organised crime. In 
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essence, the camp culture is founded and sustained around conflict thus the camp is ultimately a 
product of war. With no immediate respite for refugees trapped in protracted camp life, some find 
restitution in mobilising themselves, and if not, state and non-state actors exploit them for political and 
military currency (Jacobsen, 2001, 13). So far, the dynamics displayed in and out of the camp 
microcosm reflect its status as a social entity that stimulates the convergence and interaction of a 
diversity of actors and factors. In such an environment, military intervention inarguably becomes a 
band-aid solution to a complex problem that demands a multifaceted approach. The long-standing 
pervasive debilitating camp conditions aggravated by excessive military containment serve as 
important sources of vulnerability to militancy and radicalisation in a camp context. 
 
Globally, the discourse on settlement outcomes commonly makes a distinction between economic and 
socio-cultural aspects of integration. The programme design for refugee aid programmes in Western 
countries tends to be skewed towards the remodelling of divergently inferior social and cultural 
identities. This has led to the adoption of language acquisition and cultural adaptation as yardsticks 
for integration and the forfeiture of reciprocal host-refugee learning opportunities. In this schema, the 
treatment of refugees as policy items overrides their resource capability. Besides, public discourse has 
fashioned the dynamics on integration and belonging. Political rhetoric on asylum for example in 
Australia has stoked public fear and insecurities by influencing public opinion on the Australian 
Government’s migration policies. Similarly, political parties have amplified their stance on migration for 
political expediency. Numerous agencies match refugees with social counterparts to facilitate the 
integration process. While some of these relationships have flourished, others tend to be artificial and 
transitory as a result of other competing needs (Humpage & Marston, 2004, 68; see also Koser, 2015).  
 
On its part, the UK has introduced a raft of measures to enforce stricter border control and contain 
immigration. Political and economic insecurities have, for example, led to public resentment over state 
support and the prioritisation of immigrants above others. Sections of the media have provided fodder 
for the growing public discontent. The threat of terrorism has in part resulted in the resurgence of right-
wing extremists who continue to exploit and foster an environment of racial and religious bigotry that 
links migration with insecurity. The consequences of globalisation borne by Western countries has 
generated both cooperation and conflict in equal measure. Meanwhile, the securitised response to 
these challenges continue to place refugees in a state of limbo (Richmond, 2005, 63-64; see also 
Garcia, 2015). 
 
Ordinarily, security issues are the outcome of leaders’ attempts to comprehend and shape the world, 
and the capacity of society to respond accordingly. Securitisation theory therefore aims to understand 
why and how this happens and the effects on the life and politics of society (Balzacq et al., 2016, 495). 
The underlying argumentation for the rejection of reductionism justifies a multi-level approach that 
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transcends the camp context and highlights spatial interactions. Regional and global dynamics are 
dimensions that remain poorly understood in the province of security (Milner, 2011, 5, 18-19). Suffice 
it to say that the confluence of a multiplicity of factors and actors in the process of radicalisation and 
how radicalisation emerges in inter-group dynamics is not necessarily a singular refugee experience. 
The thesis will demonstrate that while certain groups are often profiled as predisposed to radicalisation 
and acts of terrorism, other actors, including governments and the public, among others, can also be 
(non)violently radicalised in their action or reaction towards radicalisation (Schmid, 2013, 4, 37-39). 
The study further highlights sources of the state’s vulnerability to insecurity and also demonstrates 
appreciation of radicalisation as constituting a significant threat to oft-overlooked vulnerable refugee 
populations. 
 
On this basis, the thesis aims to examine the dynamics of securitisation of migration and the 
vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a refugee camp context that closely interacts with the global system. 
As such, the thesis seeks to answer three research questions, partially developed from the Balzacq 
(2009, 64) framework of pragmatic act of securitisation. Firstly, what are the manifestations of 
encampment as a measure of securitisation of migration? This question aims to excavate the overt 
and latent or structural forms of encampment. The thesis will also demonstrate the manifestation of 
other forms of securitisation revolving around encampment alongside the production of liminality. 
Secondly, who are the agents of securitisation of migration in the context of radicalisation? The 
research will examine the power positions and identities of key agents of securitisation and 
radicalisation beyond the orthodox political elites, including the audience. In other words, this question 
aims to establish the intersubjective construction of securitisation and radicalisation and expose the 
radicalisation of public discourse (della Porta, 2009, 9) in the process. 
 
Thirdly, what is the context within which the structural drivers of radicalisation and securitisation of 
migration are predicated? The contextual factors under examination include historical, socio-cultural, 
political, economic, environmental and technological structures. While context constitutes an important 
framework for agency, action is presumed to occur within a pre-existing structured context (Hay, 1995). 
The research will examine forms of actions, interactions and circumstances that facilitate mobilisation. 
These include language; techniques (narratives/frames, metaphors, images, stereotypes); media; 
audience (public opinion and behaviour); and policy instruments. The research will also examine the 
vulnerabilities emanating from the conflation of migration with radicalisation at pre-mid-post liminal 
phases represented by the homeland, first host state and third countries of resettlement. The 
behaviour and belief systems of key actors is particularly important in this context. Recent research 
has shifted from individual to situational and contextual factors that increases an individual’s 
vulnerability to radicalisation. While individual profiles may differ, there may be shared underlying 
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contextual similarities in the same way contextual specificities prevail (Fishman, 2010, 13). In surfing 
the challenge of the global wave of migration and radicalisation, the next section engraves the camp 
within an evolving global system. 
 
1.3 Trending Refugees and Trendy Global Responses 
 
The origins of International Refugee Law can be traced back to the chaos following World War I and 
more specifically, the Russian Revolution and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The massive 
number of refugees marshalled the League of Nation’s establishment of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees in 1926. This initial ad hoc arrangement was followed by the 1933 Convention, the first 
legally binding global treaty on asylum (Behrman, 2018, 6-10). The post-1945 initiatives appeared less 
concerned with refugee affairs and more preoccupied with the consequences of disruption emanating 
from uncontrolled self-repatriation and pillaging (Malkki, 1995a, 499). That said, the international 
refugee regime was further inspired by the reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of World War II. 
The prevailing political goodwill at the time led to the formulation of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. 
Anchored on the lessons of the war experience, this convention outlined the norms and principles that 
govern states’ response to refugees (Zolberg, Suhrke & Agwayo, 1989, 21-29; Gottwald, 2012, 101). 
In 1967, the amendment to the Refugee Convention broadened the scope of beneficiaries beyond the 
affected seven million European refugees, to subsume the rest of the world (Zolberg, Suhrke & 
Agwayo, 1989, 25-27). During this time, the foreign policy and numerical significance of refugees in 
developing countries increased and in subsequent years provoked the search for durable solutions for 
refugees (Zolberg, Suhrke & Agwayo, 1989, 67-71).  
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently fulfils its mandate within the 
international refugee regime framework. The organisation was established in 1950 to protect European 
refugees after World War II. The 1950 UNHCR statute broadly mandates the agency to provide 
international protection to refugees and seek permanent solutions to the refugee problem. Its role is 
premised on the framework of international law and standards that include the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law 
and a range of other binding and non-binding regional and international accords and declarations 
(UNHCR and IPU, 2017, 15-32). More broadly, the UNHCR promotes international refugee protection 
by ensuring adherence to non-refoulment, admission to safety, fair determination of refugee status 
and humane standards of treatment. The agency also recognises the relationship between legal 
protection and material assistance in its partnership with governments and civil society organisations 
(UNHCR statute, 1950, 4-10). As part of its overall mandate of international refugee protection, 
UNHCR is charged with the responsibility to implement durable solutions for refugee situations. The 
agenda for durable solutions constitutes one of three viable options, namely, voluntary return of 
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refugees to countries of origin once safety can be guaranteed; local integration within the host country; 
or third-country resettlement (UNHCR, 2003, 5).  
 
Over time, the importance accorded to each of the three durable solutions has changed. At the onset, 
durable solutions and resettlement in particular was deemed more likely to be attained as a result of 
the prevailing international goodwill. However, the world has since adapted to the changing migration 
landscape. The situation has evolved over the years with refugees increasingly finding themselves 
trapped in protracted camp life with no durable solution in sight (UNHCR, 2004b, 2; Loescher & Milner, 
2006, 105-114; Turner, 2015, 139, 142). While repatriation remains the most preferred durable 
solution, the nature of conflict-habituated systems and high degree of volatility that is characteristic of 
refugee homelands do not often provide permissive conditions for sustainable return. This effectively 
rules out the option of repatriation in such situations. The strategic options of resettlement and local 
integration that were more viable during the colonial and Cold War eras are no longer regarded as 
such. In addition, they are no panacea for the deep-seated structural problems in the refugee countries 
of origin that trigger forced migration in the first place. The end of communism and colonialism, and 
increase of migration from developing to developed countries have shifted preference to voluntary 
repatriation especially among industrialised countries. For developing countries, the right to exercise 
state sovereignty by maintaining borders and regime security conflicts with the obligation to protect 
refugees. At the same time, impoverished host countries like Kenya are reluctant to bear the additional 
burden of supporting local integration due to their weak capacity to cater for both nationals and refugee 
populations (Chimni, 2004, 55-59; UNHCR, 2006, 141-42). Yet, as state parties to the Refugee 
Convention, signatories have a duty to comply with the regime. Evidently, the convergence of these 
issues has eroded the compassion that once distinguished the responsibility to protect as host 
countries continue to make strategic decisions on refugee affairs.  
 
In response to these developments, the UNHCR developed a more proactive multi-dimensional, 
comprehensive and homeland-oriented strategy different from the previous reactive exile-oriented 
approach. Shacknove (1985, 280-84) makes the case for a human rights approach to the refugee 
problem. He argues that this problem stems from the denial of basic human rights relating to 
citizenship. As such, persecution is just one manifestation of the state’s dereliction of its duty to protect 
basic human needs. Marks (2011, 61-77) reinforces this argument by suggesting that solutions to 
refugee problems must go beyond addressing persecution. Comprehensive durable solutions must 
therefore resolve structural causes of human rights violations, such as poverty and marginalisation, 
and embody both preventive and therapeutic approaches. Thus, over time, the UNHCR has expanded 
its involvement with IDPs and host communities (UNHCR, 2006, ix, 134), and also broadened its 
activities to include displacement prevention, refugee reintegration, and establishment of partnerships 
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with multi-stakeholders in security, development and human rights. This repertoire of interventions 
seeks to shift the orientation of durable solutions to encompass a comprehensive durable homeland 
and exile solutions. In recent years, protracted refugee situations, unsustainable repatriation and the 
impact of globalisation on mobility has once again re-oriented the international community’s approach 
to refugee flows (UNHCR, 2006, 10, 29, 96). 
 
Indeed, the global dynamism of migratory flows has recently marshalled an irregular surge of migrants, 
particularly from Africa and the Middle East, into Europe. This trend of increasingly complex migration 
flows has been termed ‘mixed migration’ and is defined as ‘complex population movements involving 
refugees, asylum seekers, economic and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population 
movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants’ (IOM, 2011, 63). This movement is 
characterised by massive flows that present rising political significance at national, regional and global 
levels. Strict border controls and the barriers to resettlement and integration increasingly compel mixed 
migrants to resort to illegitimate means to migrate. This trend signifies the reality of massive numbers 
of people willing to migrate longer distances at greater risk to safeguard their physical and economic 
security. Refugee camps have served as transit points in some cases. The range of causes triggering 
these massive mixed migrant flows include persecution, political turmoil, armed conflict, general 
insecurity, poverty, environmental problems, and a growing culture of migration among the youth in 
search of a better life. An increasingly digital and globalised world has inevitably rendered movement 
less constrained and controlled. This wave of migration has caused significant migrant deaths and 
unwittingly evoked anti-migrant sentiments in transit and host countries (Zetter, 2007, 175-180; IOM, 
2015b, 5-11). Against this evolving migration terrain, the United Nations midwifed the Global Compact 
for Migration in 2018. It is aimed at safe, orderly and regular migration. This compact recognises the 
equal inalienable rights and freedoms of migrants and refugees. More importantly, it grants exclusive 
entitlement to specific international protection to refugees only. The agreement acknowledges and 
aims to minimise the structural drivers of migration and grants migrants access to basic services, 
among other basic provisions (UN Global Compact, 2018). That said, while aid therapy has been 
relatively effective, it has not fully immunised source countries from the challenges of poor governance 
that partly trigger forced migration, nor bolstered internal political accountability. 
 
With reference to instability, recurrent cycles of turmoil and upsurge of violence in previously stable 
contexts has generated more intractable displacement situations. Syria is an exemplar of the evolving 
character of armed conflict and displacement patterns that have engendered apprehension over 
unbridled migration in the context of globalisation. Admittedly, these are the circumstances under 
which refugee protection is currently being negotiated and realised. Not to mention the developing and 
developed countries’ imbalance in burden and responsibility sharing and the high costs of hosting 
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asylum seekers and refugees. In fact, countries that have traditionally maintained an open-door policy 
to refugee protection are increasingly buckling under the pressure of open-ended responsibilities and 
national security concerns as a result of the massive influx of refugees into their territories. As a result, 
governments and opposition parties have increasingly played on the fears of disaffected populations 
by featuring asylum seekers and refugees as part of key election campaign issues (UNHCR and IPU, 
2017, 34-96). 
 
It therefore follows that migration crises tend to influence how states respond to refugee flows and 
operationalise existing refugee regimes. While numerous studies have identified non-state actors as 
responsible for terrorism, it is important to acknowledge the role of both non-state and state actors in 
triggering forced displacement, sometimes as an unintended consequence of an insurgent terrorism 
campaign or as a deliberate policy. Some examples include the Assad regime and IS in Syria, and the 
Barre regime and Al Shabaab in Somalia. Notably, while terrorism can provoke large-scale forced 
displacement, counter-terrorist operations can have a similar effect (Schmid 2016, 3-4). Orchard 
(2014, 6-18) suggests that these crises delegitimise the existing protection regime, thus triggering a 
loss of confidence and a search for alternative responses to refugee issues. It is therefore not 
surprising that in light of the prevailing mass mobility, Europe and Turkey reached a landmark deal to 
stem the flow of refugees and other migrants by enforcing the policy of refoulement. Essentially, 
refugees and other migrants arriving in Greece are sent back to Turkey in exchange for political and 
financial concessions for the latter. On their part, Syrian refugees are managed within a European 
Union resettlement programme (Al Jazeera, 2016; BBC, 2016a).  
 
Other EU countries have also passed national legislation to discourage immigration. Some of the 
measures include the seizure of assets and valuables from refugees, mandatory directives for public 
institutions to delimit external religious influences, and the ban on migrants from public places (Meko 
& Sharma, 2016). Among other controversial laws are Denmark’s shelved plans to relocate ‘unwanted’ 
migrants with serious convictions to secluded islands formerly reserved for contagious animals 
(Gargiulo & Guy, 2018). Other countries have taken similar strong positions on migration that include 
proposing flawed policies that bar the entry or encourage refoulement of refugees facing real threats 
in their countries of origin. During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign period in the United States, 
immigration provided a strong rallying point, particularly among Republican candidates opposed to the 
ostensibly lax American immigration laws (Berenson, 2015; Dovere & Bender, 2016). Australia, on its 
part, has pursued the ‘Pacific Solution’, which involves the interception and offshore detention of 
refugees and other migrants through deals with impoverished countries in a bid to curb irregular 
migration within its borders (Koser, 2015, 14). On the African continent, Kenya sensationally claimed 
that Dadaab, a camp that predominantly hosts Somali refugees is a breeding ground for terrorists, and 
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repeatedly threatened cessation of status and forceful mass repatriation of refugees (Jones, 2015; 
Daily Nation, 2016). What could possibly have provoked these controversial policy prescriptions that 
obviously denigrate international humanitarian law? 
 
In early 2015, an advisor to the Libyan government warned that the Islamic State (IS) was exploiting 
the Europe migrant flow by smuggling jihadists with the intention of setting up terrorist sleeper cells 
across Europe. The U.S. Pentagon has also reported that in some cases, IS volunteers blend with 
migrants then break away in Tripoli to head to Syria (Sherlock & Freeman, 2015; Stephen, 2016; 
Whitehead & Coughlin, 2016; Schmid, 2016, 3-4, 27). A report by the Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime (2015, 4, 8; see also Walt, 2015) similarly reveals that the Islamic 
State and other Islamist organisations have profited from migrant movement to Europe and other 
criminal economies. At the same time, Islamic State has previously threatened to flood Europe with 
agents disguised as refugees, while an operative within the organisation claimed that this threat has 
already been executed (Spencer, 2015a, 2015b; Ramsay, 2016; Schmid, 2016, 8).  
 
One of the perpetrators of the spectacular terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 130 people in Paris 
in 2015 is reported to have posed as a refugee. Reports indicate that he entered Europe through 
Greece and registered as a refugee on a fake Syrian passport (BBC, 2015a; BBC, 2015b; Whitehead 
& Coughlin, 2016). There may be different interpretations to this scenario. Other scenarios considered, 
the possibility exists that the attacker may have masqueraded as a refugee and exploited the migrant 
flow, or perhaps not. As a matter of fact, the UNHCR guide to international refugee law (2011a, 34-35, 
119) acknowledges the frequency of receipt of refugee status applications lodged by persons who 
have committed acts of violence. Ex-combatants are not considered excludable from protection unless 
on grounds of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Following a CNN 
expose, the United Nations in 2018 imposed sanctions on four Libyan and two Eritrean millionaires 
whose business model involved trading in vulnerable migrants. Among the accused is a commander 
implicated for intentionally sinking migrant boats with the use of firearms. He works for the Libyan 
Coast Guard, which is a recipient of EU financial support to contain the flow of migrants. A second 
person is accused of links with the Islamic State, including dalliances with other extremist organisations 
(Elbagir & Said-Moorhouse, 2018).  
 
Quintessentially, the currency underlying the attendant public discourse is the role played by recent 
terrorist attacks in advancing the securitisation of refugee issues. Securitisation involves the social and 
political construction of threats into national security issues. Governments and media engage in 
dramatic and persuasive forms of public discourse in their presentation of threats (Buzan, Waever & 
de Wilde, 1998, 21-48). In praxis, this results in the use of extraordinary measures to threat 
management through the suspension, challenge and changes to established norms and laws (Murphy, 
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2007, 451). As observed, mixed migrant flows have strained the protection system and contributed to 
the non-entree asylum regime of the European Union on one hand and the threats of cessation of 
refugee status by Kenya on the other. The thickening of external borders and the associated draconian 
regimes have constructed the securitisation architecture of supranational and national polities (Zetter, 
2015, 14-15). This being the case, the progressive reinforcement of the structure of border control has 
considerably diminished the quality of protection for asylum seekers. Therefore, emerging anti-migrant 
sentiments could possibly be the result of the development of the nation-state (Arendt, 1973, 9).  
 
Presently, the fields of migration and terrorism operate as two distinct fields with weak linkages. This 
thesis draws inspiration from prevailing global developments in both fields to establish transnational 
linkages and strengthen its arguments. Establishing the multi-causal relations between migration and 
terrorism is indeed a complex undertaking. Nevertheless, refugee camps have served as spaces for 
radicalisation and conscription into terrorist organisations or military launch pads as is evident in 
Palestine, Pakistan, Germany, Sweden and Greece refugee camps and asylum centres. There is a 
likelihood of terrorists to be migrants and migrants to be terrorists. This is exemplified by Western 
foreign fighters’ migration to the IS Caliphate in Syria, while expat jihadists barred from returning home 
migrate across the theatres of terrorism, namely, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Chechnya (Schmid, 2016, 3-5). Rawlence 2016 (126-27) further reports the presence of Al Shabaab 
combatants among the new arrivals at Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya in the wake of the 2011 
Somali drought. At the same time, upon returning home as part of refugee streams in the ongoing 
European refugee crisis, some foreign fighters have successfully orchestrated terrorist attacks in their 
homelands (Schmid, 2016, 4-5).  
 
These global dynamics are suggestive of refugee camps as firmly integrated within the global system 
incorporating transnational policies, coping mechanisms, migratory paths, economy, among other 
elements (Fresia & von Kanel, 2016, 254) that this thesis examines. It must be remembered that while 
some migrants voluntarily join terrorist organisations, some economic migrants and refugee 
populations are vulnerable to abductions and conscription into terror groups such as Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. Within this context, migration control as an instrument for the control of terrorism may be more 
injurious to bonafide migrants than mala fide terrorists in fostering xenophobia and marginalisation 
(Schmid, 2016, 4-5). Ultimately, the quandary for most governments remains negotiating the balance 









1.4 Methodology and Constraints  
 
This thesis employs several methodological approaches to shape and answer the research questions. 
The research has drawn from complementary primary and secondary data sources. The literature 
review involved the collection, critical review and synthesis of existing secondary literature relevant to 
the subject matter. Peer reviewed articles, newspaper articles and books constitute the secondary 
sources of information. The research further employed qualitative research methods with three layers 
of primary data sources. Firstly, the thesis case study is Dadaab Refugee Complex, a camp in Kenya 
that has predominantly hosted Somali refugees since 1991. Case studies provide comprehensive, 
systematic and in-depth information about the research topic and context. Further, within the field of 
conflict studies, the method is considered the best in testing the theories of security (van Evera, 1997, 
30). The thesis further employs a broad-brush approach and provides examples from other camps and 
countries to complement the case study and strengthen its arguments.  
 
The second source of primary data includes policy instruments, publicly available conflict and context 
analyses reports, press releases, and other relevant government, NGO, bilateral and multilateral 
organisational reports. The research also relied on 10th moment data sources, which are 21st century 
methodological innovations (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010) in qualitative research, and elements of digital 
ethnography (Morgan, 2011; Robinson & Schulz, 2009) that transcend traditional methods of primary 
and reflexive data collection and collation. The 10th moment proposes a meta-framework that 
incorporates postmodern data sources from digital social networking tools such as Twitter, Facebook 
and YouTube (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010, 697-9). Digital or cyber-ethnography1 observes culture in 
the making in the online world through the fusion of technology and human sociality (Morgan, 2011, 
84). The research subjected publicly available government reports, WikiLeaks cables, web radio 
podcasts, blogs, audio-visual sources in the form of documentaries and video-graphic speeches, and 
social media platforms to analysis. Examples of content include publicly available sermons and rhetoric 
by controversial politicians and religious clerics; media content on migration and radicalisation; publicly 
available communication exchange between policymakers and unstructured media monitoring and 
interactions on Twitter, to name a few. 
 
Thirdly, primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants. A total of 
32 interviews were conducted with NGOs, legal experts/human rights defenders, opinion leaders, 
journalists, regional security experts and host communities. An additional 11 online refugee 
representations complemented the interviews. Interviews are useful for learning about the 
perspectives of individuals as opposed to, for example, group norms. They are an effective method of 
                                                          
1 Also known as netography, webnography and online, Internet or virtual ethnography.  
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getting people to talk about their personal feelings, opinions, and experiences including discussing 
highly sensitive issues. They are also an opportunity to gain insight into people’s world views (Kvale, 
1996, 30-31). Notably, the ethics committee at The University of Adelaide did not approve direct 
interviews with refugees. To overcome this constraint, interviews were conducted with NGO 
participants working at Dadaab Refugee Complex, whose staff were accessible in the capital city, 
Nairobi. NGOs enjoy long-standing relationships with refugees and therefore offer complementary 
perspectives and ‘insider-outsider’ insights. They facilitate access to information that would otherwise 
demand lengthy periods of rapport-building between the researcher and refugees. Additionally, NGOs 
typically have a broad understanding of programmatic issues arising from their sphere of influence that 
connects other civil society and state actors.  
 
Poststructuralism accounts for much of the epistemological framework for the thesis. It encourages 
methodological innovation for social transformation and has been discussed in detail in 2.3. One 
technique allows the examination of the same qualitative data from different perspectives (Moon, 2016, 
35-36). In interrogating the singularity of object and subject, the research reconstituted refugee 
experiences into characterisations. Accordingly, the thesis utilised NGO interviews as frame narratives 
to construct embedded narratives that represent refugee voices. An embedded narrative is a ‘story 
within a story’ and is enclosed within the frame narrative (‘Frame Narrative’, ODLT, n.d.). The mental 
representations of characters in this case portray actual events and increase possibilities for the 
expansion of possible events and mutually incompatible sequences (Ryan, 1986, 319). In this 
research, refugee characters were developed from the stories emerging from the second-hand 
narratives of NGO participants and framed as ‘humanised quotations’. Further, the thesis resorted to 
the collection of online data in the form of refugee blogs, documentaries, stories and poetry. The utility 
of a mutually constructed discourse emanating from frame and embedded narratives lies in the realistic 
and contextual interpretation of life stories (Zilber et al., 2008, 1047-1055).   
 
While the research predominantly relied on empirical data, the researcher also applied a reflexive 
approach and closely interacted with the content of the thesis to analyse and interpret the data based 
on her subjective experiential reality. A reflective approach allows researchers to gain insights from 
their assumptions, choices and experiences and enables the construction of research outcomes 
(Mruck & Breuer, 2003). The researcher’s extensive work experience in peace and security 
interventions in conflict and post-conflict countries (including Somalia) has indeed enriched the 
theoretical intellectual process in the examination of relationships between concepts and reality. The 
research has evaluated and to some degree refined and reinterpreted existing theories. The 
researcher also kept a reflective journal or log on Evernote to document issues arising from 
spontaneous interactions with various actors, and also tracked the evolving context in the international 
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arena. The researcher’s interpretation of the context of events has complemented other data. The 
personal journal has been valuable in the exploration of issues such as identity, the researcher’s 
integration in a foreign country and other important factors. This experience modelled a robust 
background interpretive frame that provided pointers and clarity, and led to the interrogation of various 
scholarly claims and the identification of analytical gaps. Where appropriate, the research has 
referenced statistical data from publicly available reports. The research employed purposive and 
snowball sampling, and the data analysed using the thematic framework approach. 
 
For the most part, interviewees were accessible and remarkably enthusiastic and forthcoming. In a 
few instances, a couple of interviewees were either guarded in their response or requested the 
redaction of sensitive information. Other cases provided compelling evidence that could have been 
included as verbatim quotations but were censored due to strong language. All information was 
analysed and presented in accordance to ethical standards. Significantly, the designation of 
pseudonyms for all interviewees has been observed as a measure of identity protection. Interviewee 
discretion undoubtedly generated some level of response bias. The thesis similarly demonstrates how 
respondents project meaning through performative communication tailored to diverse audiences 
(Beech, 2011, 291). This bias, partly driven by social conformity is also a consistent limitation 
particularly in environments where respondents are likely to face the threat of victimisation. As some 
interviewees noted, this threat essentially curtails freedom of expression and creates trusted insider 
silos that buffer sensitive information. In this regard, communal protection systems discourage the 
dissemination of sensitive information and the exposure of delinquent insiders. 
 
An important ethical and methodological dilemma for the research was the conduct of interviews with 
all other groups with the exception of refugees, the primary target. The university Ethics Committee 
had refused access to this source. On one hand, the protection of vulnerable groups is ethically sound. 
On the other hand, protection constitutes the exclusion of marginalised voices and is therefore ethically 
and methodologically unsound. It perpetuates an exclusionary but changing culture in the field of 
terrorism that bases claims on minimal empirical evidence. At the same time, it is the antithesis of the 
dominant argument underlying this thesis. Specifically, the construction of identities informed by 
(under/mis)representation effectively suppresses the voices of marginalised groups as they continue 
to be constructed as ‘passive’ and ‘voiceless’. This constitutes the safeguard versus risk dilemma that 
adherence to the ethical principle of do-no-harm transforms to do-no-good. In addition, it contravenes 
the values and principles of ethical conduct, particularly, justice (exclusion and inclusion process), 
beneficence (‘benefit of the research must justify any risks of harm or discomfort to participants’) and 
respect. It therefore follows that the research was methodologically constrained but employed the 




The raft of institutional barriers that plagued the research is instructive of the challenging mechanics 
of generation of knowledge in institutions of higher learning. While the ethics approval process was 
rigorous yet effortless and swift, the research faced further bureaucratic bottlenecks long after ethics 
approval, that were successfully mediated by supportive supervisors. Without delving into specifics, 
the extent of institutional governance of the research on occasions represented the suppression of 
academic and research freedoms. Granted, the sensitivity of radicalisation and terrorism studies and 
the burden of securitisation poses important challenges for both scholar and institution. An 
appreciation of risks is therefore important. At the same time, institutional dictates and barriers negate 
continuous efforts to observe research rigour. These constraints were overcome through consistent 
and supportive supervisory consultations and persistent adaptation. Nevertheless, the important 
questions of benchmarks for fair and inclusive appraisal of research risks and benefits, and ultimately 
the impact of good research that also develops the field remain unanswered. 
 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
 
This dissertation is divided into three parts of a refugee’s journey. The first is the pre-migration or pre-
liminal phase (pre-limbo) and focuses on the refugee homelands. This is represented in chapter three. 
The second phase is migration to a neighbouring second country of asylum, which is the encampment 
or liminal phase (limbo phase) with a focus on the camp in the host states. This is presented in chapters 
four, five and six. The third phase is third country resettlement in the West, which is decampment or 
post-liminal phase with a focus on migrant enclaves. While literature on liminality commonly designates 
three liminal phases (pre-mid-post), the thesis interrogates the extent to which this applies in the 
asylum-seeker context. This is covered in chapters seven and eight. 
 
The next chapter sets out the epistemological, theoretical and conceptual foundations of the study. 
Securitisation theory is discussed within the epistemological framework of poststructuralism. The 
chapter identifies and critically reviews the strengths and limitations of the relevant components of 
poststructuralism and securitisation as applied in the thesis. The section additionally discusses the 
conceptual framework. Finally, the chapter introduces the broader problem of the securitisation of the 
international refugee regime and the production of liminality within the conceptual bedrocks of 
globalisation, statehood and belonging, and identifies the emerging dilemmas. 
 
Chapter three explores the extent to which the international instruments of protection have been 
responsive to the refugee problem. This it does by analysing the specific problem of encampment as 
a measure of securitisation. As such, the chapter examines the structural conditions that predate and 
underlie encampment. The chapter outlines the historical background of the Somali conflict with the 
aim of identifying the drivers of displacement. But this is examined within the Greater Horn of Africa 
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region while highlighting global undercurrents. In so doing, the chapter identifies an important turning 
point in the progression of Islamism in Somalia that led to the emergence of Al Shabaab. The section 
rejects reductionism and argues that pre-migration dynamics have been largely neglected in the 
Somali radicalisation discourse. By advancing holism, the chapter effectively incorporates the role of 
foreign actors and global influences in the calculus of radicalisation discourse. The chapter concludes 
with a presentation of the state of security at Dadaab Refugee Complex, the thesis case study, and 
the motivations behind the Kenyan governments’ excessive response to the security situation. 
 
The fourth chapter presents the three manifestations of encampment in developed and developing 
countries and highlights the physical and symbolic characteristics. The chapter describes the 
deplorable conditions at Dadaab, the primary case study. This is followed by a brief overview of refugee 
detention facilities and migrant enclaves in the West. The chapter essentially discusses the self-
contradicting character of the camp as a medium for freedom and bondage by exposing the paradox 
of turbulent homelands versus unstable places of refuge. It highlights the intensification of liminality 
and the institutionalisation of securitisation in examining the refugee macro-policy environment among 
other conditions. Subsequently, the chapter underscores the transnational interconnectedness of 
security, liminality and securitisation in a refugee’s journey from one context to the next. 
 
Chapter five deconstructs and reconceptualises liminality based on refugees’ lived experiences. It 
presents the liminal triad, which are the three dimensions of time, space and the human dimension 
(material). The anthropological concept of liminality is alien to some disciplines. It is referred to as the 
‘state of limbo’ in common parlance, which makes it ambiguous. But what does it mean in the asylum 
seeker context? The chapter answers this question by drawing from the experiences of refugees at 
Dadaab. While the previous chapters examined the instruments of protection and general camp 
experiences, this chapter goes further to assess humanitarianism in practice and the emerging 
contradictions. In the process, the chapter strengthens the link between liminality and securitisation 
and reveals potential vulnerabilities to radicalisation as a result. The emerging question then becomes 
at what point if ever, does liminality begin, peak and end, and how do refugees cope with this evolving 
environment? 
 
The sixth chapter constructs liminality as the violation of freedoms and examines the exploration of 
coping mechanisms. The section discusses how the restriction of freedoms creates an environment 
for other unorthodox forms of freedom that may include radicalisation. It deconstructs radicalisation 
beyond the common political and religious orientations. In linking to chapter five, the chapter explores 
the relativity of freedom in the context of liminality and examines the concept of freedom at the 




Chapters seven and eight conclude the refugees’ journey that began in their homeland to the second 
host state and finally to the decampment phase in host states in the West. Both chapters examine 
public discursive and performative formulations of the securitisation of migration and the effect on 
radicalisation. Chapter seven focuses on media and technology, academia, political elites and host 
communities in the context of political correctness and right-wing extremism. Chapter eight examines 
Islamist organisations and the exploitation of the discourse on ‘Islamic radicalisation’ in the 
construction of Islamism and advancement of goals. Both chapters answer the question, ‘how does 












































Chapter 2 – Epistemological, Theoretical and Conceptual Foundations 
 
2.1 Vulnerability and Resilience 
 
Vulnerability as applied in the thesis should be viewed within the context of subjective well-being and 
resilience. Subjective well-being refers to general satisfaction with life, the experience of long-term 
affect of pleasure and the absence or reduction of unpleasant affects (Satici, 2016, 68). The concepts 
of resilience and vulnerability are linked through adaptive capacity (Lei, et al., 2014, 617). Adaptation 
is ‘any adjustment, whether passive, reactive or anticipatory, that is proposed as a means for 
ameliorating anticipated adverse consequences’ (see Stakhiv, 1993, quoted in Lei et al., 2014, 615).  
 
The existing literature on vulnerability and resilience reveals multiple definitions over time. Resilience 
derives from the Latin word ‘resilio’ meaning ‘to jump back’ (Klein et al., 2003, 35). Resilience, a 
positive predictor of subjective well-being (Satici, 2016, 68) also termed as ‘invulnerability’ (p. 69) is 
focused on both protective factors and post-crisis recovery (Birkmann, 2006, 35). It has been variously 
defined as the ‘dynamic process that enables the individual to respond or adapt under adverse 
situations’ (Thornton & Sanchez, 2010, 455); ‘the personal qualities that enable one to thrive in the 
face of adversity’ (Connor & Davidson, 2003, 76), among other definitions. Resilience underscores 
opportunities for change, innovation, reorganisation and renewal during periods of stress and crises 
(Birkmann, 2006, 33) and ‘determines the persistence of relationships’ (Holling, 1973, 18). Resilient 
individuals are therefore more persistent and cope better in the face of adversity, have more capacity 
to respond to hardship and deal effectively with life stressors. Resilience involves positive adaptive 
patterns that develop over time (Satici, 2016, 68). Presently, the focus on psychological resilience is 
two-fold (1) on individual mental health and development processes post-crisis (2) individual and 
community level factors related to disaster preparedness and mitigation. Besides the individual level, 
resilience functions on multiple interlocking levels including family, community and institutional 
spheres. There is an emerging area of research on infrastructural resilience related to organisational, 
social, economic and other institutional capabilities and adaptability (Birkmann, 2006, 36) that the 
thesis examines, including individual factors. Resilience as applied in the thesis is therefore: 
 
The ability of (an individual), a system, community or society exposed to hazards to (anticipate) resist, absorb, 
accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk 
management. (UNISDR, 2017) 
 
Over time, the application of the concept of vulnerability has been expanded beyond environmental 
studies to subsume vulnerability of human society or social vulnerability. The concept is 
‘multidimensional, differential and dynamic’ (Birkmann, 2006, 32). Vulnerability, a negative predictor 
of subjective well-being (Satici, 2016, 69), originates from the Latin word ‘vulnerare’, which means to 
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be wounded. It describes the potential to be harmed and sensitivity to threats or stress. Beyond the 
personal level, vulnerability encapsulates environmental sensitivity such as social, economic, political, 
technological and other societal structures in the understanding of risk and adaptation (Birkmann, 
2006, 9; see also Downing et al., 1997) as examined in this thesis. Vulnerability, has also been 
described as a dynamic ‘pattern of cognitive beliefs reflecting a dependence on achievement or 
external sources of affirmation for one's sense of self-worth’ (Sinclair & Wallston, 1999, 102). Examples 
of core components of vulnerability include, ‘susceptibility, sensitivity or fragility (often used 
synonymously) and coping or adaptive capacities as categories to systematise societal (or individual) 
response capacities to deal with adverse environmental conditions’ (Birkmann, 2006, 24). Vulnerability 
is not merely a precondition before an adverse event but may be reinforced by policies (institutional) 
or coping strategies after the event. The analysis of vulnerability therefore combines the susceptibility 
of exposed individuals and societies with their social, economic, political and other capacities to cope 
and adapt to external stressors (Birkmann, 2006, 15-16) as demonstrated in this research. The 
definition of vulnerability as applied in the thesis therefore refers to: 
 
A human condition or process resulting from physical, social, economic and environmental factors, which 
determine the likelihood and scale of damage from the impact of a given hazard (UNDP, 2004, 11), in this case, 
interconnected ‘risk factors’ that ‘create an opportunity structure’ for radicalisation (see Weine & Osman, 2012, 
2) on multiple levels (p. 4).  
 
Based on the evidence submitted in the thesis using broad-brush examples from camps around the 
world, it is important to acknowledge the negligible proportion of refugees who have been 
(non)violently radicalised. The examination of vulnerabilities to radicalisation in the migrant context by 
no means establishes causal relationships but, on the contrary, explores possible correlations and/or 
risk factors. As with numerous concepts in academia, the terms ‘vulnerability’, ‘resilience’ and 
‘adaptation’ remain contested and continue to evolve. The ongoing debates around the concepts (see 
Uekusa and Matthewman, 2017, 355-56), for example, the inverse relationship between vulnerability 
and resilience, while interesting, are outside the ambit of this thesis. That said, in the context of 
migration, vulnerability and resilience can happen concurrently. Vulnerability may induce resilience 
among those with limited choices since resilience is also resource-dependent. Individual responsibility 
to resilience may for example obscure social sources of structural inequalities that constrain resilience. 
At the same time, ‘bouncing back’ may connote a return, not to resilience, but to vulnerability (p. 355). 
These concepts should therefore be treated as fluid, multi-dimensional and context-specific. 
 
2.2 Definition and Scope of Radicalisation  
 
Since the late 1960s, researchers have attempted to examine the socio-psychological concept of 
radicalisation by studying the phenomenon of terrorism. The definition of radicalisation commonly uses 
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terrorism as a key construct and as such, terrorists are understood as individuals at the end of the 
radicalisation process (Borum, 2011, 9-10). Notably, researchers in terrorism studies have described 
the causes and pathways (process) leading to terrorism (action), which can be construed as 
radicalisation pathways. Since radicalisation is a nascent field, this thesis discusses the state of 
research on radicalisation by drawing upon, critically reviewing and making reference to terrorism 
research and the small but growing body of literature on radicalisation. Although radicalisation has 
been subjected to scientific studies, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of the concept 
among academics and policymakers (Borum, 2011, 15).  
 
In view of the sensationalism and relativism surrounding radicalisation, some terrorism scholars 
(Horgan, 2011) have raised concerns about its utility and cast it as redundant. McCauley and 
Moskalenko (2017, 211) have compellingly argued that its expunction will naturally generate the need 
for an alternative concept that illuminates the process by which individuals embrace views that 
legitimise the use of violence. The introduction of an alternative concept is therefore likely to attract 
similar pitfalls and criticisms should myopic reconstructions prevail. It is within this framework that this 
thesis attempts to unpack and critically review the concept of radicalisation. 
 
For the most part, the conflation of the concept of radicalisation with Islamism or ‘Islamic terrorism’ is 
widespread. This conflation can be partly attributed to the sensationalisation of ‘Islamic terrorism’ that 
has moulded public perceptions as the thesis demonstrates, in addition to conceptual relativism. 
Schmid (2013, 18-19) maintains that a re-examination of the concept of radicalisation requires a 
balance between complexity and abstraction, and its appreciation as a political construct that gained 
prominence in the emergence of Salafist jihadism. The thesis acknowledges these pitfalls in its 
application of the concept and is equally sensitive to the fact that the benign treatment of radicalisation 
as cognate with Islam feeds the bigotry that sustains the vicious loop of radicalisation. This thesis has 
therefore adopted a comprehensive definition of radicalisation advanced by Alex Schmid (2011, 678-
9) as:  
 
…an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal 
practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests 
are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in 
confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and 
coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form 
of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an 
ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or 
extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of 
political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as 




Radicalisation as conceived above denotes both violent and nonviolent radicalisation. This thesis 
therefore consistently cites (non)violent radicalisation but does not aim to establish causality. In the 
study, nonviolent radicalisation represents the development of extremist ideologies and beliefs while 
violent radicalisation denotes action pathways or engagement in terrorism and other forms of political 
violence (Borum, 2011, 9). Beyond armed organised groups, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) have 
examined mechanisms that enkindle radicalisation of public opinion. Della Porta (2009) has advanced 
radicalisation as relational in the study of radicalisation of public discourse while Schmid (2013) 
contends that other actors including the government and the public can also be (non)violently 
radicalised. As such, besides armed groups, the thesis subsumes other actors vulnerable to 
radicalisation in its constructivist approach. Any allusions to nonviolent radicalisation is a critical and 
conceptual or theoretical undertaking supported by authoritative peer reviewed secondary literature. 
The justification for the application of the concept of radicalisation in this thesis is threefold. First, it is 
relatable because of its widespread (mis)use and construction in public discourse. Secondly, the 
application of the concept similarly presents an opportunity for critical examination. Thirdly, the 
securitisation of migration significantly revolves around the conflation of migration with terrorism i.e. 
violent radicalisation. 
 
2.3 Beyond Van Gennep’s Liminal Ritualisation 
 
Human life is not possible and worth living without some degree of stability, meaning and sense of home. Liminality is 
indeed a source of renewal, a restoration of meaning and the pouring of fresh wine into an old bottle... Liminality is a 
source of excitement and variety and a shakeup from the dull routine of everyday life, but nothing is more boring than the 
permanent state of liminality, where even the hope of escaping the routine is lost. Individuals are forced to invent more 
and more sophisticated and ultimately perverse forms of entertainment in a mad search after experience, in the wish to 
surpass in excitement the boredom of the hectic existence in a permanent state of liminality. (Arpad Szakolczai, 2000, 
226) 
 
The indeterminate confinement of refugees as a measure of securitisation breeds protracted refugee 
situations. Refugees in these situations often find themselves trapped in protracted limbo, a state of 
uncertainty typically recognised as the liminal state. The concept of liminality as applied in this thesis 
has been inspired by the pioneering works of Van Gennep’s monograph, ‘The Rites of Passage’ 
(1960). He contends that the universe is characterised by cycles of activity, inactivity and transitions 
that often have repercussions on human lives. There are three rites of passage performed at different 
stages in life, namely, pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal rites. The first phase, pre-liminal rites are 
‘rites of separation from a previous world’ that involve delinking from a previous social structure to 
another. This is exemplified by those rites performed in funeral ceremonies or a shift from a state of 
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peace to war (Van Gennep, 1960, 10-21) as illustrated by the conflagration of civil war in Somalia in 
1991.  
 
The second phase of transition rites is limen, meaning threshold. This liminal phase involves rites 
‘executed during the transitional stage’ as exemplified in pregnancy, betrothal, initiation, remarriage or 
age-group passage. During this phase, liminaries experience ambiguity, a situation akin to social limbo 
in a refugee camp. The third rite of passage, post-liminal rites, relate to ‘ceremonies of reaggregation 
or incorporation into the new world’ such as marriage. In this phase, liminaries may assume an 
enhanced status when they progress towards new, fairly stable social positions (Van Gennep, 1960, 
20-33; Turner, 1982, 24). The thesis examines the extent to which this happens and implications of 
the ‘liminal’ on post-camp experiences. It must be remembered that while the overarching concept is 
liminality, the thesis has examined the continuum of pre- and post- liminal experiences.  
 
Some scholars have further developed the concept of liminality beyond the ethnographic context of 
tribal ritual passages. Notably, Turner (1969, 104) highlights the ambiguity that is emblematic of the 
liminal state and describes liminal entities as ‘neither here nor there; are betwixt and between the 
positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and the ceremonial’. The transitional 
qualities of betwixt and between that previously defined tribal social order have metamorphosed into 
an ‘institutionalised liminal state’ comparable to a ‘permanent condition’ (p. 116). Periods of change 
are often accompanied by an interval, however brief, ‘when the past is momentarily negated, 
suspended or abrogated and the future has not yet begun. An instance of pure potentiality when 
everything as it were, trembles in the balance’ (Turner, 1982, 44). More importantly, liminality 
subsumes some carry-over attributes that predate and overrun this phase.  
 
It therefore follows that in PRS, the liminal state is conceived not within the camp. Liminality emerges 
from the prevailing conflictual structures in the homelands, is anchored by the protection system, and 
may subsist beyond the formal asylum system (Van Gennep, 1960, 10-21). The fluidity and inter-
connectedness of the present, past and even ‘post-liminal’ quotidian refugee experiences in time and 
space is therefore noteworthy. Similarly, inter-contextuality and the inter-generational memorialisation 
of grievances further shapes refugee world views and their adaptive capacity beyond the camp 
environment. Certain stressors tend to evoke memories that create intervals of attachment, 
detachment and reattachment of the present with the past and future. Thus, the acknowledgement of 
the past, whether consciously or unconsciously demonstrates that the past is never absolutely negated 
as reflected in the account below: 
 
We had to escape from Somali militants including the Kenyan police. Our struggle started when the civil war 
begun and it continued when we came to the camp in Kenya. We had not grieved, had no food… and I felt like 
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the world had just started to end but I did not know where exactly I was going. It was a really traumatising 
journey. I tried to forget about it and sometimes I still do remember but don’t want to think about it. (Mohammed 
– Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017)  
 
The account above also demonstrates that liminality is far from static, singular and linear in nature. 
Transitions between phases particularly in a volatile asylum seeker context are ordinarily continuous, 
recurrent, protracted erratic and circular. Turner (1969, 166-167) further observes that Van Gennep 
not only emphasises the structural2 aspects of passage but also explores the dimensions of space and 
time. This validates the research findings and the resulting conceptualisation of the spatial, temporal 
and material dimensions of liminality. Further, Turner formulates liminality as both phase and state. If 
liminality is considered a time and place to retreat from the norms of social action, it can be regarded 
as a period of introspection on the fundamental values of a culture (Turner ,1969, 166-167).  
 
2.3.1 Situating the Liminal within the Asylum System 
 
Recent scholarship has expanded and applied the concept of liminality within a finite immigration 
system. Corfield (2008) explores the liminal state and elaborates the fluidity of physical and existential 
movements (p. 6-7) as asylum seekers reconceive their existence in the immigration process. While 
illuminating, the scope is reductionist in its encapsulation of asylum seeker experiences within a 
terminable immigration system. Turner (1982, 25) submits that the transition from one phase to another 
in asylum seeker contexts is often accompanied with spatial or geographical mobility. This spatial 
movement may involve an arduous journey across national borders prior to finding permanent 
settlement. Suffice it to say that Corfield’s focus is on a stage already transitioned within the 
immigration process. Be that as it may, Corfield adeptly portrays the liminal state as structured yet 
complementarily messy and amorphous when movement and complexity within a particular system 
are considered (p. 18). Kits (2005, 3) further suggests that limbo commences at the point of asylum 
seeking but the evidence emerging from this research suggests otherwise. Unlike studies that are 
focused on the post-flight stage, there is an overlap in pre-mid-post liminal phases of migration. This 
also reveals the amorphous nature of the migration process within an unstable structure as chronicled 
by Corfield (2008).  
 
                                                          
2 By this, Turner (1969, 113; 166-7; 668-9) implies ‘social structure’ as distinguished by the ‘arrangement of specialised 
mutually dependent institutions and the institutional organisation of positions and/or of actors which they imply’. Structure 
is entrenched in the past and is sustained into the future by law, customs and language. It involves the enduring 
institutionalisation of groups and relationships through the evolution of human interactions and coping. Structure 
connotes the ‘superorganic’ organisation of inter-related components that undergo gradual transformation. Bigger 
(2010,3) adds that structure is the status quo of social and power structure as depicted in top-down authority systems. 
Thus, substructure as applied in the context of liminality relates with and anchors other structures, a slight departure from 




Liminality represents the synergy between subjective and collective experiences that results from the 
interaction of a multiplicity of factors that sustain the camp’s smothering existence. Some scholars 
(Wendling, 2008, 2; Szakolczai, 2000, 220) have distinguished between temporary and permanent 
liminality. In permanent liminality, pre-mid-post liminal phases become frozen (Szakolzcai, 2000, 220) 
and is ‘pure danger’ (Thomassen, 2012, 30). This thesis further models the liminal state typical of PRS 
as indeterminate and evolutionary. It is timeless in as far as episodes of transient liminality punctuate 
permanent liminality, and is similarly spatially reproducible. Some refugees more succinctly capture 
this liminal spectrum, the struggles involved and possible consequences: 
 
We were seven in the family with mom and dad and we all scattered to different places. My brother and I fled 
to Kenya. We registered so fast and we were waiting and waiting, waiting and waiting. And now you can imagine 
it has been many years now. I started working as a community worker so that I could get something to add on 
to what I got from the UN. My brother who was under-age at the time but under my mandate managed to go to 
Canada in 2012. (Zainab – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
There are people who even try to go to Uganda, South Africa or even Somalia. Going back to Somalia with no 
exposure and maybe the person did not go to school, options become very narrow as you think about solving 
your problems. Someone becomes vulnerable and becomes an Al Shabaab member. (Mohammed – Refugee, 
embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Liminality is therefore a relevant concept to examine the situation of asylum seekers (Corfield, 2008, 
12) and particularly, protracted refugee situations. As a matter of fact, other theorists (Malkki, 1995b; 
Becker et al., 2000; Harrell-Bond, 2002; Agier, 2002, Coker, 2004; Gross, 2004; Turner, 2005, 2006; 
Jaji 2011; Turner, 2015) have applied the concept of liminality in refugee contexts. Crapanzano (1985, 
43-46) chronicles the concept of ‘waiting’ for something or anything to happen’ among white South 
Africans. Waiting is experienced in time, anticipation, uncertainty, paralysis and the likelihood of 
possibility. Similarly, analogies can be drawn with the experiences of Somali refugees ‘waiting’ in limbo 
for elusive durable solutions. 
 
2.4 The Epistemological Framework of Poststructuralism  
 
The confounding complexion of poststructuralism conveys the duality of its existence and non-
existence. Poststructuralism exists as a retrospective epistemological framework that has for the most 
part characterised a strand of ‘French’ philosophy. While no group of scholars or philosophers identify 
with poststructuralism, the field of politics has generated influential thinkers (Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Felix Guattari, Gillles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Fredric 
Jameson, Gayatri Spivak, Jonathan Culler among others) that are nonetheless classified as 
poststructuralists (Dillet, 2017, 516-7). While succeeding sections discuss the most relevant 
expressions of poststructuralist thought that the thesis applies, the main philosophical concepts 
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underpinning poststructuralism include Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s power and knowledge, 
Butler’s performativity, Spivak’s marginality, Deleuze’s desire, and Barad’s intra-action (Moon, 2016, 
35). 
 
Poststructuralism disrupts conventional research norms where realities, meanings and symbols exist 
to be discovered. Conversely, it theorises individuals’ experiences within the social, cultural, economic 
and political contexts in time and space. These theories interrogate experiences grounded on 
subjective discursive construction and at the same time re-examine and restructure experiences. 
Dominant conceptual frames underpinning poststructuralism include subject and subjectivity, 
language and discourse, deconstruction, reality, memory, power and representation. More importantly, 
poststructuralist theories underscore the continuous construction of multiple realities produced for a 
specific audience in a specific context. The disruption of predetermined realities facilitates the 
transition from linear to multiple realities and corresponding interpretations. As such, poststructuralism 
essentially challenges the singularity of reality. It recognises that qualitative research can neither 
capture nor objectively and accurately represent social reality due to the limited capacity of language 
and other media. Poststructuralists challenge the notion of memory and the simplistic retrievability of 
facts from memory storage (Moon, 2016, 36-7). Memory is perceived as meaning-making through the 
‘reinterpretation of the past in the present’ (Smith and Watson, 2010, 22) and is also contextual, spatial 
and temporal, not neutral but political (Moon, 2016, 37) as this thesis demonstrates in the 
memorialisation of grievances. 
 
The concept of power is an important element of poststructuralist thought. The manifestations and 
dispersal of power in the intersubjective construction of radicalisation in the context of migration is 
therefore important. The concept of power is polysemic, contextual and contested therefore the pursuit 
of a single concept is illusory. The conception of power may lead to the reproduction, reinforcement, 
the challenge or subversion of power structures and relations. Power therefore is the ability or capacity 
of an actor, which may or may not be exercised, to positively or negatively bring about significant 
effects by advancing own interests and influencing the interests of others. Power is the ability to make, 
receive or resist change and is therefore a dispositional concept that determines potentiality and not 
actuality (Lukes, 2005, 61-9). Power is a capacity and not the vehicle or exercise of that capability 
because power can be exerted through the satisfaction and advancement of others’ interests. The 
subjects of power are indoctrinated with ideals and inspired to consent or adapt to domination in 
coercive and noncoercive situations. Within the domain of power, interests can be conspicuous but 
also imperceptible and unarticulated (pp. 12-26). 
 
Poststructuralist theories complicate the meanings of experience in their political interpretation of 
experience within historical and social contexts. In poststructuralist posturing, experience is politically-
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laden and created through the interpretation of language. The poststructuralist exploration of complex 
experiential meanings in this thesis is partly supported by the four salient concept that Moons (2016) 
advances. These include ‘(1) experience as discursively constructed (2) experience as non-linear 
development (3) experience as performative acts (4) experience as (im)possible representation’ (p. 
46).  
 
First, is the notion of experience as discursively constructed. Experience is viewed as dynamic rather 
than fixed. Neutral knowledge is illusory and as such, power and knowledge are both the source and 
outcome of experience. Moreover, legitimate experience is not informed by stable truth but is politically 
established by power dynamics within specific communities. Discourse therefore determines the 
speakers’ thoughts and the circumstances of the circulation of ‘truths’. The regimes of truth and 
intersubjectivity construct the subject and experience, and are also spatial and temporal, situated 
within historical, social, economic, political and cultural contexts. The political neutrality and singularity 
of experience is fallacious and so is a single objective truth (Moons, 2016, 47-9). The thesis additionally 
examines the technological context and argues that while there may be multiple ways to arrive at the 
‘truth’, the capacity for research to arrive at a single indisputable ‘truth’ is limited if not impossible. It is 
for this reason that the generation of knowledge is a sustained process towards the excavation of the 
single unattainable ‘objective truth’. At the same time, deconstructivism and the groundswell of infinite 
relative truths inadvertently provide a framework for the advancement of pseudoscience and 
conspiracy theories as illustrated by some aspects of New Ageism that limit discernment.3  
 
The second formulation of meaning is experience as non-linear development. The complexity of time 
is not characterised by homogeneity or linearity but by heterogeneity (Moons, 2016, 50-51). The 
Derridian concept of ‘diffarence’ addresses the spatial and temporal dimensions of meaning and 
alludes to meanings as ‘deferred’ and ‘different’. This liminal concept belongs to neither speech nor 
writing but occupies the space between them, and complicates the chronological notion of time 
(Derrida, 1982, 21). Incidentally, Einstein’s theory of time relativity (1961) represents time as an illusion 
that capsulises the past, present and future in a single existence and as such, everything happens 
simultaneously. Better yet, in his ‘No Boundary Proposal’ Stephen Hawking (1988) speaks of 
imaginary time and propounds, ‘The universe would be completely self-contained and not affected by 
anything outside itself. It would neither be created nor destroyed. It would just BE’. As such, this thesis 
explores liminality in the temporal as well as spatial and material dimensions. 
 
                                                          




The third conception of meaning in poststructuralist theorising is experience as performative acts. 
Poststructuralism challenges the ownership of individual experience and views the subject as 
constituted by performative acts. Performative acts are ‘repetitively constructed, produced and 
sustained by social norms’. The doer’s experiences are involuntary and dictated by a set of social 
norms and are as such the effects of discourse in a specific time and space. Experience as 
performative acts explores the discursive and social construction of the subject and experience 
through the iteration of social norms (Moons, 2016, 52-54). Conversely, the thesis acknowledges 
individual experience in meaning-making, examines performative acts and conceives the individual as 
an important agent in the design of social norms. 
 
The fourth element of poststructuralist theorising is experience as (im)possible representation (Moons, 
2016, 52-54). Poststructuralists challenge all aspects of presence in the spheres of subject, identities 
and structures. Representation is not the reflection of a presence but various forms of presence, for 
example, class identities are the effect of representation. The question of representation has been 
contentious among poststructuralists and particularly the role, nature and extent of representation. 
There is agreement on representation as laden with failure, yet disagreement persists on 
representation as constitutive, and the approach to hierarchy and violence as elements of 
representation (Thomassen, 2017, 539-40). Of significance is exclusion as constitutive of 
representation and the delivery of justice to the excluded ‘other’. To illustrate, the exclusion of ‘the 
mad’ from the discourse of reason effectively qualifies their representation within that discourse as no 
more than those devoid of reason. At best, they are positioned to speak as ‘the mad’ in that discourse. 
The excluded ‘other’ therefore cannot project their voice in the discourse from which they are excluded 
(p. 543). Whereas the thesis explores representation of refugees by several actors, the constitution 
and appropriation of voice and agency within the humanitarian architecture is an important aspect that 
the research examines. In so doing, it exposes the exclusive, hierarchical and silencing effects of 
representation and potential vulnerabilities that go in tandem with voice, inclusion and equality (p. 543-
44). 
 
The past two decades have seen the proliferation of poststructuralist scholarship on autonomy and 
hegemony (Dyer-Witheford, 2007; Kioupkiolis, 2010; Bratich, 2011; Prentoulis & Thomassen, 2014; 
Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2014; Fenton, 2016) as well as activism. This has been more conspicuous 
at the political level particularly as it pertains to organisation, strategy and the role of party and state. 
Most prominent is the emergence of left and right-wing movements in the West. Theorists of autonomy 
(Negri & Hardt) advocate for the organisation of ‘networks of networks’ in the struggle against Empire. 
These cross-network relationships are centre-neutral, autonomous and horizontal, and broadly oppose 
representation within state and representative institutions. The theorists of hegemony (Mouffe & 
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Laclau) stress the significance of the articulation of different identities and struggles through an empty 
signifier or the creation of a common identity, a socio-cultural hegemony that transforms into State. 
They assert the importance of engagement with the state, party and other representative institutions 
(Thomassen, 2017, 546-47). Significantly, the tenants of autonomy contend that (Hardt and Negri, 
2012, 29) representation does not grant but strips voice. Representation, even when effective, creates 
a hierarchy between the rulers and the ruled and therefore hampers democracy. The thesis further 
explores the temper of populism in the securitisation of migration within the autonomous framework.  
 
In poststructuralist thought, the use of narratives and multiple methods are not necessarily an accurate 
representation of truth and a subject’s experience. This emanates from the crisis that language 
presents since it does not reflect reality or experience. The full representation of experience through 
methodological innovation and multiple representations of data can never capture reality due to the 
incomplete, non-linear and discursive construction of experience. They however present the 
opportunity to examine assumptions on self-other, experiences and their representations. Similarly, 
increased consciousness and novel perspectives do not result in improved data collection or analysis. 
This is especially so when ‘best’ practice in research conduct that include ‘objective’ coding, the 
reduction of subjectivity, and interrater reliability and triangulation are considered. This crisis of 
representation therefore diminishes the advancement of myths that validate research methodology 
with multiple representations. The thesis is firmly grounded on this rationale and the nature of scientific 
knowledge as dynamic, unpredictable and imperfect but also acknowledges the propensity for 
mythologisation. The normalisation of experience leads to the misrepresentation of the subject who 
does not conform to a set of social norms. The unattainable representation of experience therefore 
presents the opportunity for the examination of the discursive constructs of identity through power and 
knowledge, and the political impact of such representation (Moons, 2016, 54-56). This thesis however 
goes beyond discursive constructs in its ‘poststructuralist theoretical practice’ posturing. To conclude, 
poststructuralism has gained vitality in the era of populism, ‘post-truth’ politics, migration ‘crises’, 
(Dillet, 2017, 516-17), terrorism and technological advances. While poststructuralism has been 
relegated to a nihilist past in some disciplines (p. 519), this thesis demonstrates the applicability of 
some relevant constitutive elements in a dynamic global order.   
  
2.5 Securitisation Theory 
 
The theoretical foundation of the thesis is securitisation, nestled within the poststructuralist framework. 
In poststructuralism, securitisation is not an actor-centric, linear, autonomous and intentional process 
as proposed by the Copenhagen School. It is the gradual, dynamic and intersubjective (re)construction 
of reality and representation of an existential threat. Day-to-day engagement with international politics 
is premised on ‘abstraction, representation and interpretation’ (Campbell, 2007, 204). Therefore, the 
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Foucauldian (1984, 108-38) world does not dispense a blueprint of utterances, categories or theories. 
Agency or identity are effects to be discovered, interpreted and not assumed. Foucault similarly 
challenges the dichotomy of narrative and reality and conceives a mutually constitutive construction of 
subject and object. This underscores the nexus between power and knowledge and further links 
securitisation to poststructuralist thought. This link advances securitisation as the collaborative 
formulation of policies by identities that rely on narratives they can relate to and legitimise. 
Policymaking is a process in which the state and other actors’ response to an external reality is not 
objective but guided by ideas and identities. References to identities represent and legitimise policies 
while identities are further reconstructed through policy formulation. The business of politics therefore 
becomes (historically and technologically) examining how some representations of reality develop into 
dominant discourse at the expense of other representations. In this context, poststructuralist discourse 
is viewed as a system of important structures that construct reality (Wilhelmsen, 2017, 167-170). The 
Derridian (1981) conception of language as a system of differential signs and meaning is established 
through binary opposition. This means that the juxtaposition of two elements leads to the appreciation 
of one over its opposite thereby sustaining unequal power relations. This thesis therefore grounds 
speech-acts within the broader societal structures that they frame and vice versa. 
 
Securitisation theory was originally developed by Waever (1995) and systematised by Buzan et al. 
(1998) as part of broader research work at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, commonly 
known as the Copenhagen School (CS). The theory attempts to reconcile the debate between the 
objective (realism) and subjective (social constructivism) perceptions of threat in its advancement of 
speech-act, grounded in philosophy (Hough, 2008, 8). Securitisation primarily examines the 
emergence, evolution and dissolution of problems. As an offshoot of social constructivism, 
securitisation theory views language not as independent of but as constitutive of the social reality it 
constructs (Balzacq, 2009, 56). To begin with, the CS locates securitisation in language theory and 
grounds security studies on Austin’s conceptualisation of speech-act. This school contends that 
language constitutes security since an utterance is an act. By uttering ‘security’, a state actor effectively 
shifts an issue into a specific area and claims the right to use extraordinary measures to intervene 
(Waever, 1995, 55). At the same time, securitisation is the outcome of unexpressed assumptions 
based on the symbolic power of security (Balzacq, 2009, 59-60). Speech-act theory was introduced 
by Austin (1962) and further developed by Searle (1977). The idea underpinning the concept of 
speech-act is that utterances imply or provoke action. Statements ‘do things’ and are therefore 
performative utterances. Utterances perform three levels of action (Austin, 1962, 95, 107; Searle 1977, 




1. Locutionary – can be subdivided into utterance and propositional acts. In utterance, a sound 
is made or something is expressed with no meaning. Propositions make references that are 
suggestive, meaningful and persuasive. 
2. Illocutionary – is the performance of an action with a specific utterance that has some level of 
force termed as illocutionary force. It encompasses performative utterances in which the 
agency of ‘speech-act’ is predicated. 
3. Perlocutionary – induce a change in behaviour by persuasion, inspiration and deterrence. 
Their consequential effects evoke thoughts, feelings, beliefs and action in the audience.  
 
The relationship between the speaker and listener in illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is important 
since the listener’s interpretation may override the speaker’s intentions. This modifies the cognitive 
configuration of their shared world (Nordquist, 2017). In considering the consequential effects of 
perlocutionary acts in particular, this thesis conceives cognitive-speech-act that denotes additional 
dimensions to speech-acts that include affective and paralinguistic devices as discussed in upcoming 
sections. Indeed, there is some evidence on social cognition, a sub-component of social psychology 
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006; Marchant and Frith, 2009; Suchy and Holdnack, 2013) that 
suggests that underlying mental patterns may influence human behaviour and social interactions. As 
such, humans understand, process and interpret their interactions with others through verbal and non-
verbal communication (Morgan et al., 2017, 1). Work on social cognition has generated a solid body 
of knowledge that has increased understanding on stereotyping, peer pressure and group identity and 
behaviour (Frith & Frith, 2012, 289-303). 
 
To resume, speech-acts shape world views and establish self-identity in relation to others. Accordingly, 
speech-acts facilitate the understanding of the dialectic movement between social relations with other 
actors, and their spatial and temporal collective experiences. They are concerned with meaningfully 
employed forms of expression that include monologues, stories, remarks, speeches, arguments and 
conversations.  Speech-acts occur within a socio-political framework suffused in values, beliefs and 
categories (Corfield, 2008, 20-30). They encompass not just the what but also the why and how of 
contextual meaning-making involved in negotiating and coping with experiences (Prince, 1982, 5; 
Linde, 1993, 3). Suffice it to say that speech-acts represent a dialectic between social relations and 
context (Green, 1969, 112; See also Arendt, 1958, 95). However, other scholars (Balzacq, 2009; 
Derrida, 1977) contend that the significance of performatives is neither in the context of an utterance 
nor the speaker’s intention but in their reproducibility (cascade). It can be argued that reproducibility is 
inconceivable in the absence of context and intention and as such, the thesis has integrated the three 
elements. Arendt (1958, 176-177) suggests that humans insert themselves and experience their world 
through word and action. This insertion may be ignited by attraction to the company of others that they 
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intend to identify with. However, this new company never primes this insertion that is stimulated by the 
search for ‘beginning something new on our own initiative’ as is the case with forced migrants.  
 
Beyond social action, recent literature has expanded the scope of speech-act to include the notion of 
silence and the role of audience. Some scholars have underscored the salience of unarticulated 
assumptions (Balzacq, 2009, 60) and silence (Daniel, 1996, 133, 244-246), particularly in situations 
where the articulation of traumatic refugee memories is challenging. As a result, silence can be more 
powerful than speech-acts (Daniel, 1996, 121) and may be an expression of underlying affects. It is in 
the same token that speech can be manipulated to conceal affectivity and intentions in the form of 
spoken silence as elaborated in chapters seven and eight. It is for this reason that the thesis has also 
explored the role of the audience and the domain of the ‘unspoken’ in impression management by 
highlighting personal or cognitive conflict, and the public-private representations of various actors 
arising from cognitive dissonance. This is also consistent with Hansen’s (2000, 306) assertion that 
security as speech-act is ‘deeply implicated in the production of silence’ in its projection of dominant 
voices (McDonald, 2008, 19). The original CS imbibed the realism baggage of the notion of the state 
as the legitimate speech-ist. However, this state-centric approach was criticised for its biased and 
limiting formulation of securitisation as militarisation, thereby neglecting other forms of security (Hough, 
2008, 17-19). This thesis broadens the scope of agents and demonstrates their import in mediating 
the restriction placed on the theory. In fact, the CS currently integrates collectives of ‘societal identities’’ 
in its conception of referent objects (Buzan et al., 1998, 99-100). 
 
The social construction of threat is central to the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitisation. A 
securitising speech-act embeds the rhetorical connotations of survival, urgency, threat and defence in 
a milieu of war and history. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School’s framing of securitisation as a 
speech-act observes four elements and discursive parameters. First is the securitising agent, which is 
the entity that makes an utterance. Second is the existential threat, which is an object or ideal 
connected to a risk. This invites claims of an entity or issue as posing an existential threat. Third is the 
referent object or ideal that has been identified as a target of threat and protection. This results in 
demands for extraordinary measures to counter the threat. Fourth is the audience, which constitutes 
the target of the securitisation act, from whom the acceptance of an issue as a threat is signalled. This 
prompts public persuasion to justify the violation of existing rules to counter the threat. The label of 
‘‘security threat’ leads to the dramatisation and prioritisation of the issue (Buzan et al., 1998, 36; van 
Munster, 2012) that may in turn lead to moral (audience) or formal (policy) support (Balzacq, 2005, 
185). Security therefore does not represent an objective reality but is the agency that bureaucrats 
exercise to counter insecurity through the use of extraordinary measures (p. 181). It therefore follows 
that the framing of an issue around extraordinary measures, survival and urgency shifts the problem 
36 
 
from the realm of normal politics to securitisation. Ultimately, securitisation is the outcome of the 
integration of politics of threat design and threat management (Balzacq, 2016, 495).  
 
The audience primarily provides moral support and grants the securitising actor a formal mandate 
without which the resulting policy would not eventuate (Balzacq et al., 2016, 500). This can be 
problematised further in linking with the goal of securitisation. Besides policy formulation and 
implementation, a securitising move has the potential for other (un)intended effects. An example is the 
expansion of the audience (support) base that may or may not project the securitising agent to power. 
Secondly, an increased or significant audience base can be leveraged to maintain the status quo if the 
preferred extraordinary policy measure is unattainable and at the same time safeguards against a 
contrastingly hostile policy. It compels inaction, which may be interpreted as an extraordinary policy 
position by the opposing side. Another (un)intended consequence may be a change in perceptions 
and attitude that over time inculcates a nationalistic and protectionist ethos. This presents the question 
as to what else constitutes extraordinary measures and goals besides increased budgetary allocations, 
military interventions, suspension of civil liberties, information suppression and change of regime as 
explicated by Balzacq et al. (2016, 518). Could extraordinary measures include the agency exercised 
by other actors for example the distribution of hate posters and leaflets, the dissemination of online 
hate speech and terrorism programmes if such acts do not constitute the norm? Since recent 
scholarship supports the expansion of securitising agents beyond the political elite, it is only logical 
that extraordinary measures include the practices of other actors. However, that debate is presently 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Securitisation embeds additional constitutive elements and assumptions that similarly present 
normative and analytical limitations. The role of contextual factors as ‘facilitating conditions’ is an 
important element of securitisation (Waever, 2000, 252-53). This dimension of securitisation and more 
so historical experiences have been largely neglected (McDonald, 2008, 15). Yet to attract an audience 
or achieve perlocutionary effect, the utterances of a securitising agent must resonate with the 
prevailing context (Balzacq, 2005, 182). Identification therefore accounts for the power of security 
utterances to influence cognitive and behavioural change (p. 184). The focus on dramatic moments in 
which an issue becomes securitised is problematic because threats evolve over time and can become 
institutionalised without distinctive moments of intervention and the flawed dichotomy between security 
and politics (p. 24). The role of audience and the inter-subjective construction of security have similarly 
been under-theorised or compartmentalised as a result of the Austinian focus on the speaker 
utterances. Not to mention that audiences are inclined not only to endorse but also contest securitising 
speech-acts. This communion in turn constructs or produces audience communities (pp. 15-17) and 
delineates in-out groups. Overall, securitisation is a highly relational (Balzacq, 2005, 187), intentional 
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and strategic action (Waever, 1995, 63) that justifies the use of extraordinary measures and legitimises 
the use of force (Buzan et al., 1998, 21), and pervades different areas of social life (Balzacq, 2016, 
496) beyond the political realm. 
  
The securitisation framework as conceived by the CS represents the nature of an act as threats to 
security. The representation of security as danger and threat configures security as intrinsically 
negative and reactionary (McDonald, 2008, 2). Further, the securitisation framework has shifted from 
speech-acts as productive of security to the dynamic of inter-subjective construction of security 
(McDonald, 2008). Waever (1995, 56-57) conceives security as the opposite of politics that invites 
open dialogue. Meanwhile, von Lucke et al. (2014) have proposed the examination of securitisation 
under the rubric of risk-based securitisation, which views threats as more diffuse, uncertain and less 
imminent. They observe that issues can either be constructed as immediate existential threats to the 
survival of an entire population that demands urgent action (security), or as potential threats that may 
progressively undermine the human way of life thus require precautionary measures (risk) (p. 861). 
 
The normative advancement of securitisation as a failure of normal politics permeates the works of 
Buzan et al. (1998, 29) and Waever (2000, 253; 2004) while McDonald (2008) considers 
desecuritisation a normative assertion. While the role of intentionality, designated as ‘highly intentional 
strategic action’ is important, interpretation may supersede intentionality. Further, the communication 
of visual images by the media for example the 9/11 visuals while not deliberately securitising 
(McDonald, 2008, 11) may have unintended (securitising) effects. The same arguments and dilemmas 
apply for scholars of securitisation. Perhaps, it is within this context that Balzacq (2005, 172) contests 
the underlying assumption that securitisation is unachievable in the absence of the CS methodised 
benchmarks. Besides the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the power of the 
speaker and listener are also important. In departing from the limitations of state-centrism and the 
confusion of what constitutes ‘normal politics’ the thesis adopts the definition of securitisation as 
proposed by Balzacq (2016, 495) as: 
 
an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, 
analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt 
an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about 
the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and 
actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a 
customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it. 
 
Securitisation of immigration is therefore the product of successful speech-acts of political elites and 
their mobilising power for and against certain groups of people. It similarly emerges from specific 
bureaucratic practices as risk assessment, population profiling, proactive preparation and is 
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accompanied by an ethos of secrecy in the management of fear (Bigo, 2000, 156-71). This thesis 
further conceives securitisation not purely as a discursive entreprise but also as action whereby 
discourse elicits practice and certain practices advance discourse within a network of actors in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship. The research further investigates the interplay between discursive 
and nondiscursive symbols within specific contexts. Secondly, the thesis expands the traditional 
mainstay of securitisation beyond dominant political elites and highlights intersubjectivity. Thirdly, the 
context has been expounded beyond the immediate impending threat to subsume broader deep-
seated structural conditions that interact with the camp. Fourthly, while CS prescribes textualism for 
security analysis, the research has also incorporated the Derridian approach in examining silence, 
gesture and images (Balzacq, 2009, 66) and at the same time investigates the interplay between 
language and context. The thesis has essentially examined the constitutive elements of pragmatic act 
(Balzacq, 2009, 64) that includes agents, action and context and additionally explores potential 
vulnerabilities. In this sociological model, securitisation does not provoke exceptional measures for the 
most part (p. 63) but facilitates constructivism. Security utterances therefore function as commands 
for the construction and interpretation of situations in public and private (Violi, 2001, 187). The 
operational salience of migration and radicalisation lies in the fact that they are the focus of public 
debate and construction, including targets of public policy. 
 
2.5.1 Identity and Ideology in the Context of Securitisation 
 
The utility of identity and ideology in the construction of meaning and ultimately in the advancement of 
securitisation is primal. An examination of the construction of security must focus on historical, 
technological and other contextual factors, including identity constructs (McDonald, 2008, 17) that 
underpin ideological orientation. The thesis examines the concepts of identity and ideology beyond 
the migrant threat, to subsume other actors in the theatre of radicalisation of public discourse. The 
instrumentality of the designation of a threat is premised on the contextualised meaning-making of 
identity, values and measures that can be tolerated to protect self-preferred identities (pp. 26-27). The 
enduring presence of another ‘other’, including a radical ‘other’ inhibits the actualisation of the self. 
Any form of transformation, difference or impurity is typically perceived as posing a threat to identity 
(Gad, 2012, 394). What is more, the ‘other’ becomes a security threat or is securitised, and is also 
identified as an existential threat to self-identity. Securitisation therefore constitutes an existential 
threat to, and is also symbolic of the disintegration of identity (Waever, 1997, 311-29). 
 
The concept of relational identity submits that identity is continuously remodelled and is as such fluid 
(Corfield, 2008, 30-32). Additionally, identity construction as the projection of the self towards others 
and vice versa, is the product of the interplay between an individual and social structures (Beech, 
2011, 286) that may in turn influence ideological construction. The autonomy of the true self from the 
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social context prompts identity to generate anxiety and pose a risk to freedom and vice versa. The self 
is simultaneously free and constructed since social norms shape the will and the self has the freedom 
to interpret and alter existing norms (Kaul, 2013, 488-89). As such, individuals possess multiple 
identities that comprise the self that are hierarchically ordered into a structured system (Arena and 
Arrigo, 2005, 498; Louis, 2009, 440). By the same token, freedom permits the hybridisation of identity 
such as citizen refugees, civilian refugees and even armed refugees (Kaul, 2013, 489) the Far-right, 
‘centrists’ and the Far-left. Subsequently, identity is not strictly individualised and people project 
‘multiple, inconsistent, rapidly shifting self-representations that are context specific’ (Ewing, 1990, 251; 
Louis, 2009, 440; Ybema et al., 2015, 24). This aspect of relational identity implies that individuals can 
project facets of themselves different from their inner thoughts and feelings of what constitutes their 
self-perception. The reconstruction of identity alongside the adjustment of the hierarchy of needs is 
also a reflection of the negotiation for survival (Corfield, 2008, 31-33). 
 
In highly polarised or conflictual environments, as is currently the case with migrant and populist 
pockets in the West, the aggrieved constituency or sympathisers may never participate in violence. 
This is not because of their conscious rejection of the idea as harmful or costly. On the contrary, their 
group norms and identity unconsciously reject the behaviour as inconceivable and inappropriate 
(Louis, 2009, 438). That said, a crisis can precipitate an opening that upsets previously held beliefs 
and make an individual amenable to alternative views (Wiktorowicz, ND, 7). In considering the costs 
and benefits that are socially learned in conformity with group identities, an individual’s self-destructive 
behaviour may be perceived as harmful to the individual but sacrificial and beneficial to the group, to 
which they are a part. Group norms and identities therefore determine potential costs and benefits of 
violent behaviour (Louis, 2009, 438) and radical views. Significantly, the reconstruction of identity over 
time creates hybrid identities, situational identities, and in some cases, unexpressed or discreet 
identities. 
 
Closely tied to the concept of identity is ideological construction. Ideology has been described as an 
elusive concept laden with ‘semantic promiscuity’ (McLellan, 1986, 1; Gerring, 1997, 957-59). For the 
most part, dominant formulations of ideology particularly in violent extremism have restricted the 
concept within political and religious domains (Alton, 1971; Mumby, 1989; Cole, 2017; Patterson, 2013; 
Martin, 2015; Garcia, 2015; Flaherty, 2003, 35; Shuki et al., 2016; Graig, 2016).4 While attention has 
been on dominant ideological strands, the concept is broader and accommodates a range of 
competing strands (Cole, 2017). Erikson and Tedin (2003, 64) for example define ideology as a ‘set of 
beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved’. Ideologies integrate and 
                                                          
4 Also see the writings of Karl Marx on economy and society; Max Horkheimer on traditional and critical theory; Antonio 
Gramsci on the social function of culture and nexus with economy and politics. 
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articulate broad though not unanimously shared beliefs, opinions and values of a distinct group. They 
describe or interpret the state of the world by creating assumptions and claims about human nature, 
history, current realities and future prospects (Jost et al. 2009, 309). Ideology ‘provides a motive and 
framework for action’ (Drake, 1998, 55). With reference to Arendt’s (1973, 469) definition of ideology 
as the ‘logic of an idea’, this thesis argues that the conceptualisation of ideas occurs both subjectively 
at the micro-personal (see Flaherty, 2003, 35), institutional and societal levels. Arendt conceives the 
subject matter of ideology as premised on history, to which an idea is applied. The outcome of the 
application of an idea is not and should not be conceived as a static ‘body of statements about 
something’ rather a continuously evolving intersubjective process as is also argued in this section. 
 
Other proposed definitions are consistent with this thesis abstraction of an ideology as the lens through 
which individuals perceive the world. It is the entirety of an individual’s ‘culture, values, beliefs, 
assumptions, common sense, and expectations for themselves and of others’. It configures thoughts, 
agency, relationships and identity, and shapes how individuals make sense of their place in the world. 
Framing is an important aspect of ideologising and purposely shapes individuals’ perceptions and 
interpretations of their experiences and the world. In the context of this thesis, ideological framing is 
therefore salient to the securitisation of migration. In addition, framing influences an individual’s 
purpose, path in life and life experiences in relation to organised society. As an important aspect of 
the human experience, an ideology is often consciously or unconsciously constructed and defended 
(Jost et al., 2009, 310, 325-326; Cole, 2017). Ideology stems from and at the same time moulds social, 
political and economic structures. All things considered, ideology as applied in this thesis is subjective, 
structural, indeterminate and central to the concept of securitisation. 
 
Based on the discussion so far, historical and increasingly technological alongside other contextual 
factors may influence the construction of personal ideology and the degree of identification with an 
organisation’s or group’s ideological framework and goals. In the appreciation of the complexities of 
the drivers of radicalisation and the reciprocal relationship between the construction of ideology and 
societal structures, the conception of radicalisation should embody diverse ideological extractions 
beyond the political and religious. Viewed as a socio-psychological concept (Schmid, 2013, 19), 
radicalisation appears to develop within the context of identity in (re)emphasising and recalibrating 
existing identities that correspondingly breed radical identities outside of and in opposition to the 
mainstream. Radical identities, though peripheral, typify most facets of society in the mainstreams of 
politics, religion, race (white supremacy), ethnicity (tribalism), environment (ecoterrorism) and even 
economy based on the upcoming economic arguments. These mainstreams though seemingly 




Securitisation theory is relevant in as far as it highlights the dynamics of security and politics in 
population mobility among the liberal democracies, majority of whom are signatories to the Refugee 
Convention. Secondly, while refugees have customarily been outside the purview of traditional 
security, the linguistic characterisation of the threat they pose for example military interventions and 
border controls resonate with the conventions of traditional security. Thirdly, the framework illuminates 
the understanding of responses to population mobility, particularly among refugees who are 
constructed as a threat by the political elite. These elites typically invoke threats to sovereignty and 
identity and galvanise the support of their audiences for the use of extraordinary measures to counter 
threats (McDonald, 2008, 8). Public discourse and policy on migration and radicalisation has for the 
most part revolved around Islam or the Muslim identity. The Islamist ideology is broadly viewed as 
incompatible with democratic ideals. Muslims are likely to be viewed either as potentially radicalised 
or as possessing a special connection with the ‘radical other, the terrorist’ (Gad, 2012, 397). Yet the 
examination of this securitising discourse and attendant interventions have been largely reductionist, 
neglecting the broader context.   
 
The securitisation of migration revolves around several axes of discursive and non-discursive 
practices. These include cultural, socio-economic, internal security (Huysmans, 2000, 751-77), 
identitarian and political threats (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, 21-39), and administrative practices 
executed by security professionals (Bigo, 2000, 66-67). The thesis demonstrates how the refugee 
threat has been ideologically constructed around these elements. The construction revolves around 
the literal and symbolic orientations of the camp as a social device that interacts with other systems. 
Underlying this construction are more nuanced contextual dynamics, partially neglected in the CS 
framework of securitisation. Based on the foregoing and upcoming examination of the analytical and 
normative dilemmas and pitfalls of securitisation, this thesis has adopted complementary articulations 
of security. As such, the thesis has diversified the actors beyond institutional (political) voices to include 
dominant, marginal, masked and criminalised voices in the theatre of radicalisation of public discourse. 
The research further expands the context beyond the immediate threat and examines the facilitating 
conditions of securitisation by taking a historical perspective and analyses the structural drivers of 
migration in refugee homelands, institutional contexts and evolving conditions in the host states. In 
addition, the application of the concept of liminality has promoted a rights-based approach and 
facilitated the examination of the risks of securitisation, particularly in generating vulnerabilities that 
also include radicalisation. This has been captured diagrammatically in the conceptual framework 
below5: 
 
                                                          
5 The conceptual framework has been summarised from page 1 to 3. Other aspects have been discussed in more detail 




Figure 1: Conceptual Model: The Securitisation Complex 
 
2.5.2 The Dilemma of Securitisation 
 
The discourse on securitisation, desecuritisation and resecuritisation while for the most part grounded 
on the realities of security is also fundamentally mechanistic and idealistic. Critical approaches in legal 
and political theory have been instrumental in advancing normative standards. Yet in some cases, 
normative influence has led to social conformity in the alteration of utterances and behaviour. In reality, 
public opinion is often diverse ranging between moderate and extreme, not to mention unarticulated 
positions. In addition, the distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary measures to avert an 
existential threat may be nebulous particularly if the measures are already institutionalised (Buzan et 
al., 1998, 24). Further, do these extraordinary measures fall within the purview of government action 
or do other actors have capabilities for the extraordinary that may in turn influence government action? 
This essentially constitutes the dynamic of the social construction of threats. 
 
Desecuritisation favours the withdrawal of issues from the security agenda and their inclusion in the 
realm of normal politics (Buzan and Waever, 1998, 4). In problematising this notion, what constitutes 
normal politics? What is the distinction between security and politics? The political discourse on the 
constitution and preservation of security can be politically intense and evolve into hyper-politics. The 
goal of desecuritisation is similarly normatively flawed in its representation of security as a failure of 
‘normal politics’ (McDonald, 2008, 28). The mere suggestion that migration is not a threat and should 
43 
 
be politicised rather than securitised may be potentially securitising by the seemingly innocuous 
collocation of ‘migration’ with ‘threat to security’ (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010, 43-44). The 
preoccupation with the negative designation of threat inadvertently serves the negative, dominant and 
marginalising articulations of threat (McDonald, 2008, 28-9) besides promoting a reductionist approach 
to security with normative implications.  
  
The magnification of threats and the importance to combat them, may inadvertently aggravate the 
threat. Some of the threatening entities may find themselves threatened and reaffirm or conform to the 
prevailing narrative. Securitisation in this case has a spiral effect in breeding counter-securitisation. 
This argument applies in radicalisation as spawning counter-radicalisation as demonstrated in the 
thesis. Conversely, de-emphasising securitisation creates opportunities for novel, nuanced discourse 
that does little to diffuse conflict. The risk that threats become latent and accompanying measures 
become convoluted narratives enshrined in bureaucratic routines is therefore high (Gad, 2012, 403). 
Realistically, public discourse and studies on security will almost always securitise. Perhaps a holistic 
approach that filters relevant actors, salient issues at play and context may be an initial step towards 
navigating the hypo and hyper-securitisation continuum. Even then, the elusion of proficiency should 
be acknowledged. More importantly, beyond securitisation and desecuritisation, more attention should 
be focused on the discursive aspects underpinning representations and practices of security. At the 
centre of this broad framework should be the appreciation of both the analytical and normative value 
of the scholarship that is curiously nonconformist and risks being less elegant (McDonald, 2008, 32).  
 
To conclude, the point at which an issue becomes securitised remains contentious. Securitisation 
occurs when and only when an audience supports the claims of a securitising agent. Yet the parameter 
for securitisation as encompassing the endorsement of a diagnosis, prescription or both remains 
largely speculative (Balzacq et al., 2016, 520). A practice-oriented approach that includes 
inconspicuous bureaucratic games and a risk-oriented approach that examines the relationship 
between risk, security and securitisation have been proposed as alternatives. An examination of 
performatives, contextuality, social commitments and regimes of practices constitute important 
elements for a robust securitisation theory. More specifically, alternative studies that examine the 
origins and preservation of security challenges or civil conflicts would articulate the transnational 
character of security issues such as migration (Balzacq et al., 2016, 520-21). As such, the thesis has 
broadly considered these dimensions and most importantly aims not to establish causality but explore 







2.6 The Orientation of Migrants in Forced Migration 
 
The main classes of individuals recognised as eligible for protection or fall under persons under 
consideration for protection under international law are known as persons of concern. They typically 
include refugees, asylum seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), stateless persons, and 
returnees (UNHCR and IPU, 2017, 43). The internationally accepted definition of a refugee is derived 
from Article 1, A (2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as someone who: 
 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality (stateless) 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
 
The definition encapsulates three components under the provisions of the Convention, namely, 
inclusion, cessation and exclusion. The 1951 Convention promotes the right to asylum but does not 
make specific reference to asylum seekers, an issue that makes the instrument difficult to 
operationalise in current times (Koser, 2015, 3-8). However, the 2018 UN Global Compact for 
Migration addresses this gap. Notably, persons compelled to flee their home country due to armed 
violence are typically not considered refugees under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
Nevertheless, their protection is enshrined in other international instruments such as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims and its 1977 Protocol on Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (UNHCR, 2011a, 33). That said, the 1969 African Union Convention on the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa incorporated the 1951 refugee definition and added a clause 
reflecting the migration realities in Africa that states: 
 
the term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality. 
 
This definition takes into account Africa’s historical experience with colonialism. As such, the definition 
should subsume the current military intervention in Somalia perceived as foreign occupation or 
domination (Westin, 1999, 4). In both cases, a refugee’s reluctance to uproot himself from his 
homeland and the instinctual impulse to settle elsewhere evidently makes him distinct from voluntary 
migrants (Kolaja, 1952, 289). Foreign occupation, as captured in the 1969 (AU) Convention (Article 1, 
3), may result in persecution as elaborated within the framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In 
such situations, the asylum seeker must avail sufficient evidence of ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ 
and simultaneously prove the incapacity to receive protection from country of origin or other power, 
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and demonstrate that such protection is ineffective. Although the AU Convention makes multiple 
references to armed groups, it does not directly address the omission of these groups but tacitly 
proposes their rules of conduct. This implies an admission to the difficulties involved in the screening 
and exclusion of armed elements in a camp context. In fact, the provision that addresses armed groups 
presumably instructs states to hold armed persons accountable for their actions (Kidane, 2011, 72). 
 
These definitions spell out the pre-qualifying standards for the recognition of pseudo-human status 
and similarly address a context of strife. This effectively signals the foundation of the securitised 
construction of refugeeism within international instruments and the accompanying securitised 
discourse. Discussions on refugees outside the securitisation ambit is therefore inevitable. In practice, 
the refugee status can be withheld and invalidated and at the same time be informally recognised upon 
misconduct, as one interviewee reports below. The cursory shifts between visible and invisible 
refugeeism stimulates identity fluidity that further promotes opportunistic identification and 
disidentification with the refugee status. Essentially, refugees occupy the extremes of invisibility and 
hypervisibility: 
 
You know to give us the name ‘refugee’ is hard but when something happens, they tell us, ‘you refugees are 
doing this’. They never even give some people the name ‘refugee’. To get the name is very difficult. They always 
say asylum seekers. To be a refugee you have to be vetted, given mandate and other things but when something 
bad happens they say, ‘’refugees did this’’. And if you ask, I say, ‘First of all you have not given me the name 
refugee so I’m not a refugee’. During peaceful times they don’t want to give you the name but when bad things 
happen you get the name. Everybody is a refugee when they want to harass you. (Ahmed – Refugee, embedded 
narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
Migrant is a broad term that covers individuals who move from their home countries for wide-ranging 
reasons, usually for a minimum of a year. As such, refugees are considered fundamentally different 
for example from economic migrants, who elect to move to enhance future economic prospects. 
Similarly, they are disparate from people displaced by natural disasters such as floods and 
earthquakes, who enjoy their governments’ support. Further, the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’ 
are often conflated. An asylum seeker is someone who seeks refugee status but whose claim has not 
been definitively evaluated and determined. Asylum seekers lawfully determined to not qualify as 
refugees requiring international protection can be repatriated. The capacity to conduct individual 
asylum interviews during mass movement of refugees displaced by conflict is virtually non-existent. 
Neither is it necessary, since the causes of displacement are usually obvious. Such individuals are 
often proclaimed as prima facie refugees. Refugees essentially move to save their lives and preserve 




This said, the terminology within forced migration has triggered criticism on the artificial distinction 
between refugees and migrants (Long, 2013, 5-15). The state-centric view that presents refugees as 
crossing national borders due to persecution is too specific and hence restrictive (Carlier, 1999, 37-
39). Due to the expansion of drivers of displacement, the term ‘refugee’ has evolved post-1951 to 
reflect an amorphous description of a gamut of involuntary migrants. These migrants are often 
uprooted from their homes by armed violence and other underlying drivers but are not subject to 
persecution as stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Marfleet, 2006, 11-12).  
 
The UN convention’s definition of refugee predominantly delimits it to threats of identity and political 
opinion. The definition fails to capture the complex and multi-variate character of underlying drivers of 
conflict that often manifest as armed violence namely social, economic, political, environmental and 
cultural factors. This generally complicates the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants who 
are uprooted from their homes often by any of those drivers. International regimes do not consider 
natural causes in situations requiring the protection of forcefully displaced persons and their 
determination as refugees (Ek & Karadawi, 1991, 196, 201). Yet kinetics that are seemingly influenced 
by an act of nature may possess political elements that interact with other factors to trigger an influx 
into other regions. At the same time, the distinctive stipulation that an international border must be 
crossed to be considered a refugee essentially obscures and shifts focus and equal responsibility to 
protect from IDPs (Ek & Karadawi, 1991, 196, 202). 
 
The global context within which the term ‘refugee’ has been applied has progressively changed and 
will continue to evolve. Interestingly, UNHCR has developed its own definition of refugee. The scope 
has been broadened beyond the 1951 convention to reflect its evolved mandate and encompass 
victims of war, stateless persons and other ‘persons of concerns’ in addition to some IDPs (UNHCR 
and IPU, 2017, 43). Having examined the scoping deficiencies, this thesis has adopted a synthesis of 
the original definition of ‘refugee’ as framed in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the expanded 
elements of the UNHCR definition. 
 
2.7 The Production of Liminality in a Securitised Refugee Regime 
 
Scholarship on forced migration has neglected the concept of loss of home at least in part due to 
methodological nationalism. Academia has adopted the view of the state and the world as 
compartmentalised into territorial partitions comprised of distinct people and culture (Wimmer & 
Schiller, 2002, 581-83). This attests to the pervasive influence the nation-state has had on intellectual 
enquiry. As a result, migrants are positioned outside the national order and are perceived as a problem 
due to lack of a national homeland. The construction of territorially bounded states has therefore 
effectively created a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders. It has also led to reductionist discourse 
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skewed towards the examination of refugee-belonging and the concept of home as either the original 
homeland or successful integration into host states through enculturation and transfer of allegiances. 
Indeed, the dichotomy presented by territorially bounded states imposes a false choice between two 
or more polities. In addition, it reinforces the insider-outsider categorisation (Taylor, 2013, 131-38) and 
advances the representation of refugees as the liminal ‘other’.  
 
The application of transnationalism in forced migration has revealed the potential for multiple 
allegiances and connections beyond a single country. Al-Ali and Koser (2002, 6) have challenged the 
dominance of the nation-state and contend that ‘concepts of home are not static but dynamic 
processes, involving the acts of imagining, creating, unmaking, changing, losing and moving homes’. 
As such, refugees may maintain emotional attachment to the lost home and initiate physical, economic, 
social or cultural movement between nations. Meanwhile, some of the proponents of globalisation 
(Ohmae, 1990) have articulated the irrelevance of nation-states in the wake of a globalised world 
where people, information, capital and objects move freely. However, while a migrant’s sense of 
rootlessness can be liberating as a result of free movement, the thickening of borders for example in 
Europe has bolstered liminality. Thus, globalisation does not hold an equal promise of universal 
mobility. At the same time, the nation-state continues to influence the global world since it is the body 
within which people access rights based on territorial identities (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002, 585-89). 
While beneficial, the notion of globalisation is therefore bounded, contestable, subjective and 
propagates the promise of inequality. 
 
Beyond bounded globalism, an examination of the convention of refugee protection further exposes 
the dilemma emanating from the tension between security and protection, in theory and practice.  The 
legal principles governing modern refugee protection are enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol. These principles have been adopted in numerous international, regional and 
national frameworks governing the treatment of refugees. While the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol have been received with broad international support, they have in recent times been matched 
with criticism. The regime has been described as a feeble antiquity of a ‘bygone, cold war, almost ice 
age era’ that has grossly failed to prevent and resolve the root causes of displacement such as armed 
violence. The convention has further been censured for state parties’ unconscionable application 
standards particularly with regard to security, and its rigidity in adapting to changing times and 
emerging challenges such as climate change (Goodwin-Gill, 2003, 24). Besides the restrictive refugee 
definition confined to the experiences of WWII, the regime lacks an enforcing mechanism and 
monitoring framework for state parties’ fulfilment of their protection obligations. Correspondingly, the 
regime is anaemic as far as the demand for accountability and responsiveness of states engaged in 
the persecution of refugees in situations of mass displacement is concerned. The gradual decline in 
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the authority of the 1951 convention has meant that state parties no longer consistently conform to the 
instrument’s standards and have contextualised it based on their experiences (Koser, 2015, 3-8). The 
state-centric approach to durable solutions has therefore created a permissive environment in which 
sovereign states aggressively pursue the constructions of statehood, citizenship, stability, borders and 
boundaries as conventional (Soguk, 1999, 35-37). 
  
Among some of the critical aspects of the Refugee Convention is Article 2, which effectively embeds 
securitisation within the framework of general obligations. This article clarifies the duties of those 
seeking protection and instructs refugees to conform to the laws and regulations of the host country 
and respect the measures that maintain public order. Refugees are therefore expected to refrain from 
inciting violence or opening themselves to political mobilisation. Non-refoulement is another central 
principle within the 1951 Convention that prohibits states from expelling or repatriating refugees to 
territories where their lives and freedoms may be threatened. This principle applies to both signatories 
and non-contracting states, even though the former has additional obligations to fulfil. State parties 
are expected to confer specific rights that encompass protection and relate to but are not limited to 
freedom of movement, freedom of religion, right to education, employment, travel documents and 
physical security. Exceptions to these principles are allowed in cases where a refugee is deemed as 
a risk to the host country’s national security. Convictions on serious crimes are assessed on 
reasonable grounds. In addition, the convention outlines the basic rights that states should accord 
refugees (Refugee Convention, 1951, Articles 2, 31, 32, 33). 
 
The potential for all humans to become refugees is noteworthy. As such, the rejection of state-centric 
notions of belonging may significantly transform human orientation of concepts such as home as 
issues of universal concern (Taylor, 2013, 131-36). Turton (2002, 28) contends that the international 
refugee regime is aimed not at the protection of refugees but at the preservation of the international 
system of nation-states. It can therefore be argued that the broader global agenda of refugee 
containment underlying this framework, and the preservation of nation states as vessels of distinct 
peoples and culture diminish prospects for a borderless world. The US, Australia and other Western 
countries’ refusal to ratify the UN Global Compact for Migration (Karp, 2018) is reflective of the 
trepidation arising from a shake-up in the global migration system. The gradual shift to an ostensibly 
insular world order has not only consigned forced migrants into a liminal asylum system but also 
signalled the resurgence of right-wing movements opposed to migration. The presumptive 
representation of citizenship among descendants of migrant parents similarly attests to the duplicitous 
nature and constructions of citizenship and belonging. In host countries, this is illustrated by the 
lionisation of exemplary acts and indiscriminate vilification of delinquency within refugee communities. 
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Therefore, the fluidity of the concepts of home and belonging are mutually (re)imagined and 
constructed by migrants and hosts with the arbitrary power to grant and strip belonging. 
 
To some extent, specific principles portray the 1951 Refugee Convention as an instrument of 
containment rather than the protection of refugees. The same applies to the voluntary and non-binding 
nature of the 2018 UN Global Compact for Migration. Firstly, there is no absolute right of asylum but a 
right to claim it. Secondly, refugees are responsible for proving their claims. Thirdly, responsibility for 
asylum is a right vested on the state and not the refugee. Lastly, states reserve the right to set the 
procedure for the assessment of asylum claims. The principle of non-refoulement is no guarantee for 
the right to refugee status. Besides preventing forceful repatriation, it does not provide protection from 
detention and other violations. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention bestows upon states the 
unchallenged sovereign right to exclude from their territories any foreigners regarded as undesirable. 
Far from providing protection, refugee law was founded to restrict it (Behrman, 2018, 1-6, 14), as a 
basis for rationalising refusal for protection (Hathaway, 1990, 130) of those predominantly ‘poorer and 
darker’ (Behrman, 2018, 13).  
 
The determination of asylum on the basis of the definition of a refugee has strengthened the capacity 
for states to police forced migrants. The discussions culminating into the 1951 Convention were 
dominated by the emphasis on defence of national interests and the need for a strict codification of 
laws to filter refugees. This led to the discussion on the adoption of a formal legal definition of the 
refugee that would contain population movements (Behrman, 2018, 6-12) and eventually exclude 
internally displaced persons, economic, natural or ecological disaster migrants, stateless persons not 
facing persecution and victims of war (Einarsen, 2011, 52). Therefore, the mass ratification of the 1951 
Convention succeeded in part because it vested the right on nation states to determine who they can 
or cannot host (Noiriel, 1998, 151). 
  
Refugee camps are largely portrayed as spaces of turbulent neo-liberalism that support a unique 
organisation of space, social life and system of power. The camp establishment has been depicted as 
a place of ‘exception’ with legal intermission in contrast to cities as the ‘norm’. Further, the scholarship 
on armed conflict has examined the constructive and subversive roles assumed by various actors. 
Refugees represent an illusion within the foundational predicament in the enduring form of political 
identity that circumscribes citizenry and the nation state system (Sanyal, 2011, 879). Notably, refugees 
are often portrayed as traumatised victims of war, a voiceless (Malkki, 1995a, 513) collective living in 
a state of bare life (Agamben, 1998, 47), and passive recipients of humanitarian assistance (Malkki, 
1995a, 513) rather than persons with dignity. At the same time, refugee camps have been cast as 
zealous ethno-nationalistic spaces (Malkki, 1995b, 156, 155-240; Sanyal, 2011, 882-87) and 




Host states have at times been incriminated for allowing refugees to engage in meaningful employment 
alongside militancy. Consequently, the concept of space in some cases reflects both physical and 
political dimensions. The politicisation of space is exemplified by Palestinian camps in the West Bank 
and Lebanon that have successfully blurred the boundary between active political agents and 
refugees. Further, the Shatila Refugee Camp in Lebanon is an important symbolic space for 
Palestinian nationalism that highlights their agency (Sanyal, 2011, 884-85). The segregation of civilian 
and military characters and elimination of the latter, has therefore been traditionally invoked in conflict 
situations. Whereas the preservation of the civilian character of a camp is one of the central tenets of 
international humanitarian law, it is impossible to maintain a fool-proof screening mechanism (Harrell-
Bond, 2002, 19). The common description of refugees as people fleeing persecution in part distorts 
the camp mosaic as similarly representing suspected offenders in countries of origin or aliens in 
violation of immigration laws, particularly within the minorities (UNHCR, 2006, 52-53, 117; UNHCR, 
2007, 15; UNHCR and IPU, 2017, 65, 71-73).  
 
The UNHCR (2011, 34-35) acknowledges that asylum applications are regularly lodged by persons 
who have used force or committed acts of violence associated with political activities or opinion. These 
persons may have acted independently or within an organised group that may be clandestine in nature 
or an officially recognised political cum military organisation. At the same time, there are individuals 
specifically excluded from the Refugee Convention protection such as war criminals or people 
suspected to have committed serious non-political crimes. However, the identification and extraction 
of such persons in large camps is onerous (UNHCR and IPU, 2017, 145). The UNHCR reportedly 
used to call upon refugees to surrender their arms before camp registration because an individual who 
is actively involved in armed violence within the host country cannot be granted asylum. At the same 
time, combatants who have disarmed may be granted refugee status as long as they are not 
excludable for other reasons. Such reasons may include but are not limited to participation in serious 
non-political crimes outside the country of refuge, crimes against peace, war crimes and the 
desecration of international humanitarian and human rights law that constitute crimes against humanity 
(UNHCR, 2007, 26; 2011, 29-35).6  
 
The attribution of violence to the development of political consciousness is tacitly supported by the 
African Union’s (AU) normative standards of depoliticisation of refugees in places considered safe 
zones. As such, the African Union has designed normative standards to regulate the treatment of 
refugees and by extension depoliticise their presence in host countries. Relevant articles in the AU 
Convention for example spell out the roles and responsibilities of refugees in maintaining public order 
                                                          
6 See the 1945 London Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for more comprehensive definitions. 
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and the importance of preserving the civilian character of camps (Ek & Karadawi, 1991, 196; Loescher 
et al, 2008, 75-76; OAU, 1969). The OAU Convention on Refugees specifically stipulates that ‘granting 
of asylum should be considered a peaceful and humanitarian assistance; the reception of refugees 
should not be considered as unfriendly or antagonistic acts. Likewise, refugees should refrain from 
any act that might be interpreted as harmful or subversive’ (OAU, 1969). The framing of the article 
connotes the organisation’s awareness of refugees’ political activity while in exile and member states’ 
efforts to counter these activities. Despite these lofty aspirations, the African Union remains largely 
incapable of operationalising its goals. This implies errant member states can discriminately apply the 
statute due to the organisation’s principle of non-intervention and its subordination to state interests 
(Zard, 2005, 5-7). In practice, with the exception of Uganda, the management of refugee affairs in the 
Greater Horn of Africa region typically falls within security-focused ministries in collaboration with other 
government dockets. This essentially reflects the dominant securitised approach to refugee issues 
(UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 27). 
 
Customarily, a distinction is made between combatants and civilians with the aim of civilian protection. 
As an illustration, in 1973, the ICRC made an appeal to Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Israel to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants. Not to mention that during the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict in 1979, 
the ICRC appealed for the clear separation of civilian spaces and military installations (ICRC, 2005, 5-
66, 511). Similarly, the Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire hosted genocidaires who 
diverted aid for military use. On their part, The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) infiltrated the 
Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya and used it as a ‘safe’ base. The SPLA was actively involved in the 
selection of community leaders to broaden their influence on camp administration. The camp acted as 
a safe haven for wives and children of combatants, a rehabilitation base for wounded combatants, a 
source for armed recruitment, and also attracted regular visitations by SPLA commanders (Crisp, 
1999, 23; Jansen, 2016, 431-33). Similarly, the SPLA reportedly used Ugandan refugee reception 
centres to rest and recuperate and forcefully conscript young men (Smith, 2004, 46). Uganda’s alleged 
support of SPLA and the corresponding allegations of Sudan government’s support of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda demonstrates the politicisation of camps and the links between 
camp and regional dynamics. A study (Haer & Hecker, 2018, 7) conducted in Nakivale Refugee 
settlement further suggests the recruitment of refugees into armed groups. Consequently, aid agencies 
have traditionally maintained staff-focused security protocols that enable them navigate such 
unpredictable operational environments. On their part, donors have designed policy frameworks that 
regulate the delivery of aid.  
 
Refugees concentrated in the border regions and other marginalised enclaves may disrupt local 
balance and destabilise their locality. While the security implications demand a more robust policy 
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engagement to address the root causes of encampment, sometimes policymakers detract from calls 
for humanitarian intervention. This is because an escalation of humanitarian intervention may be 
interpreted as nurturing and sustaining encampment and further upset negative public opinion. 
Nevertheless, states overlook the fact that improving conditions for refugees may actually pacify an 
environment of insecurity and engender stability within the host state and surrounding regions (Smith, 
2004, 46; Loescher et al., 2008, 3-4; Loescher and Milner, 2008, 33-9). 
 
Nevertheless, an important feature intrinsic to the character of a camp is the degree to which the 
relationship between the combatants and civilians is coercive or consensual (Loescher, et al., 2008, 
76). Host states have expressed increasing security concerns over links between international 
migration and terrorism (UNHCR and IPU, 2017, 11). The UN Security Council has emphasised the 
need for counter-terrorism measures to comply with state obligations under international refugee, 
human rights and humanitarian laws (p. 71). The UNHCR emphasises the fact that refugees 
themselves flee from violence including terrorism (p. 73) and encourages the proper application of 
exclusionary clauses to debar persons responsible for terrorism (p.145). The resulting pushbacks from 
border control (p. 73) including the gross mischaracterisation of refugees have intensified (p. 217) and 
are fundamentally hyper-securitising. 
 
In fact, soon after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution 
that acknowledged that asylum seekers could be terrorists. The resolution calls upon states to prevent 
the abuse of refugee status by those who ‘plan, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist 
acts’ (UNSC 1373, 2001); and reaffirms resolutions 1269 (1999), and 1368 (2001) on terrorism. The 
UNSC resolution 1373 is however immaterial in as far as the refugee convention’s existing exclusion 
from protection of perpetrators of crimes against peace or humanity is concerned (Refugee 
Convention, 1951). That notwithstanding, the resolution confirmed concerns with the inadequacy of 
screening processes. At the time, the U.S. claimed that Canada’s weak border control necessitated 
the 9/11 attacks. Prior to the attack, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian citizen had attempted to enter the 
U.S. via Canada with explosives in his vehicle. Although he had previously been denied refugee status 
in Canada, his deportation had been stayed despite a criminal record and associations with Islamists 
(Collacott, 2002, 1-4). This demonstrates that since the non-refoulement principle prevents a return to 
persecution, states are forced to comply with their obligation and either recognise status on the 
presumption that all asylum seekers are refugees or make a status determination. The latter implies 
states’ obligation to verify claims of refugee status that is open to violations and abetted by minorities 
like Ressam (Marx, 1995, 385-94).  
 
To conclude, the UN Global Compact for Migration adopted in 2018 veils a subtle security accent and 
is aimed at safe, orderly and regular migration controlled by nation-states. It has been argued that the 
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international refugee regime is in part aimed at the preservation of nation-states. The legally non-
binding document is linked to international human rights instruments, the UN Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime and permits migrant detention as a final recourse. The agreement 
criminalises human trafficking, smuggling and slavery and decriminalises the migrant (UN Global 
Compact, 2018). It has received heavy criticism from European right-wing movements on grounds of 
sovereignty with far-right Germany terming it a dodgy migrant resettlement plan (Schultheis & 
Calamur, 2018; see also Karas, 2018). Treated as a living document, the compact forms an important 
framework for future negotiations responsive to a dynamic migration landscape. Clearly, the threat of 
the development or advancement of political awareness and engagement in political activities appears 
to underlie protection articles. While inherently securitising, these instruments are ordinarily aimed at 
civilian protection and have been responsive to security threats that have pervaded some refugee 
camps. The systemic securitisation of the international instruments of protection, besides grappling 
with the protection-security dilemma, are for the most part intrinsically liminalising in theory and 
practice. So, what broader context do these instruments address and are they sufficiently responsive? 
An analysis of agents and structural conditions at micro, meso and macro systems that underlie 
encampment can offer further insights. The next chapter therefore outlines a historical background of 
the Somali conflict and drivers of forced displacement. It positions Somalia within the broader global 
context and additionally identifies the drivers of Islamism. The chapter essentially outlines pre-



























Chapter 3 – Dadaab Refugee Complex: A Macro-Historical Perspective 
 
This chapter is premised on the internationalisation of conflict and regional conflict systems. Regional 
Security Complex (RSC) is linked to securitisation theory and advances the notion of complexity and 
interlinkages of (in)security between states. RSC is grounded on bounded territoriality and distribution 
of power and rejects global level structure (see Buzan & Waever, 2003) yet this chapter invalidates 
the anti-globalist thesis. The chapter examines the historical roots of the Somali conflict within the 
context of the Greater Horn of Africa (HoA) region. The chapter aims to enhance understanding on the 
causes of forced displacement in Somalia and highlight the global undercurrents that intimately interact 
with Dadaab Refugee Complex. The section begins with a brief overview of the Greater Horn of Africa 
region and highlights the dynamic of the colonial partitioning of states that led to the fragmentation of 
homogenous ethnic groups and eventual dispersal of Somalis into different countries. The chapter 
further examines the regional security dynamics, including the role of external actors and links to the 
Somali conflict, and the ensuing Somali refugee situation in the Greater HoA region. The historical 
perspective in particular highlights the Somali struggle and adaptation to domestic challenges, foreign 
interference, the impact of conflict on populations, and the progression of Islamism - specifically the 
emergence of Al Shabaab. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the security situation at Dadaab 
Refugee Complex. 
 
3.1 Security in the Greater Horn of Africa Region 
 
The Greater Horn of Africa region is a political concept that consists of eight countries namely Kenya, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Uganda. During the 1980s, the original 
Horn of Africa states7 suffered severe effects of environmental degradation along with their neighbours 
in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, which led to the establishment of Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1986. Natural disasters notwithstanding, the intertwinement of 
conflict among the IGADD member states gave rise to the entity known as the ‘Greater Horn’ region. 
It also led to the succession of IGADD by Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 
1996 (Mengisteab, 2011, 7-8).  
 
The Greater HoA region forms a tapestry of interlocking armed conflict as observed in post-conflict 
zones, areas with ongoing sporadic and localised violence, and areas experiencing latent conflict 
where violence may be anticipated but not yet manifest. Functioning as a regional security complex, 
one country’s state of security is intimately connected to another (Healy, 2008, 6-7). There are 
variations in the conflicts fuelling the regional crisis as well as country-specific conflict dynamics. 
Conflicts in the region are generally protracted in nature. Such long running armed conflicts assume 
                                                          
7 The Horn of Africa is a geographical concept that originally comprised of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. 
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special, self-perpetuating dynamics commonly referred to as a ‘conflict trap’ (Collier et al, 2003, 79-
87). Although peace negotiations and the implementation of agreements are aimed at sustainable 
conflict transformation, the actual transition is often highly problematic and volatile. In many cases, 
peace agreements in countries like Somalia and South Sudan have not necessarily ended fighting. 
Post-armed conflict transition tends to manifest as the continuation of war by other means with 
palpable hostilities among conflict parties (Healy, 2011, 46-48). This is observable in Kenya following 
the 2007-08 post-election violence. These situations are variously called ‘neither war nor peace’ 
(Seton-Watson, 1960), or ‘fragile peace’ (Maier, 1995), or ‘turbulent peace’ (Crocker et al, 2001). They 
all indicate conditions of unsustainable peace and a potential relapse into conflict. 
 
3.2 Regional and Global Security Dynamics in the Somali Conflict  
 
While some conflicts in the Greater Horn are purely internal, some reflect sub-regional dynamics with 
important international dimensions or both. The human cost of violent conflict in the region has been 
extremely high. Large populations have been traumatised by years of conflict, loss of livelihoods and 
destruction of social infrastructure. Disparities exist between urban and rural areas in terms of income 
and access to basic services (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 47-48). Different claims over access to 
land intensify the risk of conflicts. The absence of legislation and mechanisms that regulate and secure 
access to land and tension between customary and statutory law generate gross inequities in land-
holding patterns. The practice of local and foreign land grabbing has also become rampant in countries 
in the region (Rowa, 2018). The quest for communal land ownership and control, and cultural practices 
such as cattle rustling and conflicting lifestyles of nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers have 
impacted regional security. This has led to the politicisation of boundary issues and fed balkanisation, 
inter-ethnic and cross-border disputes between Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Djibouti (Mengisteab, 2011, 19-23). Communities tend to lack a common vision for national unity and 
are accustomed to years of relief-type support, which generates an attitude of passivity (UNHCR & 
World Bank, 2015, 47-48).  
 
Increased political dialogue and cooperation, either bilaterally or within the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), has paid dividends for regional peace and security. That notwithstanding, some 
of the countries have overlapping membership within different RECs with competing institutional 
frameworks (Healy, 2011, 17-18). The African Union and other regional economic blocs have 
considerable, but arguably still unmet potential to promote economic and political development across 
the region, and prevent and mediate conflicts. They remain institutions with no visible orientation 
towards the improvement of lives of populations. In some instances, closer collaboration within 
incoherent structural frameworks has often generated conflict (El-Affendi, 2009, 3-5). Vulnerability to 
conflict among independent states is closely linked to the internal power structure of the sub-region. 
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Long established patterns of inter-state subversion and military interventions that have survived radical 
political restructuring, including regime change have further destabilised the region (Mengisteab, 2011, 
12-15).  
 
The systemic nature of conflict in the region has been manifest through interlocking factors. Common 
drivers of instability across some countries has resulted in the spill-over of conflicts such as the Lord’s 
Resistance Army activities in Uganda, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Notably, countries 
in the Horn simultaneously generate and host refugees. There are currently four major protracted 
displacement situations in the region namely Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea (UNHCR and 
World Bank, 2015, 12). Countries in the region are jointly fighting Al Shabaab under the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force, and have also had antagonistic relations and 
internal security challenges. Eritrea and Ethiopia, an AMISOM member, have fought a proxy war in 
Somalia (Healy, 2011, 1-5). The Ethiopian military has made incursions into Kenya to inspect a 
disputed border and pursue rebel movements (Barasa, 2015). There is competition over exploitation 
of natural resources for example oil exploration off the coast of Kenya and Somalia; and competing 
claims over Migingo Island between Kenya and Uganda. The involvement of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia 
and Djibouti in AMISOM has previously exposed their civilian populations to terrorist attacks. Somalia 
has experienced insurgencies while Kenya has witnessed increased radicalisation within sections of 
its population associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Shabaab. It should not be 
overlooked that while these complex interactions breed patterns of conflict, they also enhance patterns 
of cooperation within the framework of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ (Healy, 2011, 1-5).  
 
The fragility of the post-conflict situation in the Greater Horn is compounded by the proliferation of 
small arms and inadequate capacity for conflict resolution. The collapse of Somalia in the late 1980’s 
and civil wars in Sudan, Uganda, and South Sudan created regional challenges for the regulation of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). The regional trade in SALW and resultant widespread 
availability of illicit arms has led to increased criminality and inter-communal clashes. The use of 
modern weapons has increased the impact of incidents such as highway banditry, violent cycles of 
community retribution and disputes over access to resources. It has also transformed cattle rustling 
into militarised campaigns both intra and inter-state supported by armed groups or political dissidents 
(Wasara, 2002, 50-51). The weak governance structures in Somalia, Somali irredentism and the flow 
of small arms from Somalia to Kenya has undoubtedly inspired the securitisation of refugees in Kenya 
(Loescher & Milner, 2005b, 32). 
 
Western foreign policy has been instrumental in the configuration of conflict in the Greater Horn. 
Historical issues such as the legacy of colonialism have impacted peace and security in the region. 
For example, the colonial determination of administrative units led to the separation and ethnic 
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fragmentation of homogenous groups across the region. Further, the eventual intra-state boundary 
demarcations also set the ground for disputes over borders. Colonialism exploited and aggravated 
inter-ethnic hostilities through divide and rule policies, for example, by pitting ethnic majorities against 
minorities that in turn enhanced the dominance of some groups and subjugated others.  
 
Increased globalisation and the pull of international markets along inequitable trade guidelines has 
dampened prospects for sustainable growth. The high level of reliance on foreign development aid 
has weakened local capacities to nurture resources. Moreover, the reliance on aid has led to state 
dereliction of duty to citizens. Worse, foreign aid has indirectly been a political stressor and advanced 
conflict between duty bearers and rights holders for example in the embezzlement of foreign aid in 
Somalia and Kenya (Margesson et al., 2012, 15-21). Further tensions have erupted when citizens 
have interrogated the application of foreign policy double standards that have buttressed dictatorships 
for example in Ethiopia (formerly) and Uganda.  
 
The situation in these countries has been exacerbated by the resurgence of hard power in the war on 
terror by various regional actors supported by Western governments. Somalia has emerged as the 
regional epicentre of terrorism where Islamist organisations continue to develop the plot in one of the 
global theatres of terrorism. International involvement in support of governments that combat Islamist 
groups arguably also risks causing further radicalisation of Muslims across the region (Healy, 2011, 
18-19). Notably, the UN Monitoring Group has in the past exposed corruption within AMISOM. To 
illustrate, the Somali National Army is reported to have enrolled ‘ghost soldiers’ onto its payroll and 
misappropriated troop supplies (UNMOG, 2015). The Kenyan military violated the moratorium on 
charcoal export in Somalia and was essentially ‘in business with Al Shabaab’ (McCormick, 2015). 
Meanwhile, Ugandan AMISOM troops have been arrested for the sale of military equipment to their 
opponents, Al Shabaab, and other arms dealers (Hassan, 2016). Despite these transgressions, these 
countries paradoxically continue to fight Al Shabaab under the banner of AMISOM in Somalia. 
 
One of the major challenges in the region has been human displacement resulting from man-made 
and natural factors. The most common causes of displacement have been armed conflict as well as 
environmental degradation resulting from climate change. The latter has at times bred cycles of conflict 
particularly over scarce water and pasture resources during periods of drought within and between 
states. The displacement shocks and stressors are often a complex intertwinement between socio-
cultural, economic, political and environmental factors as evidenced in the Somali context (UNDP, 







3.3 Causes and Origins of Forced Displacement in Somalia 
 
The causes of displacement in Somalia are rooted in a dynamic and complex web of political, social, 
economic and environmental structures. For the most part, retracing Somalia’s history facilitates 
theoretical development grounded on the documentation of the past, refugee meaning-making and 
ideological construction, that in turn enhances understanding of the present. The extraction of 
neglected issues in the Somali historical experience instructs the reconstruction of the Somali narrative 
and enables a contextualised interpretation of the Somali experience particularly in the context of 
Islamism. Accordingly, O’Brien and Williams (2016, 36-37) have submitted that the adoption of certain 
practices by entities such as states and individuals may be the result of historical experiences. This 
fundamentally underscores the relationship between structure and agency and highlights the 
constraining and enabling influence of structure on agency and vice versa. As such, the origins and 
trajectory of the Somali protracted refugee situation can be traced along four main phases. The colonial 
partition of administrative units effectively led to the separation of homogenous ethnic Somalis in 
different countries. The 1991 ouster of the authoritarian regime of President Barre and the ensuing 
civil war marked the first major displacement crisis. Between 1992 and 1995, the combination of 
conflict and a drought that triggered a major humanitarian crisis marked the second wave of mass 
displacement. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 to counter Islamist insurgency represents the 
third phase of mass displacement.  
 
3.3.1 The Import of Clannism in Somalia  
 
In comparison to other parts of Africa, Somalia is considered linguistically, religiously and culturally 
homogenous. The structure of lineage is patrilineal along clans, sub-clans and also sub-sub-clans 
even though no agreement exists on the sub-clan structure. Somalis can trace their lineage up to 30 
generations (Grosse-Kettler, 2004, 8). The patrilineal social segmentation of Somali society along 
(sub)clans gives currency to the concept of ‘u dhashay’. This concept assigns social membership to 
individuals conjoined through blood relations by family, clan or nation (Hoehne, 2010, 34-35). The 
Samal and Sab form the two main lineage groups within the Somali clan structure (Grosse-Kettler, 
2004, 8). These are further divided into five major clans namely Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Isaaq 
constituting the former and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle), largely agro-pastoralists constituting the 
Sab (UNDP 2012, 22). Other minority groups include the Bantus, Bajuni, Benadir Gaboye and 
Barawans who have been systematically marginalised by the dominant clans (Eno et al., 2010, 1). The 
population is predominantly pastoral or nomadic and marginally agro-pastoralists with a significant 
portion engaged in business and fishery (World Bank, 2005, 7). 
 
The overarching clan system, which instructs social, political and economic life played an important 
role in the Somali civil strife. Clan membership demands allegiance and as such differentiation of out-
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groups by race, political and religious orientation, informs social identification beyond lineage (Hoehne, 
2010, 34-35). Somalis have historically employed a traditional form of governance known as ‘xeer’ or 
customary law that also regulates clan relations. Colonialism and the advent of Islam saw the 
abrogation of elements of the xeer that were not compatible with Islam and the coexistence of all three 
systems in Somali society. Shariah courts created in the mid-1990s served individual sub-clans, which 
made them largely localised and unable to exercise jurisdiction over other clans. The courts operated 
within the realms of customary law and accorded disputants the choice of either law.  Later on, many 
of the Shariah Courts became unwitting launching pads for new radical Islamism. These local systems 
of governance enjoy popular legitimacy despite their vulnerability, which in turn accords them a 
modicum of rule of law and predictability in an otherwise dynamic context (Menkhaus, 2006, 87-89). 
 
The antinomy of the clan as a source of both the escalation and de-escalation of conflict is indeed 
notable. The clan, as Hill (2001, 11-14) argues, is the core of the Somali problem yet the rubric of 
clannism is also imperative in the resolution of the Somali problem. Almost all contemporary armed 
conflict in Somalia have been fought along clan lines. Clan cleavages have fuelled contestations over 
power and resources, mobilised militia and hindered inter-clan reconciliation. While clan per se is not 
the root cause of the conflict, leaders have deliberately manipulated clan identities to formulate political 
demands. As such, clans are not intrinsically conflictual but are often exploited when polarising leaders 
emphasise or de-emphasise clan differences. Such leaders tend to raise or lower identity levels from 
clan to sub-clan to sub-sub-clan according to changing situations. Prior to the 1991 civil war, most 
divisions existed among major clans over control of power and resources. More recently, conflict has 
further degenerated to sub-clan and sub-sub clan levels. State collapse led to an economy of plunder 
that sometimes pitted members of the same clan vying for the same resources against each other. As 
a result, the struggle for power, resources and territorial control prompted the atomisation of clan 
identity (World Bank, 2005, 15-34). Conversely, the clan system has traditionally been a cohesive 
force providing a sense of identity, acting as a deterrent, promoting inter-clan conflict resolution and 
providing protection and social insurance. The expression of dominant clan interests determines the 
extent to which clans can be mobilised to wage conflict or pursue peace (World Bank, 2005, 16-17).  
 
While state collapse and decades of instability eroded clan-based structures, it did not destroy them. 
However, in recent years, religious structures (Shariah), which transcend clan divisions have emerged 
alongside the clans to maintain law and order particularly in South Central Somalia. Despite the 
dominance of Islam, its potential to create unity has been diminished since religion has been modified 
to conform to traditional cultural affiliations (Kusow, 1994, 38-40). Islamic revivalism notwithstanding, 
the predominance of diverse social connections to secure social security has seen the co-existence of 
religious nationalist aspirations and clan affiliation. In a context of fluid clan relations, clan or sub-clan 
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members typically perceive their upward mobility as being closely associated with the (sub)clan’s 
success. As a result, (sub)clan members provide unreserved support to their leaders. Therefore, in 
times of crisis strong (sub)clans provide support and protection against external threats. Since weak 
(sub)clans cannot provide similar dividends to their members, they tend to coalesce with other similar 
clans in order to challenge the hegemony of the dominant clans (World Bank, 2005, 15-18). Notably, 
the ostensibly shared Somali identity perpetuates nationalistic sentiments that unite against external 
adversaries but sows national discord where individual clan interests are threatened. Suffice it to say 
that the balance between the preservation of clan distinctiveness alongside inter-clan cooperation is 
an important feature of political organisation (Kusow, 1994, 36-38). 
 
3.3.2 History of Conflict and Forced Displacement in Somalia 
 
The modern history of the Somali conflict can be traced back to 1897 when colonialists partitioned the 
country into British Somaliland; Italian Somaliland comprising South Central and Puntland; and French 
Somaliland, present-day Djibouti. The second and third major developments in the conflict trajectory 
was the British transfer of Southern Jubaland region of Somalia to form Kenya’s Northern Frontier 
District in 1925; and the transplantation of Somali Ogaden region to Ethiopia in 1948. The colonial 
brand of governance marked by clan repression and exploitation ushered the beginnings of clan 
fissures and inequality. The colonialists favoured clans that could advance their interests, a strategy 
that successive Somali administrations inherited (Solomon, 2009, 2-3). In 1960 the Italian-
administered Somalia and the British Somaliland protectorate simultaneously gained independence. 
The two territories merged to become the United Republic of Somalia. While Lindley (2011, 16-19) 
identifies three phases of Somali displacement from the 1990s, it is important to acknowledge the role 
of the colonial determination of administrative boundaries and the eventual dispersal of Somalis across 
different countries as constituting the initial phase of forced displacement.  
 
The Somali constitution of 1961 provided a strong foundation for the integration of territories with 
disparate colonial culture and a cross-clan multi-party political system. Somalia enjoyed relative peace 
during the reign of the first two presidents, Aden Abdulle Osman and Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. 
Flagrant corruption and a failed multi-party system led to the deposition of President Sharmarke in 
1969 and the installation of General Mohammed Siyad Barre as Somalia’s new president (Ahmed, 
1999, 116-7; see also UNDP, 2012, 48). President Barre abolished the cross-clan multi-party system. 
His dictatorial reign was also characterised by violence and systematic discrimination. More 
specifically, the Barre regime was dominated by the Marehaan, a sub-clan within the Darood clan, that 
firmly controlled the state and plundered public resources (World Bank, 2005, 19). The dictatorship 
manipulated clan identities and politicised clan fissures by aligning with clans that would strengthen its 
grip on power. As a corollary, deep suspicions and sharp cleavages emerged within clans and sub-
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clans as is presently observable in Somalia. Some of the regime’s oppressive policies towards some 
clans, for example, the Issaq clan in the North-West, contributed to the fragmentation of Somalia 
(Menkhaus, 2003, 2-4). Suffice it to say that Barre’s rule metastasised the seeds of discord previously 
sown by the colonialists. 
 
Somalia experienced both internal turmoil and international armed conflict between 1977 and 1991. 
Migration has therefore been a key feature in the political and economic history of Somalia. Since the 
1970s, different dynamics involving armed conflict, economic hardships and natural disasters offset 
displacement at varying scales (Hammond, 2014, 2). In 1977 Somalia invaded Ethiopia in a military 
campaign to reclaim the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region that colonialists had transposed. During this 
period, Somalia hosted approximately 1.1 million Ethiopian refugees. At the same time, the conflict 
produced over 500,000 Somali refugees who found sanctuary in Ethiopia (IOM, 2014, 12). Upon return 
to Somalia, the refugees discovered they had been dispossessed of their lands and became IDPs 
(IOM, 2014, 17). Ethiopia emerged victorious with the backing of the Soviets and Cubans while Barre’s 
popularity diminished back home. Liberation movements emerged in 1978 to oppose Barre’s 
oppressive regime. Ethiopia armed and hosted several opposition groups who organised a series of 
armed struggles against the Somali government. In 1981, Northern Somalia predominantly inhabited 
by the Isaaq clan organised an insurrection against Barre’s dictatorial regime. A national civil war 
ensued that recorded heavy fatalities and displacement. The Isaaq clan bore the brunt of the 
government’s assault with approximately 50,000 fatalities and the forced displacement of another 
650,000 into Ethiopia and Djibouti (Elmi & Barise, 2006, 35-36).  
 
During the Cold War, Somalia’s political dalliance with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union was 
motivated by Barre’s strategic calculations of potential dividends. This gambit secured Somalia 
assistance from both rivals while the big powers maintained their strategic interests and propped the 
predatory state. Barre built the most capacious army in Africa substantially funded by foreign military 
aid. This army was implicated in gross human rights violations that included the execution of Somali 
citizens. Towards the end of the Cold War, the West withdrew foreign aid as Somalia’s strategic 
importance declined. Barre could no longer sustain the system of patronage politics nor maintain the 
bloated bureaucracy and military he had built. Meanwhile, the United Somali Congress (USC), one 
among other armed groups fighting against Barre consolidated support from the Hawiye Clan in South 
Central Somalia. In January 1991, the increased onslaught by USC in the decade-long civil unrest 
culminated into Barre’s deposition from power and eventual state collapse (Menkhaus, 2003, 1-4). In 
addition, the drought in 1991 and 1992 intensified the effects of violence and disrupted food production. 
The overthrow of Barre’s authoritarian regime, the onset of the civil war and the effects of drought 




The overthrow of the military government precipitated a prolonged period of violent upheavals, 
humanitarian catastrophe and the restructuring of the state. In May 1991, Somaliland reasserted its 
sovereignty and made a unilateral declaration of independence but has never been internationally 
recognised as an autonomous state (Elmi & Barise, 2006, 41). Between 1992 and 1995, Somalia 
experienced a major famine that triggered a major humanitarian crisis. Both crises generated an efflux 
of approximately one million people into neighbouring countries with an estimated, 250,000 fatalities 
(Refugee Policy Group, 1994, 5)8. Meanwhile, South Central Somalia descended into anarchy, 
crumbled into clan-based fiefdoms and also witnessed the installation of warlords. Warlords and 
different clan factions battled for control of the state while pursuing an enterprise of resource plunder. 
Factional leaders exerted territorial control over shifting boundaries while their authority was constantly 
challenged. The most affected were the poorly armed and politically marginalised agro-pastoral clans 
who suffered assaults from better-armed dominant clans (Elmi & Barise, 2006, 33-38).  
 
In April 1992, the United Nations authorised the establishment of United Nations Mission in Somalia 
(UNOSOM I) to lead humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In addition, a small contingent of 
peacekeepers was deployed to address the problem of food aid diversion among the fighting factions. 
In response to the worsening famine, the U.S. launched ‘Operation Provide Relief’ in August 1992 to 
airlift food from Kenya to Somalia. However, problems with food distribution persisted and hampered 
relief efforts. The increasingly chaotic situation on the ground prompted the creation of the United Task 
Force (UNITAF) in November 1992. UNITAF was a US-led UN-sanctioned multinational peace 
enforcement operation mandated to secure relief centres and protect humanitarian aid in ‘Operation 
Restore Hope’. The U.S. army was initially glorified as Somalia’s saviour from famine. UNOSOM’s 
mandate, however, was more politically oriented and included initiating a national reconciliation 
process, conducting DDRR and providing state building support. At the time, the two main rivals whose 
fighting hampered relief efforts were General Mohammed Farah Aideed, a former general in Barre’s 
army and also former ambassador to India, and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, a former businessman and 
leader of the armed faction, USC. The latter had assumed presidential powers in January 1991 after 
ousting Barre and was later recognised by the international community as the de facto interim 
president of Somalia. Initially, the U.S. managed to broker an uneasy truce between the two factions 
and the relief mission proceeded unencumbered (UN DPKO, 2003; see also Refugee Policy Group, 
1994, 18-23). 
 
                                                          
8 This report is by far the most instructive historical account of U.S. intervention in Somalia that traces the trajectory of 
Somalia’s hostility towards the West. See p. 6-49. 
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The end of the Cold War stimulated profound change in the international order as former Cold War 
allies experienced ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2005, 492-93). Somalia thus became an experimental subject 
for a new form of military engagement. In March 1993, the UN passed Resolution 814 that significantly 
expanded its mandate to intervene in states’ internal affairs. In effect, for the first time in its history, the 
UN considered an intra-state conflict as posing a significant threat to international security despite the 
citizens’ right to self-determination. This resolution also broadened the UN mandate from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement (UN Brahimi Report, 2000, 9-12). The former involves the 
deployment of peacekeeping troops to support the implementation of a peace or ceasefire agreement. 
The latter involves the application of ‘all necessary means’, which implies the use of force and other 
coercive measures to restore peace and security in the face of a threat or breach of peace or act of 
aggression, potentially against the will of conflicting parties (UN DPKO, 2008, 18-19; See also p. 34, 
97-98). In the Somali experiment, the UN put a strong case for UNITAF’s transition to UNOSOM II, 
and recommended a peace enforcement operation.  
 
In May 1993 UNOSOM II was established as a model for more robust post-Cold War peace 
enforcement and state building. General Aideed who had little regard for the new organisation 
ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers thus compelling the UN to approve Resolution 837 to adopt 
a more aggressive military stance towards the General. In addition, the UN under the direction of U.S. 
Admiral Howe, known in some quarters as the ‘third warlord of Mogadishu’, issued a warrant for his 
arrest and a bounty (Refugee Policy Group, 1994, 38-42). An American attack on a major Aideed 
compound killed Somali elders some of whom were not Aideed supporters. This resulted in the 
revenge killing of four Western journalists displayed to the world press. The casualties were heavy on 
both sides but more importantly, civilian casualties were estimated at between 500 and 1500 (UN 
DPKO, 2003).  
 
As the battle between the UN and Aideed intensified in October 1993, the United States Rangers and 
the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) launched a military operation in Mogadishu and captured some 
suspects and two key Aideed aides.  However, in the course of the operation, Somali armed groups 
RPG-ed two US helicopters. During the evacuation of the detainees, the U.S. lost eighteen soldiers 
and suffered 75 wounded casualties under intense fire. Ghastly images of armed groups dragging 
bodies of US soldiers along the streets of Mogadishu were broadcast internationally. By November 
1993 the political turmoil and famine had displaced 1.7 million people. Circa 600,000 accounted for 
those internally displaced while more than one million people are estimated to have crossed into Kenya 
and Ethiopia. Citing a failed foreign policy, the US capitulated and withdrew most of its troops from 
Somalia in March 1994. UNOSOM on its part withdrew in March 1995 for lack of political results and 
repeated attacks on peacekeepers (UN DPKO, 2003). The combination of conflict, drought and a 
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botched foreign military intervention between 1992 and 1995 marked the third wave of large-scale 
displacement in Somalia. The U.S. intervention in Somalia has since shaped Somali public opinion 
and attitudes on foreign intervention.  
 
UNOSOM’s humiliating exit from Somalia was accompanied by international disengagement and 
gradual decline in foreign aid. In response to limited state authority, non-state actors, namely within 
traditional and religious institutions that had been weakened during the Barre regime begun fulfilling 
government functions. They exercised what has been described as ‘governance without government’ 
that also included maintaining the rule of law (Menkhaus, 2006, 75-82). While some communities drew 
upon the ‘xeer’ to govern their territories, others established local governance structures that became 
transitional systems for developing regional and trans-regional decentralised governance. These 
structures provided a semblance of peace such that much of Somalia became to be identified as a 
situation of ‘neither war nor peace’. Within this period in 1998, Somalia underwent further 
fragmentation when the main clans in the North East of Somalia led by the Darood clan reached a 
power sharing arrangement leading Puntland to proclaim itself a semi-autonomous state. In as much 
as Puntland has its own constitution, government and military, it is constitutionally a part of Somalia. 
The region predominantly inhabited by the Darood clan aspires for a unified Somali state, and has 
advocated for and formally endorsed the transitional federal process unlike its counterpart, the self-
declared state of Somaliland. The convergence of interests including security demands, commercial 
sector regulation, renewed inter-clan cooperation and inter-regional trade and Diaspora remittances 
increased the demand for governance. Private sector engagement in ‘Salafi’ commercial networks and 
an increase in Islamic philanthropy stimulated the growth of local Islamic charities, Shariah courts and 
Islamist movements (Bradbury & Healy, 2010, 10-14). The absence of a functioning state impelled 
Islamic institutions to fill the vacuum by providing a social welfare and judicial system with backing 
from the private sector (Bjorn, 2009, 13). 
 
From 1996 to mid-2006, there was a decrease in the number of new refugee arrivals in camps. This 
period saw relative stability with more localised conflict in South Central Somalia (Lindley, 2011, 16). 
A small number of refugees from Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti repatriated to Somalia only to languish 
as destitute internally displaced persons (Hammond, 2014, 6). In August 2006, the two Central Somali 
regions of Galgudud and Mudug merged to form the decentralised state of Galmudug. The 
predominantly Sa’ad clan territory considers itself an autonomous federal state within the larger 
Somalia (Mosley, 2015, 10). The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and institution of 
Shariah law in Somalia in 2006 ushered a period of relative peace and stability for the first time in 




However, this fleeting period of amity was suddenly disrupted in a move that reformulated the security 
structure and architecture of the Greater Horn region. In December 2006, the Ethiopian troops with 
the support of the United States invaded Somalia to counter Al Qaeda’s growing influence in the Horn 
of Africa (Bradbury & Healy, 2010, 14). The internally displaced fled to the refugee camps in Kenya 
and Ethiopia while Al Shabaab obstructed their flight through direct attacks that included the launch of 
assaults inside Dadaab Refugee Complex (Hammond, 2014, 7). Ethiopia’s invasion scuttled elements 
of the ICU and fragmented the institution resulting in the formation of Al Shabaab by the youth wing 
(Bradbury & Healy, 2010, 14). A combination of military occupation and rising Islamist insurgency 
reversed the political and economic gains made in the late 1990s. This period witnessed the 
reconfiguration of the Somali civil conflict within the context of the global war on terror that marked the 
fourth phase of mass displacement. By 2010 approximately 1.3 million people had been forcibly 
displaced, 3.6 million people required food aid and an average of 60,000 Somalis continued to flee the 
country on a yearly basis (IOM, 2014, 13).  
 
There has been an unsteady stream of new refugee arrivals driven by a mix of political and 
environmental reasons. Between 2010 and 2011, Somalia experienced an unprecedented drought 
and famine that further triggered a mass influx of about 142,000 refugees to Dadaab (Lindley, 2011, 
22). The international community has presided over fifteen peace agreements in Somalia yet the 
country continues to experience threats to stability. Local conflicts continue to erupt over access and 
control of resources, exclusion and marginalisation from services, grievances over government 
policies, and in some cases the misappropriation of international aid.  Somalia typifies a hybrid 
governance system punctuated by surrogate regimes, each stamping its authority. These include 
religious institutions, territorial militia, formal government structures, traditional institutions, and local 
and international civil society organisations supported by foreign governments and trans-national 
companies. Consequently, the applicability of bilateral negotiations between state and armed 
opposition defies the traditional state-centric model of peacemaking (UNDP, 2012, xvii-xix, 17-26). 
 
The militarisation of politics has signalled the proliferation of armed opposition groups that have battled 
for control of the state with wanton disregard for basic rules of governance and civilian welfare. These 
groups controlled different parts of the country due to long periods of the absence of a central 
government or non-functioning governments thus qualifying the status of a juridical rather than an 
empirical state (Jackson, 1992, 4-9). A disturbing trend has been the conscription of young and 
displaced people into armed groups with promises of rewards (UNICEF, 2004, 4-5).  
 
Since the Barre regime, environmental degradation and resource conflicts persist. Poor regulation and 
illegal allocation of idle and unregistered land has led to multiple claims over ownership. Further, 
foreign mineral exploration companies stoke conflict between clans and administrations in disputed 
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regions. As an illustration, Puntland and Somaliland have laid territorial claims on the potentially oil-
rich regions of Sool and Sanaag. Oil exploration companies have been mired in the conflict over 
competing grants of exploration rights and licence issuance by both disputants. The dynamic is further 
complicated by Sool Sanaag Cayn (SSC) administration’s separatist ambitions since 2009 (Lindley, 
2013, 295-303).  
 
Somalia has not been spared from the ravages of environmental degradation emanating from both 
natural and manmade causes. A number of factors including climate change, deforestation and ozone 
layer depletion has increased the threat to environmental security. Reduced access to pasture and 
water during dry spells that triggers inter-group resource conflict illustrates one of the ripple effects of 
environmental degradation. Additionally, food security is a continuing threat with the most recent 
famine experienced in 2011. It is estimated that about 87% of Somalis rely on wood fuel while 14% of 
the country has undergone deforestation. Landmines in Somaliland and Puntland are estimated at 12 
million and between 25 and 50,000 respectively (Mbugua, 2013, 13-14). Between 1991 and 1999, 
more than 200 foreign fishing vessels were involved in illegal fishing in Somali waters (Lucas, 2013, 
57-58; See also UNEP, 2006, 133). In 2002 alone, foreign fishing vessels had illegally trawled 60,000 
tonnes of fish from Somali waters (Mbugua, 2013, 13). More importantly, Western industrialised 
countries took advantage of the state collapse and the absence of Somali maritime regulation and 
dumped nuclear and other toxic waste along the Somali coastline. This has had toxic effects not only 
on the environment but also on the general health of Somalis (UNEP, 2006, 134; See also Mohamed, 
2001; Lucas, 2013, 60). This maritime encroachment led to the rise of de facto coastguards who 
gradually morphed into the infamous Somali pirates (Lucas, 2013, 59). Meanwhile, Somalia and Kenya 
are locked in a maritime dispute that has seen the former institute proceedings at the International 
Court of Justice over Kenya’s illegal oil exploration (ICJ, 2014).  
 
Somalia still ranks low in the Human Development Index (HDI) and has not fully recovered from the 
economic decline that preceded the 1991 collapse of the Barre regime. Local businesses have 
flourished and withstood some of the economic shocks. However, the country has suffered a dearth 
in large-scale and long-term investment. Attempts to develop and diversify the economy are 
constrained by a lack of institutional capacity. Regulations governing investment and banking are 
opaque and subject to frequent change, further discouraging entrepreneurial activity. The labour 
market remains underdeveloped, and much of the labour force is employed in the informal sector. The 
general breakdown of infrastructure coupled with institutionalised corruption has weakened the 
government’s capacity to deliver basic services and increased reliance on foreign aid. There is 
widespread development inequality across clans and regions that has been aggravated by the conflict 
situation. There is a 67% unemployment rate among the youth who account for over 70% of the Somali 
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population. Approximately 82% of Somalis are reported to live below the poverty line while the literacy 
level is circa 38%. As a result, poverty and lack of livelihoods, challenges also associated with the 
‘youth bulge’, have increased vulnerability to crime (UNDP, 2012, 31-64; See also World Bank, 2018).9  
 
Despite the grim outlook, Somalia conducted peaceful elections in 2017 and has drafted its first 
National Development Plan. The economic growth has been modest, continues to be vulnerable to 
recurrent shocks, and grew by just 2.3% in 2017, down from 4.4% in 2016. The average annual GDP 
growth of 2.5% between 2013 and 2017 has not translated into poverty reduction. Somalia ranks last 
in the 2018 Doing Business rankings partly due to insecurity and a poor business environment. The 
fragile political and financial institutions notwithstanding, Somalia’s mobile money market is among the 
most vibrant globally (World Bank, 2018, v-11). Somalia was also host to 15,877 refugees and 15,959 
asylum seekers from Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Ethiopia and other countries as at 2018 (UNHCR, 
2018b), thereby constituting a source and host state for refugees. 
 
AMISOM’s intervention to bolster the stabilisation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
particularly in the reduction of the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other AOGs resulted into more 
anarchy during the initial years. Displacement patterns have since been dynamic following AMISOM 
troops’ sustained efforts to liberate Somalia from its status as a terror outpost (Lindley, 2013, 300-
301). The U.S. has re-engaged in Somalia and conducted drone strikes since 2011. Approximately 
500 troops have been deployed to train Somali forces. The troops have been engaged in ground 
operations and have also increased airstrikes against Al Shabaab positions since the Trump 
presidency (Bearak, 2019). The latest entrant in the peacekeeping calculus in Somalia under the 
auspices of the UN is the British army (BBC, 2016b). Most recently in 2013, the Ras Kambooni armed 
opposition group, largely from the Ogaden sub-clan (Darood clan) spearheaded the formation of 
Jubaland State that borders Kenya and Ethiopia to the south. Kenya has been sympathetic to the 
polity’s interim administration and militarily and diplomatically backed the formation of the new state 
after both parties wrestled the strategic port of Kismayo from Al Shabaab’s grip (Mosley, 2015, 9-12).  
 
The creation of Jubaland meets Kenya’s interests to secure the border between Kenya and Somalia 
and effectively acts as a ‘buffer zone’ to avert external threats like Al Shabaab. Ethiopia feels 
threatened by the creation of an Ogaden-majority polity that may whip clan consciousness among their 
kin in Ethiopia and potentially renew secessionist ambitions of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. The 
territory is currently considered an emerging semi-autonomous federal state even as the Somali 
government remains circumspect on its formation. The creation of Jubaland has received broad 
                                                          




support from refugees at Dadaab Refugee Complex, many of whom hail from the South and also 
participated in the ‘state-making’ consultations (IRIN News, 2013). Notably, in comparison to clannism, 
Islamism in Somalia has never been a robust political rallying point for Somalis. Nevertheless, 
Islamism has prevailed as an instrument of mass mobilisation when cast against foreign non-Islamic 
antagonism such as British colonialism, the U.S.-Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2002, 110) and most recently 
AMISOM interventions. 
 
3.4 The Kenyan Security Conundrum: Dadaab Refugee Complex 
 
In recent years, the issue of insecurity at Dadaab Refugee Complex and its environs has been a 
growing source of concern. Moreover, Somali refugees at Dadaab have been the target of 
condemnations over their alleged role in terrorist attacks in Kenya. In setting the background, what 
informed the Kenyan government’s characterisation of Dadaab as a nursery for Al Shabaab? Further, 
what propelled Kenya’s excessive counter-terrorism measures that qualified Dadaab as among its 
major targets? The evolution of the security landscape at Dadaab and its environs can instruct the 
understanding on Kenya’s militaristic posturing. To begin with, the role of Kenyan security agencies is 
an important strand in the fabric of insecurity in the region. Dadaab refugees regularly experience 
human rights violations in the hands of Kenyan law enforcement agencies. More specifically, the state 
of insecurity at the camp is closely linked to limited access to justice and lack or limited protection by 
security agencies. When Somalis are charged with unlawful entry and presence in Kenya, the judicial 
system does not protect their right to seek asylum (Lindley, 2011, 36). Incidents of police harassment 
through arbitrary detention of refugees and forceful return over unlawful entry into Kenya is prevalent 
(RCK, 2012, 11-14). The failure of these measures to curb unlawful entries into the country is 
noteworthy since refugees have resorted to human smuggling to avoid police detection. In addition, 
state agents who are custodians of security have perpetuated the existing culture of corruption and 
impunity through the financial extortion of refugees.    
 
Once in the camp, the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), formerly the Department of Refugee Affairs, 
often arbitrarily declines to issue refugees with movement passes. Be that as it may, this deterrent 
strategy has been ineffective particularly among those determined to leave the camp without a pass. 
While some refugees are intercepted enroute, others manage to travel by use of counterfeit identity 
documents (Lindley, 2011, 34-8). Moreover, it is impractical to enforce some of these policies due to 
government officials’ ineptness and complicity in circumventing the system. Security officers have 
been reported to engage in bribery to facilitate free movement of refugees beyond camp precincts 
(Campbell et al, 2011, 17). The authorities are generally tolerant of the presence of self-settled Somali 
refugees in Nairobi. However, refugees who end up apprehended are often subjected to further police 
harassment. The officers habitually ask for bribes from refugees who wish to evade arrest and threaten 
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compulsory relocation to the camps. Those unable to raise bribes inevitably face re-encampment 
(RCK, 2012, 15). Corruption is similarly rife in the issuance of Kenyan identity cards. The attainment 
of Kenyan legal status is often regrettably acquired through bribery of corrupt government officials. 
Campaigning politicians desperate for votes have also been linked to the irregular issuance of identity 
cards to refugees in order to gain undue advantage over their political opponents. For the most part, 
corruption has enhanced the free movement of refugees who can now live, work and access 
government services with no restrictions (Lindley, 2011, 36). 
 
Subsequent to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Kenya, widespread insecurity at Dadaab was 
attributed to poverty within the immediate host community, failed humanitarian interventions, the camp 
make-up and Kenya’s declining political economy (Crisp, 1999, 13-23). The integration of refugees 
and Islamists posed a further challenge to insecurity causing the camp to be viewed as a recruitment 
and training ground for terrorist organisations (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008, 221-3). The terrorist imprint 
at Dadaab was traced to the presence of Islamist organisations such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiya with links 
to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Ittihad and other organisations exploited the festering refugee 
frustration over the privation emerging from the protracted humanitarian crisis (Loescher & Milner, 
2005a, 41; Kagwanja & Juma, 2008, 221). They further exploited the Somali Hawilaad or Hudi banking 
systems that sidestep paper trails to finance activities among camp refugees, sponsor the war and 
purchase weapons (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008, 221-3). The Hawilaad system was also used to remit 
funds from the Western Somali Diaspora to refugees at Dadaab (Horst & van Hear, 2002, 32-34).  
 
Islamic charities in the camp such as the degazetted Al Haramain Foundation was further accused of 
facilitating terrorism (Kagwanja & Juma, 2008, 221-23). The U.S. global war on terror and the ensuing 
global shutdown of al-Barakaat and Hawilaad offices in Dadaab dealt a huge blow to refugee 
livelihoods and intensified anti-Americanism (Horst & van Hear, 2002, 32-34). Research (Kagwanja & 
Juma, 2008, 223; see also Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 41) conducted at Dadaab Refugee Camp 
between 1997 and 2006 revealed close collaboration between al-Haramain Foundation and al-Ittihad. 
al-Haramain Foundation conducted religious training and provided food donations in the camp. This 
partnership, aimed to ‘defend Islam and the Somali nation’, and provided political education to Somali 
refugees designed along ‘Pakistan-style madrassa classes’. 
 
Various reports have suggested the potential for insurgency by armed groups or political factions using 
camps as operational bases, as indicated in the activities of Al Shabaab and the Kenyan government. 
Between 2009 to 2011, the Kenyan government trained and conscripted thousands of Somali youths 
from the predominantly Somali North Eastern Province of Kenya and Dadaab Refugee Camp to join 
the Somali Government troops in the fight against Al Shabaab in Somalia (Wikileaks cables, 2009; 
Wikileaks cables, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2009, 2012). In addition, other youths were trained in 
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Djibouti, Uganda and Ethiopia. The Kenyan government’s failure to fulfil its financial contractual 
obligations led to mass desertion. Reports reveal that some of the disgruntled youths joined Al 
Shabaab while others returned to Kenya and have been absorbed into terrorist sleeper cells (Standard, 
2015). At the same time, Al Shabaab recruited youths from the camp (Human Rights Watch, 2009, 
2012; Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013) while others voluntarily departed the camp to join the 
organisation in Somalia (Wikileaks cables, 2010). A U.S. Department of State Report (2014) further 
corroborates accounts of Al Shabaab’s recruitment of children from Kenya’s refugee camps. To quote 
one research interviewee: 
 
It (Al Shabaab) was recruiting from the camps (Dadaab). Those two entities (and government) were recruiting 
at the same time. Al Shabaab went further and took advantage of the boys who had been recruited to the Isiolo 
Brigade since Jubaland had failed to pay their salaries. Al Shabaab had a lot of money yet up to this day the 
government is unable to pay its soldiers… There may be a remote possibility that there are a few Al Shabaab 
elements in the camps. But some of the returnees who went to fight alongside the Isiolo Brigade came back 
with gunshot wounds and we know them… Al Shabaab members made contact with widows who welcomed 
them…  (Hera – INGO Security Manager, personal communication, February 8, 2017) 
 
Further research conducted by the Refugee Consortium (2012) reveals that 56% of refugees 
interviewed felt unsafe as a result of IEDs and the presence of Al Shabaab elements in the camps. At 
the same time, 12% of respondents expressed fear of recruitment of children into Al Shabaab. Child 
protection agencies and parents have in the past encountered both specific cases of conscription and 
the threat of conscription by Al Shabaab. There have also been reports of attacks on refugee leaders 
charged with safety oversight in the camps. The report partially attributes the state of insecurity to the 
massive refugee influx of 2011, lack of screening at the border, and corruption and weak capacity of 
security enforcement agencies. The research (p.47) further highlights the key findings of the UNHCR 
Participatory Assessment report (2012) and concludes that the absence of security screening of new 
refugee arrivals enabled the smuggling of weapons into the camps. 
 
In fact, a 2013 study commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council and the UNHCR identified 
voluntary and forced conscription of youth within the camp into Al Shabaab, and increased criminal 
elements within the camp as some of the major protection issues. The study further acknowledged the 
camp security situation as compromised due to the presence of members of Al Shabaab operating 
under the guise of refugees, and a refugee constituency of Al Shabaab sympathisers (Danish Refugee 
Council & UNHCR 2013). Notwithstanding this, fears and concerns abound among Somalis over Al 
Shabaab’s possible infiltration of the refugee camp following the unresolved murders of a couple of 
individuals perceived to have cooperated with the police on security matters (Lindley, 2011). Dadaab 
refugee camp has also been used as a ‘safe haven’ for the storage of stockpiles of arms trafficked 
from Somalia in transit to other destinations in the region (International Peace Institute 2011). 
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Following the spectacular terrorist attack at Garissa University, the chairman of the Kenya Refugee 
Affairs Commission, Ali Korane, confirmed that the terrorists stayed and assembled their arms at the 
camp (The Guardian 2015). A security expert further discusses this possibility: 
 
When the refugees cross the border, they can be anyone including men in uniforms who can shed their uniforms 
but smuggle in arms into the camp. The camps become a place to stockpile arms. The Somalis are very close 
even though they may have clan differences. They protect their kin and also because of fear they will not share 
such information with the authorities. (Dr. Wekesa – Security Expert, personal communication, February 3, 
2017)  
 
In the aftermath of the Westgate Shopping Mall and Garissa University terrorist attacks in 2013 and 
2015, the Kenyan government threatened to shut down Dadaab Refugee Complex and forcefully 
repatriate Somali refugees. The Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for both attacks that resulted in 
more than 60 and 140 deaths respectively (Daily Nation, 2016). The government claimed that the 
Westgate attack exposed the connection between the perpetrators and the camp. Specific assertions 
include the incrimination of some Somali refugees hailing from Dadaab and Kakuma camps as among 
the perpetrators. Further, the assault weapons used in the Westgate attack are alleged to have been 
smuggled through Dadaab (Kamau, 2017). While weapon smuggling does not constitute an act of 
terrorism per se, it facilitates the goals of terrorist organisations (Fishman, 2010, 62). There are 
additional camp-specific incidents that predate these attacks. In September 2011, suspected Al 
Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan driver working for CARE, an international NGO with operations 
in Dadaab (IRIN News, 2011). In October the same year, two MSF doctors were abducted and their 
driver murdered (Rice, 2011). Rawlence (2016, 38; also see p. 145) further describes Al Shabaab’s 
subdued presence and eventual activation in the camp in the wake of Kenya’s incursion into Somalia: 
 
Al-Shabaab’s presence in Dadaab was a watchful one. It didn’t have the strength or the desire to start 
kidnapping refugees and picking a fight with the UN and Kenya. At that time, it saw Dadaab primarily as a place 
to get medical treatment and stock up on food. All that would change though, with Kenya’s invasion of Somalia 
ten months later. Then, Dadaab would become a battleground and one of the first bombs would be placed 
here… 
 
The general security situation at the camp continued to worsen through 2011 when the Kenya Defence 
Forces launched ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ to counter Al Shabaab’s incursion into Kenya. In 2012, 
suspected Al Shabaab members murdered one and abducted four foreign workers from the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (Al Jazeera, 2012). By 2013, there was increased reporting of incidents of rape, 
shootings, assault and murder. Discoveries of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, shootings and 
the use of remote controlled IEDs had become regular occurrences at the camp. The threat of 
abductions affected humanitarian agencies’ operations and prompted the scale-back of interventions 
(IRIN News, 2011). In 2015, suspected Al Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan teacher, raising 
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further concerns of insecurity at the camp (Hajir, 2015). A newspaper security brief10 suggests that the 
abduction of ‘nosy’ aid workers and security officers is often aimed at ransom procurement and 
intimidation though this has not been the case in Dadaab (Kamau, 2017).  
 
Some research interviewees attributed the state of insecurity to either Al Shabaab or a fall-out between 
illicit cross-border trade cartels. The newspaper brief further reports that the retail businesses in the 
camp source contraband sugar, cooking oil and milk powder from the Middle East and Somalia. On 
their part, trucks that ply Al Shabaab-controlled areas pay tax to facilitate the transportation of goods 
between Kenya and Somalia. Tax collection is done in Dadaab and remitted to Al Shabaab through 
the hawala money transfer system. The government mapped the transportation routes and identified 
Dadaab as the nucleus for VHF radio communication. Further, a radio operator connects with Al 
Shabaab operatives disguised as cross-border cattle herders whose role is to establish security patrol 
points. The government acknowledges the involvement of other actors in Kenya, including top level 
bureaucrats engaged in joint business ventures with Al Shabaab (Kamau, 2017).  
 
That said, the government disclosed that in 2015, eight men infiltrated Dadaab Refugee Complex. 
Some camp dwellers facilitated the acquisition of Kenyan identity cards prior to their travel to Nairobi. 
An additional five men are reported to have blended with refugees and some terrorists. One woman is 
also claimed to have conspired with a senior mastermind of the Garissa University terrorist attack that 
claimed 147 lives. The then Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, Dr. Karanja Kibicho noted, 
‘Dadaab is not a joke…That this is a haven for terrorists is not academic’. He further adduced that the 
presence of Al Shabaab sympathisers and supporters in the camp was indicative of the contagion of 
religious extremism from Somalia. The country’s security apparatus familiar with these dynamics 
therefore view unscreened asylum seekers as conduits for weapons, intelligence gathering and 
militarisation (Kamau, 2017).  
 
Meanwhile, a chemist operating in the pretext of relief aid and owned by an Al Shabaab operative is 
alleged to have served Al Shabaab members and facilitated a terrorist attack in Garissa County. The 
camp drug supply chain also serves other Al Shabaab hubs, namely Boni Forest in Lamu and Somalia. 
The government portrays this particular case as exemplifying several other fronts disguised as 
legitimate business establishments in the camp. Al Shabaab commercial investments also include 
schools, money transfer outlets, retail stores and madrassas in Dadaab such as Masjid Najah and Al 
Haramain linked to the deceased terrorist, Mohamed Kuno. The poorly policed camp also became a 
base for the mobilisation of funds and weapon smuggling by human traffickers active in the camp, 
Somalia and Nairobi. The infamous Al Shabaab recruiters, Eric Ogada and Ramadhan Kufungwa, 
                                                          
10 The newspaper brief (Kamau, 2017) is based on government security sources and has been referenced accordingly. 
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similarly operated in the camp. Kufungwa’s wife, Rukia Faraj, who also appears in the most wanted 
list helped him evade police capture through the camp into Somalia. This elaborate mosaic of 
insecurity forms the backdrop of government claims of Dadaab as a rich source for the recruitment of 
desperate youths and its attendant posturing towards refugees and efforts to improve screening 
(Kamau, 2017).  
 
The emerging evidence suggests possible radicalisation and militarisation of some refugees at 
Dadaab. While the civilian character of the camp has been compromised, it must be remembered that 
no refugee has been convicted of terrorism charges and the statistics cited by government are 
negligible. An important feature intrinsic to the character of a camp is the degree to which the 
relationship between the combatants and civilians is coercive or consensual (Loescher, et al., 2008, 
76). Correspondingly, the nature of relationships between vulnerable civilians and Al Shabaab at 
Dadaab may have revolved around logistical support, fundraising, ideological indoctrination and 
recruitment. To recap, research interviewees cited several other drivers of the state of insecurity at the 
camp. Some described the ‘phantomisation’ of Al Shabaab, which facilitates camp infiltration and 
impedes detection. Others reported the fear of retribution from Al Shabaab and the threat of 
victimisation by the state as fostering silence, as captured below:  
 
I belonged to a group known as Community Police Security Team (CPST). I was a member of the committee. 
You never know who is your friend and who is your enemy. Explosions could happen, and a community leader 
is killed either in Dagahaley and Hagadera camp. The chairman of the CPST was killed one evening and that 
is when I decided to leave the camp… I was sent threatening text messages and also received anonymous 
threatening calls. I thought because there were elements of Al Shabaab in the camp, they must have been the 
ones. They have a tradition of threatening and asking you to stop doing certain things and can also send text 
messages. It also felt like they were Al Shabaab especially after the kidnappings and how the hostages were 
released. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
I suspect everyone when I move around in the market. I live in constant fear because I know the people who 
are threatening me could be in this camp. The problem you are talking about (Al Shabaab in the camp) is real 
but I cannot talk freely to explain the details. That should tell you something. (Anonymous, Refugee)11 
 
People in the camps are afraid of Al Shabaab and there may be some people who are sympathetic to them. We 
cannot ask a refugee to report on Al Shabaab because that person’s life will be jeopardised. (Amina – UNHCR 
Protection Officer, personal communication, February 18, 2017) 
 
The glaring security conundrum at Dadaab and the interplay of multiple undercurrents have influenced 
wider security dynamics within Kenya, Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region. In recent years, 
the Kenyan government has played a more active role in the reception and registration of refugees 
                                                          




due to security concerns. Some of the regional security threats include the potential spill-over of the 
Somali conflict; Al Shabaab recruitment and activity within Kenya; the potential union of grievances 
between Somali-Kenyans in North Eastern Province and extremist organisations; dissention within the 
Muslim minority community (Lindley, 2011, 23); and the proliferation of illicit arms in the Greater Horn 
region (Wasara, 2002, 54-55). These regional threats tend to have microcosmic ramifications at the 
camp level. Notably, historical, political, social, cultural, technological and economic structures present 
vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a camp context. While refugees are often constructed as victims and 
a threat, the role of other actors in relation to these structures remains undervalued. Whereas the 
Kenyan government has maintained accusations of (non)violent radicalisation at the camp, it has 
sanitised its own role in the process. Moreover, the role of other actors, indeterminate camp 
confinement and the insufferable camp conditions that invariably spawn liminality have been largely 
overlooked. Suffice it to say that the convergence of a multiplicity of actors and factors creates a zone 
of exclusion that generates grievances, which can create distress and propel individuals towards 
action. 
 
3.5 Pre and Post-flight Dynamics: The Impact of Conflict on Populations  
 
So far, the thesis has traced the historical trajectory of the Somali conflict, the migration dynamics and 
initial links with the camp context. In establishing further links, it is important to examine the impact of 
conflict and forced migration on refugees and the state. The experience of protracted conflict inscribes 
deep physical and psychological wounds on affected populations. Regardless of the phase of conflict, 
people would typically have participated in, experienced and witnessed acts of violence that lead to 
large scale pain and suffering. The fatalities, injury, material loss, other forms of injustice, insufferable 
levels of destruction in addition to the loss of sense of safety and security leave devastating emotional 
legacies on affected populations (Diamond, 1997, 15-18). A study (Halcon et al., 2004) conducted on 
Somali and Oromo refugees was consistent with findings from other studies that showed a high 
correlation between trauma, psychological and physical problems. These studies also found that there 
may be differences between groups in their experiences and response mechanisms. Other studies 
have found that refugees who have survived conflict trauma experience physical and psychological 
problems such as anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (Fawzi et al., 1997; Ichikawa 
et al., 2006; Lindert et al., 2009; Sulaiman-Hill & Thompson, 2012; Alemi et al., 2016). 
 
Conflict also has ramifications on movement of people and can result in displaced populations and 
restricted movements (World Bank, 2005, 7-8). Prior to fleeing their home country, conflict-affected 
populations, including those likely to seek asylum, experience psychosocial disorientation. The kinetics 
of migration activates triggers for conflict and mental health problems during the ‘period of 
decompensation’ or crisis at the resettlement phase (Alemi et al., 2016, 631). The progression of 
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conflict undermines interpersonal and communal trust, and vitiates positive overtures from external 
actors. Further, community capacity to address conflict non-violently becomes significantly diminished. 
Groups can go into either extreme of rallying behind a trusted leader or lose trust in their leaders, 
altogether. If the former, they recreate a situation typical of mass hypnosis where they unquestioningly 
follow their leader. Their capacity to challenge their leader’s rhetoric becomes weakened including 
their ability to generate constructive and proactive solutions. They develop rigid inter-group 
perceptions that are negative, stereotypical and prejudicial of the ‘other’ but are generally accepted as 
truth (Diamond, 1997, 16-17). This occurs in the absence of any accountability for attitudes and actions 
(Kunz, 1981, 42). Opportunities for bridging polarisation are ignored, limited, devalued or criminalised. 
Due to the erosion of positive social capital, groups tend to strengthen intra-group as opposed to inter-
group bonds as a coping mechanism to external threats (Moser & Shrader, 1999, 9).  
 
Conflict may be sustained by denying people an opportunity for healing and reconciliation through 
appropriate restorative justice mechanisms. As a result, the cumulative psychological trauma can act 
as a mobilising driver for retribution among disaffected groups. More specifically, individuals tend to 
present with post-traumatic stress disorder observed through anxiety, recurrent flashbacks and 
dreams, short term memory loss, depression, guilt, among other signs. Pervasive fear engulfs them 
over the possible recurrence of traumatic events. Symbolic actions or events that may appear 
harmless could stimulate disproportionate fearful responses (Diamond, 1997, 16-18). The loss of home 
can be kept alive through individual nostalgic memories of aspects of the lost home worth 
remembering. This process forms a vision of what the past and present should represent (Warner, 
1994, 171-72). 
 
At the same time, a culture of victimhood that lionises victims of suffering alongside competition over 
who suffered most and thus deserves more sympathy and restitution can emerge. Unresolved grief 
from maiming, material loss and death of loved ones becomes protracted and may be used for political 
ends. Consequently, loss and pain become mythologised and ingrained in the form of inter-
generational narratives that work against social transformation (Diamond, 1997, 17-18). Further, these 
outcomes can manifest as hostility towards close relations and other groups. Individuals may 
transpose the responsibility of violence to the ‘other’ without acknowledging their role or collective 
responsibility in the conflict. Subsequently, blame and projection become crucial strategies in 
peacemaking as they may be used in delegitimising the ‘other’ while ascribing the good to ‘our’ side. 
This dialogical drift may be exhibited through the use of divisive, unconscionable and uncompromising 
language of ‘either-or’ and ‘us-them’ where a zero-sum game is typically assumed. If not stemmed, 
the discourse can advance to dehumanisation of the ‘other’ who are portrayed as less human or 
personified as evil as a result of their role in the conflict. Moreover, simple words and gestures by the 
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out-group may elicit excessive reactivity that can escalate tensions and increase the potential for actual 
violence between the groups (Diamond, 1997, 16-18). Notably, the use of propaganda is reciprocal; 
one group’s discourse and action influence the other group’s response (Power and Peterson, 2011, 
27-29). 
 
The effects of conflict also increase children’s susceptibility to shocks during their formative years. 
During conflict, children are sometimes abducted and forcefully conscripted into armed groups. Those 
who resist may be tortured or killed while those who take flight from their captors usually face 
stigmatisation from family and larger community (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon, 2004, 114). In addition, 
children in conflict situations not only witness but are also forced to commit atrocities. As an illustration, 
forcefully conscripted children in Northern Uganda and Mozambique were forced to execute a parent 
or a community member to guarantee loyalty and prevent them from returning home. At the post-
conflict phase, as difficult times bear on the family unit, children who witness their parents’ 
powerlessness may come to disrespect figures of authority and also become disillusioned. Post-
conflict Northern Uganda for example reported a high school dropout rate and poor performance in 
state exams. In addition, young men were reported to have joined gangs, abused alcohol and engaged 
in petty crimes (p. 149-150).  
 
3.6 Between Old and New Home 
 
Refugees have been variously classified based on their attitudes towards displacement, and 
resettlement experiences and outcome. Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2003) have identified passive and 
active refugees. Kunz’s (1981) trichotomous categorisation is based on refugees’ social relationship 
with their home country. The first group, ‘majority-identified refugees’, strongly believes that their 
passive and active opposition to the prevailing political system in their homeland is shared by majority 
of their compatriots. The second group, ‘events-alienated refugees’, exhibit ambivalence or 
disgruntlement due to events preceding their refugee situation or past discrimination by a section of 
their compatriots. They constitute a group that has been marginalised or suppressed and rejected by 
a nation they (once) identified with. Unlike majority-identified refugees, they rarely show interest to 
repatriate. They constitute religious, ethnic and other minorities such as German Jews, Rohingya in 
Myanmar and the Oromo in Ethiopia. The third group ‘self-alienated refugees’, are exiles who do not 
identify with their homelands for individual ideological reasons and whose departure is not necessarily 
influenced by broader systemic factors (Kunz, 1981, 42-43). That said, the potential for overlap within 
these designations is noteworthy. 
 
All things considered, the common distinction between victim and perpetrator in conflict situations can 
be illusive since it typifies individuals as either good or evil and belonging to either distinct category. 
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Yet an individual can project a range of attributes, both negative and positive at different points. 
Further, a perpetrator can be both active and passive, an element that further distorts the images of 
victim and perpetrator. A passive perpetrator can be complicit to a violation or atrocity by witnessing a 
crime without taking action, or become drawn into conflict through less visible and ingrained negative 
attitude towards others. In ascribing moral judgements, the disaggregation of victims as innocent and 
pure and perpetrators as guilty and evil should consider the obscurity of both categories (Jenkins et 
al., 2018, 25-27). Therefore, upon arrival to a host country, it is likely that self-alienated refugees with 
strong political, religious or ideological inclinations continue to pursue their aims. They can either found 
idealist settlements and practice new values undisrupted by the outer world, or focus attention on 
revolutionising their homeland. The latter believe that their cause is shared by a majority of their 
compatriots back home and may experience the guilt of detachment from their countrymen’s fate. As 
a corollary, they may perceive ‘historical responsibility’ to compensate for their freedom by pursuing 
the cause and championing the rights of their suppressed compatriots (Kunz, 1981, 45-46). In some 
cases, the inter-generational memorialisation of grievances instructs their worldview and adaptation 
beyond the camp environment, and may partially explain the phenomenon of foreign jihadists.  
 
Past stories, both pleasant and morbid, adapted over time become a collective narrativisation of home 
and exile. Structured memorialisation rituals are organised in celebration of important dates and the 
deceased. As an example, the Greek Cypriot refugees living in London have established a village 
committee to share past stories and keep memories of the homeland alive. The rituals and celebrations 
connect second and third generation children to victims of violence. The passing of memory to the 
next generation is also an important way of maintaining connection to the lost home. This explains 
how second and third generation refugees are familiar with intimate details of memories of lost homes 
inherited from their parents. Feelings of nostalgia are sometimes encouraged as forms of political 
campaigns against past oppressors. As a result, inherited narratives of loss can pervade an individual’s 
consciousness to demonstrate their memories and search for restitution for that which they did not 
experience (Taylor, 2013, 136-46).  
 
The potency of conflict memory cannot be emphasised enough. Survey data that examined conflict-
affected and conflict-averted zones in Croatia concluded that in post-conflict situations, the memories 
that one group has of another during times of conflict can influence current inter-group attitudes. Thus, 
in order to understand contemporary post-conflict dynamics, it is important to understand the role of 
symbols and narratives in the context of memory and history (Bresco, 2011, 49-51). While some 
refugees are politically inclined, others in an effort to erase their guilt and past may opt to assimilate 
and pursue material success. Between the revolutionaries and assimilationists are the passive ones 
who remain hurt and the realists who seek a form of integration that is consistent with their past and 
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present roles. Whichever trajectory they pursue, the role-phases shift unpredictably between 
progression and regression from the day of flight until their eventual demise or repatriation (Kunz, 
1981, 45-46). 
 
The impact of refugee flows on host states and vice versa is an important dimension for exploration. 
Acute refugee movement is occasioned by sudden political triggers that in turn compels movement. 
As discussed, refugees witness atrocities, experience violations and also hold political beliefs and 
alignments, and are therefore intrinsically political (Lederach, 1997, 8). The presence of refugees can 
therefore alter the political configurations of the affected host country and region. Refugee flows 
influence the relationship between their countries of origin and the host states. Their home countries 
may use them as foreign policy instruments just in a similar manner the hosting states can find 
themselves inadvertently enmeshed in the former’s domestic politics that can also have regional 
ramifications. Refugee ethnic, political, religious and other ideological affinities with marginalised 
members of the host country may dramatically shift the domestic power equilibrium. Subsequently, the 
host country may experience an increase or unprecedented expressions of subversive activities aimed 
at changing the status quo. Refugees may be victimised in contexts experiencing political and 
economic vulnerabilities. Host communities may for instance perceive them as geneses of insecurity 
and hold them responsible for their economic disempowerment (Ek & Karadawi, 1991, 201).  
 
Ek and Karadawi (197-203) maintain that refugees constitute a political force irrespective of their 
causes of exile. They discuss the impact that Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees have had on intra-state 
political instability within Sudan and inter-state tensions between Sudan and the refugees’ countries 
of origin. Of interest is the Sudan government’s perception of refugees as constituting a security threat 
to the state. They discuss how the factionalisation of refugees, their possible infiltration by the 
Ethiopian intelligence unit, and the unprecedented militarisation of the Sudanese society has 
contributed to the government’s perception. They conclude that discourse on the refugee problem 
simplifies complex contextual issues and rarely accounts for the presence and actions of political 
groupings. While they have gone to great lengths to position the refugee flows within a historical 
context and discuss the ensuing dynamics, the paper largely focuses on the role of macro-political 
actors and does not critically address other actors and their contribution in the complex mechanics of 
insecurity. 
 
The camps themselves are emblematically highly politicised spaces where refugees assert their 
national, ethnic, political and other forms of identity. In fact, refugees are often warehoused to avert 
the spill-over of conflict into the host country. Additionally, warehousing prevents the camps from being 
used as training grounds and launching pads for military attacks on neighbouring countries linked to 
refugees. The oft-touted imperative of facilitating humanitarian assistance is characteristically a smoke 
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screen of the real encampment agenda. This under the impression that refugees can exert political 
influence in their countries of origin from within a camp setting. Apart from utilising camps as training 
grounds, refugees have been reported to engage in the dissemination of political messages and self-
mobilisation (Sanyal, 2011, 882-87). Further, armed opposition groups exploit environments of 
dissatisfaction and aimlessness for recruitment into their ranks or engagement in terrorist activities (Ek 
& Karadawi, 1991, 196-201; Loescher & Milner, 2008, 34-35).  
 
To summarise, while similarities may exist in group dynamics, individuals have diverse experiences 
based on their encounters, specific role in conflict and the prevailing social relationships. Upon 
becoming refugees, some may feel more marginalised by their homeland than others. During the 
resettlement phase, some of the refugee struggles may be traced back to their emotional links with 
their past and the nature of their identification with their homelands (Kunz, 1981, 42). As discussed, 
they transform into victims who both experience and feel humiliation. One study (Lacey, 2011) that 
applied a psychosocial lens that also focused on the role of emotion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in Gaza showed that individuals who experience and perceive humiliation are more likely to resort to 
violence. It must be remembered that a refugee is a cumulative embodiment of experiences that 
predate their asylum status. Correspondingly, the effects of conflict drive dysfunction at all levels of 
society, from the individual to systemic levels. The psychological reorientation at the individual and 
collective levels leads to a sense of helplessness and disillusionment. This level of dysfunction has a 
debilitating effect on the social, political, cultural, environmental and economic structures of society 
(Narayan et al., 2000, 2). When people have been violated, oppressed and dispossessed, they are 
naturally inclined towards anger and frustration that finds expression in escalating rage and ultimately 




The exploration of forced displacement in Somalia within a historical context has exposed the internal 
and external dynamics that are important in understanding the plight of Somali refugees. Most of the 
battles in Somalia have been waged along clan lines while the lack of inclusivity in national institutions 
continue to undermine the construction of a strong national identity. Moreover, the capacity to pursue 
peaceful conflict resolution remains a challenge. At the root of forced displacement is an intricate 
convergence of governance deficits, weak institutions, policy incoherence, and structural economic 
inequalities. For the most part, the armed struggle has been an enduring expression of the contestation 
of power aimed at renegotiating the distribution of resources. Upon displacement, certain factors have 
conspired to prolong the liminal state in a series of collapsed peacebuilding interventions that have 
underpinned the loss of assets, social and political marginalisation, loss of livelihoods and other 
opportunities, diminished access to basic services, and the breakdown and loss of social capital in the 
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homelands and host states (World Bank, 2014, 39). Somalia’s history and the regional and global 
dynamics of Islamism that interact with Dadaab Camp, largely neglected in terrorism discourse are 
crucial. It provides a good basis for understanding past refugee experiences, adaptive capacity and 
significantly, the inter-generational memorialisation of conflict. The cumulative individual and collective 
refugee experience therefore informs their world view and adaptive capacity to a complex interplay of 
internal and foreign stressors. Further, these processes are important in the understanding of the role 
of resilience and vulnerability in radicalisation. The upcoming chapter further develops the plot to the 
next phase of migration, encampment, and exposes the contradictions between turbulent homelands 
and places of refuge. The section further demonstrates the intensification of liminality and the 









































Chapter 4 – From Limbo to Limbo: Three Manifestations of Encampment  
 
This thesis conceives the practice of encampment as the containment of refugees in camps, detention 
facilities and migrant settlements in states that have experienced mass human migration. While 
refugee camps are commonly conceived in spatial and temporal dimensions, they are additionally 
symbolic representations. The spatial dimension formulates the camp as a physical space delineated 
with boundaries. Temporally, the original notion behind the conception of refugee camps was the 
establishment of temporary shelters that could act as safe havens pending the identification of 
resettlement sites that would enable refugees to become self-sufficient (Turner, 2015, 139-141). Yet 
this self-contradicting container imposes some degree of limitations on refugee freedoms. These 
camps, typified by fluid boundaries, characteristically exact a state of permanent impermanence as 
the duration of human confinement remains unknown. It is within these dimensions that subjective 
experiences of inclusion, participation and the access and enjoyment of freedoms models the third 
material dimension. While camps in the cities are visibly borderless, inside-outside sequestration 
persists (Turner, 2015, 141). Taking into account global contextual nuances, refugees, migrants and 
asylum seekers in host states are confronted with similar vulnerabilities on differing scales. Regardless 
of the form of encampment, these individuals converge around their quest for protection outside their 
countries of origin, and experience intermittent isolation as outsiders in the countries that eventually 
host them. 
 
This chapter further develops the embryonic argument from the previous chapter that asserts that the 
process of politicisation neither happens in a vacuum nor does it develop suddenly within a camp 
context. The first country of asylum for refugees is usually a neighbouring country that shares similar 
if not slightly differing dynamics of a conflict-habituated system. Many of the host countries particularly 
in the developing world face similar constraints of instability, are in post-conflict transition and are 
themselves fledgling democracies. While these safe havens ostensibly provide security and relief from 
suffering for refugees, they often present new dynamics that interact in a complex web of (sub)systems 
that may create vulnerabilities to radicalisation (Loescher & Milner, 2008, 3, 35-38). At the same time, 
national and international security policy privileges states’ territorial defence against external threats 
from adversarial states. Host states incessantly grapple with the challenge of balancing between 
humanitarianism and national security concerns. Oftentimes, gravitation towards the latter evidently 
intensifies liminality through securitisation and increases vulnerability to various stressors. There is 
ample evidence that suggests that displacement is not only a consequence but also a source of 
insecurity. In the same way, camps constitute both a temporary solution and a long-term problem. 
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are compelling cases in which PRS acted as a 
principal source or catalyst of the conflicts (Loescher et al, 2008, 5, 34-36; Turner, 2015, 140) 
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alongside other contextual antecedents. In this chapter, Dadaab Refugee Complex similarly 
underscores the transnational interconnectedness of (in)security dynamics and highlights systemic 
securitisation.  
 
4.1 The First Manifestation of Encampment 
 
The first manifestation of encampment arises from the practice of the interminable spatial confinement 
of refugees that has resulted in what is technically known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). 
The UNHCR recognises a refugee situation as protracted if 25,000 or more refugees from one country 
of origin have been hosted in another country for five or more consecutive years with no immediate 
prospects for durable solutions (UNHCR, 2018a, 22). Loescher et al. (2008, 7) and Betts (2006, 510) 
expose the limitation of UNHCR’s definition of PRS and maintain that it excludes ‘residual refugees 
who remain after repatriation, those outside UNHCR’s mandate, or changes that arise due to repeat 
migration’. An evaluative analysis of the concept should therefore be contextualised in order to curb 
against misleading categorisations or exclusion of situations that fit the broader description. That said, 
the 25 countries most affected by prolonged refugee presence are in the developing world (Guterres, 
2010). Protracted displacements would normally have progressed beyond the initial emergency phase 
with the overriding challenge presenting as developmental rather than humanitarian (UNHCR & World 
Bank, 2015, 29). Further, protracted displacement is symptomatic of drawn-out intractable regional 
conflict system dynamics that often culminate in conflict spill-over into neighbouring fragile states 
(Smith, 2004, 45-46). It is estimated that 13.4 million refugees constituting 67% of the overall refugee 
population are in protracted situations. The encampment period has ranged between 5 and 37 years 
from 1979 to 2017. Kenya, the thesis case study has hosted Somalis at Dadaab Refugee Complex for 
over a quarter of a century since 1991 (UNHCR, 2018a, 22-23).  
 
4.1.1 Somalia Transposed: A Motionless Flight 
 
While making plans to leave the country of origin, Somali families typically do not leave together. They 
send out the politically exposed and vulnerable members first and leave a property custodian behind. 
There are obvious risks involved in crossing to neighbouring countries that include sexual violence, 
political and criminal threats (Lindley, 2011, 24). Poverty, disability and sickness therefore precipitate 
involuntary immobilisation as opposed to involuntary migration within the vulnerable population who 
stand a greater risk if left behind (Lubkemann, 2008, 467-471). The refugees seeking sanctuary in 
Kenya usually arrive through the main border post of Liboi town. They would have walked for days, 
sometimes barefoot with no food or water. Once they arrive at Liboi, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) facilitates their transport to the camp (RCK, 2012, 34). Others who can meet their 
travel expenses use buses, which cross a number of Al Shabaab checkpoints to get to the border post 
(Rawlence, 2016, 28). Armed groups such as Al Shabaab have been reported to intercept flight by 
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decapitating truck drivers and forcing passengers to turn back in order to lay claim to population and 
sustain their power (Lindley, 2011, 24).  
 
Once at the border, the refugees either get smuggled inside goods trucks or keep walking. Rape and 
banditry are common occurrences along this route. Undocumented Somalis jokingly referred to as 
‘ATM machines’ also fall prey to corrupt police officers. Those caught are detained, charged with 
unlawful entry ‘outside a designated area’, and are fined stiff penalties before deportation. Refugees 
who manage to get to the camp and successfully register with the UN are permitted to stay (Rawlence, 
2016, 29). Once in Kenya, a foreign country, and in light of the deterioration of the situation in their 
country of origin, they come to the stark realisation that there may never be a triumphant return back 
to the homeland. The overwhelming anxiety that pushed them to flee the dramatic events back home 
and thrust them into a perilous journey begins to dissipate as reality dawns. During this phase the 
refugees do not look forward yet but seem to realise that the doors are shut behind them. Their main 
preoccupation becomes recalibrating their relationship with the homeland and past social networks 
(Kunz, 1983, 46).  
 
Somali refugees have migrated to distant destinations like Europe, Southern Africa and the Arab 
Peninsula. However, the majority are hosted in the Greater Horn of Africa region, particularly in Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Djibouti. Kenya, similar to her neighbours, is affected by internal displacement and small-
scale refugee outflows as a result of political violence, natural disasters, environmental degradation 
and forced evictions (IOM, 2015a, 18). The country has historically been lauded for its liberal asylum 
policies that allowed most refugees to locally integrate until the end of 1980s. However, in the 1990s, 
the mass influx of refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia compelled the shift towards a more 
restrictive policy, a relatively common occurrence when there is a sharp spike in refugee flows 
(Campbell et al., 2011, 5-6).  
 
Kenya is the primary destination for refugees coming from South Central Somalia. Somali refugees in 
Kenya are represented by two main groups namely protracted refugees who fled the conflict in the 
early 1990s and more recent refugees who fled the violence in the 2000s (Lindley, 2011, 18). 
Significantly, the former population comprises of second and third generation refugees born and raised 
in the camps (Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013, 15). The latter group punctuates the Kenyan 
terrain with an unsteady stream of new arrivals driven by a mix of political and environmental factors 
(Lindley, 2011, 22). Some of the new comers for example arrived at the height of the 2010/2011 famine 
(Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013, 15). Van Hear and Sorensen (2003, 36-37) observe that 
people who flee armed conflict and persecution may seek refuge in other parts of their country, flee to 
neighbouring countries, or migrate to a third country. A single household may have family members 
dispersed in more than one of these locations or move between these places prompting the household 
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to become transnational. This can be observed among Somali refugees in Dadaab who have 
established strong networks within the camp, with Somali Kenyans outside the camp, and those in the 
Diaspora for example in Minnesota (Horst, 2006, 3-13). 
 
Places of refuge often expose various forms of marginalisation and contestation. The normative 
concepts of protection and integration that underpin policy orientation on displacement research tend 
to be predicated on the relative political stability of host states (Lindley, 2013, 293). North Eastern 
Province, which hosts Dadaab Refugee Complex, is semi-arid with average temperatures of 40 
degrees Celsius. The area’s fragile ecosystem, sparse vegetation and absence of surface water 
impose exacting living conditions for the inhabitants. Besides, the province has limited natural 
resources (Kumssa & Jones, 2014, 35), experiences intermittent flooding and has a history of cholera 
(UNHCR, 2014, 26-42) and measles outbreaks (Jaji, 2011, 226). The region is infested by mosquitoes 
and therefore has a high prevalence of malaria (Adelman, 2005, 353). It is mostly inhabited by 
pastoralist Somali Kenyans from various Darood clans who share the same language, culture and 
religion as the Somali refugees (Horst, 2008, 122).  
 
The absence of consensus around belonging, citizenship and rights implies that displaced people find 
themselves uprooted from one contested place to another. Their vulnerability is affirmed both at places 
of origin and destination as is the case with Somali refugees in Kenya (Lindley, 2013, 293). 
Correspondingly, past Somali governments have staked irredentist claims over the host province and 
recognise it as being part of Greater Somalia prior to British colonial partitioning (Solomon, 2009, 2). 
The province has a history of violent repression and marginalisation under both the colonial and 
successive Kenyan governments. Often, the province’ marginalised inhabitants visiting other parts of 
Kenya sarcastically state that they are traveling to ‘Kenya’. This in a bid to underscore the level of 
neglect and the general view of the province as lacking economic and political strategic significance 
in comparison to the ‘real Kenya’ (Lindley, 2011, 20). Underdevelopment notwithstanding, the province 
has historically been unstable and weakly governed with incidents of banditry, cattle rustling and 
insurgency. The region has also experienced a proliferation of SALW as a result of the conflicts in 
South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda. For the most part, when these social, economic and 
political grievances persist in such refugee hosting areas, marginalisation may lead to radicalisation 
which may ultimately lead to violence (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 14-18, 31). 
 
4.1.2 An Uncanny Stronghold: Profiling Dadaab Refugee Complex 
 
The large-scale refugee arrivals in Kenya prompted the set-up of camps. These camps, originally 
conceived for temporary protection, envisioned eventual repatriation once the situation in Somalia had 
normalised (Campbell et al., 2011, 5). However, this has not been the case for the Somali refugees in 
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Kenya. While Kenya also hosts urban Somali refugees in the capital city of Nairobi, majority are still 
hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex. This complex was established in 1991 as an initial set of three 
camps with the standard capacity to separately host 30, 000 refugees. The complex has since 
expanded to include five camps, namely, Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo 2, Hagadera and Kambioos. The 
stronghold is located in Dadaab town in Garissa County, North-Eastern Province (NEP). It is situated 
approximately 80 kilometres from the Kenya-Somalia border. The border has been closed since 2007 
but continues to experience an influx of asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2014, 60). 
 
Somali refugees constitute approximately 54.5% of the 471,724,088 overall refugee population in 
Kenya as at December 2018. While Nairobi city, Alinjugur and Kakuma camps also host Somali 
refugees, Dadaab currently hosts 208,633 out of a total of 257,318 Somali refugees in Kenya. The 
Somali population in Dadaab accounts for approximately 96% of the overall refugee population in that 
camp. The other 4% of refugees in Dadaab comprises refugees from South Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda, Eritrea, Rwanda and other countries (UNHCR, 
2018c, 1-5). As a mechanism to strengthen surveillance, the sequestration of living spaces along 
nationalities is indicative of internal-international borders. In essence, the refugees are not only 
uncoupled from their host but also from each other (Jaji, 2011, 4-5), and their distinct identities 
magnified. Due to the marginalisation of the host community and their overlapping identity with the 
refugees, circa 41,000 members of the host community have encroached the camps since 1999, with 
an estimated growth rate of 12% per annum (Enghoff et al, 2010, 21-25). Some of these refugees 
whose identity is in question could also be Somali refugees who have purchased Kenyan identity cards 
in order to self-settle outside the camp (RCK, 2012, 50) or maintain a fluid form of settlement in and 
outside the camp (Jacobsen, 2001, 9-10). Nevertheless, these Kenyan ‘refuzens’ are not accounted 
for in UNHCR statistics. 
 
In terms of social demographics, the Somali population in the camp is predominantly Muslim. Other 
nationalities who are primarily Christians and a handful of Somalis who are Muslim background 
believers secretly practising Christianity, form the religious minorities (Wyatt, 2011). Religious leaders 
in this camp are believed to wield strong influence over community members (ESD, 2008, 4). Females 
and males account for 51.2% and 48.8% of the camp dwellers respectively. Youth and children under 
18 make up 56.9% of the total refugee population (UNHCR, 2018c, 3). There is also a significantly 
high number of female-headed households (Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013, 15). 
 
The settlement pattern in the camp is instructive of the areas from which the refugees hail in Somalia. 
It is estimated that 70% of the camp inhabitants of Somali origin hail from South Central Somalia, 20% 
from Puntland, while 10% originate from Somaliland. The camp hosts refugees from different Somali 
clans though the majority are from the Darood clan and more specifically the Ogaden sub clans of 
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Ailuhan, Abudwaq and Magarbul. Hawiye and Somali Bantus, the other major clans, account for 18% 
of the overall Somali refugee population. Most pastoralists inhabit Dagahaley and Ifo 1. Ifo 2 is mainly 
populated by farming communities, while Hagadera largely hosts people from urban areas (Danish 
Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013, 7, 15).  
 
4.1.3 The Anatomy of Camp Freedoms: Reimagining Statehood in Dadaab 
 
The Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process evaluates eligibility for the conferral of refugee 
status to asylum seekers to whom international protection is granted. The refugees in Dadaab have 
been recognised through both individual and group determination processes. In Kenya, the UNHCR 
previously assumed the role of a ‘surrogate state’ over refugee affairs. However, this status has been 
progressively diminished with the establishment of the Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA) under 
the Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons. The DRA was disbanded in 2016 and replaced 
by the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) under the Ministry of Interior that is also tasked with internal 
security. The organ implements all administrative matters pertaining refugees with specific mandate 
on refugee reception and registration, coordination of all refugee programmes, and refugee policy 
formulation and instrumentation. The RSD is a phased transition process jointly conducted with 
UNHCR that will gradually see RAS assume more responsibilities. People who lodge individual asylum 
applications have to undergo the RSD process. This applies to asylum seekers of all nationalities with 
the exception of Somalia and South Sudan. Mass refugee movements do not require individual 
screening and such groups are granted prima facie refugee status on urgent humanitarian grounds 
through a ministerial declaration. The grant of status on a prima facie basis is considered the fastest 
and most efficient way to provide protection and is best applied in situations where there is insufficient 
capacity to conduct individual RSD (UNHCR, 2015, 2). 
 
On arrival at Dadaab, individual asylum seekers are expected to present themselves to the RAS 
registration office, where a member of staff documents their personal information and issues them with 
a waiting slip with a year’s validity. Afterwards, on securing an appointment, the new arrivals complete 
the status determination interview at the UNHCR office (UNHCR, 2006b, 44-47, 186-87). The burden 
of proof rests on the asylum seeker while the adjudicator confers refugee status based on ‘reasonable 
likelihood’ of authenticity of documented evidence and assertions (Konzolo, 2010, 13). If conferred 
refugee status, the asylum seekers are issued with refugee documentation known as protection or 
mandate letters. The waiting period for determination of status can be lengthy and ranges between 
one and three years. During this period, the asylum seekers settle in the camps without refugee status 
recognition. Some end up starting families while others eventually get rejected after years in the camps 




Rejected asylum seekers are often issued with an official letter citing the grounds for rejection. The 
explanations are often ambiguous and hardly comprehensible to the applicants such as ‘lack of 
credibility’ or ‘material inconsistency’. Applicants can appeal the outcome to the Appeal Board within 
30 days and progressively petition the High Court and the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights in the event the rejection decision is upheld (Konzolo, 2010, 11-13). Rejection has devastating 
effects on asylum seekers. In their desperation, some illegally move to Nairobi without protection while 
others seek asylum in neighbouring countries. Yet others remain informally in the camps with no 
access to ration cards and basic services, and rely on community assistance (Kanere, 2009).  
 
Against this background, if the grounds for rejection relate to threats to national security, then the lack 
of follow up effectively invalidates individual screening. This systemic gap creates an illusion of security 
within a space that the Kenyan government has unremittingly policed over the years. The interview 
stage constitutes another systemic gap in the RSD process. This is particularly so in cases where 
adjudication fails to establish the veracity of claims leading to the grant of status to less deserving 
people. At the same time, genuine cases may be rejected on the basis of subjective judgement if the 
threshold for conferral of status relies on the art of persuasion. The individual immigrant screening 
process is therefore not entirely fool proof. Developed countries with robust security and border control 
systems may be vulnerable to similar systemic plugs.  
 
The registration process for prima facie refugees in Kenya is different from the individual determination 
process. To begin with, while standard operating procedures require staff to disseminate information 
on refugee registration, this is not often the case. At the beginning of the registration process at 
Dadaab, the new arrivals are photographed and fingerprinted to avoid double registration (Konzolo, 
2010, 12-13). Duplicate entries are sometimes common among those who seek additional food and 
other assistance. Once registered, the refugees visit the reception centres and undergo health and 
nutrition screening and are offered high energy biscuits. Those in need of health services are referred 
to hospital while the malnourished and other critical cases are sent to the stabilisation unit. In addition, 
those affected by trauma from SGBV and other causes receive counselling. Refugees also access 
food rations and non-food items such as plastic tarpaulins for shelter, sleeping mats and kitchen sets. 
The process is not always seamless since some individuals wait up to two weeks to become registered 
as refugees and longer to access food and shelter. In the past, the centralisation of the registration 
system at Ifo camp slackened the registration process and distribution of ration cards (UNHCR, 2011b, 
3-5). The UNHCR has since adopted the Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS) that 
augments registration, service delivery and security, and at the same time limits freedoms (Delgado, 
2013, 1-5). Resettlement counselling is accessible to all those granted refugee status regardless of 
whether or not they are under consideration for resettlement. The sessions provide information on 
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resettlement criteria, procedures and quotas and inadvertently inspire hope and the chimera of a better 
life in faraway lands. 
 
While the prima facie refugee determination process is an imperative for emergencies and has been 
recognised as the fastest and most efficient way to provide protection, it is not without its shortcomings. 
Rawlence (2016) in an illuminating book narrates the story of Guled (pp. 12-45), a man who claims to 
have been forcefully conscripted into Al Shabaab. As an Al Shabaab operative, he lived in a displaced 
camp in Somalia where aid agencies operated with Al Shabaab’s consent. Guled later fled Somalia 
on a dangerous journey that involved being smuggled across the border, and eventually found 
sanctuary at Dadaab.  Rawlence (p. 41) observes that in order to be added to the ration distribution 
manifest, one need only bear semblance to a Somali and cite conflict as reason for flight. Other 
accounts have raised concerns over the challenges posed by the prima facie determination process, 
particularly in the differentiation of refugees and armed actors. This is especially so since at the point 
of entry, prima facie refugees are considered legitimate exiles of persecution enmasse. Jansen (2016, 
435) has similarly documented his encounter with a former rebel who adopted a fictitious identity in 
Kakuma Camp.  
 
These accounts therefore raise several significant issues. First, mass continuous streams of asylum 
seekers induce registration fatigue and make claims processing more perfunctory than rigorous. The 
adoption of BIMS may have enhanced screening but cannot authenticate the veracity of claims, 
particularly in situations of mass influx and active conflict. This benefits potential recruiters as Haer 
and Hecker (2018, 4) observe that in order to avoid detection by the host state, recruiters employ 
discretion in the camp context. Secondly, Guled’s case reflects the rich diversity of camp inhabitants 
with potential influence, a dimension that requires further exploration. Thirdly, the narrative exposes 
the poor state of camp and cross border policing and the level of vulnerability to potential threats not 
only to the host state but also to refugees. The resulting environment, further integrating runaway 
corruption, deplorable camp conditions and armed influencers presents vulnerabilities to radicalisation.  
 
Fourthly, questions arise in situations where disengaged combatants have secured protection with the 
likelihood to revert to or motivate violence. Similarly, challenges exist in evaluating recidivism, re-
radicalisation or disengagement without de-radicalisation among defectors and how this may play out 
in a camp context. At the same time, the ideals and aspirations of an individual with legitimate grounds 
for the conferral of refugee status could morph along the trajectory of radicalisation within a camp 
setting, as a result of previous experiences or upon post-camp exposure as subsequent chapters 
demonstrate. Alternatively, armed elements may seek rest and recuperation, hibernate or maintain 
sleeper cells for future deployment in the (dis)comfort of a camp setting. Finally, the accounts reflect 
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lost opportunities for de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of deserters who may otherwise 
pose threats to the civilian character of a refugee camp.  
 
While possibilities exist to screen the physical human anatomy and narratives of flight, moral standards 
preclude the application of existing methods and strategies for screening radicalisation or ideological 
inclinations on vulnerable groups. Further, downplaying the resource potential of refugees presents 
another lost opportunity for learning. In this context, securocrats are likely to benefit from intelligence 
gathered from ex-combatants and people who have renounced armed groups. Knowledge of terrorist 
organisations’ modus operandi, can similarly increase tactical advantage and strengthen counter-
terrorism measures. However, such opportunities slip in the face of the prima facie determination 
process where expeditiousness determines efficiency, and rightly so for humanitarian reasons. The 
convergence of these factors demonstrates the vulnerability of a state’s security apparatus, however 
robust. 
 
These views partly resonate with other scholars’ positions on the limitations that confront the prima 
facie refugee status determination process. As an illustration, Rutinwa (2002, 12-13; also see Jansen, 
2016, 435; Crisp, 2000, 108-09) explicates the difficulties involved in excluding armed elements from 
refugee camps. He provides the example of Rwandese refugees who fled to Eastern Zaire following 
the 1994 Rwanda genocide. While in Zaire, many of these genocidaires joined the Hutu-majority 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). When their camps were destroyed by the 
Kabila-led rebels and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, the refugees attempted to flee to Central African 
Republic (CAR).  However, the UNHCR was loath to host potential genocidaires as had inadvertently 
happened in the Zairean camp. On its part, the CAR government relented on the admission of 
Rwandese refugees on condition that the UNHCR provided all the resources required to screen and 
separate bona fide refugees from criminal elements. A similar situation was witnessed in Guinea when 
Sierra Leonean refugees were refused entry owing to their involvement with the military junta. Rutinwa 
(13-14) further demonstrates how the prima facie determination process can be open to abuse by false 
pretence.  
 
Similarly, when Lukole Camp in Tanzania was exclusively opened for Burundian refugees, it ended up 
hosting 12,275 Rwandese claiming to be Burundians. The seemingly genuine Rwandese refugees 
circumvented the individualised refugee status determination process that was mandatory for 
Rwandese asylum seekers. Rutinwa (2002, 14) argues that the abuse of this system notwithstanding, 
the absence of rigorous screening of asylum seeker backgrounds results in multiple registration within 
and across camps that optimises refugee supplies and other benefits from UNHCR. Likewise, UNHCR 
(van Hear, 2003, 5-11), in a report examining transnational relations, highlights the outflow of mujahidin 
into neighbouring Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet-Afghan war. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
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Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan had become the epicentre of political activism and it is within these 
camps that the Taliban later emerged. So is the case with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
who early on drew support from refugees in Tamil Nadu in India. Later on, the Tigers broadened their 
resource base from remittances by Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.  
 
Other scholars have provided further insights on the state of refugee status determination process. 
Harrell-Bond and Kagan (2004) have decried the lack of transparency and accountability in UNHCR 
RSD operational procedures. They recommend the reformation of RSD procedures and pursuit of 
other means of recognising refugees that lessens the burden and high risk of error in prima facie 
recognition for mass movements. Though not foolproof, BIMS has mitigated this problem in recent 
years. They further argue that the UNHCR conception of prima facie determination in the 1960s 
regarded refugees falling under this group as temporary in nature. The recommendations of the UN 
Standing Committee (UNHCR, 1999a, 2; UNHCR, 1999b, 1-2; UNHCR, 2001, 1-6; UNHCR, 2004a, 
22-32) require states to abide by a ‘ladder of options’ and separate, disarm and impound armed 
elements. While such proposals may seem attractive on paper, they do present legal and 
operationalisation challenges as already discussed. Hyndman and Nylund (1998, 32), posit that the 
transient view of refugees in camps has permitted the politicisation of refugee determination processes 
and led to the gradual commitment to weaker standards. Overall, the international community’s failure 
to commit to the realisation of durable solutions is noteworthy. The implosion of illiberal standards of 
protection has nurtured associated vulnerabilities and inexplicably led to the passive acceptance of a 
stronghold that foists a stranglehold on refugees, the antithesis of sanctuary. The indeterminate 
settlement of a diversity of human beings in structures originally conceived as temporary is now widely 
embraced as the norm. 
 
4.1.4 The Refugee Macro-Policy Environment  
 
Kenya has ratified a number of regional and international instruments and passed several legislations 
governing refugee affairs. The country is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, its 1967 
Protocol, and the 1969 African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa (IOM, 2015a, 21-22). The first national legislation governing refugee affairs, the Refugee Act, 
was enacted in 2006 as Kenya pursued the prima facie recognition of refugees. The government 
gazetted the accompanying regulations to this act that came into force in 2009. This legislation guides 
refugee reception, formal registration process, issuance of identity cards and adjudication. In brief, the 
act outlines the grounds and procedure for recognition of refugee status; designation of transit centres 
and camps; refugee rights; and revocation of refugee status. The act also established the Department 
of Refugee Affairs (DRA) within the Ministry of Immigration to oversee all matters related to refugees. 
Similar to other non-citizens, the act restricts wage earning employment on refugees (Refugee Act, 
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2006). There are ongoing government efforts to redraft a new Refugees Bill (2011) that would repeal 
the 2006 Refugee Act. 
 
The Kenyan government’s response to the refugee crisis has had an impact on living conditions at 
Dadaab Refugee Complex. The state has limited its response to the temporary protection of refugees 
through a working policy of encampment. This effectively imposes movement restrictions within a 
camp located in a remote border area (RCK, 2012, 28-29). In order to implement this policy, the 
government has allocated designated places as transit centres and refugee camps, and made it a 
punishable offence to venture out of those areas. Upgrading legal status to full citizenship is an 
additional challenge. Few refugees can meet the constitutional eligibility requirements of fluency in 
Swahili, economic self-reliance and legal entry into Kenyan territory. Government regulations in 
addition to economic and geographical barriers have prevented many people from leaving the camp 
since their arrival in the 1990s. As a result, the camp has bred forms of segregation and domination 
inimical to the realisation of civil liberties and participation in mainstream society (Lindley, 2011, 37-
39).  
 
Kenya has specifically adopted the article on UN 1951 Refugee Convention that has a provision for 
entitlement to property, both movable and immovable. At the same time, Kenya restrains freedom of 
movement, as already discussed. Kenya’s Refugee Act does not explicitly address freedom of 
movement and instead bestows powers on the relevant minister to designate specific areas for refugee 
encampment. This clearly contradicts the primacy of the Kenyan constitution (2010) that guarantees 
freedom of movement to all (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 20-25). These stipulations therefore 
preclude the enforcement of the article on property rights, especially since the article on freedom of 
movement limits economic empowerment and property restoration. Moreover, Kenya’s domestic 
refugee law does not explicitly guarantee the provision of basic services such as health, education and 
housing. This law also effectively curtails refugees’ right to work. Consequently, refugees at Dadaab 
often become a cheap source of unskilled casual labour under unpredictable and exploitative 
conditions (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 75-83).  
 
The Refugee Affairs Secretariat, has the mandate to issue movement permits to refugees wishing to 
travel for specific reasons. Permissible reasons for the issuance of a movement pass include treatment 
seeking, in situ security threats, higher education, business engagement or resettlement. While the 
pass application outcome can be protracted, many applications are often declined arbitrarily, notably 
by the Security Sub-Committee within district and provincial administrations. However, determined 
refugees do circumvent the system with the collusion of corrupt police officers who facilitate their free 
movement. Overall, the reluctance to grant legal status as one among other viable options potentially 
open to refugees, is partly instructive of the informal encampment policy espoused by the Kenyan 
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government. For the most part, this policy is motivated by political and security imperatives (Lindley, 
2011, 21, 37-38).  
 
Another legislation of relevance is the Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011 and the 
Citizenship and Immigration Regulations 2012. In broad terms, the act addresses the administration 
of citizenship and immigration matters, including and not limited to citizen rights and duties, travel 
documents, foreign nationals management, immigration controls; and management of immigration 
records. More importantly, the Act permits restriction on entry and movement of certain foreign 
nationals in times of armed conflict and other crises. Moreover, it permits the inspection of 
employment, education and business premises. This, it argues, is justified for the purpose of the 
verification of information on applications, and compliance monitoring of visas, permits and passes 
(Citizenship and Immigration Act, 2011). 
 
The infamous Security Laws (Amendment) Act, which came into effect in 2014 effectively amended 
the Refugees Act (2006) and the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act. It came in the wake of a 
string of terrorist attacks in the country (Doya, 2014). The act, described as a major assault on 
democracy, amends 19 other laws including the Criminal Procedure Code, Evidence Act, Penal Code, 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, the National Police Service Act, among others. This act, prompted by the 
promulgation of the 2010 Kenya constitution, has imposed tighter control on refugees. It demands 
immediate refugee registration and stiff penalties for violation. What is more, it outlines crimes and 
punishment for identity document fraud, limits the number of refugees and asylum seekers to 150, 
000, and further enforces the existing encampment policy. The Act employs broad language to 
criminalise the publication of ‘offending material’ and ‘facilitation of terrorist acts’ through advocacy, 
glorification, advice and incitement. Culpability to stipulated crimes attracts a stiff conviction of between 
14 and 20 years in prison. The law inserted a new provision that criminalises radicalisation and offers 
a stiff penalty of 30 maximum years in prison on a criminal count. In addition, it accords state security 
organs broad unchecked surveillance powers (The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014). In 2015, 
a court ruling upheld restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement and struck off the clause placing 
a cap on refugee numbers.  
 
In response to terrorist attacks in Kenya, the government has further tightened its stranglehold on 
refugee macro-policy. Kenya suspended the registration of new refugee arrivals in Dadaab since the 
military incursion into Somalia in 2011. During this time, aid agencies also scaled down operations due 
to increased insecurity in Dadaab (WFP, 2014, 13). In 2012, the government issued a directive halting 
refugee reception and directed the closure of all urban registration centres. All asylum seekers and 
refugees were instructed to report to Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps. Further, UNHCR and 
other service providers were requested to transfer their services from the urban centres to the camps. 
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This directive evoked widespread protection concerns and increased rights violations among refugees 
(Refugees International, 2013, 3). In 2013, the Kenyan government, the Federal Government of 
Somalia and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement that set out a legal framework for the staggered 
repatriation of refugees (Tripartite Agreement, 2013) to an unstable Somalia. So far, voluntary 
repatriation has occasioned only a slight reduction in the number of refugees at the camp since 2014 
(IOM, 2015a, 39-43). Even so, overall donor funding for Dadaab Refugee Complex has significantly 
diminished as Kenya deplores the international community’s failure to fulfil its financial obligations 
(Mohamed, 2016). 
 
Some sections of these laws are not only in blatant contravention of existing international and regional 
refugee instruments but are also potentially open to abuse by state structures. It is important to assess 
the impact the broader policy environment has had on refugees at the camp level. While some of these 
laws duly respond to security concerns, they are equally repressive and infringe on human rights. As 
such, they present a dilemma for refugee host states. Should considerations on national security 
supersede the humanitarian imperative, or vice versa? In response to this dilemma, the Kenyan 
government has in the past capitulated to public pressure and issued threats to shut down Dadaab 
Refugee Complex (Daily Nation, 2016). These measures not only intensify the liminal state but also 
conform to the current global trend on securitisation of refugee issues. 
 
4.1.5 Overview of Conditions and Interventions at the Dadaab Microcosm 
 
The concept of human security compels a comprehensive examination of threats and shifts analysis 
from micro to systemic enquiry. The refugees at Dadaab face a host of human security12 challenges 
that encompass a wide spectrum of pervasive threats. These challenges subsume military, political, 
social, environmental, economic and cultural threats (UN Human Security Unit, 2009, 6-8). Dadaab 
Refugee Complex continues to attract international attention since renewed international engagement 
in Somalia in 2001. This attention has been matched by the mobilisation of substantial amounts of 
resources channelled towards humanitarian aid (WFP & UNHCR, 2014, 5-8). When the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees declared the end of the Somali emergency in 1993, its mandate 
changed to ‘care and maintenance’. The situation at the camp has since evolved into protracted 
displacement. There have been recurrent shortfalls in donor funding since the late 1990s while the 
                                                          
12 The thesis approaches security more broadly, beyond the traditional realm of state security (military). The concept of 
human security, which is people-centred complements state security and encompasses personal, community, social, 
economic, political, environmental, health, food and technological security. These dimensions, if neglected, have the 
potential to undermine security within and between states (See UN Human Security Unit, 2009). The concept of human 
security is linked to the thesis’ conceptual framework (see Figure 1). Notice that some dimensions of human security 
relevant to the thesis are embedded in the conceptual framework. 
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UNHCR struggles to maintain minimum humanitarian standards with little hope for durable solutions 
(Milner & Loescher, 2011, 9-12). 
 
The refugees at Dadaab are the subjects of appalling living conditions in a complex spread over thirty 
square miles. In the local lingo, the name Dadaab means ‘the rocky hard place’ due to the presence 
of boulders obscured by vast sand cover (Rawlence, 2016, 33). The UNHCR and other Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have over the years operationalised wide-ranging programmes. 
These include water and sanitation, shelter provision and management, provision of non-food items, 
food security and nutrition, education, health, protection, energy and environment, and small initiatives 
in peacebuilding (UNHCR, 2014, 11-48). Over time, the UNHCR has morphed into a ‘surrogate state’ 
administering mass populations of refugees within a sizeable territory on a substantial budget catering 
for wide-ranging services (Slaughter & Crisp, 2009, 8). While the UN and other organisations continue 
to provide humanitarian assistance to the Somali refugee community, the sordid living conditions 
preclude the enjoyment of human rights entitlements and the attainment of a life with dignity. 
Concomitantly, the congestion in the camp and dwindling funds have heavily compromised the quality 
and capacity of service delivery (UNHCR, 2011b, 1). The deplorable conditions at the camp 
compromise the quality of asylum as basic freedoms that serve to improve settlement outcomes 
remain violated (Long, 2011, 8).13  
 
Dadaab refugees’ survival tactics is comparable to that of Chechnyan refugees in Azerbaijan, some 
whose asylum claims have been found inadmissible or ill-founded. These refugees test the limits of 
the law and experiment with extraterritoriality. A significant number of refugees move between the host 
state and homeland for trade and employment opportunities (Gottwald, 2012, 111). Jacobsen (2001, 
9-10) refers to this practice as ‘fluid settlement’. In this living situation, some households use camps 
as a broader survival strategy to access assistance for vulnerable groups such as the elderly, mothers 
and children while some family members may self-settle in the local community. The spontaneously 
settled members periodically visit the camps and typically engage in casual labour, trade, explore 
repatriation and city settlement options, entertainment, while others join armed groups. Self-settled 
refugees are generally reluctant to be counted and tend not to disclose their locations to authorities. 
Both situations exemplify the interdependence of refugee social systems and the constitution of 
transnational networks (Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR, 2013, 27). In examining how displaced 
persons develop collective protection mechanisms, Lindley (2013, 298) observes that greater currency 
has been given to poverty and vulnerability with little existing evidence on agency. The security 
                                                          
13 For a comprehensive coverage of conditions at the camp, see Rowa, Y. (2016). ‘An examination of Radicalisation in 
the Context of Migration’. http://afsaap.org.au/assets/11-Yvonne-Rowa-Woods.pdf 
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implications of human smuggling, runaway corruption, self-settlement and unregulated cross-border 
trade and mobility have been covered in upcoming chapters.  
 
Refugees in protracted displacement experience onslaughts on physical security both within and 
outside camp precincts, and Dadaab is no exception. Some host countries for example manipulate 
refugees as political instruments by galvanising negative public sentiments to advance discriminatory 
migration policies (Lama, 2008, 278-327). Kenya, has for example conducted security operations at 
the camp in the wake of past terrorist attacks. The negative unintended consequences that such an 
approach is likely to precipitate is instructive of mass displacement as both a source and consequence 
of insecurity (Lama, 2008, 295-97). Kenya, in the most recent attempts to quell public security 
concerns, repeatedly threatened the camp with closure despite the fact that the humanitarian and 
security costs of such a premature and logistically challenging repatriation process may not have been 
accurately assessed (Daily Nation, 2016). While the tripartite agreement that guides the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees became defunct in late 2016, the strategic timing of the threats around the 
electioneering period must be underlined. A populist response to the refugee ‘problem’ therefore 
presented an opportunity for the incumbent government to gain political mileage on matters security.  
 
Within the Kenyan mainstream society, social exclusion among refugees is bilateral and advanced by 
both Somalis and Kenyans. On one hand, a challenging economic environment coupled with scarce 
resources, runaway security and Somali irredentism has elicited fear and suspicion of the ‘other’ 
among Kenyans. Further, the refugee antipathy has reinforced a strong Kenyan national identity. 
Kenyans generally perceive Somalis as lacking the willingness to integrate in mainstream Kenyan 
society as a result of their distinct socio-cultural background. For these reasons, strong public opinion 
has animated debates on refugees and influenced government policies on the same. Similar dynamics 
play out following resettlement in developed countries as detailed in chapter seven.  
 
Somali refugees’ apprehension over the loss of their cultural heritage and spiritual path (gaalonimo) 
has impeded interaction with mainstream Kenyan society. While some parents have enrolled their 
children into Kenyan schools and speak fluent Swahili as a result, others opt to send their children to 
Somali-run private and Quranic schools to reduce interaction with the locals (Lindley, 2011, 43). Some 
of these schools, particularly in developing countries, are financed by oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, 
a practice coined as ‘petro-Islam’. Saudi Arabia and Sudan for example, widely support Arabic 
language learning and Islamic education. Al-Haramain, a beneficiary Islamic NGO with interventions 
in Somalia and Kenya used to run some elementary schools in Dadaab (Abdi, 2007, 201-03). Al 
Haramain’s links to Islamist networks has been covered in chapters three and eight. The experiences 
of the beneficiaries of petro-Islam funding further illuminate the interaction between formal and informal 




There has been little respite for the legions of refugees trapped in limbo under insufferable conditions 
at the camp. As a result, refugees have developed an enduring appetency for the single most desired 
yet least achievable of the three durable solutions. Inevitably, orientation towards resettlement to rich 
third countries is not only immensely popular but is also an actively sought goal among Somali 
refugees (Lindley, 2011, 46). People are typically compelled to represent their resettlement cases 
skilfully, which implies some degree of embellishment in the process of ‘identity reconstruction’ 
(Rawlence, 2016, 193). Emergent inconsistencies in refugee stories has as a result bred distrust 
between the UNHCR and Dadaab refugees. UNHCR tends to be suspicious of refugee stories, while 
the latter mistrusts UNHCR’s capacity to fairly judge their cases against resettlement criteria (Jansen, 
2016, 435). In fact, some refugee experiences are adapted along the judgement criteria to fit the more 
deserving and vulnerable cases for resettlement. The rejection of applicants has in the past produced 
a thriving industry of brokers specialised in resettlement coaching and trade in identities (Rawlence, 
2016, 193-94). There have also been accusations levelled against UNHCR, for selling spaces to those 
with the financial muscle to buy their way out of the camp. This state of corruption has inevitably 
facilitated the accommodation of minor and major war criminals in the Western world (Rawlence, 2016, 
194). 
 
Resettlement has little strategic value when the negligible annual resettlement cases are considered. 
While the developed world has made significant contributions towards supporting refugees in other 
host countries, they have abdicated from resettlement burden sharing. A paltry 20,768 Somali refugees 
were resettled in third countries between 2011 and 2018. The lowest number of resettlements of 285 
refugees was recorded in 2018, and accounted for 0.1% of the overall population (UNHCR, 2018c, 9). 
In numerical terms, in the 2000s, there were 9,000 new refugee arrivals for every 8,000 people 
resettled every year. While hopes for resettlement diffuses frustrations with deplorable camp life, it 
also creates buufi, which is a strong preoccupation with resettlement (Lindley, 2011, 46). This 
preoccupation continually entraps refugees in liminal state (Turner, 1982, 45) and inhibits improvement 
and focus on the present (Lindley, 2011, 46).  
 
4.2 The Second Manifestation of Encampment 
 
The second manifestation of encampment is the onshore and offshore immigration detention system 
in Western countries. Comparisons can be drawn between refugee situations in Dadaab and other 
host countries such as the United States, Australia and European states. Similar to Dadaab refugees, 
irregular asylum seekers in developed countries often find themselves unlawfully warehoused for 
indeterminate periods with restricted movements. Since the 1980s, private and state-run facilities that 
warehouse undocumented immigrants have mushroomed in nations such as the U.S., the U.K., 
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France, Sweden, Australia, Greece and Italy. This practice has also seen a growing number of 
detainees. The capacity of detention facilities in the U.K. has for example increased from 250 people 
in 1993 to 32,163 in 2016. France’s holding capacity nearly doubled from 28,220 in 2003 to 46,565 in 
2015, while Australia experienced fluctuations between 2009 and 2013 followed by a drop of 68% in 
2016 (Skodo, 2017). The detention capacity in the U.S., home to the world’s largest immigration 
detention system, increased from 85,000 people in 1995 to 477,523 in 2012, followed by a gradual 
decline of 323,591 in 2017 (Global Detention Project, 2016).  
 
Protraction in refugee situations in developing countries is comparatively longer than in Western 
countries, where the average period of detention also differs across states. In Australia, the duration 
of detention is approximated at 826 days as at 2018 (Refugee Council, 2018). The detention period in 
the U.S. is between one to 1,460 days or more (Freedom for Immigrants, 2018) while the average 
confinement period in Sweden has increased from 18 days in 2015 to 31 days in 2017 (Global 
Detention Project, 2018). Swedish detention conditions are comparatively ‘better’ than the U.S. In 
Sweden, detainees dress in own clothes with rooms shared between two people. The common space 
is furnished with couches, dining furniture, pool tables and television. Refugees have access to 
computers, telephones, internet and visitation rooms (Skodo, 2017). In the U.S., refugees are held in 
‘prison-like facilities’ together with pre-trial and sentenced felons (Global Detention Project, 2016) and 
dressed in ‘colour-coded prison-style uniforms’ (Skodo, 2017). They are subjected to ‘torture-like 
conditions’ with inadequate healthcare, food and water, lack of telephone access, sexual abuse, 
among other rights violations (Global Detention Project, 2016). In some cases, incidents of brutality 
and neglect has led to fatalities (Webber, 2012; ABC Four Corners, 2016). The length of detention and 
deplorable state of human security notwithstanding, the common denominator within PRS and the 
detention system appears to be the liminal existence of those affected. People frequently revolt by 
staging riots or engage in self-harm in order to draw attention to their plight and reverse some of the 
stringent government policies. In some cases, Australia and other European states’ failure to deal with 
rejected asylum seekers has led to claimants taking up residence as irregular migrants (Koser, 2015, 
5). 
 
4.3 The Third Manifestation of Encampment  
 
The third manifestation of encampment is symbolic and constitutes the self or externally imposed 
patterns of settlement in migrant enclaves in developed and developing countries. Examples of these 
camps include Eastleigh in Kenya, Lakemba and ‘African gang’ neighbourhoods in Australia, East 
London in the U.K., Paris and Montfermeil in France, Molenbeek in Belgium and Rosengaard in 
Sweden. Majority of the dwellers are lawfully resettled and occupy ethnically homogenous 
communities.  Some reside in ghettos that as peripheral enclaves project camp-like characteristics. 
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Wacquant (2015, 122-26) conceptualises ghetto as a social-organisational device with the constitutive 
elements of ‘stigma, constraint, spatial confinement and institutional encasement’. This device, 
designed to confine and control, employs space to limit intimate contact with ghetto residents and 
dilutes the threat of symbolic corrosion and contagion. This instrument of containment incubates a 
‘spoiled identity’ imbued with poverty, segregation and ethnic clustering. The resulting social exclusion 
enables the ghetto to function as an integrative and protective device that strengthens internal bonds.  
As a weapon and shield, the ghetto modulates the dialectic between external antagonism and internal 
affinity. This group, which includes both forced and voluntary migrants, may share common 
experiences with those in PRS and detention facilities. Some of the experiences relate to the 
prevalence of single‐parent families, missing family members, prior exposure to trauma, isolation from 
mainstream society resulting from parents’ illiteracy and unemployment, prior exposure to war, life in 
poverty, discrimination, among others (Heitritter, 1999; Weine & Osman, 2012).  
 
Palestinians living in housing projects in Denmark describe the country not as a safe haven but as 
‘close to hell’. They assert that they have not escaped the camps and perceive the deterioration of 
their lives as a replication and progression of the Nakba. Nakba means ‘the day of the catastrophe’ 
when the creation of the new state of Israel led to the displacement of more than 700,000 Palestinians. 
These refugees were denied social, political and economic rights while in the Lebanese camps.  They 
were never granted citizenship in Lebanon and most remain stateless in Denmark. They live in the 
fringe of Danish society modulated by low socio-economic status. The presence of gangs and 
continuous clashes with the Danish police has reproduced their history with conflict in a new context. 
The social interactions and housing arrangements are congruent with Palestinian customs. The 
Palestinians identify with their local villages and camp origins, while the Danish housing projects are 
referred to as ghettos, villages or camps. The camps in Lebanon and Denmark are perceived as 
potential criminal or terrorist havens and attract a host of security measures. Feeling unwanted and 
tired of proving themselves after 30 years in Denmark, some refugees have concluded that their 
tireless efforts can never make them Danish (Kublitz, 2016, 230-42). Danishness is therefore 
‘something that you are and not something that you become’ (Hage, 2000, 61). While Kublitz (2016, 
246) conceives life in the Danish camps as ‘infinite un-becomings’ this thesis additionally conceives 
their experiences as facilitating the construction of new identities.  
 
The experiences of migrants and refugees in London, Paris and Montfermeil in France, Molenbeek in 
Belgium and Rosengaard in Sweden illuminates overarching themes of discrimination and 
segregation. One interviewee in particular observes that while there are many immigrants from Europe, 
Arabs are singled out as 'immigrants', a label they find demeaning. Another interviewee who seems to 
gain inspiration from a legalistic interpretation of religion defiantly adds, ‘A Muslim is either in prison or 
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on his way to prison’. Those interviewed are openly frustrated with state surveillance and rising 
imprisonment of Muslims, and gain agency and solace from preachings by charismatic self-styled 
religious scholars (Yehezkeli & Deryi, 2012). Some of the neighbourhoods represent predominantly 
homogenous and isolated communities of migrants and refugees. The settlement patterns reveal that 
an increase in migrant inflow in a particular commune leads to a corresponding flight of members of 
the host community. As the racial demography changes, these communities evolve into peripheral 
enclaves closed to the locals and security agencies, and cannot be effectively policed. In fact, a host 
community member in France states, ‘If these people stay in one place it is easier to control them’.  
 
Majority of migrants and refugees aspire for improved economic conditions in Western nations. 
Migrants initially view their mobility as temporary and over time, come to terms with their low levels of 
education, blue collar jobs and poor grasp of English. Their treatment of migration as temporary has 
resulted in poor integration and assimilation and the emergence of ethnic enclaves with limited contact 
with mainstream society. Poor understanding of British society has for example complicated Muslim 
migrants’ ability to address the issues plaguing their young children (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 99). Evidently, 
these suburbs typify another form of encampment that is temporally and spatially occurring, and also 
symbolic.  
 
The prevailing conditions in these virtual structural camps mimic the residents’ countries of origin. A 
significant number of people benefit from social welfare due to the high rate of unemployment among 
migrant and refugee communities. While some originally fled from dictatorial regimes, they encounter 
restrictive policies targeting Islamic practices in Europe. There is a high level of insecurity evidenced 
by widespread availability of arms, drug dealing, suspicion of law enforcement agencies, and gang 
fights that reproduce some of the violent scenes from conflict zones. Scholarship in the field of 
migration (Malkki, 1995a; Baubock & Rundell, 1998; Zolberg & Woon, 1999) has examined the 
continuous redrawing of boundaries of national identity. Zolberg and Woon (1999, 7-16) for example 
explore how religion and language in Europe and the United States are used to construct symbolic 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
This structural encampment is articulated by the state and bolstered by refugees and host community 
insentient complicity in drawing their social boundaries. Lamont and Molnar (2002) describe social 
boundaries as ‘objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal 
distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities’ (p. 168). These 
boundaries are similarly revealed in behavioural patterns of association (Lamont & Molnar, 2002, 168) 
and govern the negotiation of relationships between new arrival and host (Zolberg & Woon, 1999, 8-
10) camps. This process gives impetus to legitimate grievances that expose forms of structural 
encampment. Lederach (2003, 23-33) augments this view by highlighting the political, social and 
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economic structural inequalities and negative relationships that underlie violent and other harmful 
expressions of conflict. The conflict actors are typically oblivious to the existence of these inequalities 
or ignorant of the structure of their relationships. The exposure of these structures has the potential to 
recalibrate power and resource distribution but their unacknowledged existence promotes the 
institutionalisation of conflict.  
 
4.4 Discordant Kinship in Encampment  
 
The collocation of encampment in the North and South draws polarities and unlikely analogies. The 
three expressions of encampment foster varying degrees of violations of human rights as well as 
political and security challenges for host states and the immediate regions. Besides precipitating or 
exacerbating regional stability, encampment further undermines peacebuilding efforts in the refugee 
homelands. The failure of refugee-producing countries to guarantee security and address the structural 
causes of conflict and persecution generates mass efflux. Such complex humanitarian and security 
emergencies are inherently intractable, particularly in the presence of prolonged cycles of serial 
peacebuilding negotiations. The conflict parties’ reluctance to make concessions coupled with 
anaemic commitment to the implementation of sometimes fragile peace agreements in an environment 
of normative conflict, may lead to complete state failure. In other words, it can be argued that protracted 
instability in refugee-producing countries sustains protracted encampment in host states. The 
persistent state of turbulence effectively eliminates repatriation as a durable solution unless the 
homelands experience conflict de-escalation and normalisation of conditions permissive for safe return 
(Loescher et al., 2008, 3-6).  
 
Although most refugee populations are civilian in character, states and societies tend to manifest 
pathological attitudes towards them. They are generally perceived as threats to security, national 
identity and social cohesion, and an economic strain even within struggling economies. Mohammed 
captures the discriminatory character of refugee policies and host governments below:  
 
How the police also treats you is important. You feel you are different from others and are a refugee. At the 
back of their minds they are wondering why are these things happening? They are happening because you are 
an Al Shabaab suspect. For a very young person, he will think that because he is cornered, and he is affiliated 
to this group, he will want to visit Somalia or even any other place to see if it is different. There are people who 
even try to go to Uganda, South Africa or even Somalia. Going back to Somalia with no exposure and maybe 
the person did not go to school, options become very narrow as you think about solving your problems. 
Someone becomes vulnerable and becomes an Al Shabaab member. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded 
narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Some of these migrant communes, similar to detention centres and camps have become restive 
spaces that have incubated (non)violent radicalisation, with Molenbeek in Belgium serving as an 
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example. Integrating culturally and religiously diverse refugee populations who still identify with 
countries of origin and other causes outside the host country continues to be a challenge for most 
states. Such states have to contend with the construction of structural camps that virtually shift 
boundaries as settlement patterns change. Some second-generation refugees with third generation 
children in Dadaab refugee camp still strongly identify as Somali. But the space to manipulate their 
physical boundary is limited and perhaps not by other forms of boundaries. That notwithstanding, 
Dadaab can provide vital lessons to other forms of camps, particularly relating to how obstacles to 




The values and principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights determine the global 
criteria for inalienable freedoms. Sovereign states are obligated to ensure the full enjoyment of rights 
by allowing access to social, economic, political and civil rights. The universality of these human rights 
guarantees access for all including refugees who seek protection outside their homeland. Clearly, this 
is not entirely the case for the refugees hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex and other enclaves. 
Failure to fulfil these rights may compromise state stability and security. The deplorable camp 
conditions notwithstanding, frustrations emanating from indeterminate camp confinement and failure 
to locally integrate within the host country has invariably inflamed the state of limbo. Notably, the 
existing legal and policy frameworks that implicitly and sometimes overtly conflate refugees with 
terrorists have advanced governments’ belligerence towards refugees. The international refugee 
regime’s failure to sustainably address the needs of refugees, and host states’ frustrations and 
deleterious response is similarly palpable. There are obvious limitations and dilemmas within the 
existing refugee instruments. In particular, the anachronistic 1951 Refugee Convention and national 
policies are inherently securitising, while the Kenyan government’s weak security architecture has 
compromised security. While the political actors’ pressing concerns remain national security and 
political opportunism, the primacy of humanitarian aid has waned in the global agenda, with Dadaab 
affected as a result. This chapter has set the background for the next chapter and exposes systemic 
securitisation and general experiences with liminality. The context for the next chapter is still the 
encampment, liminal phase. The chapter strengthens the link between liminality and securitisation. It 











Chapter 5 – The Liminal Triad: A Portrait of Limbo and Securitisation 
 
The reconceptualisation of liminality through the representation of the lived experiences of refugees 
clarifies the state of limbo and further exposes securitised discursive and non-discursive practices. A 
pattern emerged among research participants of framing experiences and responses in the 
dimensions of time, space and matter. As such, the conceived liminal triad constitutes the temporal, 
spatial and material dimensions that model the liminal state. There have been attempts to explore the 
elements of liminality with the aim to increase understanding and appreciation of the concept. 
Thomassen (2009, 16; See also Turner, 2015, 139-42) conceives liminality in time and space but with 
limited focus on (inter)subjective experiences or the material dimension as formulated in this research. 
His conceptualisation of time is restricted to moments, periods and epochs, a dimension that this 
chapter further deconstructs. The same applies to the spatial dimension that Thomassen essentially 
constructs as physical places or zones. He, however, proposes an important fourth dimension of ‘scale’ 
that refers to the degree or intensity of the liminal experience that similarly underlies the representation 
of refugee experiences at Dadaab. Significantly, the humanitarian paradox exposes the tensions 
between humanitarianism, power and surrogate interests. The principles and practices of 
humanitarianism and the unwitting institutionalisation of securitisation and intensification of liminality 
presents further dilemmas and contradictions that this chapter examines. 
 
5.1 The Liminal Triad 
 
In conceptualising the liminal triad, the research participants’ views compel the examination of the 
notion of movement. As such, the variability in the dimensions of time, space and matter have been 
conceived in motion, more specifically captured as non-linear movements. To put this into context, 
Corfield (2008, 6-7, 199-200) conceives movement as ‘physical and existential’, involving refugee 
journey and dispersal as well as ‘the struggle to make sense of their experiences, identity and their 
‘being in the world’. She argues that movement both propels and is initiated by asylum seekers. 
However, this research found that refugee movement within the three dimensions is similarly 
galvanised by external agents. To complement Corfield’s conception of movement as physical and 
existential, a third component of movement as metaphorical is advanced. Finally, Corfield (2008, 18) 
describes movement as complex, dynamic, multi-layered and multi-directional, which is consistent with 
the findings of this research. In establishing movement and the enabling role of other actors, a security 
expert for example suggests both aspirational and physical movements:   
 
These people live in an environment that is not theirs with no citizenship rights and are deprived of basic human 
rights and needs. Whoever calls attention to the satisfaction of those needs can for example raise money, profile 




Corruption in government has been a sensitive issue. Some of the refugees who have acquired Kenyan papers, 
whether ID card or passport, they have been acquired illegally through bribing. And since some of the occupants 
of the camp are associated with Al Shabaab some have actually also benefited from corruption. They then 
disperse to other parts of the country to execute their attacks and radicalise others within and outside the camp. 
Some government officials have been implicated in corruption. (Dr. Wekesa – Security Expert, personal 
communication, February 3, 2017) 
 
To crystallise, besides sustaining protracted refugee situations, the practice of encampment and other 
measures of securitisation of migration also inflame liminality. The liminal triad exposes the state of 
human security and illustrates the complexity of human experiences that inspire various coping 
mechanisms that mediate resilience and vulnerability. The triad, therefore facilitates the understanding 
of the concept of liminality, the embedded expressions of securitisation and potential vulnerabilities to 
radicalisation in PRS. Hassan’s views below for example reveal the dimensions of securitisation, 
liminality, and potential vulnerabilities, in this case to radicalisation. It is within this context that the 
liminal triad should be viewed: 
 
The context of the camp is more of a centre of deprivation. The camps lack the basic facilities to provide both 
social and economic needs to refugees. That in itself causes psychological challenges to the refugees. …So, 
the condition of refugees in itself is an enabling environment for social disorder in the camp. Most of the times 
they will look forward to the time they will get resettlement… Therefore, it is both wrong for government or 
international organisations to blatantly say there is no radicalisation or otherwise. It is a confused kind of state. 
So, anybody can use the camp and refugees for their own conclusions and interests. If the government says 
that the camp is causing insecurity, they can conclusively say that and they will be justified because they have 
created the right kind of environment for radicalisation to take place. (Farah – INGO Programme Manager, 
personal communication, February 23, 2017) 
 
5.2 A Portrait of Liminality and Securitisation 
 
The framework represented as Figure 2 below is a snapshot of the pre and post-PRS contexts that 
stimulate various forms of coping. The framework further represents the three-part building block of 
the entire dissertation that conveys a refugee’s journey. The first is the pre-migration or pre-liminal 
phase (pre-limbo) and focuses on the refugee homelands. This phase is depicted by the first three 
tablets in the framework as examined in chapter three. The fourth, fifth and sixth tablets represent the 
second phase of migration to a neighbouring second country of asylum, which is the encampment or 
liminal phase (limbo phase) with a focus on the camp in the host states. This has been discussed in 
chapters four, five and six. The third phase is third country resettlement in the West, which is 
decampment or post-liminal phase with a focus on migrant enclaves. This is represented by the 
seventh tablet. While literature on liminality commonly designates three liminal phases (pre-mid-post), 
the thesis has interrogated the extent to which this applies in the asylum-seeker context. This has 
been covered in chapters seven and eight. The tablets that represent the absence and loss of 
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freedoms, and inter-generational fragmented integration traverse all the phases with the exception of 
the premigration phase for the latter. The ninth tablet on coping mechanisms is similarly eminent in all 
phases. Coping mechanisms are further illustrated and reinforced by the black arrow that undulates 
across all the phases.  
 
 
Figure 2: The Displacement-Coping Framework 
 
It must be remembered that a firm grounding on pre-migration dynamics as indicated on the left-hand 
side of the orange PRS tablet is crucial in enhancing the understanding on potential vulnerabilities to 
radicalisation. Chapter three has already examined the pre-migration phase of the framework. 
Similarly, refugees’ lived experiences at the camp microcosm present important implications for third 
country migration as indicated on the right-hand side of the orange PRS tablet. This chapter therefore 
examines the PRS period and chapter seven explores the post-PRS phase while establishing the 
interlinkages within the three phases. To contextualise, disquiet over the 1993 American military 
intervention in the Somali civil war persists in some sections of the Somali population. This pre-
migration history has occasionally informed resistance to foreign military interventions in Somalia. Al 
Shabaab has for example in recent times capitalised on this dynamic to mobilise support against the 
Ethiopian and Kenyan military interventions. 
 
At the same time, the liminal substructure interacts with the securitisation superstructure, and both are 
mutually reinforcing, as the blue arrows denote. To illustrate, encampment as one among other 
measures of securitisation fosters liminality. The employment of coping strategies may also include 
(non)violent radicalisation that in turn attracts securitising speech-acts. Ultimately, while the liminal 
and securitisation structures formulate the constantly evolving relationships within broader societal 
structures, they are also the outcomes and components of these structures. Similar to securitisation, 
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liminality originates from pre-camp experiences and is likely to reach its peak at the camp level, or not, 
based on subjective experiences. Most importantly, the framework exhibits the point at which the loss 
of freedoms activates various coping mechanisms.  
 
For the most part, liminality is consistent with the United Nation’s concept of ‘limbo’ in the context of 
PRS. The ‘static state’ of liminality breeds an environment that strips refugees of the fulfilment of basic, 
social, economic, and psychological needs. Limbo maintains a state in which a refugee ‘is often unable 
to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance’ and endures restrictions on mobility, 
livelihood opportunities and confinement in camps. The link between limbo and freedom is therefore 
unequivocal (UNHCR, 2004b, 1-2; Horst, 2018, 444). A recent study (Haer & Hecker, 2018, 6) found 
that economic deprivation among refugees induces desperation that in turn increases vulnerability to 
militancy. The study asserts that it is not greed or the desire to profit that drives radicalisation but the 
desperation emerging from the extremely low standards of living. Indeed, the international community’s 
focus on the ‘relief-to-development’ gap in the 1980s largely overlooked the ‘relief-to-freedom gap’ and 
normalised long-term displacement and vulnerability. The practice of warehousing refugees has since 
fostered disempowerment and transformed them into spectators in their own lives. With their human 
capabilities put on hold, they are deprived of the freedom necessary for normal existence (Jacobsen, 
2001, 3; Smith, 2004, 38-44) as one interviewee laments: 
 
I thought I would only be here a few months. Now I have lived in this camp for over 24 years. I have never even 
been to the closest town. Is this freedom? (Sarah’s mother, Refugee)14 
 
5.3 The Temporal Dimension: Time(lessness)? 
 
An examination of liminal experiences revealed four orientations of the temporal dimension, with close 
linkages to the spatial and material dimensions as captured in the table below. 
 
Orientations of the Temporal Dimension 
1. Active waiting                         Descriptions of intermissions as relating to action 
2. Real – imagined Actual versus (wishful) illusory time in which aspirations are actualised 
3. Stasis – kinesis  Stillness and movement in time (back and forth; circuitous; intermissions) 
4. Bound interstitiality Allusion to experiences in time with links to the past, present and future 
Table 1: Orientations of the Temporal Dimension 
 
To begin with, ‘waiting’ emerged as a dominant theme among most respondents. More specifically, 
this was construed as active waiting, whether consciously or unconsciously, that involves refugees’ 
parallel engagement with other areas of their lives. This state captures the dimension of ‘real time’ or 
                                                          
14 UNHCR. (2014). Kenya: A Lifetime of Waiting. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_4tYAmhrp8n 
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calendrical passage of time as discussed by Turner (1969; 1982). Turner (2015, 142) additionally 
makes some interesting observations on their liminal state. First, they cannot settle in the camp since 
they are purportedly ‘on the move’ back home or elsewhere in an unknown future. Second, they are 
restrained from being ‘on the move’ as they are likely not to venture anywhere now or in the unknown 
future. As a result, they exist in a time-fluid capsule in which time dissolves and rebounds as calendrical 
time continues outside the camp. In addition, they wander in and out of the present, sometimes into 
the realm of the unknown or an imagined fulfilling life beyond the camp. Trapped in suspense, their 
seeming obliviousness to the passage of time indulges blind anticipation. Yet stripped of free will, they 
resign themselves to fate.  
 
Perhaps the state of buufi aptly illustrates their affliction with their pending and imagined state of 
existence. In the Somali lingo, buufi denotes a strong preoccupation with resettlement among Somali 
refugees in Dadaab (Lindley, 2011, 33). Buufi can also be compared to a state of depression that 
evokes insomnia, self-pity, desperation, loss and failure. Access to mobile phones and Facebook often 
aggravates the torment of resettlement. Some refugees create parallel online lives by posting pictures 
of preferred vehicles and resettlement cities while the lives of those awaiting resettlement become 
paused (Rawlence, 2016, 194-195). This practice has been described as the substitution of real travel 
with ‘dream travel’ that leads to loss of touch with reality and possible lapse into mental illness. These 
double lives, characterised by the display of shifting behaviour in different situations may induce the 
alter ego, the second self, and may also represent a form of coping. While technology and social media 
present these drawbacks, they are also aspirational platforms that provide refugees with the notion of 
a dream (Rousseau et al. (1998, 385). These tools are especially impactful in a profoundly liminal 
world that spawns the debauchery of selfhood and basic humanity.  
 
Further, time(lessness) is especially evident in the inter-generational occupancy of camps and in the 
struggles of those who have come before them and will subsist after them. Under these circumstances, 
the introduction or exposure to stimuli in the form of recruiters and resettlement has the potential to 
disrupt the liminal state, both negatively and positively, however short-lived. Some interviewees 
described the open-ended waits and states of remission that highlight the temporal dimension, its 
interaction with space, and potential outcomes: 
 
I am living as a refugee but I am running for life, for the rest of my life. As a Muslim I can manage. As a refugee 
it is too too hard especially looking for stable life, permanent life and yet your days are few. There is no change. 
You cannot be yourself. You cannot be with others. Meanwhile you are left behind. It is too hard. It’s hurting me. 
When? Just waiting. Where will the settled life be? How will it be? There is no way out especially movement. I 
want to move, to change and to be myself and live a certain life. It is my choice, but I didn’t get it. It is a question 





For as long as I have been alive I have been a refugee. My mum came to this camp as a refugee. She gave 
birth to me as a refugee. I gave birth to my daughter as a refugee… I feel like I am Somali. My parents are 
Somali. I believe that someday Somalia will be peaceful and I will go there… (Sarah, Refugee)15 
 
Now coming to refugees, they have just been sitting at the camp and don’t have a world view but only have a 
madrassa world view. That is the only education they have and that is so risky. That is so dangerous. Anybody 
can come and twist their mind. (Maina – INGO Security Expert, personal communication, February 7, 2017) 
 
Evidently, time interacts with the spatial and material dimensions, as successive sections shall 
demonstrate. The liminal within the dimension of time(lessness) is a construct based on refugee lived 
experiences and symbolic interpretations of their quotidian existence. As has been seen, time can be 
real or imagined, and static or kinetic. Their invisibility and inconsequential state of being therefore 
renders them statically kinetic and permanently transient. Since the liminal state can be episodic, or 
interminable particularly when collective experiences are considered, the dimension of time is what 
makes the liminal a state or phase (Turner, 1969, 166-167). When alluding directly to time, refugees 
and other actors alike drew upon phrases like ‘over time’; ‘pass time’; ‘sit’, suggestive of limbo’s tight 
grip. Ogola’s account below presupposes that while oftentimes externally imposed, restrictions on 
aspirations that often result from confinement are also internally enforced. As such, confinement is 
both externally and internally foisted (see also Thomassen, 2009, 18) in a process which constitutes 
symbolic encampment. The accounts below further depict the conception of time as real and imagined 
or unacknowledged: 
 
Honestly speaking, even for the UN, why does somebody only get citizenship at the third country and not the 
second country for example in Kenya? People live in Kenya for 25 years and never get citizenship. People are 
born, grow up, get married but are still not part of society. (Mustafa – Refugee, embedded narrative from 
personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
When you come to Dadaab there are a lot of opportunities for the young people but how many take up those 
opportunities? …When the schools are open, they attend school and when schools are closed, they go for 
training in Garissa. But getting students to fill those slots is a problem… It is because someone has confined 
their minds! They share narratives of how, ‘’I am just passing time and I will be going and so this is not where 
I’ll stay’’. (Ogola – INGO Programme Manager, personal communication, February 15, 2017) 
 
Some of the youth have finished their education and are out there with nothing to engage them. So, the lure of 
Al Shabaab comes with the money and it is big money. That is one of the main driving forces. The lack of a 
future. These young people sit there and don’t have a future to talk about. The futures they would look at 
previously was getting an opportunity for resettlement. The resettlement space has been reducing and it 
                                                          




becomes very difficult for them to see any hope in the process. (Ogola – INGO Programme Manager, personal 
communication, February 15, 2017) 
 
Some research interviewees reported that refugees typically compare the restrictive character of the 
camp to a prison and bird cage and decry the infraction of freedoms. The findings of the research 
suggest the overwhelming perception among refugees as ‘doing time’ in the camp. This in the same 
way a convict may describe his experience in a correctional facility, or a psychiatric patient in a mental 
asylum, a phenomenon referred to as ‘asylumdom’ (Morrall & Hazelton,2000, 90). These total 
institutions16, of which the camp is a part, similarly typify liminal dynamics. As such, the concept of 
liminality has a broad range of applications in diverse settings from psychology, organisational theory, 
trans-sexuality to migration (Thomassen 2009, 18-19; Ibarra & Obodaru, 2016, 53).  
 
I was born here. What I know is only this camp. I wanted a better life than this one. I think my mother has lost 
hope of going back to Somalia because of this war. She told me that we were expecting to stay some months. 
Two months, one month and then we would go back to our country. But months, years…, years…, years… Our 
life you can imagine 27 years living in a refugee camp? We don’t know another place. We don’t know our country 
Somalia. We are just like a bird in a cage. We cannot move anywhere else… I’m hoping is my children to get a 
better life than what I had… a good job, a good world and freedom. Freedom is the most important thing in 
human being. (Abdullahi, Refugee)17 
 
You are given food every 15 days which is like kilogrammed and that is the only food you eat. When you get 
this food, you cannot eat something different. It is as if you are animals in a cage where the owner feels he 
wants to feed you with these types of food. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal 
communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Within the frame of time(lessness), the hollow response to refugeeism poses an existential stalemate 
to an ageless problem. Khadija’s insights further capture the concept of the camp as a total institution. 
The definitive sentencing period grants a convict more certainty and assurance of freedom in 
comparison to a refugee in a camp: 
 
Staying in a camp feels like your life has been tied. It is like prison. It cuts your life. But you see if you are in 
prison, you know at what point you will leave prison but staying in a camp gives you a sense of uncertainty. It 
is like being in remand but at least you know you will get out in remand. There is no peace in that camp. When 
you fall seriously ill you die in that camp. When you are hungry you might die. (Khadija – Refugee, embedded 
narrative from personal communication, February 19, 2017). 
 
Certain actors perceived as commanding influence within the camp polity are unwittingly involved in 
the construction of time. Government officials and aid workers operating in the camp are for example 
                                                          
16 The concept of total institutions has been discussed in more detail under the freedoms section. 




involved through the implementation of mechanical time-bound programmes and policies. Their 
practices solidify the element of time in a population with diverse and situational temporal sensibilities. 
The profusion of counter-productive exploits among various actors in Dadaab has inadvertently foisted 
camp existence. The appreciation of the deficiencies in humanitarian interventions is not just an 
indictment to the protection system but is also indicative of the adverse impact time-bound policies 
inflict on dynamic human lives. While programmes are time-bound, camp occupancy remains 
stubbornly timeless. Paradoxically, the architects and unwitting crusaders of campian naturalisation 
are often temporary tenants serving a population that in its protracted state, remains largely liminal: 
 
The kind of services that UNHCR and other NGOs provide is not structured in a way that depicts refugees are 
able to do, work, or behave like human beings. You are given food every 15 days which is like kilogrammed 
and that is the only food you eat… The irony of it all is that you are required to report from 8.00am to 4.30pm. 
You have your contract and the only option is to go at 8.00 or you don’t get the job. So, because of your 
circumstances in life, you have to abide by the rules. It is very very challenging… Projects are funded in January 
and end in December. So, these same organisations look for funding in January and you wonder what impact 
these humanitarian projects have. It is zero. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal 
communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
5.4 The Spatial Dimension and the ‘State of Exception’ 
 
The spatial characteristics of refugee camps have been the subject of vivid scholarly descriptions. The 
bilocation of the camp as a place of refuge parallel to its dual power to exert control over its inhabitants 
has been prevalent. Many descriptions have been centred around Giorgio Agamben’s (1998, 15; 2016, 
209-211) conception of the camp as a ‘state of exception’, an unruly ungovernable space where calls 
for security and states of emergency justify the absolute domination of the public. In this context, the 
camps have for example been likened to strangleholds of restrictive lawless spaces, devoid of rights. 
Camps have further been depicted as politicised spaces. The encampment of refugees by host states 
is motivated more by the containment of militarisation and cross-border conflict prevention, and less 
by the humanitarian imperative. Aid organisations have reported the use of camps for military training 
and as launching pads for revenge attacks on refugee homelands perceived to be responsible for their 
displacement. For that reason, the contiguity of the camp as a space of refuge protecting the vulnerable 
while concurrently serving as a space to exert political influence and affirm various forms of identity is 
palpable (Sanyal, 2011, 879-80). 
 
In the assessment of refugee camps in Lebanon, the lawlessness in camps is typified as the deficit or 
absence of governance. The state of exception in the camp is characterised by the arbitrary 
enforcement of Lebanese statutes, and for the most part, the law is held in abeyance. Refugees in 
Lebanese camps occupy a zone of obscurity between the internal and external, the exception and 
rule, lawfulness and unlawfulness, in which the concepts of ‘subjective right and juridical protection’ 
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are indiscernible. This state of exception is interpreted as the suspension of law by a sovereign state 
justified by national security concerns (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 147-48). This interpretation is consistent 
with the role of securitisation as fostering liminality while presenting vulnerabilities to radicalisation as 
discussed in chapters two and seven. In the Dadaab context, an analysis of research participants’ 
responses reveal various orientations of overlapping spaces in the physical, social and affective 
realms, that in turn interact with broader spatial structures as animated below: 
 
Orientations of the Spatial Dimension 
1. Confined space References to cocooning / isolation and prison-like space / ‘asylumdom’ 
2. Fixed space Lack of movement / stagnation in physical and other areas 
3. Restricted space Controlled movement in and out of the camp stronghold 
4. Constricted space Deliberate shrinkage of space (relational barriers with aid agencies and other 
actors) e.g. hierarchical relationships with intermediaries and physical fences 
5. Dynamic space Fluidity in movement, both physical and aspirational e.g. failed resettlement, 
higher education attainment, aborted career prospects 
6. Imposed space Institutional containment experienced in the occupation of space through 
compulsion – boxed in the camp by government policies 
7. Insecure space Existence of spaces impenetrable to security agencies but penetrable to 
social stigma. Produces element of contested space (‘foreign’ camp polity 
imposing its ‘will’ on sovereign host state) 
8. Affective space Formation and expression of emotions and ideologies informed by camp 
experience, past encounters, inter-generational memorialisation intertwined 
with buufi and visioning  
9. Indeterminate space Interactive dynamics with other spaces spurs limbo/intermissions, 
represented as liminality  
Table 2: Orientations of the Spatial Dimension 
 
The research participants’ engagement with the protection system is particularly instructive in 
calibrating the spatial formations at Dadaab. In drawing analogies, Jaji (2011, 223) contends that 
refugees are an aberration by virtue of their dissociation from the nation-state. As such, their 
administration involves the creation of an environment of domination and containment in order to 
preserve the predictable conventional order. The duality of the existence of refugees within yet outside 
the nation-state is a fitting depiction of their liminal state. Refugees cannot assert full rights within the 
host state, neither can those born in the camps (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 146). Meanwhile, their rights 
are denied while they remain the subjects of legislation (Silverman, 2008, 10). Neither do they enjoy 
the rights of the host state by birth nor can they access rights as foreigners (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 
146). As a result, camp dwellers live in a ‘zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception 
and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer 
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make any sense’ (Agamben, 1998, 170). The ambiguous character of this zone of indistinction 
epitomises the liminal state. This state precipitates the dissolution of identity that in turn leads to 
disorientation and the temporary suspension of normal structures and modes of social action (Ybema 
et al., 2015, 22). In as much as refugees fall within the legal jurisdiction of the host state, their 
exceptionalism is indeed evident in the legal instruments that governs them distinct from the host state 
(Turner, 2015, 141).  
 
The seclusion of refugees in the zone of indistinction therefore preserves ‘the national order of things’. 
Refugees represent unsettling elements in the order of the nation-state that serve to break the link 
between man and citizen, and ‘nativity and nationality’ and thereby threaten modern sovereignty 
(Agamben, 1998, 131; See also Horst, 2018, 443) and identity. Their state of ambiguity in the 
constitutive outside challenges the link between nation, state and citizen (Turner, 2015, 140). Their 
existence in the zone of indistinction reflects the state of exception that pervades the camp resulting 
from the suspension of the law by the sovereign host state. This is often motivated by perceptions of 
contamination, and national or state security concerns (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 147; Turner, 2015, 141) 
that in turn invokes securitised-sterilisation.  
 
In advancing the protection arguments in the temporal dimension, the deliberate constriction and 
spatial hierarchy that characterises the interaction between refugees and aid agency staff is 
noteworthy. The installation of refugee community representatives though touted as democratic, 
creates a buffer between aid agencies and refugees and is tacitly aimed at containing the barrage of 
communication by refugees. Thus, on one hand exists the construction of the fence between the 
refugee camps and the UN compound that represents the physical barrier. On the other hand, these 
community officials exemplify a contrived form of ‘popular’ representation detrimental to the pursuit of 
basic freedoms. In Jaji’s words, ‘the staff are simultaneously available and conspicuous but 
inaccessible, physically near but socially distant’ (p.229).  
 
Further, an interviewee recollects a period of high-level insecurity at Dadaab Refugee Complex 
between 2011 and 2015. He reports the mobilisation of youth in Dadaab to protect the Dadaab Main 
Office (DMO) that hosts the aid agencies. The aid agency ‘protection’ by refugee youth was done while 
maintaining direct communication with UNHCR and the Kenyan government. These youth aimed to 
stave off the interruption of aid flow even as numerous agencies continued to roll back interventions 
due to insecurity. In this case, the role of the host state and aid agencies as the custodians of protection 
of freedoms becomes contested when the (un)protected assume the mandate of protectors. 
Nonetheless, the state of insecurity indisputably presents an operational dilemma for the aid industry 
in a context that is difficult to police as a bureaucrat notes below. Agier (2002, 319, 364) observes 
similar impetus by states to protect themselves from refugees for political reasons. This reversed 
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protection role similarly undermines and curtails the space for the expression, access and exercise of 
freedoms because the role of a handful of militants unequivocally results in the collective victimisation 
of refugees. 
 
But there are some places in the camp you cannot access because they are very unsafe for anybody even 
government officials. There are some zones or blocks that cannot be accessed even by police. You can enter 
on the outside but cannot access the inside. These are some of the issues the police raised with us when we 
went there with members of parliament. I think that was the reason why we decided to close Dadaab. We want 
to get rid of the rogue elements in the camp. (Emma – Refugee Affairs Secretariat, personal communication, 
March 6, 2017) 
 
In establishing linkages with the temporal dimension, and as discussed further in the material 
dimension, an illusion of refugee protection is emergent. While the protection regime evidently works 
for the greater good, the internal contradictions, challenges and dilemmas have nurtured a space that 
is at times inimical to freedoms. The prevailing global developments have further challenged the 
negotiation of space through funding cuts, anti-migrant agency and other means.  These constraining 
conditions may breed spaces that are vulnerable to exploitation, that both legitimate and illegitimate 
actors compete to fill, and could be potentially volatile under the right conditions.  One interviewee for 
example took exception with the space between mainstream clerics and the youth that radical clerics 
have exploited. Other research participants’ accounts below further exemplify the construction and 
dynamic of the spatial dimension and securitisation at Dadaab: 
 
The refugee camp is like a detention camp. This is because there is no protection and you are only being 
guarded so that you cannot get out of the camp. There is no security and you learn to survive. We used to say 
that if you found someone alive in the morning that was okay. It meant you ate well and survived for one day so 
that’s okay. (Ahmed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017)  
 
That is also because of Al Shabaab. The most suspected people are Somalis. So, let us put them together. It 
has nothing to do with kindness but to be harsh and control us more. If many different nationalities are together, 
there can be many forms of suspicion that can be confusing. That is to hurt us more and be harsh on us. If they 
feel or suspect anything in the camps now they can easily go and investigate. (Mustafa – Refugee, embedded 
narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
Given this background, the unlocking of physical, psychological and virtual spaces not only attracts 
‘do-gooders’ but also lures harmful agents of change. It can therefore be argued that the multiple 
spaces within which refugees must navigate to access and exercise their freedoms renders 
radicalisation an expression and manifestation of conflict resulting from suppressed freedoms. As 
such, radicalised individuals in a camp context to some degree express unfulfilled freedoms yet the 
clamour for freedom is not necessarily an expression of radicalisation as demonstrated in the next 
section. Correspondingly, in matters pertaining the interpretation of existence based on his theory of 
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perception, Kant (1781; 1998) contends that imagination reproduces a range of fictitious or make-
believe representations. Imagination is involved in the recollection of the past, anticipation of the future 
and ultimately the perception of the world. He observes that experience is constructed not only upon 
a priori knowledge but also on intuition or perception of external objects. The outside world beyond the 
self provides experiences that stimulate the human senses. Therefore, human minds process and 
order information by supplying the conditions of space and time with which to experience objects. 
Essentially, the representation of the spatial dimension in Dadaab as both physical, relational and 
affective is in part consistent with Kant’s abstraction of space as intuitive. Secondly, the subjective and 
collective intertwinement of past, present and prospective dimensions of space inform refugees’ 
interpretations of the world. Their experiences within these spaces authenticate their aspirations and 
entitlements, and advance the clamour for elusive freedoms. 
 
5.5 The Human – Material Dimension 
 
The representation of refugees in public discourse has customarily pivoted around the extremes of 
threat and vulnerability. In recent times, the conflation of refugees with terrorists has gained global 
momentum. Conversely, refugees are commonly depicted as innocent victims of violence and are 
assumed to lack and are also deprived of political agency in the camp setting. As an illustration, 
Agamben (1998, 47) portrays refugees as feeble and living in a state of ‘bare life’. The notion of bare 
life is aptly captured by the symbol of ‘homo sacer’, the sacred man. Paradoxically, homo sacer is ‘that 
who may be killed with impunity but who is not supposed to be sacrificed or put to death by ritual 
practices’. Sovereign powers perceive homo sacer as lacking political or other value and therefore 
exists only biologically or lives a bare life. This image of the camp, constructed by the media and 
academia (Fresia & von Kanel, 2016, 250) has led Horst (2018, 445) to question the traditional 
representation of refugees as objects of governmentality over the less common portrayal as active 
political subjects. The representation of refugees as victims necessitates a security and biological 
response to their needs. Therefore, to be deserving of humanitarian aid, they must be pure humans 
with no past or agency (Turner, 2015, 143). As victims, they have no way of uttering a political voice 
but can only groan in pain (Nyers, 2006, 38). With no freedom to articulate political rights, they can 
only appeal to humanity by exposing their wounds (Fassin, 2005, 372). 
 
Within this backdrop, other scholars have submitted that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in 
the margins of law and are therefore liminal entities. As a result, they have no voice in the formulation 
or implementation of law. The Palestinian voice on the Lebanese and Palestinian political processes 
affecting them has therefore been suppressed. Further, the state of Lebanon has abdicated its duty to 
the Palestinian refugees and mandated the responsibility to United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA). These refugees have been stripped of full enjoyment of their fundamental human rights 
114 
 
since UNRWA only provides them with bare life (Hanafi & Long, 2010, 146-148; Afifi et al., 2016, 345). 
As a result, the emergence of political and religious movements within the camp can be interpreted as 
an attempt to navigate away from the state of exception by the exercise of agency through political 
influence and re-assertion of identity (Beydoun, 2010, 47).  
 
Meanwhile, bare life continues to permeate Dadaab Refugee Complex in the Agambenian sense. A 
temporary de-emphasis of the interrelated dimensions of time and space permits the elevation of the 
human dimension that captures the overwhelming sense of dehumanisation among refugees. The 
state of bare life similarly experienced by refugees in Dadaab, animated in table 3 below (developed 
from the analysis of research findings), strongly suggests that they are perpetually on the brink of 
survival. Suffice it to say that this cliffhanger state of existence is predicated on chance. Similar to their 
Palestinian counterparts, they experience limits to their enjoyment of freedoms and self-actualisation. 
The persistent state of deprivation that springs from piecemeal gratification propels them on the brink 




































Orientations of the Material Dimension 
1. Disempowerment Crippling characterisation of refugees and reliance on aid creates a dependency 
syndrome. Therefore, those who seek to empower ineffectually disempower 
2. Disillusionment Staggering hopelessness sets in as a result of protracted instability in the 
refugee’s homeland and dissatisfaction with the ‘settlement’ outcome at the 
camp. The Kenyan government’s threats of cessation of status exacerbates 
uncertainty 
3. Deprivation They exist in an environment of want and dispossession. Shortfalls in the 
quantity and quality of services and rights such as education and livelihoods 
impact their quality of life 
4. Finitude Their existence is replete with limits. They are for example restricted in the 
goods and services they can access within the aid architecture. Besides limited 
choices and tastes, ‘they don’t have what we call world view. They only have 
Dadaab view, Al Shabaab view…’ as one respondent suggests 
5. Vulnerability  They are exposed and pliant to the opposing influences of enabling and 
constraining elements – linked to interventions by aid agencies, government, 




The self and popular perception and opinion around ‘refugeeism’ denigrates 
their sense of self-worth. Thus the ‘exceptionalisation’ and veneration of humans 
outside the refugee orbit is common 
7. Procreation Even though the quality of life and longevity remain a challenge, the survival of 
the human progeny in the camp is ensured through reproduction. The camp 
environment similarly breeds new coping mechanisms, memories, social capital, 
aspirations, opportunities and challenges 
8. Survival The element of chance is pervasive. The sense of chronic uncertainty that 
distinguishes various aspects of their existence promotes a protracted sense of 
being on the verge, including being on the verge of life or death (‘we are lucky if 
one wakes up’) 
9. Demise  Death is both literal and symbolic and affects refugees’ physical and 
psychological states. Similar to procreation, other areas of their lives such as 
social capital, opportunities and coping can become deceased 
10. Adaptation Trapped in the fringe of existence, refugees acknowledge their situation as 
‘normal’ and build resilience by employing both adaptive (constructive) and 
maladaptive coping mechanisms.    
Table 3: Orientations of the Material Dimension 
 
Notably, the discussion so far reveals that the representation of refugee experiences not only projects 
liminality but also highlights the interplay with securitisation. In further examining the theme of 
adaptation in the table above, the antinomy of the conceptual dualism of vulnerability and resilience in 
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the context of (non)violent radicalisation becomes apparent. In seeking to adapt to their environment, 
strengthening resilience among refugees can be potentially antithetical to widely accepted norms. 
Thus, adaptation to the prevailing camp environment may involve building resilience through both 
constructive and maladaptive means, and may also include radicalisation or joining an armed group. 
Besides individual agency, constructive agents such as aid agencies design and implement 
interventions to strengthen resilience against radicalisation. At the same time, terrorist organisations 
work to strengthen resilience against hostile forces among their constituents to secure and expand the 
base.  
 
Both forms of activism demonstrate that strengthening resilience is not exclusive to the domains of 
counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. As an illustration, a recruiter is likely to exploit the 
challenging economic conditions (See Garcia, 2015, 20) in a camp context to weave a narrative that 
resonates with a refugee’s economic aspirations. This in the same way an aid agency may roll out a 
livelihoods programme. Therefore, the derogation of interventions aimed at reducing vulnerability to 
violent extremism as the specialty of ‘well-intentioned actors’ is a chimera. The programmes that 
terrorist organisations design to counter opposing influences within their constituency equally suggest 
the primacy of reducing vulnerability within their sphere. Madrassa classes that churn radical ideology 
are instructive of this dynamic. As such, any attribution of resilience and vulnerability as exceptional to 
well-intentioned actors is conceptually reductionist. For these reasons, radicalisation manifests as a 
form of coping mechanism. It is also possible that commitment dynamics prior to disengagement may 
display fluid identification and disidentification with radical ideology and as such, conversion is not 
absolute. 
 
As liminal entities, the imposing spirit of happenstance among refugees implies unpredictability, and 
more so, a life with no guarantees. As such refugees, tend to find themselves in the throes of 
brinkmanship that inspires the quest for coping mechanisms and eventual dispersal along multiple 
pathways. These pathways manifest as coping mechanisms of which the progression towards 
radicalisation may be a part for some. Thus, in augmenting Agamben’s thesis on the emergence of 
political and religious movements as a reassertion of identity, it is argued that these movements in fact 
represent the clamour for freedom that ultimately redeem their identity. Indeed, the environment of 
deprivation serves as an overpowering impulse for dehumanisation as one respondent observes 
below: 
 
…That is how you live here as a refugee but that is not a durable solution in itself.  It’s like living in denial. In 
denial of a right that you really possess from the onset of being a human being. Moving around with official 
documents even brings more problems and it makes you a target for extortion and you are very much 
stigmatised by the community and the police.  It is better for me to die than hear what they say when they know 
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we are refugees. There are some things that really dehumanise you, that really stigmatise you, that really 
discriminate you. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 
2017) 
 
The depiction of liminal entities as habitually passive subjects that must submit to instructions and 
arbitrary punishment is vividly analogous to the Somali refugee experience at Dadaab. While guided 
by ‘prescriptions, prohibitions and conditions’ (Turner, 1969, 109), they are at the same time 
remodelled entities who are anonymised, homogenised and furnished with coping mechanisms for 
their new environment. This view is in part consistent with Arendt’s (1973, 6, 455) thinking on state 
terror. She argues that modern terror is no longer aimed at the extermination or intimidation of 
opponents but as an instrument to rule the docile masses. The conditions in the camp therefore 
produce a horde of degenerate individuals compliant to the impulses of animal instinct. In this context, 
terror is conceived as a form of government that is also employed as an instrument to advance an 
ideology. Thus, in drawing parallels with the writings of Turner and Arendt, Rawlence captures the 
mechanics of the social reengineering of humans. He describes the liminal ritual of food distribution 
among Dadaab refugees: 
 
A policeman with a stick and a machine gun marched up and down keeping the ‘clients’, as they were called, 
seated, docile, ready to be corralled through the system, ‘processed’, like sheep being dipped. It was a ritual 
humiliation. After an hour in the sun, the policeman waved them up. (Rawlence, 2016, 42) 
 
The experiences of refugees in Dadaab demonstrates that PRS not only sustain physical displacement 
but also facilitate other forms of displacement that diminish the space for optimal human function and 
the enjoyment of freedoms. This is for example observed in cognitive ‘displacement’18 from 
psychological resilience, economic displacement from improved livelihoods and self-reliance, political 
displacement from political participation, and social displacement from cohesive social capital. On their 
part, Ibarra and Obodaru (2016, 50) observe that the uncertainty accompanying liminal existence can 
lead to progressive or regressive change or unresolved stasis as the interviewee contributions below 
similarly confirm: 
 
It is the lowest level. Being a refugee is the worst thing you can ever be more so in a country like Kenya. In a 
country like Kenya where there is a lot of prejudice… I think the Somali refugees are the worst refugees. When 
I hear ‘refugee’ it means that I am unprotected. It is in between you and God, or between you and UNHCR, or 
between you and other humanitarian organisations that are dealing with you. The problems of the refugees are 
bigger than any project funded by any organisation. (Mohammed – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal 
communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
                                                          
18 This differs from cognitive displacement as understood in the field of psychology. 
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…many more children today starve and die malnourished inside and outside Somalia, dozens slaughtered in 
South Africa and hundreds others deported while seeking asylum in another country. We need to act on how 
our neighbours and the world responds to our problems-treats us. Today, we are none other than a tool for fund 
raising by the UN and other humanitarian organizations, a trading commodity and a walking corpse. (Abdi, 
Refugee)19 
 
When I was a child, I used to dream of becoming the president of Somalia. Now all I think about is if I will live 
or die. (Anonymous, Refugee)20 
 
As discussed, liminality arises during periods of ‘radical social transition’ that in turn marshal new 
societal states (Turner, 1969, 133). Moreover, liminality not only functions to identify the significance 
of transitional limbo periods but also serves to interpret human response to the liminal existence. This 
promotes the understanding of how liminality models the human personality, the sudden activation of 
agency, and the powerful link between thought and experience. The ambiguous character of liminality 
enables the disintegration of identity that culminates into disorientation and novel perspectives. If 
liminality is interpreted as the temporal and spatial suspension from societal norms and action, it 
should similarly be viewed as a phase for the examination of the core values of a society’s culture 
(Thomassen, 2009, 14). Liminality therefore undermines normal limits to thought, self-awareness and 
behaviour. These circumstances permit the temporary suspension of core societal structure (Turner, 
1969, 81, 156). In this regard, one interviewee describes the modelling of perceptions towards 
‘outsiders’ at Dadaab Refugee Complex: 
 
…Meeting with other people who do not have your problems is actually an exposure and something your soul 
may really want to have. This is because when we all fled home from Somalia and we all have the same 
problems, and we are put in a camp and you only see UNHCR, you feel like you are very much segregated 
from the world and this is the only option for you as a human being. You are not able to work. You are not able 
to move. Every person you see coming to you is a superior human being because he is able to go out. He is 
able to go out. He is able to travel. You hear about Nairobi. You hear about Kisumu and you wonder where this 
Nairobi is. You wonder where these other human beings called Kenyans and other people live. (Mohammed – 
Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017)  
 
This reflection is an expression of perceived identity privilege with multiple facets encompassing race, 
ethnicity, citizenship, vocation among other dimensions of identity. The pending nature of liminal 
experiences may in some instances mimic a lifeless state. Those experiencing liminality, ‘liminaries’, 
elude common cognitive categorisation due to their interstitial state. As a result, their structural context 
renders them hypothetically ‘dead’ as the accounts below similarly demonstrate. Thus their ‘structural 
                                                          
19 Abdi Abdullahi. Information, Inspirations and Opinion. Wordpress, 2014. https://fishhkeyf.wordpress.com/page/1/ 




invisibility’ is typified by their sequestration, inconspicuousness as well as loss of symbols in pre-liminal 
status such as livelihoods and homes (Turner, 1977, 37 - 42).   
 
A refugee camp should not be a place to kill people. Practically, when you see Dadaab, Kakuma… these refugee 
camps practically are places to kill people. If young people have no place to study properly… and if there are 
no opportunities, it would be better for us to stay in our country in jail. I don’t see a big difference. As long as we 
are not considered human beings, and our physical, biological and mental needs are not met, why are we here? 
It is a kind of killing. (Mustafa – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017)  
 
So, refugees are desperate people, disturbed people. In his country he is a big man but in Kenya he can be a 
baker or just waste his time. Maybe he has a Masters degree but he has no way to use that skill. By itself that 
is killing his head. (Mustafa – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017)  
 
Disorientation, disillusionment and the corresponding dissolution of human identity are evident in these 
accounts. Some interviewees made strong repeated references to ‘human being’ in their interviews. 
The overall structural dispossession appears to shape refugee perception of themselves as subhuman 
relative to the superhuman character they ascribe to the people they are exposed to. The crippling 
effect this outlook has on their self-worth and agency also reflects on their sense of identity. Some 
studies (Rosenberg & Owen, 2001; Silverstone & Salsali, 2003; Moss, 2010) have indeed shown a 
correlation between low self-esteem and such negative outcomes as radicalisation. Refugees with 
diminished self-esteem perceive the divergence between their quality and character and societal 
standards and values. This in turn weakens their sense of contribution to a valued purpose in society 
and impairs their sense of free will (Moss, 2010, 5) as is discussed in chapter six. The occupants of 
Dadaab refugee complex are not Somali because they feel Kenyan. Conversely, they are not Kenyan 
because they feel Somali. Yet at the same time, the system not to mention their ‘Somaliness’ neither 
supports their aspiration to be Kenyan nor allows them the enjoyment of a full Somali experience. 
 
5.6 The Humanitarian Paradox 
 
An interpretive frame cognisant of both human resilience and vulnerability is important in the 
application of normative ethics within the humanitarian sphere. The appreciation for the altruistic ethos 
that fuels the aid sector was prevalent among research interviewees. Nonetheless, some interviewees 
observed the surrogate interests that have permeated the industry, ostensibly aimed at profiteering 
and sustaining aidcraft. Interviewees for example reported that the Kenyan government’s threat on 
cessation of status and forceful repatriation of Somali refugees was likely intent on arm-twisting donors 
to grant financial concessions. Reports on the Kenyan government’s treatment of Somali refugees as 
bargaining chips to settle scores on an ongoing maritime dispute with the Somali government provided 




Moreover, it emerged that fair work policies resulting from an agreement between the Kenyan 
government and UNHCR are applied discriminately. Notably, remuneration among nationals and 
expatriates is comparatively higher than among refugees who are treated as incentive workers. 
Perceptions on corruption of the system in the context of third-country resettlement procedures was 
similarly pervasive. An internal audit conducted in 2018 in UNHCR Uganda uncovered massive fraud 
that involved the management of 300,000 ghost refugees in a country considered a global policy model 
for refugee protection (Parker, 2018). Similarly, witnesses in the 2018 Sudan corruption investigations 
reported intimidation and harassment by UNHCR staff members (Hayden, 2018). Some interviewees 
further censured aid agencies for their preoccupation with competition for funds and job security. Smith 
similarly reports the role of governments, the UN and NGOs in perpetuating encampment and 
dependency, and reinforcing the vulnerable position of refugees in public discourse for various gains 
(Smith, 2004, 49). 
 
The innocuous agenda to empower conflict-affected populations may inadvertently spawn 
disempowerment. The appropriation of agency for example underpins disempowering narratives in 
humanitarian campaigns in their application of labels such as ‘vulnerable’ and ‘voiceless’. As a result, 
Soguk (1999, 243) asserts that the refugee is not only devoid of a home and citizenship but also lacks 
‘proper agency, proper voice, proper face’. That said, the relationship between refugees and 
humanitarian organisations is reciprocal. Humanitarian organisations project their services as 
exclusive and essential while making strong justifications for funding. On their part, refugees are reliant 
on humanitarian interventions, which justifies the existence of the aid industry (Al Nawakil, 2015, 8-
13). Refugees therefore understand the politics of projecting their vulnerability while in constructing 
refugees as vulnerable, humanitarian organisations ensure their sustainability (Jansen, 2016, 434). 
This symbiotic relationship is elaborated by dependency theory that animates the construction of 
refugees as fundamentally dependent within the humanitarian domain. The powerful images 
analogous to ‘disaster pornography’ (Burman, 1994, 246) constructed around passivity, infantilisation 
and helplessness reproduce stereotypes of colonial and dependency relations of power (Al Nawakil, 
2015, 8-13). Nonetheless, humanitarian organisations play a central role, an important trade-off, in the 
articulation of the rights and needs of refugees in their quest for durable solutions.  
 
Refugee ‘enlightenment’ and pursuit of their rights creates some level of discomfiture among aid 
agencies serving for example, the Kakuma Camp. In a study by Jaji (2011), an interviewee rationalises 
this discomfort by stating, ‘If we know our rights we will exercise them’. Refugees further describe 
incidents in which they have traded verbal exchange with aid agency staff as ‘fighting for their rights’. 
Indeed, as the study reveals, such behaviour has consequences for the antagonists, who are at times 
denied humanitarian assistance. The agency exercised by refugees demonstrates the high level of 
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consciousness and will to pursue freedoms on their part. At the same time, some of these examples 
expose the application of double standards by aid agencies who ‘empower’ refugees to demand for 
their rights from ‘other’ duty bearers but fall short of the same standards in some instances (Jaji, 2011, 
229; also see Lecadet, 2016, 189-193). From Jaji’s account (2011, 229-230), there have been rare 
instances when the blatant delimitation of refugee rights has been exercised. As an example, an aid 
agency official is reported to have reinforced the boundary between refugee and citizen rights. The 
official declared, ‘As visitors, refugees cannot exercise their rights in situations where his rights and 
Kenya’s security are threatened’. In other instances, the infringement of refugee rights mirrors their 
experiences in the countries from which they fled and leads to the attrition of agency over time.  
 
The general feeling is that the UN is not doing what it is expected. The big and crucial issue for us is the UN 
just holds people. They do not do their job, maybe they are just there for their jobs. People just live the way you 
put animals in a camp or cowshed. People have psychological problems, discouragement, hopelessness and 
the time is too long. Too long. I can mention people who have stayed here for 25 or 26 years. Just staying in 
this camp. The number of people is very high and the place is not enough. (Mustafa – Refugee, embedded 
narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
As discussed, the Kenyan government and Al Shabaab have in the past relied on Dadaab Refugee 
Camp for military conscription. The camp also serves as a rest and recuperation facility for weary Al 
Shabaab operatives. Jansen, (2016, 436-37) further observes that the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy and 
the gradual normalisation of militarisation in camps is permissive to its continuation as long as it is 
obscured from humanitarian organisations. Humanitarianism in turn inadvertently legitimises a war 
economy and armed elements, and renders the notion of camps as depoliticised spaces problematic. 
Further, human traffickers involved in the commodification of undocumented migrants and refugees 
have converted Dadaab into a transit and destination hub. The camp supports the commercial interests 
of thirsty ‘aidpreneurs’, ranging from government officials, refugees to the host community. Besides 
political and Hollywood celebrities, hungry journalists on the prowl for ‘the big story’ (Rawlence, 2016, 
108-09) occasionally browse the camp to draw attention to the unending state of human privation, and 
rightfully so. Arendt (1973, 55) further observes that when universally accepted, discrimination thrusts 
groups into civic, political and economic peripheries. This can create rallying points for political 
movements that address group grievances through acts of violence. The constellation of actors at 
Dadaab has indeed provided temporary relief to the camp dwellers’ tribulations. Conversely, the 
preservation of liminal securitised entities is the premeditated and accidental offspring of a seemingly 
thriving predatory environment.  
 
The camp device is typically a product of political crisis that serves as a space within which social 
atomisation and reorientation occurs while presenting new beginnings and opportunities alike. The 
precariousness of camp life and role of internal and external influences further transforms it into a 
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political vessel. Attempts by various actors to politicise and depoliticise the camp paradoxically 
generates a hyper-political space (Turner, 2015, 143-45). The problem with warehousing human 
beings is not so much the state of perpetual transit as it is the violation of human rights. The choice of 
the settlement area is typically motivated by political rather than humanitarian reasons. As such, 
refugee flight from a well-grounded fear of persecution underlies the apparent paradox in their 
exposure to violence and other rights violations in what should be their places of refuge. When full 
rights and protection cannot be guaranteed and a culture of dependency is sustained, a gradual 
process of disempowerment takes hold. The near total disempowerment caused by over-reliance on 
aid, authoritarian military conditions, discrimination, commodification and interminable confinement 
can engender low self-esteem and destroy initiative. Such conditions can act as precipitants for 
violence, and in particular ideological violence in a camp setting (Smith, 2004, 39-52).  
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
Dadaab Refugee Complex is the poster child of a botched humanitarian response. The gradual 
entrenchment of campian naturalisation as a measure of securitisation has fostered liminality. Identity-
based discrimination, restricted movements and long periods of confinement in camps results in social 
isolation and impairment. At the same time, the disintegration of order during liminality facilitates the 
establishment of new customs. Continued dissatisfaction with settlement outcomes emanating from 
constraining contextual conditions creates vulnerabilities to radicalisation. A stateless individual whose 
rights are violated can become easy prey for recruitment into radical or terrorist groups seeking to reap 
from an environment of disaffection (Betts, 2009, 7), and particularly so in a context already threatened 
by terrorist activity. Within this backdrop, some ‘refugee warriors’ participate in initiatives and networks 
that support armed violence while camps act as launching pads for guerrilla and terrorist activities 
(Loescher & Milner, 2005b, 30-31; 2008, 34-35). Arendt (1973, 302) while deploring the practice of 
warehousing refugees maintains that the global civilisation is at risk of producing barbarians within its 
core by propelling the masses into savage conditions. Additionally, after 9/11, other scholars (Helton 
2002a, 2002b; Schmeidl, 2002; Rashid 2000) in their examination of the humanitarian architecture 
have suggested a relationship between refugees and terrorism and the potential for militarisation in 
refugee camps. In highlighting the threat of incomplete humanitarian management, the Taliban has for 
example been conceived as a product of Afghani camps in Pakistan established by the UNHCR 
Makaremi (2010, 114). The Dadaab experience essentially underscores the failure of the international 
community to address the human security of forced migrants. It also highlights the actors, instruments 
and process of securitisation that intensify the liminal state. In short, Dadaab demonstrates the public 
construction of refugees as both ‘victims’ and a ‘threat’, and the propagation of the liminal order as a 
result. Accordingly, the next chapter examines the coping mechanisms that refugees draw upon to 
adapt to a highly securitised and liminal stranglehold. The chapter further explores the relativity of 
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freedom, vulnerability and resilience. It unmasks the illusion of freedom and builds the argument of 
radicalisation as a coping mechanism.  While the context is set at the encampment, liminal phase, the 
chapter progressively begins to draw links with decampment, post-liminal experiences in Western 


































Chapter 6 – Coping Mechanisms: Clutching at Straws 
 
In protracted refugee situations, liminality is a representation of the violation of freedoms. The 
curtailment of freedoms triggers the exploration of various forms of coping mechanisms, that may 
include the espousal of ideals and aspirations that justify violence as a means to influence change, or 
more specifically (non)violent radicalisation. Therefore, while camp governance is restrictive to 
freedoms, it also inadvertently imposes unorthodox forms of freedom that mitigate the afflictions in the 
camp. Given these circumstances, the concept of liminal disruption facilitates the understanding on 
the nuances of radicalisation. More importantly, it exposes the paradox of freedom during the periods 
of encampment and decampment. This chapter proceeds to establish the link between camp and post-
camp experiences, which is further developed in succeeding chapters.  
 
6.1 The Liminal Triad and the Freedom to Radicalise 
 
Liminality subsumes the paradox of change and immutability, reality and illusion, and freedom and 
bondage. In order for human beings to remain socially alive, they need to envision a meaningful future, 
however torturous the present is (Turner, 2015, 143-45). More importantly, the torment of an unworthy 
life may lead to ‘premature social ageing’ or even ‘social death’ as refugees grapple with various forms 
of coping (Hage, 2003, 78). Due to the common representation of refugees as victims, compassion 
projects and responds to their biological life as opposed to their political subjectivity. As ambiguous 
spaces where life is diminished to the bare and biological, the camp similarly presents opportunities 
for the reshaping of identities. Not to mention a space where politics continues, and may indeed 
intensify as social life, social hierarchies and power relations become reconfigured. The imposed 
depoliticisation of the camp essentially creates a vacuum in the general order of camp life that is filled 
with competing orders and identities, that may in turn create hyper-politicisation (Turner, 2015, 143-
45).  
 
The transactional model of stress and coping submits that transaction is the interaction between an 
individual and his environment. Coping is defined as ‘constantly changing cognitive and behavioural 
efforts to manage specific external and internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding 
the resources of the person’ (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 141). Thus, coping is the means by which 
individuals continuously seek and apply solutions in response to stressors. The model differentiates 
between problem and emotional-based coping. Individuals employ problem-based coping when they 
perceive themselves to be in control and can manage specific situations. Conversely, emotional-based 
coping is employed when people appraise themselves as having little control over their situation and 




Both methods of coping validate other scholars’ categorisation of coping as adaptive and maladaptive 
respectively. In addition, coping efforts are both behavioural and cognitive, and constantly change in 
response to new situations. A situation must be significantly overwhelming to initialise coping efforts, 
yet the interpretation and response to prevailing situations varies among individuals (Gonzalez et al., 
1990, 136). This further validates the Lazarus-Folkman model (1984, 141, 51, 80) that contends that 
the interpretation of stressful events supersedes the event itself and the person’s response to the 
stressor. The intensity of an individual’s ideals, beliefs, commitments or goals influences their 
psychological vulnerability to events. Moreover, successful adaptation is mediated by actual and 
perceived levels of control and contingent on the transactional interaction between personal and 
environmental aspects of an event (Farmer, 2008, 44-47). Notably, coping strategies vary by 
geography, time, social grouping and other demographics, and are profoundly influenced by past 
experiences (WHO, 1999, 1.9.4). 
 
Refugees in prolonged camp residency tend to adopt a range of coping mechanisms to deal with 
previous exposure to violence, forced migration and adapt to their new environment with varying 
degrees of resilience. Numerous studies have identified factors that act as predictors of resilience that 
include risk and protective factors, for example, traumatic experiences, self-efficacy, family cohesion, 
social capital, caring relationships at family, school and community levels, perception of the world 
(Bandura, 1977; Cowen & Work, 1988; Resnick et al.,1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1992); including 
psychological preparedness for trauma (Basoglu et al., 1997). Other studies (Costa et al., 1996; 
Ferguson, 2001) have identified personality traits and coping styles as important determinants of 
coping success, function and adaptation. Research findings (Goodman, 2004; Luthar & Cicchetti, 
2000) have also revealed the creative processes of coping and meaning making that survivors draw 
upon that in turn provide insightful data into the concepts of risk and reliance. Further scholarship 
(Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2003) has identified both passive and active coping mechanisms spanning 
effective to ineffective strategies. The Goodman (2004) study has for example highlighted the 
exploitation of new and existing social capital, strengthened religious beliefs and cognitive coping 
strategies among refugees such as the espousal of positive aspirations and reliance on inner strength. 
Similarly, other research (Abraido-Lanza et al, 2004; Halcon et al, 2004) has examined more 
maladaptive strategies including self-harming, avoidance and social alienation. 
 
Some of the strategies that refugees in Dadaab employ are facilitated by state policies while many are 
informal, self- driven and occur beyond official regulation. As an example, some of the refugees 
engage in self-entrepreneurial activities while others are employed by aid agencies. Some of the 
entrepreneurial activities include the sale of food aid, grocery, clothes and other consumer goods, or 
mobile money transfer services. Such economic activities enable them to supplement the very basic 
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material assistance received from aid organisations. As a corollary, these activities integrate the camps 
with the local, national, regional and transnational economic systems (Lindley, 2011, 40). At the same 
time, the high influx of refugees and presence of humanitarian organisations in Dadaab has presented 
market opportunities for host communities. They have increased demand for goods and services and 
also attracted other nationals in search of livelihood opportunities into the host area (UNHCR & World 
Bank, 2015, 32-34). A socio-economic survey of the camp conducted in 2010 found that despite the 
negative environmental impact in the surrounding areas, the camp generates approximately USD 25 
million annually to the economy of the host province (Enghoff et al, 2010, 43). This indeed exemplifies 
how the commercial activities targeted at the camp integrate with the local and national economies. 
 
The conflict in Somalia has shifted household and social structures and given rise to other forms of 
coping. A shift in social structures happens when male family members leave to join armed groups, 
depart in search of livelihoods, or become victims of violence or death. A common survival mechanism 
among Somalis is the dispersion of family members in order to spread physical and economic risks 
and increase livelihood opportunities. The indefinite periods of separation has gradually led to an 
increase in female-headed households and unaccompanied children (UNHCR & World Bank, 2015, 
38-39). Another shift in the camp involves the traditional role of males as providers and protectors. 
Women’s engagement in small businesses is comparatively higher than male involvement. Most males 
tend to have a low regard for petty trade and prefer to pass time under trees discussing politics (Abdi, 
2007, 198-99). Male refugees unable to fulfil their roles have a proclivity to frustrations and inferiority, 
which can manifest negatively through substance abuse and domestic violence (UNHCR & World 
Bank, 2015, 38). 
 
Other forms of coping mechanisms can be identified at local and international levels. Some refugees 
leverage the international aid system in order to optimise the aid they receive. By cultivating stronger 
relationships with aid workers, they may receive preferential treatment or secure incentive work. Other 
forms of coping include the formation of savings and credit associations, making contributions towards 
the needy and newly displaced, paying zakat, and sharing homes and meals (Lindley, 2011, 39). For 
the most part, these mechanisms seem to cater more to basic physical needs and offer little in way of 
psychological rehabilitation. Since Islam is an integral part of people’s identity, religion remains the 
primary coping tool for many. Refugee narratives emphasise the importance of religion in coping during 
flight and in the camps. There is strong identification with religion as a source of strength that enables 
refugees to overcome obstacles of civil strife (Abdi, 2007, 204). In fact, the conversion to an imagined 
Islam, which is deemed a reinterpretation of the pathway to true Islam prevails in Dadaab, Somalia 
and the larger diaspora (p. 195). The other form of coping with a transnational dimension involves 
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reliance on overseas remittances from relatives in order to cover living expenses, manage 
emergencies and invest in commercial activities and education (Lindley, 2011, 40; 2013, 296-97). 
 
Some refugees adopt more active and purposive coping strategies characterised by strong political 
inclinations. This is manifest in increased political consciousness and open engagement in political 
activity that is reinforced by ideological beliefs (Punamaki, 1990, 76-84). As a result, camps become 
politicised spaces where refugees assert their national, ethnic, political and other forms of identity 
(Sanyal, 2011, 882-87; Lecadet, 2016, 187-89). For some, the process of politicisation can progress 
into the adoption of extreme views and transform into violent or non-violent radicalisation. However, 
this is neither sudden nor entirely camp-induced but linked to broader contextual dynamics as 
demonstrated so far (Loescher & Milner, 2008, 37; Dumper, 2008, 203). Therefore, commonplace 
media accounts illustrated by sudden visits to symbols holding religious significance or contact with 
recruiters only provide partial explanations of the dynamics of radicalisation. In a magazine interview, 
Professor Horgan, a psychologist and terrorism guru, discounts the theory of YouTube videos and 
other terrorist channels as primary drivers of radicalisation. Instead, he considers these channels as 
more relevant in sustaining commitment (Knefel, 2013) or acting as triggers. Husain (2007, 263) 
similarly asserts that extremists do not suddenly emerge but rejection and confrontation tends to 
precede violence. Previous chapters have examined some contextual factors beyond the camp level 
while successive sections will aim to broaden the contextual dynamics. 
 
While examining the dynamics of radicalisation at Dadaab Refugee Complex, collective experiences 
and subjective nuances have emerged as important parameters for analysis. This is supported by the 
appreciation that diverse individual profiles may share both underlying contextual similarities and at 
the same time exhibit inimitable peculiarities (Fishman, 2010, 13). This essentially implies that a group 
that is ostensibly monolithic may pursue different pathways despite the similarities in collective 
experiences at the macro level. In his application of the social-cognitive theory of radicalisation, Ginges 
(2009) notes that radicalisation is not principally ‘a process of changing ideas but is the inter-play 
between changing behaviours and changing moral priorities’ (p. 76). Essentially, radicalisation is 
conceived as a process in which a commitment to the use of violence is prioritised over other duties. 
Numerous people may share strong moral outrage but few will radicalise to the extent of abandoning 
life goals for radical political action.  Distinction can therefore be made between those with strong 
grievances and those who articulate those grievances (pp. 76-81). 
 
Some studies (House, Landis & Umberson, 1988) have shown the debilitating impact of social isolation 
on physiological and mental health as may be the case with encampment in protracted refugee 
situations. This underlines the significance of social cognition in not only maintaining physiological but 
also social health. The swiftness of automatic responses suggests they unfold long before the 
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occurrence of any deliberation. In appraising Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) views on cognitive 
processes, Cleeremans (2014, 2) further notes that human beings are occasionally, ‘unaware of the 
existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response; unaware of the existence of the 
response; and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response’. This may indicate that coping is 
both a conscious and unconscious process. The open-ended internment of refugees in camps is 
therefore counter-productive because it can compound existing security problems and generate new 
ones. Moreover, as is the case with Dadaab, security measures, such as military raids and direct camp 
attacks, and the culture and organisation of camps create a viable climate for violence. The presence 
of weapons and bored, disillusioned young men increases vulnerability and volatility, especially in the 
prevailing conflict-habituated system. These factors constitute important precipitants for crime, 
violence, emergence of ethno-political factions, and increased likelihood of conscription into armed 
groups or organised crime. As discussed, armed elements can hide among the refugee population, 
with camps more likely to fall under the domination of political or military actors. When crimes are 
organised in a camp context, the human cost it inflicts goes beyond the confines of the camp. As such, 
encampment policies aggravate rather than address security problems and may impose emotional-
based coping (Jacobsen, 2001, 13; Agier, 2002, 319). 
 
The longer people are displaced the longer you are exposing them to negative coping mechanisms. What 
happens is that you will have camps where there is smuggling, trafficking, prostitution, low literacy rates.  Camps 
are perfect places for armed groups to recruit from because you have populations that are disenfranchised and 
unhappy. They don’t have any will or love for the place where they are because they are treated like second- or 
third-class citizens. Then you have this weird population. So, you are destroying them. You are destroying their 
potential to contribute or do anything. (Amina – UNHCR Protection Officer, personal communication, February 
18, 2017) 
 
While the dimension of time is ubiquitous in PRS, the research findings are inconclusive in as far as 
the prominence of protracted confinement on radicalisation is concerned. New camp arrivals and the 
younger generation at Dadaab Refugee Complex have been singled out as more vulnerable to 
radicalisation (Rawlence, 2016, 107, 126, 151, 172). This may suggest that the length of time refugees 
spend in protracted confinement while significant, is subordinate to the deplorable conditions that may 
instigate various forms of coping. Further, as mentioned, varied liminal experiences including exposure 
to the camp’s external environment produce both deviant subjects and diverse outcomes. Rawlence 
(2016, 78) thus dramatically observes, ‘The camp is a bounded world. To send your imagination out 








6.2 Liminal Disruption: Freedom as Elusive and Illusory 
 
The thesis on liminal disruption framework is comparable to Wiktorowicz’s (2005) theory of cognitive 
opening. To illustrate, besides religious seeking, multiple factors may stimulate cognitive opening and 
facilitate potential receptivity to alternative views and motivations. These include economic crises as 
regards loss of livelihoods and stunted mobility; socio-cultural factors, exemplified by discrimination 
and identity crisis, political repression, and personal circumstances such as familial death or crime 
victimisation. Equally significant is the aspect of facilitated cognitive opening that is inspired by radical 
activism through organisational outreach activities. It involves mechanisms that facilitate cognitive 
opening through direct individual and mass targeting. To mobilise collective action, public outreach 
programmes design inflammatory and contentious demonstrations, conferences, leaflet distributions, 
da’wa stalls, among other activities. Individual outreach strategies involve religious and political 
discussions that challenge established religious edicts and Western domination. In cultivating 
relationships, it adopts an indirect approach that explores issues of personal relevance and initially 
circumvents more controversial ideology (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 5, 20-22, 85-98). At the same time, 
contact with recruiters or engagement in radical activism, religious seeking, departure from the camp, 
engagement in (il)licit trade, renewed optimism, pursuit of available opportunities in education and 
livelihoods, succumbing to failed aspirations and a fatalistic acceptance and outlook on life, among 
others are symbolic of liminal disruption. In this context, liminal disruption represents both emotional 
based and problem-based coping.  
 
Wiktorowicz’s seminal works proposes a four-stage model of radicalisation. In the first phase of 
cognitive opening, the individual becomes amenable to new people and ideas. This results from 
experiences with personal disconnection, and personal or group grievances (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 5, 20-
22, 85-87). Besides cognitive opening, circumstances that make an individual more receptive to 
influences have also been termed as ‘unfreezing in social psychology and as biographical availability 
in sociology’ (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, 206).  In this context, vulnerability to radicalisation is 
higher among individuals who have recently experienced a breaking point related to some form of 
crisis or in situations where global events have spurred moral outrage (Roy, 2015, 7). Al Raffie (2013, 
75) submits that the presence or absence of competing influences determines success at this stage. 
Thus, anxiety arising from discrimination for example, presumes some level of ‘radicalisation 
readiness’. She challenges (p. 68) the role of recruiters as the sole agents of radicalisation and 
broadens the role of extremists as recipients of individuals whose identity has already been radicalised. 
Jasper and Poulsen (1995, 497) and Wiktorowicz (2005, 86) similarly suggest that new recruits to 
extremist movements often hold pre-established opinions and positions prior to engagement. They are 
therefore recruited and not converted to a belief system. Ginges (2009, 75) supports both views in 
suggesting that a formal recruitment process, indoctrination or a sophisticated ideological basis are 
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not prerequisites for radicalisation. Hence highly radicalised individuals are volunteers whose 
motivations are alienation and the injustices in Muslim countries that in turn spark moral outrage. 
Subsequently, he discredits the theories that focus on the manipulation of vulnerable individuals and 
contends that ascribing formal structures to the radicalisation process can be misleading. It is possible 
that in some cases, the existence of competing influences might interrupt cognitive opening. At the 
same time, in underlining gradualism, what may seem a recent crisis may in fact be a trigger that has 
been preceded by a steady build-up of structural factors. 
 
The second phase in Wiktorowicz’s model is religious seeking, which involves seeking meaning 
through religious expression. Some individuals who experience cognitive opening may not necessarily 
engage in religious seeking. This in the same way not every religious seeker explores Islamist groups. 
The next stage is frame alignment, somewhat similar to the ideological alignment process discussed 
in upcoming sections. Frames provide the language and cognitive tools for interpreting and evaluating 
the causation of events and experiences, and prescriptions. Frame alignment involves identification 
and alignment with an extremist organisation’s public representation of grievances and interpretations. 
Religious seekers must be convinced of the credibility of the religious interpreter and the legitimacy 
and authenticity of the interpretation of religious texts.  Besides, frames must be consistent and 
compete with government and other movements. Frame alignment between an individual and 
organisation’s interpretive schemata makes mobilisation and recruitment possible. The last stage of 
socialisation involves an individual’s participation in religious experiences that promote ‘indoctrination, 
identity-construction, and value changes’. Wiktorowicz asserts that the first three stages are necessary 
preconditions for socialisation (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 5-6, 21; Wiktorowicz, ND, 5). An alternative 
hypothesis can be advanced as regards conflicting ideological alignment as similarly discussed in 
chapter 5. For example, the acceptance or rejection of a movement’s beliefs is a dynamic process and 
may be indicative of partial commitment or renunciation. 
 
The Wiktorowicz model in its current formulation suggests a systematised radicalisation process. While 
presented as stages, the model itself suggests a cyclical and adaptive process, which is conclusively 
‘stage-neutral’. Further, in its presentation, the Wiktorowicz theory in part minimises the complex 
dynamism of radicalisation within the broader socialisation environment. While there is a compelling 
integration of exogenous conditions in the proposed pathway, they don’t seem to be accounted for 
particularly in the ‘final’ stage of socialisation. Ginges (2009, 76) has similarly endorsed a progressive 
pathway to violence resulting from the inefficacy of previous actions. He, however, adds a caveat by 
arguing that thoughts of political aggression may override instrumental outcomes therefore, pathways 




In light of the above, it is important to examine the orientations of identification with organisational 
ideology. The two pyramids model of radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017), for example 
identifies justifiers as individuals involved in violence; sympathisers as those who believe in but do not 
justify violence; and neutrals as apolitical. The characterisation of neutrals, who may not account as 
such reveals an important shortcoming with this categorisation. Secondly, there is an active and 
passive constituency of challengers. Thirdly, this model does not identify a potential group of those 
who engage in violence but with weak or shifting commitments to a cause. At the same time, 
sympathisers may be split between those who believe in the cause but do not justify violence and 
those who support the act of violence by proxy. Husain (2007, 178), a former Islamist, chronicles his 
journey of disassociation without deradicalisation to demonstrate this dynamic. Drawing from his 
experience, he states that globally, there are individuals who embrace a confrontational worldview 
even though not active in Islamic movements. A similar view is relayed by a research interviewee 
below. The frustrations that the interviewee vocalises also attest to the excessive response by the 
state as not only a driver of radicalisation but also a deterrent. These conflicting results of government 
response present a predicament on how a balance between human rights promotion and effective 
counter-terrorism can be struck. 
 
You see we have lost a lot of youth. People are missing, and we don’t know where they are so they fear the 
consequences of their actions even though they feel strongly about certain things. I think fear is a big factor. 
Given a chance everyone will rise because deep inside they are unhappy. Personally, when there is a Muslim 
killing or something else I don’t feel right…I have to do something… (clicks and lowers voice). I don’t feel right 
and wonder whether we have a voice with the government? I wonder can I go and talk with the government? 
(Anonymous, personal communication, date withheld, 2017) 
 
Since an individual’s construction of a personal ideology is shaped by societal structures and vice 
versa, individual transformation involves both introspection and socialisation (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 24-
25). When ideology is translated into practice at the macro level, it is controlled and maintained by 
social institutions that rely on language or discourse to shape beliefs and structure reality (Flaherty, 
2003, 35-36). The micro ideologies, subconsciously extant in most people (see Flaherty, 2003, 35), 
and somewhat comparable to Roy’s (2015, 3-4) individual trajectories, are connected to personal 
aspirations that motivate agency or lack thereof. The process of ideological construction may ultimately 
precipitate the convergence of micro and macro-organisational ideologies when the conditions are 
ripe. In fact, Jost, et al., (2009, 308, 314) have proposed a socio-psychological model of ideology that 
recognises ideological outcomes as a fusion between ‘top-down socialisation processes and bottom-
up psychological predispositions’. In constructing micro ideologies, the alignment and opposition 
between certain strands at micro (personal) and macro (organisational) ideological levels is possible. 
The ideological synchronisation and strategic alignment of the micro with the macro is a significant 
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advancement towards an ostensible ‘non-zero sum’ outcome. Similarly, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991, 
988-89, 1001) have explored the process of ideological socialisation and congruence and invalidate 
claims of homogeneity among movement participants. More importantly, this process invalidates the 
depiction of radicalised individuals as passive ideological consumers open to external influences as 
portrayed in some literature (Al Raffie, 2013, 75), and as one respondent similarly suggests:  
 
The important thing is that it is already a radicalised mind that gets picked because it was already radicalised. 
What was going on is that it was just waiting but did not know how to move forward with their ideas or plans. 
So, when they get somebody who supports them, they go.  A radicalised mind is already radicalised and waiting 
for somebody to tell them lets go (Ogola – INGO Programme Manager, personal communication, February 15, 
2017). 
 
The value of ideological complementarity becomes evident when the individual draws connections and 
applies the principle of reciprocity (Adair & Brett, 2005, 35; Quong, 2007, 79-81; Kim, 2013, 187; Erelle, 
2015; Burke, 2015) in assessing potential dividends in identifying with or participating in a cause. 
Influence becomes possible in a reciprocal sequence since either party responds to competitive or 
cooperative behaviour with similar behaviour, good or bad deeds are likely to be returned and people 
expect rewards for their action (Adair & Brett, 2005, 35; Holbrook, 2010, 368). This level involves the 
process of subjective value-based negotiation (Gan, 2017, 5-8) that may incorporate distributive 
aspects of positional transactional bargaining (Adair & Brett, 2005, 34-37; Holbrook, 2010, 363-64; 
Erelle, 2015; Burke, 2015) depending on the strength of ideological alignment, which impacts 
identification with and commitment to an organisation. The process of ideological socialisation could 
possibly lead high-risk individuals to downplay the risks involved in participating in an organisation 
(Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991, 1003). In this context, religion, politics among other elements that 
constitute personal values influence the relationship between the recruit and recruiter during the 
negotiation process and encourages cooperation (Gan, 2017, 6-7). The power structure in the 
interaction or relationship is similarly pivotal in exerting influence in as much as it may revolve around 
coordination and cooperation (Adair & Brett, 2005, 34). In the context of indoctrination, this could 
possibly signify a negotiated aspect of radicalisation in an unequal relationship structure where 
deception may similarly pervade. Some accrued dividends that are also symbolic of fulfilled aspirations 
include travel and adventure, connection with the homeland, revenge, economic empowerment, 
identity ‘recovery’, recognition of status among other factors that have been extensively researched in 
social movements. Upon further grouping, these dividends, which are also motivations, typically form 
the typologies of radicalisation. Indeed, Fishman (2010, 28) has submitted that the nature of an 
ideology influences the radicalisation process and called for further research to identify variations in 




This dynamic certainly raises questions on the broad characterisations of multiple complex drivers as 
merely constituting political or religious radicalisation as has emerged in other studies and models 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). While politics and religion play an important role in radicalisation, 
they are manifestations of deep-seated structural factors as numerous scholars have similarly 
observed.  Flaherty (2003, 41-42), for example observes that a low self-esteem resulting from 
deprivation increases vulnerability to charismatic leaders who provide ideological frameworks that 
explain prevailing situations and offer hope and alternatives for change. However, the complex, 
subliminal dynamics as has already been argued, sometimes demonstrate weak linkages with religion 
and politics even though broadly framed as such. The fluidity in shifts between triggers and structural 
factors obscures the often-superficial distinction between the two milieus. A driver that is seemingly a 
trigger could be a root cause and vice versa. For example, if an act of violence is triggered by a state’s 
use of excessive force in and outside the camp, as a result of a previous attack, this represents a 
trigger on the surface. However, if this pattern of response constitutes violations that are demonstrably 
systemic in nature as is often the case, a structural driver is implied. 
 
The failure to de-conflict opposing micro and macro ideological nuances, that are initially seemingly 
congruent could play a role in an individual’s disengagement from a radical group. The seemingly 
divergent motivations directed towards sometimes incompatible yet complementary goals is 
analogous to a defective yet functioning cogwheel that eventually implodes. When either party 
responds to cooperative or competitive behaviour with a different yet pragmatically similar behaviour, 
the negotiations follow a complementary sequence different from a reciprocal sequence (Adair & Brett, 
2005, 35). The integration of these ideologies, however fluid, disqualifies potential arguments on the 
absence of linkages between an individual’s and extremist organisation’s ideologies. Secondly, it 
compels a re-evaluation of some scholarly orientation and preoccupation with mono-causes or 
pathways of radicalisation. Overall, it demands a deeper examination of the anatomy and dynamics of 
radicalisation beyond political and religious doctrines as advanced in some literature (Botticher, 2017). 
While defining a concept is important, making sense of its core anatomy through a meaningful process 
of deconstruction and reconstruction is essential. The concepts of radicalisation and terrorism are fluid 
thus the appreciation of the historical and technological dimensions of radicalisation should go in 






Figure 3: The Liminal Disruption Framework 
 
The liminal disruption framework (Figure 3) crystallises preceding discussions and analyses on the 
liminal triad. It is the consolidation of refugee lived experiences within the encampment and 
decampment orders. In addition, the framework is a representation of the movement towards multiple 
pathways that may include (non)violent radicalisation. Some refugees become disillusioned and 
develop an impulse to penetrate the liminal barrier as represented by the orange liminal disruption 
border in the model. The refugees who succeed in disrupting the prevailing liminal order effectively 
dismantle the border between the camp and the outside world. The penetration of this border, both 
real and imagined, while construed as the physical ejection from the camp, is similarly cognitive in 
nature. It is therefore indicative of entry into a new environment or state. This manoeuvre exposes 
them to ancillary stimuli that propels them into multiple pathways as depicted by the blue arrows.  
 
The orange margin in the framework further represents the liminal disruption border that challenges 
and disrupts the existing order. Liminal disruption prompts opposing yet interactive bilateral movement 
between the encampment and decampment orders as represented by the blue arrows. The blue cone-
shaped arrows at the bottom of the model along both orders represent an hour glass when flipped 
upright. Comparable to the Wiktorowicz (2005) theory, the arrows signify that the trajectory towards 
radicalisation is not linear but circuitous. Flipping the hourglass denotes retracing radicalisation 
pathways in an attempt to not only understand the dynamics but also design effective deradicalisation 
strategies. Secondly, the pathways to radicalisation even among groups that are ostensibly 
135 
 
homologous are varied, similar to the sources of vulnerability, as demonstrated in the triad. The arrows 
are also symbolic of not just the nature of radicalisation but also the ebb and flow along the 
radicalisation continuum. Notably, Figure 3 should be interpreted as an explanatory framework that 
attempts to condense the core ideas on the liminal triad, the orientation of radicalisation and the 
concept of freedom. 
 
The liminal disruption border challenges the existing order of encampment that necessitates an upset. 
Refugees perceive the zone of encampment as an order of occupation and view the decampment 
order as the sphere of freedom. In the exploration of the notions of freedom and liminality, the duality 
of freedom has been portrayed as ‘freedom from and freedom to’ (Turner, 1977, 42). This portrayal 
indeed captures the dynamic of disruption from the encampment to the decampment order as the 
‘freedom to transcend social structural normative limitations’. Within the context of psycho-social 
development (Erikson 1950, 1963; Gonzalez et al. 1990), freedom and occupation subsume the 
cognitive, bodily and physio-structural orientations of the ‘camp’. Refugees’ perceptions of life beyond 
the camp remits is based on their limited exposure to the external environment that informs their 
interpretations of freedom on both sides. For the most part, prior to exposure to the decampment order, 
the distinction between both orders is likely based on the absence and profusion of freedoms. Upon 
exposure to the decampment order, positive perceptions on the profusion of freedoms become 
negated. It therefore follows that the nature of freedoms and latitude for agency on both sides are 
comparable. To illustrate, Mohammed deserted Dadaab as a result of insecurity only to discover the 
elusiveness of freedom upon resettlement in Eastleigh, an urban area predominantly inhabited by 
Somalis: 
 
Life has really changed, and you have to be very smart to live here. There is a lot of police harassment… When 
someone tells you, ‘I will take you back to Mogadishu (Somalia)’ then why am I here? It doesn’t answer the 
question of why I am here. I am here because of safety, security and my life is in danger. That is why I seek 
refuge. When someone who is supposed to protect you harasses you, you just need to develop your own means 
of survival in the sense you can tell yourself you are more Kenyan than a refugee… They try to psychologically 
measure you and see if you’re Kenyan or refugee. That’s the battle you can either find yourself winning or losing. 
In the evenings you will find very many refugees in police Probox vehicles which are not branded... There is a 
time while working for XXX, I was arrested and put at the back of a Probox with 17 other people during Usalama 
Watch (government counter-terrorism operation). We were squeezed in a Probox and were suffocating. They 
use their boots to squeeze us together. At that moment you feel like you should be in Mogadishu (Somalia) 
instead. From what I have seen, they squeeze together women, children, old men, youths and we are all 
Somalis. And you ask yourself, ‘what the hell is this? Where has this curse come from?’. (Mohammed – Refugee, 
embedded narrative from personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
The interaction between the encampment and decampment orders elaborates the framing of the 
change process as disruption. The fluidity of the liminal disruption border depicts a dyad of resistance 
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and receptivity with the capacity to thrust refugees on either side. As illustrations, some of their camp 
experiences may be replicated in their new settlements, or the ensuing culture shock may be 
overwhelmingly unsettling. This may in turn weaken their adaptive capacity in their ostensibly new yet 
relatable surroundings. Ultimately, the fleeting enjoyments of freedom is emblematic of freedom as 
elusive and illusory. Hogue (2006, 5) describes this as a state in which ‘things are not as they were, 
and they are not yet what they are to become’. Yet again, they summon the agency to reconcile their 
hitherto utopian ideal of out-of-camp salvation with the omnipresent damnation of the camp aura. A 
security expert further describes camp conditioning that presents challenges to coping upon 
decampment: 
 
In refugee camps, due to the harsh conditions, you find the occupants have developed a lifestyle and they have 
reached a point they have adapted their values and norms. It may also be difficult for them to leave the camp 
because they may not be able to cope in the outside world. Some even suggest coming back to the camp… 
when slaves in the US were emancipated, the slave masters came in the evening and told their slaves they 
were free to leave. In the evening they (slaves) came back and said they had nowhere to go because they were 
used to life in the plantations. Likewise, there are people who have adapted to camp life. (Dr. Wekesa – Security 
Expert, personal communication, February 3, 2017)  
 
As already discussed, prior to liminal disruption, the distorted perceptions of the profusion of freedoms 
in the decampment order is pervasive. In addition, the ensuing shift upsets the prevailing encampment 
order but does not entirely eliminate or change the constraining system. Some of those who self-
resettle within the first host country or are resettled in third countries in the West come to this 
realisation. Upon decampment, their experiences invalidate their equation of disruption with increased 
or absolute freedom. In other words, they are never completely free on either social order. As a result, 
this realisation may recalibrate their conceptions of freedom as they make sense of past and present 
circumstances. The epiphany that springs from this mixed experience reinforces the link between both 
orders. The most recent example that symbolises the cognitive dissonance that arises from this 
experience, and the paradox of turbulent homelands and unstable safe havens, is the 2019 terrorist 
attack at the New Zealand mosque that also claimed the lives of refugees. As such, the boundary 
between encampment and decampment is real, imaginary, permeable, malignant and interactive. The 
disillusionment that accompanies the reality of resettlement could introduce new dynamics to coping 
as discussed in chapter seven. 
 
You have to look at coping in context. People also cope based on which phase of displacement they are in. 
What is the external environment? What are the cultural coping mechanisms? The age? A 60-year-old would 




I know so many Somali refugees we resettled in Norway and Sweden and they hate it. They want to come back 
to Somalia, which is at war. They complain that it’s cold, they don’t speak the language, people treat them 
differently. (Amina – UNHCR Protection Officer, personal communication, February 18, 2017) 
 
Whereas the findings of this research validate Wiktorowicz’s theory of cognitive opening, it also 
partially challenges its representation as the point of existential enlightenment when an individual 
adopts a ‘more true’ world view. Cognitive opening presupposes a single terminal opening that 
precedes three other stages in the radicalisation pathway. It is possible that there are various 
orientations of cognitive opening in the same way the interaction of a multiplicity of factors may 
generate unchanneled grievances that may not necessarily result into a climactic ‘more true’ world 
view. This is exemplified by an Islamic scholar interviewed for the research who points out, ‘The second 
thing has to do with the ones who are unhappy with the situation but are waiting for direction from 
Islamic authorities’. Be that as it may, this argument vindicates the cognitive opening model, which 
specifically examines activism. Abdul further notes: 
 
The harsh conditions one is exposed to right from the start of the conflict and movement from their country. The 
nature of lifestyle right from your homeland will affect someone psychologically and disrupt their lives. Personal 
assets and livelihoods are lost as you leave everything behind within a short time. If you try to imagine all that 
– that is the psychological effect of this… Due to their harsh lifestyle back home and movement, when they land 
in camps, they become rowdy and carefree. They do things in their own way. They don’t see a sense of future 
and just see now. Not even tomorrow. They just see now. (Abdul – NGO Director, personal communication, 
February 21, 2017) 
 
Wiktorowicz poses an important question on why individuals with similar personal experiences and 
exposed to the same environmental conditions pursue disparate pathways. While most of the research 
interviewees mentioned factors that included individual disposition and situational behaviour, this 
research demonstrates an emerging pattern of fear and bellicosity as influencing choice. This is 
similarly validated by Haer and Hecker (2018, 5) who argue that recruiters in refugee camps tend to 
target candidates who either already display signs of delinquency or have a high proclivity to 
delinquency. At the same time, in as much as individuals are exposed to diverse ideologies, some 
may fall by the wayside, a dynamic that is tacitly attributed to choice: 
 
We have projects that are trying to help the youth. We had a meeting that addressed radicalisation among the 
youth. We got 600 scholarships from the government of Sudan… These students are taught all ideologies and 
then it is up to them to decide which one they choose. They are not being radicalised in this university. In 2015 
all the certificates from this university were banned in Europe. This is because one of the students from the 
university had joined Boko Haram. (Anonymous, personal communication, date withheld, 2017) 
 
Even after school, some choose marriage while others don’t. There are also those who have spent their lives 
with their parents telling them how bad Al Shabaab is. The successfully recruited may have been adults waiting 
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for a job. Or others who don’t join may be fearful of consequences. These kids know Somalia is not a good 
place even from the coverage on TV. So, the ones who go to Somalia are the aggressive ones. They are told 
we have jobs so those who are interested should follow us. (Maryam – NGO Staff-CVE Expert, personal 
communication, February 18, 2017) 
 
Upon further analysis, the framing of choice appeared to be linked to freedom. In this case, the inability 
to choose may imply the absence of or limited freedom. Felson (1986, 119), upon examination of free 
will versus determinism states that ‘People make choices, but they cannot choose the choices 
available to them’. At the same time, a study conducted by Feldman et al. (2014, 244-45) found that 
the number of options or choices available to an individual determined the level of satisfaction in 
exercising the free will. It can therefore be argued that the deplorable conditions at Dadaab represent 
an enabling environment that yields both risks and opportunities. As such, the choices available to 
refugees in an environment thriving with competing actors, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
grants them the free will to employ various forms of coping that may also stimulate radicalisation. 
Conversely, the Feldman study found that too many choices can diminish or limit an individual’s 
contentment with free will. Belief in free will was found to have a strong link with the ‘idea of choosing’, 
with individuals correspondingly relating choice with freedom. Subsequently, ‘the more they perceive 
their actions to be choices, the more they enjoy making decisions and choices, the more confident 
they are about their ability to make such choices, the less difficult they perceive their selections to be 
and, finally, the more satisfied they were with their selections in life’ (p. 244). 
 
Wiktorowicz (2005, 101) relates choice with self-empowerment while Feldman posits that people who 
enjoy making decisions, may enjoy the capacity for free choice while those with an aversion for 
choosing may shirk the responsibility. Those averse to making decisions tend to detach themselves 
from their choices due to the expected ‘or even feared’ consequences of their choices as discussed, 
and as the interviewee below affirms. Meanwhile, those who make wrong choices are not necessarily 
unsettled if their ‘actions are inevitable and caused by prior events’. This is consistent with the push 
effect of constraining contextual conditions, as this thesis has shown. Those who perceive themselves 
as having greater influence over their choices may more aggressively consider and pursue different 
avenues to improve their lives, thereby igniting liminal disruption.  
 
People have different personalities. People behave differently in different situations. For some people there is 
no way someone can suppress or frustrate them. It is either they will fear to give their view or those who don’t 
fear will give their views. It also has something to do with fear. Generally, I ask people why they don’t react to 
situations and some will tell you they fear the government. They fear being jailed, killed or taken away. ( Islamic 




In determining their own choices, individuals are more likely to perceive themselves as wielding the 
power to control their circumstances in the context of limitless choices as opposed to interpreting life 
as predetermined experiences. However, this thesis has similarly demonstrated the appropriation of 
this power by the intervention of various actors, including aid agencies, government, entrepreneurs, 
Al Shabaab, among other agents. Feldman’s study concludes by submitting that the desire for control 
seeks satisfaction in motivational patterns that include making choices and exerting power. Thus, in 
considering their actions as choices, individuals will adapt to internal and external influences that 
impact their capacity to choose freely.        
 
Essentially, an environment of freedom determines and promotes opportunities, risks and choice. 
Horst (2018, 444-45) further argues that the life histories of refugees exhibit periods of turbulence and 
radical uncertainty, clearly resulting from their liminal existence. These experiences configure their 
civic engagement and transforms them into active political subjects. Her research on Afghan and 
Palestinian refugees links individual and collective experiences with injustice, insecurity and general 
loss of freedoms with increased politicisation. Thus, the confronting liminal existence, conceived as 
the privation of freedoms, is a disempowering state that sets an individual on various pathways, 
including radicalisation.  
 
The subjective and collective experiences with freedom and domination in a camp environment that 
presents both risks and opportunities is likely to determine an individual’s choice(s) of coping. 
Correspondingly, there is an emerging notion of radicalisation as a struggle to recalibrate the balance 
of power within existing relationships for aspirational goals. Lukes (1974, 27-29, 85) describes power 
as domination, which is the ability to constrain the choices of others. This can occur explicitly through 
coercion or implicitly through unconscious processes to secure compliance. His conception of power 
in the third dimension describes how the powerful transform the powerless who are unconscious of 
their interests. This observation is consistent with Turner’s (1969, 109) portrayal of liminal entities as 
habitually passive subjects under subjugation. While Lukes’ ideas validate Turner’s argument on 
subjugation, liminal entities are not inherently passive but maintain various forms of agency as this 
thesis and existing scholarship demonstrate. 
 
6.3 Identity Construction in the Context of Liminal Freedoms 
 
The theme of identity has featured prominently in radicalisation scholarship (Turner et al., 1989; 
Hornsey, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2004; Louis, 2009). Liminality has similarly been conceived as the 
reconstruction of identity resulting from the significant disruption of the sense of self. The ambiguity 
and sense of in-betweenness that delineates ‘who refugees used to be’ and ‘who they might become’ 
is symbolic of the continuous process of identity reconstruction. Their present self remains ‘not yet’, 
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‘not anymore’ and ‘in the making’ with their present selves cast in the past and future (Beech, 2011, 
296; Ybema et al., 2015, 22-24). The more fortunate humans have succeeded in isolating and 
protecting themselves in gated communities. In contrast, the systematic global segregation of 
undesirable elements subjected to special regimes has created gated identities of refugees, IDPs, 
prisoners, among other stigmatised identities (Agier, 2002, 363-64). These isolated communities have 
been discussed within the three manifestations of encampment in chapter four. Besides the 
increasingly robust border protection systems, racial and economic identities, including the 
phenomenon of “white flight” have been examined in chapter seven.   
 
In their search for identity, individuals vulnerable to radicalisation are driven by the desire for self-
worth, an exploration of the links between religion and secularism, and the strengthening of social 
capital arising from feelings of alienation (Fishman, 2010, 13). Freedom and identity are 
interdependent and similarly influenced by prevailing circumstances. Favourable circumstances tend 
to enhance compatibility and reduce friction between freedom and identity. The autonomy of the true 
self from the social context prompts identity to generate anxiety and pose a risk to freedom and vice 
versa. The self is simultaneously free and constructed since social norms shape the will and the self 
has the freedom to interpret and alter existing norms (Kaul, 2013, 488-489). 
 
The unpredictability of the post-war plight that refugees find themselves in results in a threatened, 
traumatised identity. The heterogenous character of the camp and its inhabitants creates opportunities 
for encounters, interactions and the remodelling of identity (Agier, 2002, 322). In a review of the 
writings of various scholars (Banks, 1996; Handler, 1988; Malkki, 1995b; Abrams, 1982; Ewing, 1990), 
Corfield (2008, 30-32) elegantly explicates the concept of relational identity. She argues that the 
refugee identity is constantly reworked, a testament to its fluidity. Their identity is heterogeneous in 
nature, with each individual endowed with a subjective background, experiences, ideals and agency. 
Their current identity is largely intertwined with the homeland and multi-faceted, with each facet of 
identity expressed at different times with different variations.  As such, identity is transient and 
reflective of current status, partially linked to origins and an unknown destiny. Some aspects of identity 
may be collectivised, thus providing a sense of solidarity, while some aspects are distinctly subjective 
(Tilley, 2006, 9). Zainab’s reflection below, similar to that of other refugees interviewed for the study, 
illustrates the projection of dual or multiple identities and implications for agency:   
 
As a Muslim I can manage. As a refugee it is too too hard especially looking for stable life, permanent life and 
yet your days are few. (Zainab – Refuge, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
The Kenyan security agencies’ excessive response to terrorist attacks at Dadaab refugee camp could 
in this case promote perceptions of common fate with extremists, increase popular support and lead 
141 
 
to disidentification with the Kenyan state (Louis, 2009, 438). Some interviewees similarly noted that 
these reprisals also breed an environment of fear and reinforced loyalty to the Somali identity and the 
group norm of clan protection. It is therefore notable that collective punishment and collateral damage 
have increased camp dwellers’ reluctance to share information on suspicious activities with security 
agencies. Though inconclusive, a study by Haer and Hector (2018, 5, 12-13) reveals that ethnic identity 
as observed in shared language and culture facilitates the spread of ideas, mobilisation and collective 
action. Ethnicity reinforces in-group identification and the dislike and disidentification with the out-
group. Nevertheless, identification with an ethnic group does not necessarily motivate participation in 
an armed group.  The interplay between ethnicity and other structural factors is possible since the 
study concludes that economic deprivation and ethnocentrism are mutually reinforcing. 
 
In drawing linkages with deplorable camp conditions and the experience of freedom, the identity 
construct becomes important. The strong attachment Muslims have to Islam is in part the result of 
resentment to Western colonial rule and models of development as the Somali experience in chapter 
three similarly demonstrates. Post-colonial humiliation, deprivation and subjugation have buttressed 
Islamism thus identification with Islam emanates from the fulfilment of psychological and physiological 
needs. Islamist organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood including the Al 
Shabaab in Somalia have gained support as a result of social service provision to the depraved. 
Psychological theory submits that identity is the outcome of a psychological process that is spurred by 
human needs. It therefore follows that individuals firmly espouse identities that comprehensively 
respond to their needs. The agents who respond to these needs be it NGOs, entrepreneurs or Al 
Shabaab are therefore also likely to be embraced (Kaul, 2013, 495-96) as John notes below. Kaul’s 
conception of freedom however seems to disregard its interpretive pluralism. He contends that the 
anti-Western attitude of Islamist organisations does not appreciate the value of freedom and therefore 
supports oppression. This argument restricts the concept of freedom to a Western interpretation yet 
Islamist tenets also embody their own interpretations of freedom, however unorthodox. 
 
You know it’s a very sad situation. Promises have been made to these people. They have seen others come 
and go, they have seen others try to go back home and come back to the camp. So, they have seen a lot of 
suffering. Of course, as a human being, you have your extension limit, it reaches a point all your dreams fade 
and become frustrated and you could do anything to survive. That leaves you at the mercy of the government, 
the UNHCR, the NGOs and even the terrorists that push you to that level to the extent that you go with whoever 
comes with an idea that can guarantee his survival. You pledge your allegiance to that person regardless of 
whether the idea is good or bad. If it makes me survive, I will embrace it… You know there is a misconception 
about radicalisation. Radicalisation may not be entirely about religion. Radicalisation is closely associated with 
desperation, discontentment, frustration at all levels. (John – IGAD Security Expert, personal communication, 




The recalibration of identity over a lifetime moulds hybrid identities. In the course of this transition, 
refugees may construct identities with which they seek to connect and similarly wish to disengage 
from, customised for diverse audiences (Ibarra, 2007, 1; Ybema et al., 2015, 25). Identity transitions 
present discrepancies between current state and future possibilities or aspirations. This discrepancy 
represents reconciliations with experiences and aspirations of freedom among refugees trapped in the 
liminal state. In conceiving identity transition as ‘alterations in a person’s set of possible selves’, 
individuals may respond to these possibilities by inaction or an altered self-concept. Consequently, 
‘desired and feared future selves’ intuitively shape interpretations of and responses to prevailing 
opportunities and challenges (Ibarra, 2007, 9). At the same time, inter-personal relationships provide 
important contexts for identity transition since inspiration from other people also determines changes 
in self-concept. Life events may have an effect on identity transition in as far as sense making and 
social justification is concerned. Various literature (Ibarra, 2003a; Lee & Mitchell, 1994; Ebaugh, 1988; 
Hall, 1976) has discussed the role of events as triggers for exploratory behaviour that in turn offset 
cognitive processes by which individuals probe alternatives. An exploration of the salience of identity 
construction therefore further reveals states of unexpressed or discreet identities besides situational 
identities.  
 
The link between identity and radicalisation is fairly well established in existing literature. The success 
of radicalisation is partly attributable to an extremist’s ability to formulate an identity that potential 
recruits can relate to (Al Raffie, 2013, 67). The terrorism scholarship (Bollinger, 1981; Knutson, 1981; 
Crenshaw, 1986; Fishman, 2010, 19-21) highlights the adoption of negative identity among individuals 
in marginalised communities. While an individual can adopt multiple identities, individual identification 
with shared grievances influences collective action in radicalisation. In the quest for purpose and 
meaning in life, individual negative identity may draw people to the collective identity of extremist 
organisations that in turn accords them a strong sense of identity. Low self-esteem, identity 
disorientation accompanied by a low threshold to cope with life’s frustrations have been identified as 
psychological causes of radicalisation (Shaw, 1986; Moss, 2010).  
 
Since psychological theories are restrictive, social psychological enquiry, a field that portrays human 
behaviour as a manifestation of human interaction, may provide further explanations (Arena & Arrigo, 
2005, 487). To begin with, identities are ‘parts of the self-composed of meanings that persons attach 
to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary society’ (Stryker & Burke, 
2000, 284). Since identity influences self-appraisal, life choices and behaviour, an individual can take 
pride in their successes despite the obstacles, or become mired in self-denigration, low expectations 
or victimisation. The family, as the primary source of self-appraisal in an individual’s formative years, 
is supplemented by cultural and social institutions. The compatibility of familial, educational, peer and 
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professional views establishes a pattern of interaction that is mutually reinforcing and also reflects an 
individual’s own views. More importantly, dissonance occurs during periods of dramatic social changes 
or when social institutions espouse beliefs that conflict with the norm. Whatever the case, after 
introspection, the individual continues the search for an individual identity and an ideal that may be 
facilitated by a mentor, literature, and other media (Flaherty, 2003, 49, 53).  
 
6.4 The Freedom Trap: Freedom to Cope  
 
Freedom in the context of protracted refugee situations is experienced in momentary alterations of the 
liminal state attained through the exercise of the personal sovereign. This state is characterised by 
fleeting detachments from the order of occupation that is the camp, aimed at the exploration of 
potentiality for actuality. It is within this context that Agamben (1999, 178) poignantly situates ‘I can’ 
within potentiality thus, ‘‘I can’ does not refer to any certainty or specific capacity but is, nevertheless 
absolutely demanding. Beyond all faculties, this ‘I can’ does not mean anything – yet it marks what is 
for each of us, perhaps the hardest and bitterest experience possible: the experience of potentiality’. 
It is for this reason that refugees employ various coping mechanisms to fulfil their needs and 
aspirations. 
 
On her part, Arendt (1958, 31-33) affirms the exclusivity of freedom within the political sphere. She 
submits that human beings are predisposed to violence as a pre-political act, in their quest to liberate 
themselves and fulfil human needs, notably wealth and health.  Physical necessity subjugates an 
existence of poverty and disease thus to be free implies immunity from the necessity of life and 
inequality. Within a camp setting, a life endured in the public sphere maintains its visibility. However, 
the camp also loses the depth that distinguishes ‘a privately-owned place to hide in’ (Arendt, 1958, 
71). While Arendt conceives the camp as visible, popular discourse on refugeeism alternates between 
hypervigilance and indifference, and correspondingly confers macroscopic and microscopic stature.  
 
The nature and quality of freedoms accessible at Dadaab Refugee Complex have been discussed in 
chapter four. So far, it has emerged that refugees’ experiences with freedom has more to do with 
paucity, quality and infractions as opposed to the complete absence of freedoms. In some aspects, 
there is complete lack but more prominent is the repressed power to manipulate the space within which 
increased enjoyment of freedoms can eventuate. At the core of powerlessness lies the paradox of 
freedom in the camp context typified by an environment that promotes the enjoyment of fringe social, 
economic and political freedoms. In contrast, the desperation emanating from diminishing aid and the 
constraining structure of the camp permits the perversion of certain freedoms as forms of coping. 
Some respondents for example acknowledged the economic freedom in illicit cross-border trade that 
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has sometimes conjoined strange bedfellows that include refugees, government officials and Al 
Shabaab.  
 
The aberrant humanitarian environment enables shared experiences and resilience to stressors. The 
shared problems provide validation and motivation for efficacious collectivised coping. At the same 
time, this environment imparts stress contagion, concealment, and mistrust resulting from shame and 
political affiliation and infighting (Afifi et al., 2016, 345-57). This necessitates both subjective access 
and enjoyment of freedoms, resilience, vulnerabilities and coping. As such the collectivisation of the 
enjoyment of freedoms is fairly significant in the face of refugee homogenisation. Every collectivised 
experience, seemingly modest in orientation, is marked by complex individual peculiarities. At the 
same time, the illusion that derives from the comparison and interpretation of freedom between the 
camp and the ‘outside world’ impassions liminal disruption. This illusion becomes a freedom trap when 
refugees, upon leaving the camp or progressing along another disruptive trajectory, are unable to 
reconcile aspects of the real world and the camp. It is therefore remarkable when Hogue (2006, 5) 
submits that liminality constructs a ‘time out of time’ in elaborating the lack of or little change in pre- 
and post-transitional experiences. The ensuing disillusionment projects freedom as not just 
subjectively constructed and (un)fulfilled but also as illusive and self-negating. Therefore, the quest for 
freedom is advanced post-camp through the employment of various forms of coping that may include 
radicalisation. 
 
The configuration of the camp dominion potentiates the co-existence of freedoms alongside 
humanitarian domination. As has already been discussed, the coterie of actors with diverse interests 
and engaged in a range of protection services that fulfil basic freedoms similarly exercise some form 
and level of dominance within the camp stranglehold. The pursuit of survival and psychological needs 
invites the exploration of personal choices21 that determines an individual’s propensity to submit to 
freedom or domination. In the context of refugeeism, liminal existence intensifies coterminous 
experience with freedom and domination even in extramural spaces that initially give the illusion of 
expanded freedoms. It is therefore not the lack of freedom in the camp that consumes a refugee’s 
existence, but their conception of freedom based on their camp experience, relative to the external 
world to which they have had little to no exposure.  
 
Though loosely universally defined, the conception of freedom appears to be subjective and, in some 
cases, a controversial process. While acknowledging the reality of religious fundamentalism, Roy 
                                                          
21 See Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs – physiological and growth needs that motivate behaviour; and William 
Glasser’s (1997, 2007) choice theory. The latter who differentiates between survival and psychological needs contends 
that unhappiness is the result of poor relationships that in turn deteriorate as a result of ill-advised choices. It follows that 
improving choices strengthens relationships. Ultimately, happiness is rooted in self-determined decision-making. 
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(2017) contends that fundamentalism is not an outcome of violent radicalisation. His argument that 
fundamentalism ‘rejects individual choice and personal freedom’ similarly suggests a fundamentalist 
conception of freedom, as possibly freedom from Western values and dominance. It is also instructive 
of the relativity of freedom, in the same way the relativity of human rights has persisted. Not to mention 
the relativity of vulnerability and resilience as discussed in chapter five. It is therefore important to 
underline the contextual nuances that underlie the interpretation of concepts. Premised on nihilism, 
Roy further describes the death goal of radicalised martyrs as the notion of pure revolt that arouses 
seduction and fascination. Violence is not only a means, but also an end. Suffice it to say that in death, 
the martyrs yield to the ultimate and purest form of freedom through an unassailable, total and absolute 
form of resistance.   
 
It is important to examine freedom in the context of total institutions and the effect of this form of social 
ordering on human beings. There are three forms of concentration camps that function as total 
institutions, namely Hades, Purgatory and Hell. Hades are also found in non-totalitarian states and are 
used for the confinement of refugees, stateless persons, and other ‘undesirable elements’ (Arendt, 
1973, 445). In her examination of freedoms in total institutions, Arendt (1973, 296, 473) notes that the 
pathological infraction on human rights is predicated on the suppression of agency, both opinion and 
action. Further, ‘Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as 
freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men.’ Therefore, an 
attempt to grasp the behaviour of concentration camp dwellers must appreciate the potential for the 
human psyche to be destroyed with little or no corresponding impact to the physical self. The end 
product of the atomisation of the psyche are therefore inanimate men who defy common psychological 
understanding in their quest to cope with the constraining conditions (p. 441). Life in those camps is 
therefore a drawn-out process of death (pp. 446, 453):  
 
The human masses sealed off in them are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them 
were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead and some evil spirit gone mad were 
amusing himself by stopping them for a while between life and death before admitting them to eternal peace. It 
is not so much the barbed wire as the skilfully manufactured unreality of those whom it fences in that provokes 
such enormous cruelties… (Arendt, 1973, 445)    
 
An exploration of coping strategies provides further insights on the links between freedom and 
encampment. In her study of Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, Jaji (2011, 232) argues that refugee 
surveillance in the camp triggers the quest for freedom and some degree of self-determination. Thus, 
some refugees tend to have a predilection for defiance of authority and established rules while others 
eventually break free from the camps. Camp deviants are often profiled as ‘apolitical’ disregarding the 
fact that refugees are indeed a bi-product of politics. The presumption of the apolitical character of 
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refugee protection is indeed far-fetched since politics and humanitarianism are ultimately intertwined. 
The institutions of order and control in the camp are not instilled upon seemingly passive beings thus 
the exertion of power provokes not compliance but resistance among some refugees. They devise 
ways to violate the rules and reclaim their political rights without detection. This defiance sometimes 
enables the infiltration of camps by armed groups, as further illustrated by the military training of youth 
in Dadaab (Jaji, 234). They take advantage of their attribution to vulnerability and victimhood, which in 
turn safeguards them from links to such subversive acts (Jansen, 2016, 434; see also Malkki 1995b, 
99-220, 1997; Ibeanu 2004; Corfield, 2008, 179). Since the forms of resistance range from passive, 
confrontational to fake compliance, they identify and exploit loopholes that advance the enjoyment of 
their ‘personal sovereignty within camp sovereignty’. It is such actions that facilitate for example the 
receipt of extra food aid and the accommodation of unsanctioned and at times militant guests in the 
camp. The homogenisation (Turner, 1969, 95, 111; Turner, 1982, 26) of refugees that accentuates the 
collective for purposes of control and order inadvertently engenders mutual identification and solidarity 
with the aim of resistance (Jaji, 234-35). 
 
Tension between humanitarianism and the war on terror is similarly palpable. The international 
community’s deployment of humanitarian aid in states with restrictive and abusive refugee policies that 
also benefit from support on the war on terror is demonstrative of contrasting principles that further 
constrict refugee freedoms. During the infamous government-led Operation Usalama Watch in Kenya, 
some Somali refugees were brutalised, relocated to the camp, then forcibly repatriated as the broader 
collective endured diminished aid. The operation was aimed at cracking down on illegal immigrants 
and suspected terrorists in the aftermath of two terrorist attacks (Amnesty International, 2014). Some 
of those forcefully repatriated had never set foot in Somalia. The angst that this operation provoked 
further reinforced the indelible impact similar operations have had within the Somali community over 
the years. Khadija recounts the afflictions of some refugees who had decamped during the counter-
terrorism operation:   
 
There is a woman who is a neighbour of ours who was very scared when the police came around that she 
jumped from her flat and broke her leg. We also have a neighbour who was forcefully deported to Somalia. 
(Khadija – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 19, 2017) 
 
Freedom thrives where potentiality exists, and choices abound. As such, an examination of freedom 
should imbue the distinction between potentiality and actuality (Basescu, 1974, 232). The polarising 
nature of potentiality as ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ and the subjective interpretations of freedom similarly 
signal mixed aspirational outcomes among refugees. The deplorable camp conditions and heterotopic 
post-camp experiences while symptomatic of suppressed freedoms, also provide varying degrees of 
respite from the liminal. The manifestation of freedom as elusive and illusive stimulates the predilection 
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for change expressed in the persistent employment of emotional and problem-based coping. It is within 
this context that Agamben (1999, 182-83) repositions freedom from actuality to potentiality and writes 
of the roots of freedom:  
 
…human beings are the animals who are capable of their own impotentiality. The greatness of human 
potentiality is measured by the abyss of human impotentiality. …to be free is not simply to have the power to 
do this or that thing. To be free is, in the sense we have seen, to be capable of one’s own impotentiality, to be 
in relation to one’s own privation. This is why freedom is freedom for both good and evil.  
 
This assertion resonates with the theme of brinkmanship that fuels the hankering for change discussed 
in the liminal triad. Beyond being a physical ‘temporary’ structure, the camp represents a mindset that 
imbues a state of perpetual soporific transience and camp-like existence emanating from structural 
conditioning. Further, beyond personification, is the singularity between camp and human, in and out 
of the camp, sometimes transmitted over generations in the quest for freedom: 
 
So, I am just pushing on with refugee life all these years yet others they get the resettlement and leaving this 
life behind. At the moment I am called to translate for other people who have resettlement interviews. I was 
even called last week. Some of the ones I translate for get resettled. They will just ask me, ‘Are you arrested? 
No. Are you persecuted? No. Have you been harassed? No. I am living as a refugee, but I am running for life, 
for the rest of my life. (Zainab – Refugee, embedded narrative from personal communication, February 10, 
2017)  
 
When your son keeps on getting arrested, what will they say? They cannot keep on staying in the country. They 
escape and go to places where they are accepted. If I keep arresting you every other day for things you have 
not done, that is what you will do. Are we supposed to be Somalis or Kenyans?... When the children finish 
school, they don’t get any jobs. Somalis have a lot of problems. We are oppressed. (Khadija – Refugee, 
embedded narrative from personal communication, February 19, 2017) 
 
The intersection of deplorable camp conditions and open-ended warehousing that promotes the loss 
of freedoms has significant impact on refugee coping. The chronic uncertainty defined as the paucity 
of confidence in an individual’s ability to predict an outcome is an important manifestation of the liminal 
state. Coupled with the dire living conditions in the camp inimical to freedoms, chronic uncertainty 
produces anxiety and stress. Increased threat-related anxiety over protracted periods inflames 
refugees’ mental and physical health. Similarly, it depletes executive functioning, which is the mental 
capacity to execute plans, decisions and goals. The normalcy of chronic uncertainty, also common in 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon promotes coping efficacy. However, individual adaptation to 
these norms in the context of past trauma, poses challenges, while future uncertainties inhibit their 




The impairment of the sense of free will can be compared to what Kruglanski et al. (2014, 73) in their 
examination of radicalisation term as ‘loss of significance’ in unstable social, economic and political 
conditions. This loss can trigger the quest for significance ‘to matter, to be someone, to have respect’. 
Ultimately, the loss of freedoms that accompanies dispossession is likely to thrust refugees along one 
of several trajectories likely to reclaim, establish or even sustain their sense of meaning and identity. 
As a result, the construction of refugeeism and other forms of identity informs perceptions, 




The personal and collective sovereignty exercised in the context of state sovereignty are at the same 
time extrinsic and resistant to the state and other institutions exacting dominance within the camp. 
Refugees are not mere victims but possess a measure of agency to impact their destiny. The exertion 
of personal sovereignty among refugees is geared towards the disruption of the liminal existence. At 
the same time, personal sovereignty reconstructs conceptions of freedom that in turn enhances the 
potential to actualise, even if piecemeal. Further, identity construction in the context of liminal freedoms 
highlights the evolution of identities and identification with causes and groups as a pattern of coping. 
Ultimately, the agency for potentiality and possibly actuality ignites the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of dominant perceptions and conceptions of freedom, resilience, vulnerability and 
coping in the context of refugeeism. A chronic state of liminal existence similarly advances conceptions 
of freedom and the reconstruction of identities in new settings. As migrants in Western countries, the 
presenting opportunities and challenges precipitate further forms of coping that may include 
radicalisation. However, this needs to be understood within the wider context that the next chapter 
explicates. As such, the upcoming chapter thrusts the refugee into the decampment, post-liminal 
phase. But to what extent is this phase post-liminal? The chapter explores the new yet strangely 
familiar environment, this time in the West, with some broad-brush Kenyan examples. In this phase of 
a refugee’s journey, it becomes evident that for some, the journey never ends. This chapter essentially 
















Chapter 7 – The Hooded Society: Securitised Discourse in the Construction of Radicalisation 
 
This chapter is premised on the argument that an examination of vulnerabilities to radicalisation in the 
migrant context that neglects the host environment is problematic. It essentially develops this argument 
as advanced in chapter 3 on the history of conflict in Somalia and the role of external factors. With 
reference to Figure 2, the dissertation has so far examined pre-encampment and encampment 
dynamics. This section shifts to decampment dynamics while drawing from camp experiences. The 
refugees are thrust into the wider global context as they continue their onward journey to the North, 
while also drawing from their experiences in the South. The chapter further interrogates the 
compartmentalisation of liminality into pre-mid-post liminal phases and the extent to which it applies in 
the asylum-seeker context through the exposure of the liminal in the post-liminal (decampment phase).  
 
An examination of the second and third manifestations of encampment further casts radicalisation as 
intersubjective and relational. These forms of encampment, both physical and symbolic, reveal the self 
and externally imposed patterns of integration in migrant enclaves, post-decampment. It is further 
argued that liminality persists long after decampment. Though structurally invisible, refugees forge 
strong solidarity bonds and egalitarianism and as such intra-group distinctions of status become 
blurred (Turner, 1969, 95, 111; Turner, 1982, 26). A refugee’s fringe existence potentiates connection 
with other disengaged persons and offers further reflections on common historical and prevailing 
oppressive social structures that suppress freedom (Turner, 1982, 51-54). Ultimately, they forge a 
‘loving union of the structurally damned pronouncing judgment on normative structure and providing 
alternative models for structure’ (1979, 49).  
 
The conversion of relationships within the social structure could culminate into a struggle of human 
identities. A liminal, fringe and structurally inferior system generates cultural myths, symbols and 
practices that provide alternative paradigms to reconstruct reality and experiences. The new culture’s 
attempt to synthesise with the structural or broader collective reduces the limitless freedom that is 
compatible with the goal of integrating humanity. The examination of liminality must therefore 
encompass the examination of multiple polarities in society. In other words, liminality is an enquiry into 
the social action of the full human condition, the total social phenomenon (Turner, 1982, 51-55). It 
therefore follows that an examination of migrant coping strategies and settlement outcomes must be 
situated within broader societal structures. 
 
This chapter therefore examines public discursive and performative formulations of the securitisation 
of migration and the effect on radicalisation. It discusses the role and impact of information framing, 
diffusion, and emergent discourse and action on (non)violent radicalisation. The chapter highlights 
camp and post-camp dynamics in a trans-national context of refugee migration and resettlement in 
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Kenya and Western countries. Specifically, and though presented as separate sections, the chapter 
analyses the interactive public discourse and actions of political elites, media and technology, 
academics, radicalised groups and their construction of (non)violent radicalisation. It also examines 
the prevalence of closet identities in a hooded society by highlighting personal or cognitive conflict in 
public-private representations and its effect on engagement with and construction of ‘controversial’ 
issues, in this case radicalisation. In so doing, the chapter illuminates the effect of these dynamics on 
public perceptions and attitudes and the resultant patterns of construction of securitisation and 
radicalisation. 
 
7.1 The Refugees are Coming!!!: The Theatre of Public Discourse 
 
Public opinion influences a revolving cycle of public perceptions, attitudes and behaviour that in turn 
inform further discourse. In the realm of migration, public representations doubly inspire and shape 
the politics and policies that determine refugee lives (Horst, 2018, 446). The representation of refugees 
in public discourse has engendered compassion alongside emotional desensitisation, 
dehumanisation, sub-humanisation and the perpetuation of stereotypes and prejudicial acts that have 
impacted refugee attitudes, beliefs and opinions. In the theatre of public opinion, shifting speaker-
audience roles and their influences on individual and institutional behaviour pivot around the 
interpretive agency that moulds the social construction of refugeeism and security. In this public 
theatre, the power, meaning and resonance of a rhetoric is determined not by the speaker’s intention 
but by the schemas through which an utterance is interpreted (Brubaker, 2012,11). The political and 
discursive opportunity structures in the context of migration have indeed demonstrated the role of 
various actors in influencing group behaviour. Specific focus has been on the accentuation of group 
differences and control over access to information in the public sphere and their impact on immigrant 
sentiments (Garcia, 2015, 20-21).  
 
The prevailing polarised political context that magnifies differences between in-out groups is an 
important element in the securitised discourse on migration. Discursive opportunity structure describes 
‘aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion into the public sphere’ 
(Koopmans & Olzak, 2004, 202). These aspects include the degree of visibility of public claims, 
resonance and legitimacy. Discourse becomes visible when multiple channels of communication are 
involved in message broadcast. It resonates if it generates positive or negative reactions by other 
actors in the public domain. Discourse is legitimated if it is supported rather than rejected by majority 
of actors. This thesis therefore submits that public discourse on contentious issues, in this case 
radicalisation and migration, has a polarising effect. This polarity may serve as motivation for non-
violent extremists to reinforce negative attitudes and beliefs while serving as a guide for violent 
extremists to justify the use of violence in response. In light of this, the potential and dynamics of 
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contagion22 or diffusion (see Garcia, 2015, 19-20; also, Cliff & First, 2013) of radical beliefs and further 
impact on radicalisation in the context of migration require closer examination. 
 
The diffusion of radicalisation can further be examined within the framework of indoctrination. This 
chapter posits that public discourse may involve the active or intentional (Momanu, 2012, 96-97) and 
tacit indoctrination of population segments that progressively acquire certain beliefs, attitudes and 
opinions in varying degrees. The espousal of such beliefs in turn elicits out-group response 
mechanisms that include the adoption or perpetuation of a reinforcing loop of open or latent counter-
beliefs and actions. To this extent, the element of indoctrination in public discourse theatre is not 
confined to the province of (Islamic) religion. In fact, the original meaning of indoctrination had a 
positive pedagogical meaning of instructing people with knowledge. A pejorative definitional shift 
injected political ideology and religion into the semantics of indoctrination while maintaining the 
pedagogical thrust to connote the adherence to a doctrine or opinion. Examples include training or 
brainwashing of young Nazis and totalitarian propaganda (Momanu, 2012, 88-89), which can be 
compared to the propaganda in extreme-right discourse as explored later. Wiktorowicz (2005, 168-69) 
also discusses capitalist indoctrination that movements strive to overcome whereby schools are 
framed as institutions of capitalism and agents of secular socialisation. Indoctrination can be inter-
personal or institutional and involves an authority that exercises powers that may be deemed legitimate 
(Momanu, 2012, 89-90). By drawing from various examples including race, religion and other identity 
constructs, Reboul (1977, 14-24) identifies 13 standard aims of indoctrination: 
 
to teach harmful doctrines… to use the education to support a partisan doctrine… to learn without understanding 
the essence… to make use of ‘authority’ in teaching… to teach starting from preconceptions… to teach starting 
from a doctrine considered to be unique… to teach something as scientific when in reality it is not… to teach 
only the positive aspects of a doctrine… to counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a certain doctrine… to 
arbitrarily select parts of a curriculum… to emphasize a specific value during the educational process while 
disfavouring others… to inculcate hatred through education… to impose a belief using violence… 
 
Premised on this framework, this thesis contends that besides intentional conditioning, tacit 
indoctrination may be facilitated by previous experiences or culture (Momanu, 2012, 10) such as 
exposure to biased media and victimisation that reinforce preconceived or existing beliefs and 
attitudes. Momanu (2012, 98-101) argues that accidental indoctrination may occur when, for example, 
a teacher unconsciously employs passive or authoritarian methods with the belief in the validity of their 
own ideas. In applying the concept of cognitive conflict as advanced by Inhelder, Momanu submits 
that knowledge acquisition is neither linear nor cumulative but involves deconstruction and 
                                                          
22 For a comprehensive review on contagion theory and diffusion refer to Myers 2000; Gleditsch 2002; Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Maves and Braithwaite 2013. 
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reconstruction in ‘cognitive unbalanced situations’ that expose individuals to experiences that 
determine internal conflict. Subsequent sections demonstrate this by highlighting public-private 
representations or ‘impression management (Goffman, 1959, 1-24, 112) in a dynamic Momanu (100) 
terms a conflictive confrontation between an individual and the environment. 
 
Existing literature views the marketplace of Islamic religious ideas as the domain of Islam(ism) (see 
Husain, 2007; Fahmi & Meddeb, 2015; Shakeel & Wolf, 2017; Kurti, 2017). Islamism as a manifestation 
of market failure suffers from the absence of quality options, diversity in Islamic theological instruction, 
autonomy from the state, and competition between sects to encourage moderation (Shakeel & Wolf, 
2017, 9). Yet Husain (2007, 83-153) maintains that Islamists have thrived in the free marketplace of 
competing radical concepts that promotes extremism. In examining Islamist market fundamentals, this 
chapter argues that the religious marketplace is inundated with clients whose consumption and 
interpretation of Islamist products feeds the broader public discourse on religion, refugees and 
radicalisation. Linked to this, the term radicalisation typically invokes associations with Islam that 
denotes ‘Islamicalisation’. Yet in a magazine interview, the powerful invocations of Professor Horgan, 
an authority on the psychology of terrorism, captures the ubiquity of radicalisation in which this chapter 
is premised: 
 
But beneath that (ideology) is something far more powerful: the ebb and flow of everyday human psychology. 
Whether you’re alt-right, alt-left, anti-government, or just a jihadi, the psychology is the same. Those feelings of 
frustration, insecurity, paranoia, anxiety, jealousy, desperation, all tangled up in a lack of direction and purpose 
— these are the real forces at work (Romano & Belkin, 2017). 
 
7.2 Navigating the Marketplace of Religious Ideas 
 
7.2.1 To Friend or Unfriend Technology? 
 
The subjects in the securitisation of migration discourse intersect in the nucleus of technology. 
Subjects are typically exposed to interactive discursive social networking platforms that pose risks and 
opportunities alike. But lurking beneath the visible user interface that enables the operation and control 
of social media applications are powerful programming commands called algorithms. An algorithm is 
‘any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and 
produces some value, or set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of computational 
steps that transform the input into the output… a tool for solving a well-specified computational 
problem’ (Cormen et al., 2009, 5). Therefore, to what extent are subjects purportedly in control of 
popular social media applications, and what are the potential risks to radicalisation in polarised 
contexts?  
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In social media networks, algorithms influence the content displayed on feeds based on users’ digital 
footprints and therefore command significant influence (see Oremus, 2016). Algorithms are designed 
by rational humans with a set of values, beliefs, goals and visions, which makes algorithms, intrinsically 
value-laden. Correspondingly, the ideology that informs a company’s vision, that in turn instructs the 
design of algorithms is also embedded within the algorithmic architecture. Algorithms therefore act as 
the interlocutors between front-end (users) and back-end (engineers and visionaries) actors. 
Significantly, both extremes are human. Company visions are not static, particularly in the fast-evolving 
technological terrain. Visions often evolve as technology breaks new ground, with companies like 
Facebook revolutionising technological, social, political and economic spaces. While algorithms are 
not yet sentient, they are clearly value-laden, interactive and represent and convey a system of values 
and goals. As such, they influence how society feels, thinks and behaves. They have normalised and 
institutionalised digital behaviour and consequently wield significant invisible, sophisticated power that 
is increasingly at odds with the state. Algorithms therefore exert and confer power by proxy. Social 
media algorithms have similarly forced traditional media to adapt its antiquated business model to 
changes in technology as shall be discussed in the next section. Consequently, algorithms have 
practical functional as well as utilitarian and instrumental value.  
 
While social media networks have been instrumental in connecting the world, they have also conferred 
a platform to actors with nefarious goals. There is a preponderance of research on online radicalisation 
that has largely neglected the dimension on the (non)discursive power of algorithms and their 
unanticipated and unintended consequences. Facebook’s founding president, Sean Parker, admitted 
that they created an addictive platform that exploits ‘a vulnerability in human psychology… interferes 
with productivity in weird ways. God only knows what it’s doing to our children’s brains’ (Solon, 2017). 
Evidently, the challenge for the company has been taming a technological platform that has become 
ungovernable and commands excessive powers that also mediate digital battlegrounds. Algorithms 
have the capacity to constrict people into ideological silos, and also influence ideology in their 
construction and simulation of an ideal world. Improvements in machine learning implies that 
algorithms will continue to test and push the boundaries of cognitive and behavioural plasticity as the 
world progresses towards technological singularity. It also means that there will be improvements in 
technology as unanticipated teething problems emerge.  
 
Foucault (1975) analyses ‘technologies of power’ and more specifically, societal functions and effects 
of technologies of surveillance. The bodily government of gestures indeed instructs behaviour and has 
localised effects at personal level with viral societal impacts. Foucault (1989, 61) further reflects on the 
discursive practices between ‘words and things (technology)’. The significance of algorithms in the 
Internet of things is therefore notable. With the capacity to model language, algorithms have the 
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capability to command and influence discursive and nondiscursive practices, as Facebook’s utility and 
limitations have demonstrated in the Kenya and U.S. elections (see also Beer, 2017). Algorithms are 
therefore performative. Media reports suggest that in some instances, social media platforms have 
threatened democracy for example, in the U.S. But beyond this, they have also influenced politics in 
dictatorships (the Arab Spring), including ordinary political discourse as exemplified in the prioritisation 
of Twitter and Facebook trending news. The proliferation of conspiracy theories on social media is 
similarly noteworthy. In 2019, Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the terrorist attack at Al Noor Mosque 
in Christchurch, New Zealand posted his manifesto (Tarrant, 2019) on social media prior to the attack. 
Brenton views mass immigration and higher fertility rates among immigrants as posing a threat to white 
identity. This worldview is rooted in ‘the great replacement’ conspiracy theory that constructs 
immigrants as invaders with an inferior and dangerous culture, and the aspiration to ‘replace’ 
Europeans.  Among the long list of motivations for the attack on the mosque includes taking ‘revenge 
for the thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands’ (p. 5).  
 
While there is some degree of cohesiveness between online and offline behaviour, ‘identity 
performance’ has been found to pervade online interactions. Identity editing allows for the creation of 
multiphrenic personas that facilitate the enjoyment of elusive offline experiences and deviance 
(Robinson & Schulz, 2009, 686-88). The hidden power of social media networks lies in part in providing 
the virtual space to create multiple identities – that which eludes humans in the offline world. They 
facilitate discreet indiscretion in some users’ espousal and normalisation of the ‘other’ that may include 
the ‘radical other’. The exploration of and interactions with the ‘other’ has bred virtual communities and 
magnified the boundaries between ‘us-them’. This has further contributed to the proliferation of 
conspiracy and counter theories, and other fallacies that have suffused digital online platforms and 
blurred the boundary between real and constructed facts. Some interviewees reported exposure to 
online content on migration and security that have constructed parallel realities and consequently seek 
to reclaim old traditions that have been effaced by postmodernism. Social media interactions, besides 
reconstructing identities, have therefore also nurtured underground sub-cultures, and mobilised 
subjective and collectivised agency. 
 
So far, it has emerged that a system of algorithms can be conceived as ideologies that fashion not 
only human behaviour but also reconstruct world views. Besides, conditioning human behaviour, 
algorithms solve problems that challenge governments, for example predictive policing (see Perry et 
al., 2013). Algorithms are therefore sufficiently cooperative but also pervasively adversarial in their 
capability to define relationships slightly skewed towards disruption and theatrics. Solon (2017) further 
argues that this dynamic partly feeds the addiction for social media. Radical algorithms inadvertently 
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blur the lines between what is real or true and contrived or artificial. Technically, algorithms may be 
fairly autonomous but do interact with and shape the social world in beneficial and destructive ways.  
 
Algorithms significantly present the risk of computational propaganda, which may induce 
computational radicalisation. Computational propaganda is ‘the use of algorithms, automation, and 
human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks’ (Woolley 
& Howard, 2018, 4). The character of social media networks complicates the predictability of 
algorithmic outcomes for designers and publics therefore, unintended effects should be anticipated. 
Typically, political actors use autonomous programmes to spread propaganda and influence public 
opinion. For example, bots and obscure algorithms that propels them mimic humans in social media 
platforms and produce substantial information. The deployment of political bots produces fake reviews, 
increases attacks on opponents, overwhelms activist discourse and inflates follower numbers, 
retweets, and likes. Consequently, interactions in digital platforms have moulded political identity and 
bolstered the rise of both progressive and radical social movements (Woolley & Howard, 2016, 4883-
885; see also CBC Marketplace, 2014). This dynamic is explored in more detail in chapter eight. 
 
7.2.2 An Evolving Media Environment: There was Drama when… 
 
The evolution of mass communication has transformed the intricate relationship between the media 
and terrorist organisations. As the nerve centre of interactions between actors and propagators of 
distorted perceptions (Fan, 2008, 50), media coverage of terrorist attacks has informed public agency. 
The public’s burgeoning appetite for entertainment and drama funnelled by digital mainstream, 
alternative and social media, has exerted further pressure on the media’s capacity to conform to a 
dynamic environment. As such, a progressive reorientation of the media landscape has spawned 
urgency in the delivery of real-time news, the use of buzz words such as drama, clickbait headlines 
and sensational content on radicalisation and migration.  
 
Research interviewees reported positive media contributions, and particularly the media’s informative 
and moderating role in public discourse. At the same time, interviewees noted deviations from conflict-
sensitive journalism that habituates radicalisation discourse. Some interviewees reported exposure to 
online documentaries, for example, ‘The Muslim Agenda’ and other social media conspiracy theories 
seemingly to ‘understand’ the ‘other’s’ ‘mentality’. Others were exposed to social media images and 
clips of atrocities committed in Muslim countries. Such skewed media exposure that animates 
communication without direct engagement has informed attitudes, beliefs and opinions. Conversely, 
interactive media tools have elicited a similar effect, as John notes below. Some individuals have 
transformed social media into an online battlefield that mediates offline outrage with impunity. In this 
regard, social media has become a platform for toxic engagement, particularly during terrorist attacks. 
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The eruption of Facebook and Twitter feeds with compassion for victims and vitriol for the perpetrators 
and those they represent has been widespread. It should be noted that the interviewees who reported 
negative views on religion appeared to be influenced more by confirmation bias and less by objective 
truth seeking that cultivates shared meaning. Overall, terrorist attacks have triggered the spread of 
(mis)information, evoked ‘selective grief and outrage’ and created opportunities for anti-immigration 
advocates to advance their agenda and standing (see also McClintock, 2015).  
 
The good thing about social media is that it’s a playing field for everyone whether you are crazy or not. To some 
extent, social media can easily trigger interest in some of these radicalisation processes or it can also work 
against it depending on where the individual is. The decision to search a given area in social media is personal 
though it can also be influenced by what is trending. But it is largely your decision. (John – IGAD Security Expert, 
personal communication, February 6, 2017) 
 
The media has been accused of being the ‘terrorist’s best friend’ in the orchestration of drama, tension 
and agony. Besides reporting the horrors of unfolding terrorist attacks, the media injects itself and 
abets the drama. In this ‘theatre of terror’, the media assumes the role of drama critics in conveying 
and interpreting information to the audience. The industry has previously played extra-journalistic roles 
of investigation and mediation. Additionally, decisions on the content and style of reporting have ignited 
public apathy, support and outrage. This mechanics has bred a symbiotic relationship in which the 
terrorist organisations serve the media’s goal for audience captivation as the media quenches the 
terrorists’ desire for publicity. By tailoring their acts to fit the media’s benchmark of headline news, the 
terrorists’ arsenal of deliverables has included timeliness, sophistication, adventure or entertainment 
value and audience-impact. The drive for journalistic scoops has led to ethical oversights and in some 
instances endangered lives and hindered government and security interventions. In particular, the 
media has ‘glorified’ terrorism by providing publicity, promoted sensationalism, applied insensitive 
terminology, engaged in dangerous speculations, undertaken insufficient research and transmitted live 
coverage of unfolding events (Cohen-Almagor, 2005, 385-99). Some research interviewees similarly 
reported the unintended consequences of information broadcast: 
 
If my fellow Muslim is having a problem I should be able to help him. The media is portraying a very bad situation 
(in conflict countries). So, with this kind of coverage, the youth say they have to travel to these places and see 
for themselves and also see how they can deal with these situations. They end up joining these extremist 
groups. (Islamic Scholar, personal communication, March 15, 2017) 
 
When the media covers the narrative that the extremist groups are advancing, they reinforce that narrative. 
Many people are likely to think there is a problem here and we have a duty to respond. For example, there was 
a recent attack in XXX… So, some photos were published on social media. So, anybody who was not radicalised 
will now be radicalised. They would say these children had nothing to do with the attack so why were they killed? 
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They would get even more radicalised than before the attack. (Kiplagat – INGO CVE Expert, personal 
communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
The magnification of the impact of terrorism, unbridled publicity, horrific content, graphic images, and 
schismatic speculations do little to dignify terrorism victims and pacify the public. The representation 
of terrorism and immigration in the media has indeed stimulated public discourse and impacted 
attitudes. Similarly, public opinion has played a significant role in the formulation of migration and 
security policies. Consequently, the negative portrayal of migrants in the media may have provoked a 
sense of social crisis where none exists. The ensuing uncertainty and unease foster a crisis mentality 
in the portrayal of refugees as intruders at the doorway striving to invade the West. The warnings on 
potential threats attract public attention when populist politics and media capitalise on scoops and 
extremist content (Kosho, 2015, 86-89). To some degree, every newspaper has submitted to the 
attraction of exaggeration and presented sensationalist and simplified content. Migration news 
coverage typically begins with strong negative messaging with migrant references and unsettling terms 
such as emergency, segregation and cultural differences (Jacomella, 2010, 55).  
 
The under-representation of migrant voices is common, regardless of the media’s political orientation. 
Similarly, language use has reinforced the existing narrative and constructed the migrant as the 
physically different, inferior and criminal ‘other’. Value laden concepts such as ‘sham’ and ‘terrorist’ 
are applied in raising security concerns. Subsequently, the representation of events significantly 
shapes perceptions and hostilities while securocrats are compelled to quell the ensuing alarm through 
security operations (Kosho, 2015, 89). Omar, a Kenyan journalist who has covered insecurity in 
Dadaab, further describes external threats to the state as inspiring nationalistic sentiments that in turn 
underlie news coverage, with potential adverse consequences: 
 
Sometimes we tell ourselves that even if we are journalists, we are also Kenyan. So, we draw a line between 
being patriotic and writing a good story. Sometimes you may write a story and it might end up fuelling negative 
feelings and radicalising people. We are careful when we write. (Omar – Journalist, personal communication, 
February 14, 2017) 
 
In his examination of the representation of mass migration and security, Lamour (2018, 1, 5) validates 
Kosho and Jacomella’s assertions on the media’s influence on Western audience. He poses important 
questions on media discourse on border control and its influence and alignment with the extreme-
right’s migration narrative. Lamour further questions whether media sensationalism may have been 
modelled as an instrument that legitimates exacting border control measures in the quest to broaden 
audience base. Interestingly, he argues that commercial media is not associated with the discourse 
on increased border control in the European and extreme-right context and does not conflate terrorism, 
Islam and migration. This is a slight deviation from this thesis and other scholars’ contentions 
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(McManus, 1994; Allan, 2004; Pickering, 2006; Amin-Khan, 2012; Walsh, 2015; Chouliaraki & 
Zaborowski, 2017) that the media has tacitly influenced the migration securitisation discourse and 
facilitated the construction of radicalisation. While Lamour’s study demonstrates the positive role of 
the media as a moral space of bridging cultural differences, his conclusion is grounded in his scholarly 
interpretation of media content outside the general public’s interpretive subjectivism, a shortcoming he 
eventually acknowledges. He however highlights the discursive frames of extreme-right ideologues 
and the dominance of the nation-state in public discourse even in an integrated Europe (p. 12). 
Consequently, he views securitisation as measures and actions and highlights its discursive formations 
within the right while excluding the media (p.2). In contrast, this thesis additionally conceives 
securitisation as discourse and highlights the discursive power of key actors including the media, and 
the potential impact on unpremeditated or existing actions: 
 
The media works with politicians. They work together, talk together, they listen to each other. If they bring the 
reality of injustices it will fight them back so they don’t want to die. The coverage is very wrong. Al Shabaab just 
wants to tell the world there is a problem and no one wants to listen and this (terrorism) is how they will talk. 
(Pastor Tedese – Orthodox Church, personal communication, February 10, 2017) 
 
A further examination of radicalisation discourse has indeed depicted an interactive landscape of 
actors and designs. Similarly, discourse thespians have gained audience in varying degrees. Firebrand 
extreme-right leaders, ‘Islamic terrorists’ and irregular migrants have hogged media attention in an 
increasingly sensational media landscape. This interest is driven by attempts to increase clientele 
market share in a competitive digitalised media market. Mainstream established media giants have 
not been spared from sensational representation and the instantaneous context of ‘Journalism at 
Internet speed’ either (Van der Haak, Parks, & Castells, 2012, p. 2933, Lamour, 2018, 2-3). Extremist 
movements in particular recognise the strategic importance of the media as a powerful instrument for 
agenda setting, issue framing and public sensitisation. The media customarily pivots between its role 
as an agent in the social construction of meaning as well as a forum for symbolic contestation. It 
therefore functions as a resource and potential discursive competitor to terrorist organisations. For the 
most part, the media provides an accurate representation of terrorist organisations and their ideology. 
The organisations in turn exploit the media’s use of direct quotations to disseminate ideological 
snippets even as they lament misrepresentation (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 153).  
 
Whenever the media airs information they should know that these bad guys (terrorists) watch news. They watch 
news. Airing issues to do with how the camps are managed, the number of people who are there may expose 
the camp and the humanitarian organisations there. They need to decide what to air and what not to air in order 
to secure the country. The negative reporting on refugees and sometimes suggesting they are terrorists could 




More broadly, terrorist organisations frequently utilise media coverage to advance their interests 
through publicity campaigns and the transmission of specific frames. Contrastingly, media interests 
are driven by market pressure, competition and editorial preferences for spectacular disruption and 
confrontation. Inflammatory public rhetoric punctuated with allusions to violence and veiled threats 
therefore feeds the media’s penchant for sensationalism. The convergence of these complementary 
interests ensures the sustainability of both entities and their agenda. However, terrorist organisations 
oftentimes face the predicament between the active pursuit of media publicity and brand management 
that enforces their credibility and authority in light of negative media portrayal. Although these 
organisations censure negative press coverage, the free media advertising is deemed a necessary 
evil (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 153). Husain (2007, 214-15) observes that after 9/11, Islamist groups 
strengthened mobilisation and attracted a lot of media attention. Gradually, they began to be perceived 
as mainstream and became representatives of British Muslims. The absence of contentious ideological 
convictions and demands that wrested the moderates from media spotlight illuminates the inclination 
towards sensationalism and the construction of ‘Islamic terrorism’. Consequently, the leadership and 
membership of Muslim representative bodies in the U.S. and U.K. became dominated by Islamists.  
 
On their part, terrorist organisations have framed the media as an agent of the Crusaders and Zionists. 
The media’s characterisation as globalist and an instrument of Western imperialism informs 
perceptions on the subversion of Islam through misrepresentation, distortion of truth and the 
advancement of Western values and secularism. The media has also been accused of a cover-up of 
Western atrocities towards Muslims (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 154-55). More specific and rarely discussed 
collective historical grievances include the indiscriminate expulsion of Muslims who rejected 
conversion into Christianity from Spain and Sicily. Additionally, the Sykes-Picot agreement, viewed as 
the watershed in Western-Arab relations, splintered and partitioned the Ottoman territories into the 
British and French spheres of influence. The establishment of the state of Israel and the application of 
Western double standards in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another source of contention. The role 
of the West for example in Afghanistan, Kashmir in India, and Bosnia in the Balkans has similarly bred 





Figure 4: Twitter Meme from the 2018 #WorldCupFinal following France’s Victory 
 
 
Figure 5: Twitter Meme – Fluid Boundaries and Patterns of Migrant Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
Apart from the misrepresentation and underrepresentation of historical facts, the public condemnation 
of terrorist attacks by Muslims does not attract sufficient media attention. Identity profiling of 
perpetrators of terrorism has also been observed. Media framing of terrorism has largely revolved 
around ‘radical Islam’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ and the racial bifurcation of perpetrators. The 
representation (Wood, 2017) of Dylan Roof, the 2015 Charleston church ‘shooter’ (ABC, 2017) and 
Mark Conditt, the 2018 Texas bomber (Raymond, 2018) as murderers, gunmen, white supremacists, 
among other forms of deodorisation are exemplary. While the (re)construction of identity involves 
multiple actors, host states establish fluid boundaries and patterns of inclusion and exclusion of 
refugees. In Australia, refugees who make significant contributions to Australian society are 
recognised as Australians or Australians of African or Arab origin. However, any moral turpitude among 
refugees prompts the stripping and ‘derogation’ of identity to ‘African gangs’ or Arabs as the meme 
above suggests. For this reason, Africans in Australia prefer to be identified as African Australians as 
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Hiruy (2009, 67) observes. Similarly, 17 out of the 23 team members who led France to the 2018 world 
cup victory were either first or second-generation immigrants (Schmidt, 2018). The win sparked online 
discussions on race, selective acceptance and migration, and also generated some of the Internet 
memes above. Succeeding sections have examined the interplay between the media and other actors 
and the effect on radicalisation. 
 
7.2.3 Contending Notions on the Role of Religion in Academic Discourse 
 
The thesis findings on the role of religion in radicalisation have been inconsistent in as much as they 
have been confounding. In establishing the context, Huntington (1996, 217) identifies the root problem 
for the West as Islam, described as a different civilisation rather than Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic 
adherents, owing to their sense of cultural superiority, simultaneously hold the conviction of the 
inferiority of their power. In addition, traditional and cultural institutions have been maligned for their 
failure to create wealth and protect Islamic localities from economic and military predation. 
Consequently, the disintegration of cultural identity in the Islamic sphere may have compelled some 
individuals to adopt Western culture and identity, and others to reject it and align with fundamentalists 
(Louis, 2009, 440). These arguments are further supported by Khan’s (2001, 218) view of increased 
radicalisation as resistance against the penetration and expansion of Western values into Muslim 
society, inimical to the religion.  
 
Some research interviewees indeed perceived the West as presenting the threat of ethno-cultural 
dominance. This global cultural clash is experienced through the introduction of policies that, for 
example, regulate Muslim behaviour in public spaces. Such policies inflame radicalisation and also 
play into terrorists’ polarising strategies. However, Murshed and Pavan (2009, 3-6; see also Klein, 
2016, 870) reject this culturalist perspective that treats Islam with it’s numerous, evolving facets as 
monolithic. They assert that the overemphasis on a monolithic religious identity in radicalisation 
literature is misleading. The reference point, particularly for Islamic radicalisation has been the 
homogeneity of Islamic adherents inherently susceptible to radicalisation due to their religious 
convictions. The rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, despite being an indignant reaction to Islamist violence, 
is also indicative of broader contempt for Muslim culture. In contrast, the thesis findings highlight the 
risk, not of monolithism, but of perceived balkanisation of the Islamic faith. The Islamic barometer that 
stratifies Muslims as ‘Jihadi, moderate, normal and secular’ was reported as constituting personal 
identifications that cannot substitute legalistic religious convictions and delimitations. Hence as a 
radicalising factor, Islamic balkanisation deepens existing schisms through intra-religious profiling. 
While both arguments are valid, balkanisation facilitates the identification of specific extremist strands 
to arrest generalisations. In rejecting balkanisation, monolithism represents a compact medium of 
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undifferentiated extractions of belief systems that unwittingly safeguard extremist strands and may 
attract the indiscriminate vilification of Islam.  
 
In the context of democratisation, secularisation and globalisation, Islamic autocrats have resisted 
progress that erodes their power and instead externalised blame and incited hate and violence among 
their supporters. As a result, radicalisation is not the result of widespread crisis of religious faith but of 
the vacuum created by the deficiencies of Western-local models of justice and development. The 
Western double standards on democracy and support for autocratic regimes have promoted Western 
interests and at the same time inspired support for extremism. Moreover, the labelling of political 
opponents as terrorists and repressive regimes as democratic has encouraged disidentification with 
Western values and identification with extremist norms and identities (Louis, 2009, 441; Fishman, 
2010, 20, 122-25). As such, one interviewee notes that, ‘Terrorism has lost meaning, context and 
objectivity’.  
 
The global war on terror has programmed an environment in which personal scores are settled on 
suspicions and charges of terrorism. The domestication of the war on terror has encouraged the 
wrongful implication of individuals over terrorism charges for example, resulting from business rivalry. 
Additionally, a disgruntled wife is alleged to have reported her husband who happened to be nursing 
ambitions of marrying a second wife, on terrorism suspicions: ‘I suspect my husband is a financial 
supporter of terrorism from the way he talks and walks around’ (Farah – INGO Programme Manager, 
personal communication, February 23, 2017). The conceptual subversion of terrorism and by 
extension radicalisation does present challenges for the establishment of veracity of claims and 
delivery of justice. It may effectually enkindle radicalisation if false reports and the application of double 
standards lead to unwarranted surveillance, victimisation, profiling, radical public discourse and further 
repression of populations whose governments are misrepresented as democratic. 
 
The findings reveal that in light of contending and complementary academic views on radicalisation, 
the West’s role on radicalisation seems to be widely acknowledged in Islamic discourse and contexts 
and less so in the Western world. The subdued tenor of this discourse informs perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviour in both spheres, as reported by some research respondents.  
 
When this topic (Islamic radicalisation) is discussed I sometimes get pissed off with people basically because 
they want to distort history… Most literature tend to avoid blaming the U.S. and I like Clinton for saying they 
created Al Qaeda and caused this mess. So, whether Al Qaeda mutated into Al Shabaab, Boko Haram or others 
this is an institution that has been created void of religious conviction. It was a political movement created for 
political reasons through a religious conduit. (Farah – INGO Programme Manager, personal communication, 




The obfuscation of the radicalising effect of national and foreign policy in public discourse was 
consistently re-emphasised. Some interviewees questioned the integrity of injustice as a factor in 
radicalisation. They identified some regions in Kenya that have been systematically marginalised but 
are less vulnerable to radicalisation. This group underscored the primacy of religion as a factor among 
refugees with a ‘madrassa world view’. Other respondents further identified the synergy between 
policy, and religious and cultural identity as igniting righteous indignation. The refugees at Dadaab, for 
example, feel targeted by the Kenyan government security operations by virtue of their Somali and 
Islamic identity. The Somalis in and outside the camp are exposed to global injustices experienced by 
members of their social groups via mainstream and social media. As a strategy, some sympathisers 
and recruiters in the camp who are either active or former members of Al Shabaab share their own 
experiences and exploit camp grievances to disseminate radical ideology. Besides Western foreign 
policy in Muslim countries, the lack of global standard operating procedures for the management of 
captured terrorists was also identified as a driver for radicalisation: 
 
The Somali government for example has a small military junta court that listens to cases and then conducts 
public executions. The other group (Al Shabaab) are people being sought by international intelligence agencies. 
These ones are captured, taken on ships mainly to the US. So, the kind of radicalised message is that you are 
captured, sodomised, undergo water boarding, so there is a chain of videos on abuses that have been 
conducted by forces in Iraq, Afghanistan. These are the materials used for radicalisation to harden positions 
and say that if you have been captured you will be executed. If you are high level (terrorist) and the Somali 
government cannot maintain you because it’s weak, and you are wanted by Ethiopia, and the U.S., you will be 
handed over for a few dollars and these are the options awaiting you. (Farah – INGO Programme Manager, 
personal communication, February 23, 2017) 
 
Some research respondents observed the predominance of ostensibly oblique scholastic theories on 
radicalisation. Their reflections necessitate a scholarly re-examination of some ideas within the 
prevailing schools of thought, particularly those falling within the purview of actors, drivers of 
radicalisation, characterisation of terrorists and the role of religion. Some interviewees validated the 
intersubjective construction of radicalisation as expressed by Hassan below. Other studies have noted 
the role of the media, politicians and academia in the revolving cycle of public discourse (Jacomella, 
2010, 55; Kosho, 2015, 90) and radicalisation as relational (della Porta, 2009). Undoubtedly, academic 
research such as this stimulates public discourse, interrogates dominant thoughts on radicalisation 
and influences public policy: 
 
We should also address state and non-state actors in this violence as partners to the process (of radicalisation). 
…Of course, your professors will never accept this kind of views. The narrative they will accept is that of terrorists 
are very bad and should be crashed. As they talk to you, they might also suggest you are radicalised. … The 
solution to this (terrorism) is to accept that active participants are also victims of the global war. (Farah – INGO 




Similarly, the analysis of unfolding terrorist events in a competitive media environment is driven by the 
public’s conditioned affinity for drama (Beder, 2004, 9-10), the urgency of breaking news, instant 
gratification of clickbait news alongside the digital demands of refresh-news buttons. As such, some 
of the media interviews with academics focus on immediate unfolding events and proximate factors 
that neglect latent structural drivers. Media accounts occasionally based on snap interviews with 
academics, securocrats and other experts focus on attack targets and recount the drivers of 
radicalisation as constituting visitations to mosques or clicks on radical websites.23 While triggers of 
radicalisation are critical, these incident-driven assessments and analytical urgency create inadequate 
content for broader public discourse. In turn, the ensuing narrative of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ inadvertently 
informs attitudes and action among refugees and Muslims who feel vilified by those threatened by the 
terrorism events. Meanwhile, these dynamics positively impact terrorist organisations’ public relations 
and polarisation agenda. Likewise, securitised research, such as this, may have unintended 
consequences in mainstream discourse by informing perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Similar to 
Islamists, media exposure of experts and research presents divergent narratives to the critical mass. 
The influence of authority24 or confirmation25 bias may further shape public perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour and advance the predominance of specific narratives as one respondent notes: 
 
A respected author can write about something (on Islamic terrorism) then another set of people will listen to 
him. No one will want to contradict him because he is an authority in that field. Does that make him right? No. 
Everyone wants to listen to someone who has made a name. When people hear of specialists they say, ‘’He is 
the one who should tell us, we should not tell him’’. (Ogola – INGO Programme Manager, personal 
communication, February 15, 2017) 
 
More broadly, other factors that influence the construction and advancement of dominant narratives 
on radicalisation are for the most part latent and systemic. These include limits on academic and 
research freedoms as discussed in the methodology section. These limits, for example, impose 
boundaries on research focus, scope and methodology with ethical implications. The occasional lack 
of conflict sensitivity in academic declarations on social and mainstream media is another front. To 
illustrate, a country experiencing the polarising effects of Far-right political movements may advocate 
for ‘keeping jihadist fighters on the radar and in-check’ and promote a ‘tailored Dutch approach’ yet 
this presents a good opportunity to address both threats. A further dilemma that confronts the 
academic community involves the application of theological lingo that has the potential to reinforce 
stereotypes and legitimise Islamist movements, as discussed in chapter eight. For example, what are 
                                                          
23 See these news coverages on ‘sprint’ and ‘click’ radicalisation: Kagire, 2017; McAuley, 2018; Bilefsky et al., 2017. 
24 Bias resulting from the tendency to assign accuracy and become influenced by the opinions of an authority figure. See 
Milgram, 1963.  
25 Being inclined to search, focus, favour, interpret and remember information that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs. 
See Margit and Grosjean, 2004. 
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the implications of the use of the term ‘jihadism’ over ‘martyrdom’ and vice versa? There are additional 
factors related to intellectual balkanisation. While there is a preponderance of research on 
radicalisation and migration in developing countries, the exclusion of scholarship from these states in 
Western universities has engendered bibliographic hence intellectual marginalisation. The neglect of 
this scholarship fosters silence and sustains dominant narratives by constructing the research subjects 
who are excluded from the discourse. Ultimately, some study findings and recommendations 
contribute to contextual misrepresentation and inform flawed government policies. Similarly, some 
institutions in the South subsist in intellectual silos, constrained by weak institutional capacities. In this 
case, brilliant ideas, it seems, rarely migrate overseas. The disconnect between research and policy, 
and gross institutional failures in the homelands further inform or validate refugee 
(mis)representations. That notwithstanding, there are exemplary North-South collaborations that other 
institutions can replicate. 
  
7.2.4 Softly-Softly versus Harshly-Harshly Tensions in Radicalisation Discourse 
 
The international migration wave to Europe that started in 2014 has seen an influx of economic 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from Africa and the Middle East. The terrorist attacks in 2015 
and 2016, alongside the surge of non-European migrants encamped in the French ‘jungle’ of Calais 
and other places, has elevated border control on the political agenda of many European states. The 
threat-based and coercive rhetorical tools deployed in ‘othering’ non-European immigrants have 
legitimised anti-immigration policies (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017, 568; Lamour, 2018, 1, Cap, 2018, 
1). The ensuing clashes between the proponents of ‘protection of external borders’ and ‘advocates of 
solidarity and openness’ has similarly recalibrated the migration-terrorism terrain (European Council, 
2015). 
 
In particular, the increased displacement of Islam from Muslim lands and its re-territorialisation to the 
West has altered religious practices and redefined the Western secular space. Islam has indeed 
overstretched its boundaries beyond a community of believers to subsume an expanded public space. 
Beyond symbolic interactionism, the visibilisation of Islam has shifted attention to immigration and 
disrupted perceptions and collective imaginaries. The subsequent public debates have exposed 
Western coping mechanisms with religious and cultural differences. Consequently, immigration 
discourse has eclipsed social and economic issues to include religion, citizenship (Gole, 2011, 384-
85) and security. For the most part, leftist political correctness (PC) and rightist extremism have 
animated discursive and performative counter-frames on immigration and terrorism in particular. In 
examining the speech-acts of both sides and the effect on radicalisation, the subsequent sections 
among other things highlight the struggles with identity-shift emanating from tensions between 
authentic individuality and group conformity or personal-social identity. As such, the thesis submits 
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that in maintaining both identities, individuals may be inclined to change their conduct under public 
surveillance while maintaining or reinforcing closet sympathetic or activist behaviour in private (Louis, 
2009, 438; Goffman, 1959, 1-24, 112).  
 
a. The Softly-Softly Pedalling of the Left 
 
The America (refugee) resettlement process is the longest and takes an average of three to seven years to get resettled 
there. The people who were interviewed for America in 2007 are still waiting. It is only the cleanest, most educated and 
most vulnerable who go there. (Amina – UNHCR Protection Officer, personal communication, February 18, 2017) 
 
The value of tolerance found in the ideas of the West European Enlightenment underpins political 
correctness. The acknowledgement of the equality of all individuals is indeed important in upholding 
the fundamental differences between them. But the threat of terrorism and trans-national migratory 
flows has seen the gradual implosion of this ethos and weakened UNESCO’s definition of tolerance in 
a culture of war. Counter-terrorism measures require some level of human rights transgressions that 
have otherwise been termed totalitarian in some quarters. As such, opposition against PC in Western 
society has gained traction (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, 2). 
 
The opponents of PC claim that it is counterproductive in as far as it commits the same flaws it aims 
to correct and results in reverse discrimination. Proponents of PC argue that it promotes equality and 
respect for disadvantaged groups, advocates censorship and the use of responsible language and 
responsive policies. PC shifts interpretation from the intention of the actor to the impact of an action 
on the recipients. Underpinning PC’s claims is a history of oppression and exclusion of minority groups. 
Others have opined that the definition of PC as the espousal of a particular doctrine implies a left or 
right ideological leaning centred on a debate on what is correct. Adherents of the right ideology believe 
in complete freedom even though legislative provisions for libel and slander exist. Those on the left 
advocate for complete equality and resort to forced or superficial measures to create the ideal over 
reality. Both sides trade accusations of discrimination and the application of unjust and authoritarian 
means to attain their goals (Andary-Brophy, 2015, 3-5). 
 
The extreme sensitivity and pursuit of absolute equality in PC is perceived in its deconstruction of 
language, in the manipulation of language and employment of euphemisms. This is premised on a firm 
belief on linguistic relativism and how language essentially influences cognition and changes social 
life. The sensitivity of PC has created silence and discomfort since acknowledging differences is itself 
deemed politically incorrect. As a result, the delivery of controversial content requires linguistic 
etiquette (Andary-Brophy, 2015, 5). It is argued that linguistic conformity may induce cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957), which is the inconsistency between human beliefs and actions. A 
cognitive element or cognition is defined as a belief, attitude, perception, opinion or knowledge on 
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anything. Cognitive dissonance has generated communication knowledge on ‘decision-making, 
selective exposure to information, induced compliance and hypocrisy induction’. During cognitive 
dissonance, an individual experiences psychological discomfort or ‘conflict’ between two absolutely 
conflicting cognitions. Secondly, the individual experiences further conflict when making a ‘decision’ to 
resolve the inconsistency by altering one of two dissonant cognitions. Resolution is reached by 
changing beliefs, action or perception of action. After decision-making, the individual will still 
experience dissonance resulting from some undesirable elements of the chosen option and some 
desirable elements of the unchosen option. Forced compliance behaviour therefore occurs when an 
individual publicly performs an action that is inconsistent with private beliefs (O'Keefe, 2002, 78-85).  
 
Some studies (see Millington & Leierer, 1996; Shelton et al., 2005) have shown that PC has improved 
communication and perceived attitudes towards disadvantaged groups while other studies suggest 
the opposite (Halmari, 2011). Bigots have put more effort in managing their bias thus causing 
overcompensation in some cases. In other cases, implicit discrimination has replaced open bigotry. 
The important question therefore is whether perceived good behaviour is deliberately self-directed or 
the offshoot of externally imposed measures and societal expectations that suppress negative 
attitudes. Andary-Brophy (2015, 8-9) contends that language alterations aimed at masking differences 
are at best superficial and at worst result in fabricated equality. PC language partly appeals to an 
individual’s inclination to be viewed favourably by others and therefore draws social desirability and 
progressive virtues that enhance group conformity.  
 
Political correctness may therefore result in virtue signalling aimed at protecting or enhancing social 
status. Barker (1994, 271-72) conceives PC as impression management behaviour (see Goffman, 
1959, 1-24, 112) that seeks public conformity with the radical left. To illustrate, intolerance has 
overshadowed open-mindedness in institutions of higher learning where students are encouraged to 
espouse left leaning ideologies. Consistent with the findings of this research (as presented in the four 
upcoming pages in this section) on the dissonance between public-private representations, Barker 
further suggests that people are more likely to adopt conservative views in private. In recent times, 
this impression may have partially reactivated rightist radicalism and the application of double 
standards particularly on migration and security issues. While the right has a sizeable religious base, 
faith has at times fallen short of maintaining consistency on equity, choice, diversity, compassion and 
restraint. 
 
It is these dynamics that have impaired constructive communication between the right and left on 
issues of migration and security and further funnelled radicalisation. Notably, this research 
demonstrates the (un)conscious penetration of these tensions and dilemmas beyond the sphere of the 
left-right political debates discussed in section C (See Hollifield, 2008; Miller, 2008; Chinn et al., 2011; 
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Garcia, 2015; Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017). As an illustration, the limits on intellectual freedom in 
institutions of higher learning is observable in the censorship of sensitive research. The exposure of 
academic research to the impulses of the right and left restricts the application of alternative filters and 
production of new knowledge. This may potentially elicit flawed policies that sustain a dysfunctional 
society (see also ABC Q&A, 2018). Correctness has similarly engulfed the spiritual cosmos as 
discussed further in the next chapter. Spiritual correctness conveys convictions of a ‘True Islam’ 
according to Mawdudi, the lack of enough Islam and need for more Islam (Husain, 2007, 259), the 
chosen ones, and the true religion of Christianity. In a correct world order, public displays of solidarity 
tend to fizzle into private assertions of individuality and in-group conformity leading D’Souza (1991, 
36) to state that ‘What people say in public is not the same as what they believe in private’. Goffman 
(1959, 1-24, 112) has similarly extensively discussed the notion of ‘impression management’ of the 
private and social self that may possibly resolve the emerging cognitive dissonance. On their part, 
Lichev and Hristoskova (2017, 4-5) caption Marcuse (1965) description of PC as ‘intolerance disguised 
as tolerance’. In considering language as a mode of power, they contend that the language of PC is 
inevitably repressive and censoring. The separation of powers characteristic of democracies is 
therefore not applicable in the context of PC, rendering the concept totalitarian.  
 
In the context of social influence, individual responses are inclined to mostly conform to group 
situations in the public sphere. This ‘on-stage effect’ or ‘demand characteristic’ also causes individuals 
to customise their responses based on the audience. The oratory restraint invoked by public 
accountability impels an individual to maintain a ‘culturally-sanctioned identity’. Individuals are 
therefore likely to articulate more authentic views in private (Barker, 1994, 272). As a disclaimer, these 
dynamics are not reflective of absolutist or universalist views and practices but are subjective and 
situational. Secondly, non-conformists maintain a high degree of individuality, are less likely to be 
influenced by public dictates or expectations and hold high personal convictions on their views and 
response to the world as Barker’s study (1994, 278-80; see also Jost et al. 2009, 316-23) further 
demonstrates. The activism of the lethal Twitter Brigade that consistently champions minority issues 
and resists Trumpian ideology is a compelling example. Thirdly, social and economic differentiations 
of political ideologies within liberalism and conservatism are indicative of the likelihood for individuals 
to be socially liberal and economically conservative (libertarian) and vice versa (populist) (Jost et al. 
2009, 313).  
 
In positioning PC within the broader context of the war on terror, the 9/11 attacks revived Cold War 
arguments on combating non-military threats that include migration. Liberal migration regimes have 
been faulted for enhancing transnational threats to state security, notably terrorism, human and drug 
trafficking. Contrastingly, restrictive regimes such as Saudi have gained liberal recognition for 
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minimising these threats (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015, 2). The 9/11 attacks fomented the discourse on 
the links between terrorism and migration and the attendant enforcement of stricter border control as 
a guise to control migration as opposed to terrorism (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, 23-26; see 
also Kaya, 2010, 49-50). Proponents of the terrorism-migration link further identify global 
interconnectivity as strengthening this linkage and maintain claims on the securitisation of migration 
pre-9/11 (Squire, 2016, 23-25). These arguments are fairly consistent with the discussion on the 
Kenyan situation in chapter 3 that acknowledges the intensification of securitisation post-9/11 and in 
the wake of more recent terrorist attacks.  
 
While European states have promoted multi-culturalism, they have also advanced the idea of the 
linkage between Islam and violence. The introduction of legislation that infringe on human rights has 
further reinforced securitisation (Galli, 2008, 7). When migration is perceived as a threat, the impact is 
reflected in both policy and practice as is evidenced in migration and security policies and the 
resurgence of populism in parts of Europe. However, underlying these superficial dynamics are real 
and perceived identity fears, particularly over the changing demography in Europe and Australia for 
example. These fears have sometimes manifested as the racialisation of immigration (Forcier & 
Dufour, 2016, 6).  
 
The Australian Left has experienced ideological transmutation within its rank and file, illustrated by the 
Hansonisation of Mark Latham in 2018. Latham was a former Labour Leader who joined One Nation, 
an Australian right-wing populist party led by Pauline Hanson (SBS, 2018). Latham has since taken to 
the dissemination of radical views on race and migration on mainstream and social media. The 
ideological rupture has similarly claimed Luke Foley, the Australian NSW Labour leader who claimed 
that the influx of Iraqi and Syrian refugees is causing ‘white flight’ in Sydney suburbs, a view supported 
by Latham. The fact that a member of the Labour party, which personifies PC and prides itself as the 
champion for freedom, equality and tolerance, declared what many in his party deem controversial, 
presents a lightbulb moment. In acknowledging this tectonic shift, Pauline Hanson was quick to 
commend Folly on his remarks (Fernando, 2018). Folly’s successor in the Labour party, Michael Daley, 
was embroiled in further controversy after a 2018 video emerged in which he claimed, ‘There’s a 
transformation happening in Sydney now where our kids are moving out and foreigners are moving in 
and taking their jobs… Our young children will flee and who are they being replaced with? They are 
being replaced by young people from typically Asia with PhDs’ (Visentin, 2019). While Foley’s and 
Daley’s claims have not been empirically validated, their allusions draw parallels with fears over 
demographic changes in countries like France, Belgium, U.S. and the U.K. (Krysan, 2002, 683-94; 
Kaufmann & Harris, 2015, 1567, 1575-585). Nevertheless, ‘neutral ethnocentrism’ or self-selection to 
promote ethno-cultural homogeneity may determine residential preferences among ethnic minorities 
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and majorities (Krysan, 2002, 687). The capacity for refugees to adapt to the host community context 
is therefore just as important as the deconstruction of social attitudinal boundaries in facilitating better 
integration. Based on this study’s findings, Foley further succeeds in vocalising the views of a section 
of invisible migration opponents whose fears are informed by the atrophy of white identity. A liberal 
interviewee who also owns a company that supports refugees described the transformation of the 
German landscape that has caused him to challenge Merkel’s liberal immigration policies. Similar 
sentiments were echoed by a French immigrant: 
 
At first Germans were welcoming but there are now demonstrations against refugees. People have changed 
their opinion. That is a problem because there have been terrorist attacks in Berlin and Christmas market where 
a truck drove into a crowd… The people have become more and more fearful… In Berlin, most Germans live in 
the streets… When people need help, German people should be considered first… Then there are Muslim 
missionaries who speak to other immigrants and tell them Germany is their state and the country should become 
a Muslim country… In Germany, the camera is not good and the laws do not control people because there are 
many rights… Ten years ago police used to carry pistols but now they are armed with rifles… There is a part in 
Berlin that the police say is out of control at the moment, the police can go there but they can’t change people 
there… Right now, we have close to 2 million immigrants. If they keep coming in the next two years we will have 
5 or 6 million immigrants, 10% of the population. I think no state can just allow this… The costs are very high 
for them to live in Germany. (Hans – German national, personal communication, February 2, 2017)  
 
There is a white French agricultural community that is very poor in the country side. The big problem is that they 
feel that the government is doing a lot for Arabs, Africans and incoming refugees and they don’t do anything for 
them. When you try to think about it, it’s true…In France you pay a lot of tax and when they help refugees and 
immigrants it is money from the French who work. (Lola – French immigrant, personal communication, January 
31, 2017) 
 
Further anecdotal evidence emerging from spontaneous unstructured interactions exposed other 
Westerners’ discomfiture with the state of global affairs in a Trumpian era. In addition, some 
interviewees from the Netherlands, the U.S., Germany and Australia expressed their frustrations with 
the current state of global debate on migration, security and ‘ultra-feminism’. The admission by most, 
who are surprisingly left-leaning points to the stunted debate on migration and terrorism between the 
left and right and the pressure on individuals to conform to progressivism. Correspondingly, they 
censured the prevalence of PC gaining traction within the Left. Some respondents faulted the trend of 
diminishing tolerance and increased sensitivity over issues, including in the domain of comedy, that 
have traditionally been ‘non-issues’.  
 
The suppression of dissenting voices in the public space, as reported, has inculcated the practice of 
self-censorship. The subdued public, similar to Husain, a former Islamist in chapter eight, navigate 
shifting identities to stave off public disapproval, labels and reprisals from peers. The constricted space 
for open expression restricts constructive engagement in public discourse and effective policy 
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formulation. As a result, people’s views are tailored to suit prevailing contexts – in spoken silence. This 
dynamic, although not captured among aberrant conservatives, is highly likely and explored further in 
later sections. Notably, action and speech reveal people’s character and unique identities (Arendt, 
1958, 176-77) such as talents and flaws. In the context of PC, human attributes may be displayed or 
masked in silence or passivity. An evolving context can spark a slight divergence from mainstream 
ideals that individuals predominantly espouse that in turn transplants them into the peripheral core. As 
they conform to the mainstream, the hypervigilance and discretion they establish determines their 
authentic representation based on group structure and dynamics of discussions alongside private 
assertions of individuality. This suggests that people can maintain solidarity bonds with others with or 
without being for or against them.  
 
b. The Harshly-Harshly Pedalling of the Extreme-Right 
 
The flow of migrants into Europe and wave of terrorist attacks has provoked the mercurial rise of 
extreme-right populism. This wave is perceived as a threat to the values of compassion, social 
cohesion and solidarity in liberal democratic societies. To begin with, the extreme or far-right is an 
ideology that condones or promotes a system of social hierarchy or inequality (Rodney, 2005, 489-
91). It is sometimes articulated in the preservation of racial purity and homogeneity, antipathy to 
migration, globalisation and other liberal principles, and calls for state support for locals over 
immigrants. Extreme-right parties claim to promote better conditions for the working class while 
criticising the elites for working against these interests. They employ populist strategies to target voters 
who are disillusioned with their lives and the political system (Rodney, 2005, 693; Malone, 2014, 11-
12; Garcia, 2015, 11) and exhibit xenophobia if not blatant racism (Betz, 1993, 415). Some have 
emerged as counter-jihad groups, for example, Britain’s English Defence League (Garcia, 2015, 6). 
While numerous examples can be cited in Europe and elsewhere, the British National Party as an 
archetype of far-right extremism promotes the following policies: 
 
…to stop all immigration; put local people first in social welfare programmes; reverse Islamisation and defend 
the Christian faith; curb the ‘softly-softly Politically Correct policing and a failed social engineering policy’; protect 
the ‘British identity from Mass Immigration, multi-culturalism, health’n’safety killjoys and globalisation’. The party 
also has a publication titled ‘Identity’ which serves to promote the ‘unique and precious British identity’ (British 
National Party policies, 2018).  
 
The resurgence of the extreme right is connected to fundamental social and economic changes in 
economic liberalism, modernisation and globalisation that has also increased transnational mobility 
(Salmela & von Scheve, 2017, 568; Lamour, 2018, 1, Cap, 2018, 1). Europe experienced a strong 
wave of economic nationalism in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Popular pressure 
forced many EU states to introduce restrictive immigration policies and encourage repatriation in the 
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context of austerity measures and rising popularity of the extreme-right. As immigrants are increasingly 
constructed as an anti-liberal threat to Western civilisation, the Netherlands and U.K. policies for 
example currently favour economic over humanitarian immigrants (Forcier & Dufour, 2016, 2-3). The 
Polish government has not only back-pedalled on the implementation of the refugee quota agreement 
but also refuses to participate in EU immigration crises initiatives. A skilful rhetorical campaign not only 
validates this policy but also legitimises the Polish conservative government and the popular anti-
immigration stance (Cap, 2018, 2). Public discourse has consolidated the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ camps by 
directly attacking PC. The sub-humanisation of their targets demonstrates the (non)violent 
radicalisation of political elites and their adherents as similarly argued by Schmid (2013, 37-39). They 
are ostensibly imperceptive to their own radicalism in their attribution to others, as the examples of 
political utterances below by Cap (2018, 10-13) suggest: 
 
We refuse to sacrifice our freedom and security for political correctness…. (Witold Waszczykowski, 12 June 
2016 in Cap, 2018, 10).  
We must reject the cheap slogans of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘enrichment’. We must reject political correctness 
and call things by their true names. (Mariusz Blaszczak, 20 July 2016 in Cap, 2018, 10). 
Have we forgotten that, in the past, migrants brought diseases like cholera and dysentery to Europe, as well as 
all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which while not dangerous in the organisms of these people, could be 
dangerous here. (Jaroslaw Kaczynski, 19 December 2015 in Cap, 2018, 11). 
By advancing freedom and democracy in Syria and Iraq, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that 
brings millions of people to misery and frustration, and brings danger and, one day, tragedy, to our own people. 
(Beata Szydlo, 3 October 2016, in Cap, 2018, 13) 
 
Economic decline and the prominence of immigration as a national issue creates a domestic economic 
opportunity structure. This environment creates an opportunity for action in which the likelihood to link 
immigration with economic decline becomes heightened. Economic competition and uncertainty as 
exemplified by increased rates of unemployment, alongside declining national identities therefore 
seem to fuel anti-immigrant sentiments. This does not imply that the general public will align with 
extreme-right ideologies and tactics but that these conditions will bridge the existing ideological gap 
as discussed in the PC section. Besides, the extreme-right groups may gain control over the state in 
their role in addressing economic problems. The groups’ efforts may also expand the potential 
recruitment pool and ideological sympathy among the economically vulnerable as they strive to be 
recognised as mainstream. While the economically vulnerable may support the economic arguments, 
some may dispute the idea of migration as a threat to national culture and identity (Garcia 2015, ii, 1-
2, 21-35).  
 
Overall, socio-economic factors cannot sufficiently explain the renaissance of the extreme-right. An 
integrated structural and attitudinal framework may therefore provide better insights (Salmela & von 
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Scheve, 2017, 567-70). Underlying the economic grievances is the desire for the preservation of 
cultural and national identity. In relating this with the social psychology arguments in a camp context 
in chapter six, Bushman and Huesmann (2006, 349-50) posit that environmental cues activate hostile 
thoughts and behaviour among individuals experiencing frustrating conditions. The influence of 
emotional processes on low and middle-class worker identities could therefore provide additional 
insights. Their insecurities manifest as fears emanating from the failure to construct salient social 
identities that in turn arouses feelings of shame. The responsibility for success and failure is 
increasingly individualised, with failure stigmatised through welfare benefits, unemployment or labour 
migration.  
 
These dynamics can be explained by the psychological mechanisms of ‘ressentiment’ and ‘emotional 
distancing’. In ‘ressentiment’, fear and insecurity transform through repressed shame into anger and 
hatred towards refugees, immigrants, mainstream media and the prevailing cultural and political 
establishments. Shame, an important emotion that is repressed rather than consciously experienced 
has been neglected in current research. It can however be elicited or experienced in private settings 
when one encounters failure to meet social expectations that may lead to social stigmatisation. The 
ensuing loss of self-esteem similarly induces feelings of shame. Repressed or denied shame remains 
latent, persistent and intense, ultimately transforming into anger that shifts blame from the self to 
generic ‘others’. Shame as an ‘anticipated emotion’ is signified by expected loss and is involved in the 
fear of ‘declassement’ or the loss of social status. The threat of ‘declassement’ or precarisation 
appears to override actual ‘declassement’ when long-term unemployment and welfare benefits are 
considered (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017, 567, 579-82; Lewis, 1995, 205-07).  
 
Existing scholarship (Betz, 1994, 2005; Scheff, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Guibernau, 2010, 2013) suggests 
that support for extreme-right movements is greater among individuals who feel left behind. They 
experience fear and insecurity about their identity, work and life in general; exclusion and displacement 
from weakening social bonds; disillusionment with and distrust of democracy and politics. Besides the 
repression of negative emotions that transform into passive resentment, ‘ressentiment’ also involves 
a latent sense of powerlessness and self-devaluation in comparison to others (Salmela & von Scheve, 
2017, 572). As such, ‘ressentiment’ is an active emotion that triggers the desire for action and radical 
change in the cultural and political establishments (Betz, 2005, 28). Emotional distancing involves 
detachment from social identities that inflict negative emotions and instead promote meaning and self-
esteem from stable and exclusive linguistic, traditional gender, religious, ethnic and national identities. 
It is therefore notable that the fear of ‘Islamic terrorism’ influences support for extreme-right 





The real and perceived extreme-right grievances warrant acknowledgement and constructive 
resolution. At the same time, it must be remembered that the pathological antipathy fuelling the radical 
articulation of these injustices has fomented inter-group conflict. Besides rhetorical injudiciousness, 
extreme-right radicalisation has in some cases translated into the commitment of terrorist acts. In 2011, 
Anders Breivik massacred 77 people to prevent a take-over of Norway by Muslims. In the same year 
in Italy, Gianluca Casseri, a member of Casa Pound, an extreme-right group shot and killed two 
Senegalese street traders and injured three others as a sign of resistance to immigration. Further, 
Greece and the U.K. have witnessed a spike in politically motivated racist violence inspired by anti-
migrant sentiments (Garcia, 2015, 1). 
 
In 2018, Australian Senator Anning invoked the problem of white flight in poor urban areas, praised 
the White Australia policy and proposed a popular vote as the ‘final solution’ to the immigration problem 
(Anning, 2018). In the same year, a Somali immigrant in Australia fatally stabbed a civilian and injured 
two others. This carnage (NewsComAU, 2018) was treated as an act of terrorism and received 
widespread condemnation. Within conservative circles, Prime Minister Scott Morrison railed against 
‘extremist Islam’ as the Home Affairs Minister, Peter Dutton called for a re-examination of ‘pathway to 
citizenship’. The perpetrator, Hassan Shire, reportedly held radical views and was on ASIO terror 
watchlist. His passport had been cancelled in 2015 to foil plans of a possible travel to Syria. Hassan 
is also reported to have been mentally unstable with a history of substance abuse (ABC, 2018). 
Michael Rogers, a homeless man, was widely lionised for his heroic trolley-intervention that fended off 
the attacker. A crowdfunding drive mobilised over AU$100,000 for his support even though it later 
emerged that Michael had public housing but had chosen to be homeless. He had also been a repeat 
offender for 20 years, with a history of aggravated burglary and drug use (Topsfield, 2018). The 
cognitive dissonance arising from the tension between terrorist-rescuer profiling confounded the media 






Figure 6: Representations: Policy Positions and Political Rhetoric in the Public Domain26 
 
The criminalisation and horrific treatment of immigrants are important dimensions of the racialisation 
of immigration in Australia, the U.S., Kenya and Canada. The rhetoric and policy positions in Figure 6 
illustrate discursive motifs that conceive and depict migrants as constituting an existential threat to the 
state. More broadly, the discourse represents a pattern of the securitisation of transnational migration 
that has gained global currency in recent years. Australia for example, has had restrictive migration 
policies and is in the process of formulating stricter citizenship laws (Acharya, 2018). Australia and 
Canada have enforced a robust irregular immigrant detention policy (Koser, 2015, 14; Forcier & 
Dufour, 2016, 8-9). The detention centres are comparable to refugee camps in countries like Kenya 
that employ spatial and other forms of restrictions. Indeed, Australia continues to impose stringent 
rules on humanitarian migrants seemingly with ‘undesirable’ backgrounds. That said, Peter Dutton, 
the immigration minister exposed the application of double standards in his prejudiced call for ‘special 
treatment’ to fast track white South African farmer visas over alleged persecution (Karp, 2018). In 
comparison, while Kenya’s misgivings with Somali refugees are not particularly conventionally 
ideologically framed, some of the social, political, economic and security arguments already discussed 
are significantly resonant, though nuanced. With regard to the criminalisation of immigration, there has 
been a tendency to link immigrants to terrorism and other forms of crime (Forcier & Dufour, 2016, 8). 
It is further argued that the theologisation of immigration has been remarkable within the securitisation 
construct. Countries like Canada and Australia have been cited as employing the ‘ideological 
management of humanitarian crises’ by privileging Christian immigrants over Muslims who are 
perceived as a security threat (Forcier & Dufour, 2016, 10; Patrick, 2017; Cap, 2018, 1). Identity 
constructs have indeed emerged in the public securitisation discourse on homegrown terrorism as will 




                                                          
26 Political rhetoric accredited to William Ruto and Mark Latham respectively. 
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c. The Effects of Harshly-Softly Response on Radicalisation 
 
In as far as free speech is concerned, the opposite of correctness is important, in the same way that 
strong opinions should be articulated responsibly. Nevertheless, the free marketplace of the 
antagonistic left-right exchange has derailed and disrupted constructive engagement on migration and 
security. In essence, the speech-acts underlying extreme-right (non)violent radicalisation (Garcia, 
2015, 13) and the extravagant leftist PC are not benign but have far-reaching ramifications. The 
diffusion of the extreme-right rhetoric and policies to the wider public progressively informs the 
opinions, attitudes, belief and action of not just the sympathetic primary target but also the disparaged 
secondary audience. The contagion effect (see Midlarsky, Crenshaw & Yoshida, 1980) beyond the 
source suggests that radicalisation breeds radicalisation and is as such self-reinforcing. One French 
immigrant remarked:  
 
They (migrants) don’t like other French people except the people who live in their communes… So, when they 
start to hear about a Muslim land where they will have their rights, where they will be able to speak and fight 
those European invaders, they feel like oh this is my mission… In France I don’t feel like Muslim, you don’t 
respect us,… There are other Muslims in France who really understand and they believe that we should apply 
Shariah in France… So, they are really extremist. Their point of view is really extremist… Now in France there 
is increasing racism. It used to be there but not as much as now… But now they have started to openly say 
what they think via social media. They have started to say it and show it… If you are a woman in a burqa you 
can be insulted and told to go back to your country… When they see refugees, they see terrorists. Now refugee 
is terrorist… You feel the atmosphere now when you are going out with a lot of people you feel like you are 
going to die. (Lola – French immigrant, personal communication, January 31, 2017) 
 
A distinction can be made between conservatives who are circumspect in the adoption of new beliefs 
in an attempt to reduce the potential for error and liberals who are open to increase their reserves of 
true beliefs that may potentially be erroneous. Similarly, individuals with a preference for fairly justified 
belief over truth may embrace justified beliefs that are particularly weak in justification. Such individuals 
may resist the assessment of different justifications in finding the truth because mere justification is 
sufficient for belief. In such situations, argumentation is likely to reinforce an individuals’ rigidity. In 
contrast, individuals in pursuit of justified true beliefs may be inclined to debate if it leads to the 
attainment of truth (Chinn et al., 2011, 147). These differences significantly diminish the space for 
constructive engagement in an environment where two extremes are unwilling to cede ground and 
facilitate ‘truth’ seeking. Epistemic virtues such as intellectual watchfulness can lead to the attainment 
of true beliefs while epistemic vices related to intellectual cowardice, apathy and dogmatism impede 
knowledge (Chinn et al., 2011, 156). It is within this framework that an examination of constructive 




Besides the conflation of migration with terrorism, recent terrorist attacks have evoked criticisms 
against globalisation, multi-culturalism and the role of PC. Some scholars (Lichev & Hristoskova, 2017, 
1-8) have imputed PC, for example, in the terrorist attacks in Belgium. They submit that the cultist 
ascription of PC also described as linguistic fundamentalism has promoted silence in the hope that 
problems will resolve themselves. Proponents of PC support divergent opinions and freedom of 
speech but demonstrate the inability to listen and suppress ‘conservative’ criticism. In their fight against 
discrimination, they have inadvertently become polarising and morphed into discriminators. They 
emphasise constructive engagement but demonstrate little tolerance to cede or expand the discursive 
space, as this thesis has also found. Lichev and Hristoskova (p. 8) conclude that a direct invitation to 
the discursive theatre allows vulnerable groups to directly articulate their issues and is more 
empowering and impactful than innovating and assigning them euphemisms in their absence. That 
notwithstanding, the thesis posits that the permissive boundaries of PC have emboldened radical 
movements, including those in the extreme-right. Moreover, the ideological clash resulting from the 
hard-pedalling on the right and soft-pedalling on the left has produced a stalemate that has foreclosed 
constructive engagement on migration and security. 
 
This impasse may be partly explained by Forsyth’s (2006) ideas on group conformity. Similar to other 
movements, Left-Right supporters are involved in the process of self-identification and perceive the 
group as an ‘extension of the self’. An individual’s increasing identification with a group accentuates 
similarities between the self and the group, strengthens connectedness, interdependence, attachment 
and identification with group norms and goals (p. 90). Submission to group pressure leads to several 
responses to conformity with different levels of divergence between public and private agreement. 
Conversion or private acceptance involves private and public agreement with group norms and 
symbolises true transformation in alignment with the majority. Compliance or acquiescence involves 
public agreement and private disagreement with group ideals (194-218). It is within this frame that 
people can hold verbalised explicit beliefs and non-verbalised tacit beliefs (Chinn et al., 2011, 146). 
 
Concomitantly, this thesis argues that the resulting personal or cognitive conflict in public-private 
representations further complicates constructive engagement with emotive yet crucial issues like 
migration and security. Therefore, those who assert individuality or independence within a group, 
though likely to be a minority, may be instrumental in building consensus between hardliners in 
opposing groups. In finding their voices, they could potentially narrow the gap that emerges when 
opposing groups pull in polar directions, thus creating an opportunity for extremist forces to penetrate 
and strategise against both sides. On the flipside, this invisible peripheral core, trapped in ideological 
silos, may present a latent dynamic of antipathy resulting from repressed views. They experience the 
pressure to preserve their individuality and simultaneously conform to mass norms in an increasingly 
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dynamic world. It is within this shifting space that a hooded society has emerged. Underground 
movements on social media such as ‘Men Going Their Own Way’ (MGTOW) and strands of ‘Women 
Going Their Own Way’ (WGTOW) have found their niche within this dynamic yet currently 
irreconcilable space. Consequently, in a review of their earlier research ‘Friction: How radicalisation 
happens to them and us’, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017, 209) observe that individual and group-
level mechanisms of radicalisation lead to action while mass level mechanisms induce radicalisation 
of public opinion. 
 
Indeed, the political correctness within the Left and the attendant liberal policies have been faulted for 
creating a ‘liberal paradox’ that has presented the quandary of regulating migration while maintaining 
a competitive economy and society open to trade, investment and migration (Hollifield, 2008, 68). The 
convergence between the humanitarian imperative and the economic demand for skilled migrants 
compels states to maintain an open-door policy. The budgetary constraints presented by high 
expenditure in migrant reception, citizenship admission and integration call for a highly restrictive 
admissions policy (Miller, 2008, 377). In contrast to goods and services, population mobility poses 
greater political (and security) risks. In upholding their social contracts with the citizens, states must 
therefore enforce border control (Hollifield, 2008, 68). The inherent contradictions in liberalism while 
presenting these dilemmas also threaten the extreme-right’s quest for the preservation of national 
identity (Garcia, 2015, 34).  
 
Some long-established policies that have underpinned liberal and conservative ideology on migration 
and security continue to take hold in a dynamic global environment that calls for a balance between 
compassion and regulation. This is exemplified by the principle of non-negotiation with terrorists that 
effectively alienates key conflict parties from the negotiating table. It increases belligerence and may 
radicalise constituencies sympathetic to perceived ‘liberators’. Shifting attention to ‘ideologically-
neutral’ positions, the left-right convergence on refugee resettlement, display of solidarity during 
terrorist attacks, not to mention the astronomical funding targeted towards humanitarian interventions 
is indeed laudable. That said, the research found that in some cases, refugees are resettled in deprived 
or culturally segregated enclaves. Similar to the Kenyan experience, this pattern of resettlement 
reinforces the liminal camp existence. Terrorist organisations can potentially exploit the conditions that 
Lola, a French immigrant describes below to frame their narratives and radicalise disillusioned 
individuals:  
 
I can compare the ‘banlieue’ (bonliu) in France to a refugee camp because they have been in place for 
decades… Ideally, they should be French after having stayed there for such a long period. But when they 
arrived, they had bad jobs that no one wants to do like sweeping. Some of them had qualifications which were 
not considered, so, not fair. The French government at first put them together in ‘banlieue’. It is a suburb outside 
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the city but in French ‘banlieue’ always means bad. It is at the gate of the city. In each city they are not in the 
middle in the city, always outside. Even in small towns you will find majority of these immigrants outside the 
town. Always…. These ‘banlieue’ we can really compare them to camps because they are closed communities. 
They will speak their own language, they have their own schools. Maybe in class you will have 80% Arabs, 18% 
Africans and 2% of white French from the lower social class. These French often don’t stay in these 
communes… For the last ten years, these young people don’t feel French and stay in groups. We have 
stereotypes for these kinds of people depending on how they are dressed… (Lola – French immigrant, personal 
communication, January 31, 2017) 
 
A short documentary similarly crystallises the ‘banlieue’ tensions. One man interrogates the deliberate 
exclusion of ‘banlieues’ from Lyon’s city map that renders their inhabitants invisible. His criticism 
suggests that while some policies may be well-intentioned and superficially credible, they may also be 
fundamentally flawed and counter-productive. He remarks:  
 
When one is banished from society, one is in the suburbs… It’s a way of being set aside… It’s not just 
coincidence…The segregation is clear… When you put people in a situation like that and then bully, exclude 
and frustrate them, they suffer humiliation on an everyday basis. How can you expect the youngsters not to 
rebel? You can’t light a fire and then be surprised to see the smoke. (DocsOnline, 2011).  
 
The common riposte that terrorist attacks are attacks on Western values and democracy (Bilefsky et 
al., 2017) further defragments and devalues other distinct cultures that collectively identify with 
universal human values. Granted, some sections of the global community similarly take pride in their 
indigenous values. Nonetheless, Western exceptionalism weakens global solidarity during terrorist 
attacks and portrays the war on terror as a requisite global venture but victimisation from terrorism as 
essentially Western. For this reason, Kuo (2015) exposes the selective attention, outrage and reaction 
time in the 2015 Paris attacks that instigated the #IamParis slogan on social media. The Paris attacks 
similarly inspired the global circulation of #IamKenya seven months after the Garissa attack in Kenya. 
That there was no sloganeering in the 2019 Nairobi terrorist attack is therefore predictable. Secondly, 
the Western stance overlooks the non-discriminatory character and impact of terrorist attacks resulting 
from Western foreign policies in other non-Western countries. Thirdly, by setting themselves apart 
from the rest of the global community similarly grappling with terrorism, the West creates a loophole 
for terrorist organisations to magnify and exploit these ‘value differences’ when advancing their anti-
Western agenda. To further exemplify, the partnerships on the global war on terror become devalued 
in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in developing countries. Travel advisories to partner countries 
unwittingly facilitate terrorist organisations’ goals to divide coalitions and cripple economies. It is 
therefore laudable that for the first time, the EU exercised restraint from the issuance of advisories 
(Komu, 2019) following the 2019 terrorist attack in Kenya. Accordingly, beyond being an attack on 
traditional African values, the 1998 terrorist bombings of American installations in Kenya and Tanzania 
that claimed hundreds of civilian lives and wounded thousands was more importantly an attack on 
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humankind. This is the lens through which all forms of radicalisation beyond ‘Islamic radicalisation’ 




This chapter has demonstrated the attrition of constructive public discourse on radicalisation in the 
context of migration. The securitising speech-acts of various actors has inspired a pattern of creeping 
intolerance, antagonistic relationships and the gradual erosion of compassion and resilience. To some 
extent, the foreclosure of ‘objective truth-seeking’ has impeded the design of responsive strategies 
and in some cases formulated counter-productive policies. The chapter has advanced that the 
construction of radicalisation in the public sphere has subsumed a variety of actors beyond the usual 
primary suspects within terrorist organisations. The next chapter will demonstrate that on their part, 
these terrorist organisations have exploited their marketability in the radicalisation of public discourse. 
By introducing the notion of disruptive Islam, the chapter exposes the machinations and by extension 
the double standards that these organisations exercise, and their adaptive capacity. Though unable to 
control their public representation, the organisations’ employment of strategic communication to garner 
and retain public attention and relevance is noteworthy. Overall, the influence of the media and terrorist 
organisations has summoned the participation and radicalisation of other actors in the evolving public 
discourse. Ultimately, their influence on public perceptions makes them important mutually reinforcing 




























Chapter 8 – ‘Islamic Radicalisation’ in Public Discourse 
 
This chapter is a continuation of chapter seven and aims to examine the dynamics of religion in 
radicalisation. Specifically, it presents key field research findings on Islam and radicalisation applicable 
to the wider migrant context. The chapter describes the disruptive character of elements of Islamic 
radicalisation and its influence on public discourse and policy. By examining the synergy between 
terrorist communication and speech-acts of other actors, this chapter contends that besides being a 
useful concept, radicalisation is a social construct moulded by perceptions, attitudes, opinions and 
actions of a coterie of actors. The chapter also briefly examines the corporate identity of terrorist 
organisations and their exploitation of the currency of ‘Islamic radicalisation’ discourse in the 
construction of Islamism and advancement of their organisational goals. An analysis of contending 
views on the import of religion in radicalisation exposes its utility and analytical drawbacks. The chapter 
concludes that terrorist communication in rhetoric and action regulates public discourse that in turn 
inflames radicalisation in a reinforcing feedback loop.  
 
8.1 The Dynamics of Disruptive Islam in Radicalisation 
 
Religion has been a dominant motif in the existing scholarship (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009; 
Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz; 2005) on (non)violent Islamist radicalisation in 
particular. This being the case, only a minority of research interviewees strongly supported the 
centrality of religion in radicalisation, while others reported mixed views. Those with strong opinions 
described the role of religious dogmatism and sectarian tensions in radicalisation while drawing 
examples from madrassa conservatism, rote learning and literalist interpretations of religious texts. 
These drivers, in conjunction with a strictly defined kinship sphere of influence, create a psychological 
imprint that progressively inform attitudes, beliefs and behaviour towards ‘others’. At the same time, 
some suggested that Islamists have preyed on mass ignorance and exploited religion as a medium for 
the interpretation of grievances and justification of violence. As an enabling factor, traditional literalist 
theological interpretations have sanctioned acts like jihad to address modern day challenges. 
Comparisons were drawn with the exploitation of other forms of identity, such as tribalism in Kenya 
and extreme-right movements in the West. In such cases, the manipulation of identities serves to 
mobilise and strengthen intra-group solidarity bonds that legitimise action against perceived injustices. 
While some respondents acknowledged challenges within the faith, they also viewed Islam as a 
moderate religion that accommodates fundamentalism but prescribes peaceful co-existence with 
others. Broadly, their arguments reflect dominant scholastic thoughts on the role of religion in 
radicalisation (Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Farber, 2005; Bhatt & Silber, 2007; Alonso, 2012; Pizam, 




The research generated several key findings but most prominently, majority of interviewees de-
emphasised the salience of religion in radicalisation in the camp context. This finding is consistent with 
a study (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016, 9, 20) conducted in Kenya that found the use of religious messaging 
to be incidental, opportunistic and erroneous. In interpreting this finding, the study views some Muslim 
participants’ responses as potentially influenced by religious profiling and stigmatisation while this 
thesis additionally postulates the desire by non-Muslim respondents to convey religious tolerance. 
Nevertheless, upcoming sections tacitly support the subsidiary role of religion. At the same time, 
religion cannot be delinked from the contextual nuances of the evolution of Islamism in Somalia and 
parts of the GHoA region, as discussed in chapter three. More importantly, this section conceives the 
interpretive subjectivity of religious texts and acknowledges sections of Islamic scripture that exhort 
tolerance and diversity (Murshed & Pavan, 2009, 7). While the mixed findings are suggestive of religion 
as a double-barrelled medium, the presentation of findings below focus more on its representation and 
less on its role.  
 
Research interviewees articulated a range of reasons for challenging the primacy of religion in 
radicalisation. To begin with, terrorist attacks have claimed Muslim and non-Muslim casualties alike. 
Media exposure of terrorist attacks continues to predominate inter-faith condemnations and 
deradicalisation efforts that are insufficiently sensational. Additionally, the condemnation of an entire 
religion based on the actions of a few misguided individuals is in itself misguided. This is more 
discombobulating when the majority of Muslims seek refuge in Western countries that are purported 
enemies of Islam. Some respondents reported an admiration for Islamic values of solidarity and 
compassion that other religions can learn from. Nina, in particular, noted that previous exposure to 
mainstream international media informed her negative perception of Muslims. However, further 
exposure to a Middle Eastern media station provided a more balanced and realistic perspective on 
global issues. This and interactions with Muslim colleagues transformed her perceptions, leading her 
to state that ‘interacting with people is knowing people’ (Nina – Kenyan citizen, personal 
communication, February 16, 2017). This suggests that limited inter-group interactions together with 
ancillary sources of public information that are sometimes partial, instruct superficial group awareness 
that amplifies differences. 
 
Further observations exposed a pattern of misrepresentation of various religions in the public sphere. 
To illustrate, conclusions on the nature of an attack, particularly terrorism, was reported to be 
disproportionately linked to the identity of a perpetrator. While some mosques have operated as 
platforms for indoctrination, other religious persuasions reportedly promote an ideology of ‘othering’. 
Pulpits that indoctrinate and incite their followers against other religions were described as being held 
to different standards from Islam, which has experienced excessive reproof. This continuous 
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whispering campaign has similarly informed inter-religious perceptions that inscribe in-out group 
boundaries as Nina observes, ‘Our brains absorb a lot so the more I feed the more I believe and create 
a reality.’ Similarly, righteousness across all faiths has fashioned ‘other’ religions as either ‘bad 
religions’ or ‘right religions’.  
 
Existing research examining the role of religion in radicalisation partially validates this thesis’ 
contradicting findings on religion. Among other motivations, research respondents advanced the aim 
of Islamism as the subversion and replacement of democratic values with Sharia law. Yet Kalyvas 
(2018, 37-44) maintains that despite Islamists’ utopian claims of the establishment of a borderless 
caliphate, they tend to tap on nationalistic, political sentiments and democratic processes to gain 
popular support. At the same time, while Islamists are inspired by religious ideology, their actions 
contradict religious edicts while the influence of religion is similarly variable. There is nothing 
remarkably Islamic about the brutal acts of violence that receive wide media coverage and public 
attention. Kalyvas concludes by stating that without diminishing the carnage caused by terrorism, the 
publicity that the phenomenon has garnered belies the actual threat it represents when compared to 
other forms of violence. Ultimately, Islamism is indicative of the Islamisation of radicalism as opposed 
to the radicalisation of Islam (Roy, 2017).  
 
It is within this context that the profile of Islamic scholars, the ‘Ulaama’ needs to be understood. One 
research respondent outlines three characteristics of a legitimate and authoritative Islamic scholar. 
The scholar must understand Islamic shariah, reside within the immediate locality, and command 
knowledge of the local context. He argues that problems arise when radicalised youth overlook these 
conditions: 
 
If I have a situation in Kenya and I call a scholar in Saudi Arabia, it is not possible for him to advise because he 
does not understand the Kenyan situation. So, our youth have taken a central place in jihad. Some of them think 
jihad is a good thing. We don’t refuse but if someone from IS (Islamic State) puts a video on social media with 
an attractive voice the youth forget where they come from or live and follow what the other people are saying. 
The person talking might be saying the truth but has not considered the two conditions. Even when Muslims 
start the holy month, we do not listen to news from other people. We listen to the chief Kadhi (Sharia judge) in 
Kenya and ask whether he has seen the moon when we fast or want to break the fast. We don’t call Saudi 
Arabia or America whether they have seen the moon. This is the problem with the youth. They do not follow the 
scholars. (Islamic Scholar, personal communication, March 15, 2017) 
 
On his part, Wiktorowicz (2005, 137-38) outlines the characteristics of influential radical clerics and 
the image they project that attract religious seekers. First, the scholar must not only be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to provide reliable interpretations but should also demonstrate command of the context 
in which religious rulings are applied. Secondly, the scholar must be morally upright and of good 
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repute. Besides incorruptibility, he should work for the greater good of the Ummah and deliver objective 
interpretations free of external influences and motivated by genuine devotion. He should also possess 
the courage to address controversial topics, which mainstream traditional scholars typically avoid. 
 
Interviewees described the manipulation and selective interpretation of Islamic texts that expose the 
exploitative character of Islamists. Specifically, the interpretation of jihad, the (mis)characterisation of 
religious leaders and brand management in Islamism were common themes. One respondent decried 
the enduring preoccupation with armed jihad in public discourse in the face of other forms of jihad. 
Moreover, in their manipulation of religious texts, Islamists have promoted the armed interpretation of 
jihad that has sustained this discourse. She described the literal meaning of jihad as ‘effort’ or 
‘struggle’, not confined to violent tactics associated with Islamism as is the common misconception 
(also see Klein, 2016, 870).  
 
Secondly, the representation of radical and charismatic clergy in the mainstream media has been 
misleading. The mischaracterisation of religious quacks as Islamic authorities legitimises their role and 
identity in the public theatre and promotes their proliferation. An Islamic scholar observed this to be 
the case with the deceased Kenyan radical ‘cleric’, Aboud Rogo, legitimised by the media. He 
cautioned that their projected identity (see Matusitz, 2018, 4) of religiosity and the broadcast of pseudo-
religious messages does not confer authoritative Islamic scholar status, commonly known as ‘Ulaama’. 
Thirdly, the exploitative character of these self-styled ‘clerics’ is evident in organisational brand 
management. The Islamic scholar noted that Islamist organisations assign themselves religious 
sounding names to appear legitimate. This exploitation of ignorance engenders public conflation of 
Islam with violence. It also accords them the power and legitimacy to influence those within and outside 
their religious orbit. He added that the frustration among some Muslims over the misrepresentation of 
their religion has kindled (non)violent radicalisation. The branding dimension of religious appropriation 
has been covered in more detail in another section. 
 
Some research participants within the Muslim community observed that a gain in legitimacy among 
radical ‘clerics’ saw a corresponding loss of identity and legitimacy among authoritative Islamic figures. 
Husain (2007, 208) similarly describes the alienation of the Ulaama, the revered traditional Islamic 
scholars and the translocation of their expert role to religious amateurs. As a former Islamist, he further 
maintains that ultimately, Islamists embrace the political ideology without necessarily accepting the 
religion. Wiktorowicz (2005, 25, 86) notes that the lack of a central theological authority implies that 
the masses are overwhelmed with competing religious interpretations. However, scholars play an 
important role as cultural intermediaries in the interpretation of religious texts and its application in 
mundane practices in a dynamic context. In deepening the understanding on the role, rise and fall of 
Islamic clerics, Chinn et al., (2011, 152-55) submit that the prominence accorded religious authority 
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calls for an examination of whether knowledge is sourced outside or within the self. Some sources of 
knowledge encompass perception, reasoning, introspection, memory and the testimony of others, also 
known as authority. Other sources include intuition, revelation, religious scriptures or experiences, art, 
fiction and research findings. To illustrate, most knowledge on local and global affairs originates from 
the media and related testimonies. All knowledge therefore derives from the interaction between 
multiple as opposed to a single source while belief justification standards are situational. 
 
Wiktorowicz (2005, 86) advances these arguments by maintaining that in moments of crisis, some 
individuals rely upon established religious interpretations. Others who perceive failure in mainstream 
religious institutions become entangled in the radical interpretive pluralism of religious doctrine. 
Established Islamic institutions have particularly been criticised for their ritualistic rigour that fails to 
respond to contemporary realities as does Islamism (p. 100). In fact, an Islamic scholar interviewed 
for this research highlights the emergence of a new calibre of Ulaama who are trendy, charismatic and 
in tune with youthful exuberance. Their brand of disruptive Islam has encroached the bland vacuum 
created by mainstream scholars.  
 
In advancing the notion of disruptive Islam, it is argued that it is not so much the re-introduction of 
traditional values in Islamism that drives the Islamist strand of radicalisation as is also the idea to keep 
up with popular culture and trends in a dynamic digital era to enforce radical ideology. While this 
appears contradictory, the approach complements the whole shebang of Islamist strategies and 
supports their overall goals. Furthermore, the level of media attention that these religious thespians 
attract and their influence on public discourse accords them celebrity status and creates what Roy 
(2017) terms ‘a vision of heroism and grandeur’ that in turn captivates and lures star-struck followers. 
While predominantly perceived as conservative, they have succeeded in engineering a motley of 
identities reflective in their adaptive, mutative and disruptive character, short of ‘progressivism’. This 
is facilitated in part by their capacity to sustain public attention in the employment of strategies that 
advance the construction of an ideal identity (see also Matusitz, 2018, 4) that appeals to the masses. 
Therefore, regardless of the degree of lethality of terrorist attacks, Islamist disruptive tactics serve to 
demonstrate their resilience, resonance and relevance by generating and maintaining public attention. 
In turn, the accrued publicity influences discourse and shapes perceptions, attitudes and counter-
response that feed the cycle. 
 
The (re)configuration of the Islamic religious context and its impact on radicalisation emerged as an 
important research theme. Respondents particularly highlighted the relationship between clerics and 
adherents that revolves around the shifting positions of religious scholars; shrinking space of 
engagement; the disconnect between clerics and devotees; and the namby-pamby response 
strategies to violent extremism. To begin with, the shifting positions of Islamic scholars manifest in 
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their conferral and withdrawal of support for Islamist movements. An Islamic scholar explained that 
during its incipient stages, the Islamic State received recognition from some mainstream scholars, 
including his own teacher. Naturally, the youth followed the lead of the mainstream scholars whose 
leadership and guidance are highly revered. Subsequent to the brutalities committed by IS, these 
scholars withdrew their support while the youth maintained theirs. Whether support and withdrawal are 
openly conveyed, the crisis in communication has inadvertently precipitated a crisis of direction. The 
confusion arising from such mixed signals has transposed the youth’s allegiance to Islamists and 
shifted legitimacy from traditional scholars. In his own words, the respondent explains: 
 
When they came up with the Islamic State, they wanted to show the scholars that they were doing what the 
Quran tells us. … After convincing some of the scholars that they (Islamic State) were doing the right thing. 
Some of the world scholars supported in the initial phase. If someone today told me that a certain scholar 
supports IS then I would ask, ‘during which time? At this time or when they began?’. Personally, I had a view 
about them and gave them the benefit of doubt because I was taking into account what they were doing within 
the context in which they were. … Even my own teacher told us he supported the Islamic State when they 
started out. But as time went by some of the scholars withdrew their support. So that is why getting the right 
moment these scholars supported Islamic State is very important. The youth don’t understand these things. 
When they hear a certain scholar supports IS they don’t question the period within which he supported IS. They 
will just say a certain scholar also supports IS and so they are with him not knowing he may have withdrawn his 
support. And this could be a big scholar in Islam. (Anonymous, personal communication, date withheld, 2017) 
 
This conundrum is intensified by the disconnect between religious leaders and their followers. 
Respondents reported that clerics have become complacent and de-linked from the youth. In contrast, 
radical clerics succeed at indoctrination by establishing close personal ties with their targets. As 
recruits explore and evaluate their interaction with religious texts and recruiters, a gradual process of 
self and externally induced alienation begins to take effect. The former arises from the recruits’ 
conscious efforts to isolate themselves from family and friends in order to safeguard the budding 
spiritual sanctuary under exploration that may be threatened by unbidden intervention. In addition, 
they become intuitively alienated as a result of the clash between their beliefs and lifestyle choices 
and those of their immediate circle. Meanwhile, their burgeoning relationship with the recruiter may 
expedite integration into the recruiters’ network as they become psychologically and physically isolated 
from old networks. It is within this configuration that traditional clerics similarly become alienated. The 
lack of personal contact with traditional scholars therefore facilitates interaction with radical clerics and 
the permutation of Islam. Wiktorowicz (2005, 148) similarly describes the power of accessibility that 
charismatic scholars exude that contrasts with the aloofness of local Imams. A respondent aptly 
captures the reasons behind this attraction:   
 
They (Islamic scholars) spend most of their time between the office and home. They don’t reach out to the 
youth. When I go to seminars, the youth complain about the scholars. They say, ‘Our scholars, we want to hear 
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from them. We want someone to show us direction.’’ …During Aboud Rogo’s (radical Kenyan cleric) time, the 
youth had no one to talk to and he talked to them and gave them his ideas, which they accepted. This was their 
role model. Such people are the ones reaching out to young people who have been ignored by mainstream 
clerics. If I am a cleric and in the office all day, how will people know me? Even today if you go to Mombasa and 
tell some youth that Aboud Rogo was wrong, many will not listen because they believed in him. They believe 
he was a martyr and died as a martyr. …Aboud Rogo sits with people and talks to them to give them an Islamic 
perspective. (Anonymous, personal communication, date withheld, 2017) 
 
The fault line between mainstream clerics and adherents is also inflamed by the shrinking space of 
open engagement. The trepidation among Islamic religious leaders over government and Islamist 
backlash hinders their engagement with controversial and sensitive issues. To illustrate, discussions 
on issues critical to the youth, such as jihad, have been suppressed, at least in public. The negative 
connotation attached to jihad invokes the fear of Islamist and sympathiser labels and designation as a 
government target. Likewise, the public repudiation of Islamist attacks makes them Islamist targets. 
As a result, Islamists reap from an environment of fear by confronting controversial issues that in turn 
expands their sphere of influence: 
 
…When you mention jihad to the youth, it is a different interpretation that comes in. …So, people have 
misconceived and misunderstood jihad. Everybody fears to talk about jihad nowadays as a result even in 
interviews. There was a time I was interviewed by Al Jazeera and I told them I feared for my security and could 
not talk about jihad. This is because it has become the norm that anybody who talks about jihad supports it. 
(Islamic Scholar, personal communication, March 15, 2017) 
 
Within this backdrop, government retribution was reported as funnelling radicalisation. Counter-
terrorism measures, while effective in some cases, have also been counter-productive as discussed 
in chapter three. Interventions that surgically target Muslim communities are particularly likely to inspire 
radicalisation. The Kenyan government’s military incursions into Dadaab Refugee Camp in the wake 
of recent terrorist attacks was a source of angst for some interviewees. The impact of such actions on 
public discourse cannot be understated as they provide fodder for Islamist narratives, besides boosting 
their recruitment campaigns. Linked to this, in the aftermath of a Kenyan government operation, it is 
reported that some individuals took to social media to vent their discontentment and explore possible 
retaliatory tactics. However, one respondent proposed a more pacific approach that challenges most 
governments’ policy on neutralisation and non-negotiation with Islamists: 
 
When we kill these people as the government (Kenya) has done, their ideas remain and run with the youth. So 
how do we correct this? The solution is not eliminating this person but sometimes you have to sit with your 
enemy so that you get to know him. Remember this is only one person and there are many others like him so 
how will you kill them all? Will you kill 10 million or 40 million people? And the ideas will still remain and it even 
makes it worse when they say they are ready to die for their cause. In Islam if you die as a martyr you will go to 




The mainstream clerics’ ineffectual response to terrorism was particularly censured. Some 
respondents noted the predictably reactive pattern of media briefings in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks. This reactive remote-controlled response is possibly linked to the threats the clerics face as 
already discussed. In comparison, Husain (2007, 275) discusses the evolution of the Islamist 
landscape after home-grown attacks in Britain. Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist movement in Britain, of which 
Husain was a member, exemplifies the aggressive Islamist adaptation to a challenging operational 
environment. The movement camouflages its activities by organising forums with innocuous themes 
like ‘Open Mind’ and ‘Thought Society’ where Hizb members are smuggled under pseudonyms. These 
persons also introduce themselves as media figures in mainstream media and conceal their Hizb 
membership. Meanwhile, they condemn extremism in public and sow discord in private. Wiktorowicz, 
(2005, 126) argues that the use of non-affiliated platforms eliminates the challenges of venue booking 
and provides a cover that enables navigation without scrutiny. The frustration expressed by a research 
interviewee reveals the contrasting style of engagement between mainstream clerics and Islamists: 
 
The second thing has to do with the ones who are unhappy (devotees) with the situation but are waiting for 
direction from Islamic authorities. And this is where I have a problem with the scholars (Islamic). When 
something happens, scholars like our brothers in XXX (Islamic body) go to the media and talk about it and go 
back to the office. After the next attack, they will go to the media again and go back to their offices. This is what 
keeps happening. We need to learn the hard way and should be saying, ‘This thing has happened. Why did it 
happen? How did it happen? Where were we when it happened? What can we do about it so that it does not 
happen again?’. (Islamic Scholar, personal communication, March 15, 2017) 
 
The regulation of Islamic practices in the public space is a significant driver of radicalisation. First, 
religion was reported as a form of coping mechanism in building resilience and forging resistance. 
Islam, particularly in the context of Islamism has received widespread condemnation over its 
advancement of extremist ideology. France has for example introduced policies to regulate Islamic 
dressing, notably the burqa and niqab head veils in public spaces. Muslims generally perceive the 
criminalisation of head veils as undermining Islam, as an infraction on rights and a testament to 
growing Islamophobia in its institutionalisation and legitimisation of racism. These bans similarly 
expose the latent conflict between Islam and the West and the contradictions in the promotion of 
freedoms in Western society. In some cases, these legislations have resulted in open defiance evident 
in protests of women adorning the veil (see also Chrisafis, 2011). It can therefore be deduced that 
besides generating resistance by way of protecting religious freedoms, such measures also strengthen 
religiosity, including among previously apathetic individuals. In fact, Husain, a former Islamist, (2007, 
65, 69) describes how multitudes of young, educated and confident women at his British College 
increasingly wore the hijab head veil and were regarded as the ‘truest Muslims’. The head veil was 
intended to shame their mothers and older siblings, send a message to the wider public, act as a 
189 
 
symbol of defiance of Western values, and represent a return to Islam. On their part, terrorist 
organisations such as Al Shabaab capitalise on such policy-induced tensions to justify attacks on 
(non)Western targets and boost recruitment (Gupta, 2009, 116). It is therefore possible that such 
indiscriminate or harsh counter-terrorism measures legitimise Islamist agenda and are likely 
radicalising factors. Indeed, recent research (Choi & Piazza, 2014; Piazza, 2017) on backlash effect 
shows state religious repression and minority discrimination as predictors of domestic terrorism.   
 
The second point on the effect of government regulations on radicalisation revolves around aid. 
Several Islamic charities that support orphanages and promote access to basic services have been 
deregistered in some countries. These charities, flagged as conduits of terrorism, are reported to have 
greatly impacted the Islamic education sector. To illustrate, Al Haramain Foundation, an NGO working 
on protection in Dadaab Refugee Camp was degazetted by the Kenyan government and its funds 
channelled to a Christian organisation ‘to operate in a predominantly Muslim camp’ (Farah – INGO 
Programme Manager, personal communication, February 23, 2017). The do-no-harm principle was 
not applied in this case with the inadvertent incitement of religious tensions and the exposure of 
children to various vulnerabilities. Ahmed Kuno, the mastermind of the Garissa University terrorist 
attack was a former Madrassa teacher and principal who reportedly cared for hundreds of orphans. 
He previously worked for the degazetted Al Haramain Foundation. His own institution, Madrassa 
Najah, along with other Islamic organisations were similarly deregistered. Prior to his death, he was 
reported (Mukinda, 2015) to have commanded Somalia-Kenya cross-border incursions and had an 
extensive terrorist network at Dadaab Refugee Camp. As Farah (INGO Programme Manager, personal 
communication, February 23, 2017) further reports, ‘He felt that this war was not a war on terrorism 
but a war on his livelihood, his existence, so you can see the push factors in radicalisation vary’. In 
such cases, government policy incoherence emerge from fears of the Islamic aid agenda and the 
knowledge gap on the nature and operations of the Islamic humanitarian context and its focus on 
religious initiatives. It also results from contradictions in counter-terrorism efforts in the case of Western 
partnership with Saudi Arabia. Interviewees criticised Saudi support to Islamist movements and 
participation in a proxy war in Yemen while concurrently channelling humanitarian aid.  
 
There are additional regulations and policies that present vulnerabilities to radicalisation. Interviewees 
identified money transfer laws to Islamic countries and institutions and the failure of the formal sector 
to recognise Islamic educational qualifications. Recent reports have further raised alarm on the Trump 
administration policies in the Middle East. Of significance is the Trump administration’s drastic aid cut 
to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). The slash from $125m to 
$60m comes in the backdrop of the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This move 
is likely to sabotage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the wake of the Palestinian authority’s 
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threats to withdraw from the peace talks. The probability of ostracised armed actors stepping in to 
cover the funding gap is similarly high. The threat to vulnerable school-going children involves their 
potential recruitment into extremist organisations (Irfan, 2018). Most recently, Al Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for the 2019 terrorist attack at DusitD2 Hotel in Kenya. The organisation reported that 
the attack was motivated by President Trump’s ‘witless’ decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel (Al Shabaab Press Release, 2019). Apart from Palestine, refugees in other parts of the world 
including Dadaab have faced American funding cuts that have affected food rations, resettlement 
quotas and other services (Schemm, 2017). Interviewees deemed these policies problematic:   
 
These issues are reinforcing the narrative of terrorist organisations that the world is against them especially the 
west. We have had some reports on social media suggesting that some of the militants are saying Trump is 
actually doing them a very good job of recruitment. This is having another radicalising effect.  (Kiplagat – INGO 
CVE Expert, personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
In crystallising the evidence provided in this chapter and chapter seven (on public discourse) it is 
important to examine the framing of religion in the radicalisation-terrorism spectrum. Religion has 
undergone social construction in a process this thesis conceives as theologisation complex. This 
denotes superficial attribution of religious interpretations to threats to security, in this case refugeeism 
and terrorism. It is comparable to illusory correlation (see Fan, 2008, 33-36), which is the perception 
of relationships where none exist and may also involve looking for confirming evidence, drawing 
conclusions by the use of incomplete information, or the accentuation of actual reality (Berndsen et 
al., 2001, 209-34). The formation of linkages, in this case the conflation of immigration with terrorism, 
creates mental equations among individuals. Repeated exposure to related migration and terrorism 
events progressively reinforce the public’s mental impressions. The emerging misperception cascade 
stems from person-to-person transmission of information and beliefs, in an exacting context in which 
individuals apply little to no personal analysis. The actors with authority and public access via the 
media become early and prime movers in the formation of social cascades that shape public 
perceptions. Their compelling intuitive simplification of issues results in policy formulations that suffer 
similar simplification and distortion. This dynamic may create fear and mistrust where none existed, in 
unrealistic proportions and melds into stereotypic constructs (Fan, 2008, 33; 42-46). Therefore, 
besides enhancing impact, illusory correlation is also instructive in stereotype formation (Risen et al., 
2007, 1493, 1501). All things considered, theologisation complex conditions the entirety of actors 
including the relevant targets and manifests as the (un)intended simplification of complex, multi-
faceted social issues through sweeping religious ascriptions. In recognising the utility of faith, Islamists 
exploit this religious frame to mobilise their constituencies, who become part of the overall dynamic. 
The complex’ potential to mould attitudes, beliefs and behaviour sustains a repetitive cycle that 
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ingrains mental constructs and informs further action. Within this construction, religion emerges as an 
important factor in radicalisation but in synergy with the contextual factors and actors discussed. 
 
8.2 Islamicalisation in Public Discourse 
 
Islamist organisations as structured or amorphous formations remarkably project the image and 
character of corporate entreprises. An illuminating book by Husain (2007) detailing his personal 
experience as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist group in the U.K., sheds light on the inner 
workings of these organisations. In synthesising one striking observation, they employ specific thought 
processes, communication and a work culture that facilitates the realisation of their vision, mission and 
goals. Moreover, the aggressive inter-organisational competition in the marketplace of ideas advanced 
by the development of competing radical concepts and member recruitment typifies product 
development and client conversion in the field of sales and marketing. In maintaining their ‘corporate 
identity’, they employ strategies such as brand management, product development, content 
management, conversion paths and rates, market development and penetration, technology and 
innovation, customer relationship management and public relations (Leite & Bengtson, 2018, 2-3; 
Moller & Parvinen, 2015, 4-7). 
 
Public communication employs a repertoire of communication strategies that deliberately inform or 
influence an audience’s opinion and behaviour. Brand management is a form of public communication 
that involves brand positioning, audience targeting and the preservation of reputation. The projection 
of public identity through brand awareness conveys power. Islamist organisations model their brands 
through powerful communication strategies and action to promote their image and goals. By employing 
brand management as a form of relationship-building tool, an Islamist organisation draws the attention 
of active (providers of feedback) and passive (spectators) audiences that form an interpretive 
community during a terrorism event. Terrorism as a form of communication generates symbolic 
interaction with the secondary target or audience or constituents, controls the diffusion of information 
and alters audience opinion and behaviour. As such, organisations capitalise on mass communication 
to win ‘hearts and minds’ (Matusitz, 2018, 2-5). This form of communication is comparable to 
Goffman’s (1959, 1-24, 112) concept of ‘impression management’ that denotes people’s participation 
in a performance in the public theatre to influence perception and social identity. 
 
A successful brand management within these organisations requires differentiation, credibility and 
authenticity. Differentiation makes the Islamist organisation and its products stand out from other 
competitors (Matusitz, 2018, 6-7). To popularise religious forums, some Islamist movements for 
example literally replicate the advertising strategies that motor vehicle manufacturers employ when 
launching a new model that involves unveiling a sheet before a curious public (Husain, 2007, 53). 
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Credibility is aimed at inducing faith and loyalty among audiences and increasing followers for example 
by fulfilling promises and threats. Crafting an image of credibility requires compatibility between the 
organisation’s character and its values, ethos and goals. Authenticity involves expanding the 
‘customer’ base by practising what they preach in their construction of a credible identity (Matusitz, 
2018, 6-7) that may also include maintaining telecommuting and roaming staff in foreign countries. 
 
8.3 Disruptive Machinations: #OperationDisruptAndDestruct 
 
There is a growing body of research examining social media use within terrorist organisations. A study 
(Helmus & Bodine-Baron, 2017, 1-3; Bodine-Baron et al., 2016, 5-11) examining Islamic State 
opponents and supporters on Twitter found that despite their comparatively smaller number, Islamic 
State supporters dominate the platform by out-twitting their opponents. Their coordinated and 
sophisticated social media strategy enables the fast and effective dissemination of content in different 
languages by use of simple text and sensational videos. Their tweets include dramatic images and 
catchy phrases such as ‘breaking news’, ‘now released’, ‘spread’ and ‘link’. The strategic persuasion 
of their supporters to employ these phrases increases the capacity for their messages to go viral, reach 
wider audiences and have greater impact. They by extension share similar marketing objectives and 
strategies with other legitimate businesses and indeed consider and pursue targets and tactics likely 
to guarantee maximum publicity (Mair, 2017, 34-35). 
 
In 2013, Al Shabaab, a Somali Islamist organisation, staged a four-day terrorist attack at Westgate 
Mall in Kenya that left 67 people dead and a further 175 wounded. A study (Mair, 2017, 35) analysing 
the organisation’s Twitter use over the four-day siege concluded that their primary goal was to control 
the narrative (propaganda) and retain a global audience (publicity). Al Shabaab’s media wing live-
tweeted the Westgate Mall attack while weaving a narrative of the political and economic persecution 
of Muslims (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016, 21). During the attack, Al Shabaab continued tweeting fictional 
threats and misinformation to divert attention from Westgate, shared news updates on the hostages 
and mocked the security agencies’ response as they churned propaganda (Mair, 2017, 24, 35). 
 
Terrorist organisations’ use of the Internet is broadly aimed at outreach, logistics and attack. Outreach 
functions include ‘publicity and propaganda, recruitment and radicalisation, and networking’. Logistics 
entails ‘online training, research and planning, command and control of attacks, and financing’ while 
‘psychological warfare and cyberattacks’ make up the attack function (Mair, 2017, 27, 31). Al Shabaab 
has previously operationalised its communication goals by maintaining a website, blogs, an online 
magazine and by hosting online jihadi forums. Since terrorism as theatre is primarily aimed at an 
audience and less the actual victims, mainstream and social media have provided an ideal 




Al Shabaab’s savvy communication strategy provides content for academic and wider public 
discourse. It fulfils their broader goals by ensuring a steady flow of propaganda content circulation with 
varying impact on diverse audience segments. It also consolidates their prominence in the public 
limelight through the promotion of their disruptive agenda that also maintains their relevance. 
Accordingly, Mair (2017, 31) observes that during the Westgate attack, Al Shabaab consciously sought 
to prolong the time it retains control of its narrative and captivate its audience. In fact, David Cameron, 
former U.K. Prime Minister, had to cut short an official trip to convene a crisis meeting on the Kenya 
attack. Meanwhile, Al Shabaab managed to engage the Kenyan army in a Twitter crossfire as the 
military displayed its bravado in its soon-to-be-botched armed response. A documentation (Simon et 
al., 2014, 3-8) of Westgate social media engagement demonstrates Al Shabaab’s successful 
inducement of frantic activity and a cacophony of mainstream and social media chatter among security 
agencies, emergency response teams, and every other relevant actor including the Kenyan public. 
Ultimately, Al Shabaab’s aim was to ridicule and showcase their capacity to disrupt the schedules of 
important people and shift global focus to Westgate (Mair, 2017, 33). 
 
8.4 The Impact of Terrorist Communication on the Public Construction of Radicalisation 
 
Far from being a pure socio-psychological scientific concept, radicalisation is also a political construct. 
Western national security agencies introduced the concept into the public domain in the face of the 
specific threat of political Islam (Schmid, 2013, 19). That said, terrorism has been found to increase 
generalised political ideological polarisation, conservatism and prejudice in various cultural contexts. 
Examples include Spain after the Madrid attacks; the U.S. after 9/11; and the impact on Israeli 
teenagers in the wake of recurrent terrorist attacks. Bearing this knowledge, terrorists provoke harsh 
government reprisals against their constituents in order to expand and retain their base (Louis, 2009, 
434-36). Additionally, the belief that Islam is an intolerant and violent religion has become more 
widespread, even in liberal circles (Murshed & Pavan, 2009, 7), as already discussed in chapter seven.  
 
The dominant discourse on ‘Islamic radicalisation’ has generated Muslim-focused government policies 
and had a significant polarising effect. First, the selective and inconsistent application of the concept 
of radicalisation has constructed Muslims as a suspicious community, provoked the resentment of 
Muslims and suppressed and transplanted the circulation of radical views. In the U.K., the Prevent 
counter-terrorism strategy’s identification of predominantly Muslim individuals on the brink of 
radicalisation requiring corrective measures has been impugned. The selective focus on strengthening 
social cohesion within Muslim communities while neglecting other communities has further promoted 
fragmentation. The admissibility of radical multimedia content and social media records as adducible 
evidence of the encouragement and glorification of terrorism has further stimulated public discourse 
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and Muslim discontent. Police surveillance over suspicions of criminal intent that opens radicalisation 
to vague interpretations has been criticised for its criminalisation of non-violent views and its heavy 
focus on children that poses the risk of victimisation (Kundnani, 2015, 26-35). 
 
The disproportionate focus on Muslims has correspondingly shifted focus away from extreme-right 
violence in Europe, even though its lethality compares to that of Islamists’ in some cases. Muslim 
violence has been interpreted within the broader religio-cultural framework as emblematic of the clash 
of values and identity. In contrast, similar acts from the extreme-right have been downplayed as lone-
wolf attacks, low-incident and as constituting minimal levels of threat. This was reflected, for example, 
in a 2011 Prevent counter-terrorism policy review in the U.K. This being the case, the English Defence 
League’s (EDL) incitement of retaliatory violence towards Muslims post-7/7 terrorist attack in Britain 
led to several incidents of racist, arson and bomb attacks in mosques (Kundnani, 2015, 28-30). 
 
Secondly, the securitisation of the debate on multi-culturalism has promoted interpretations of Muslim 
public life through a clash-of-identity lens. Alternative phrases to perpetrators of terrorism such as 
‘dissenter’ or ‘mentally unstable’ are applied to non-Muslim threats in other ideological margins, going 
by the thesis conception of ideology in chapter two. The legislation of radical opinion in Western 
society, in particular, has shrunk the space for communicating dissenting views and enforced political 
self-censorship. Dissenters are often diagnosed as extremists on a radicalisation pathway. The 
absence of a legitimate outlet for political grievances is therefore likely to further inflame (non)violent 
radicalisation. Public criticisms of multi-culturalism as generating Muslim failure to assimilate, and 
connotations of Muslim identity conflict in media coverage such as youth travel to Syria, has also 
portrayed Muslims as being at odds with Western values. This has imbued a deep sense of alienation 
among Muslims and threatens the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy agenda (Kundnani, 2015, 26-
35). Though fairly tendentious, Kundnani’s arguments are broadly reflective of the public’s 
engagement with Muslims and Islam, and the impact of Muslim experiences on radicalisation. The 
selective deradicalisation interventions that further reinforce stereotypes, as well as the suppression 
of Islamic expression in public life has transplanted spaces of expression from the public to private 
arena. Well intentioned interventions designed for the subjects of radicalisation that neglect other 
radicalising agents, such as a biased media, rambunctious politicians and a restive host community, 
are therefore likely to be either counter-productive or low-impact and engender intractability.  
 
In shifting focus to Kenya, public discourse on the 2013 Westgate Mall and the 2015 Garissa University 
terrorist attacks had a significant impact on security and migration. The government launched its initial 
response by terming Dadaab Refugee camp ‘a nursery for Al Shabaab’. What is more, the chairman 
of the Kenya Refugee Affairs Commission at the time claimed that the refugee camp had hosted the 
perpetrators and served as a weapon assembly plant. Other senior government officials threatened 
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cessation of refugee status and camp shut-down (Allison, 2015) over Dadaab’s status as a ‘breeding 
ground for terrorists’ (Gettleman, 2017).  
 
The Westgate and Garissa university attacks in particular attracted unprecedented response, shaped 
public opinion and attitudes and had the potential to spur radicalisation among refugees. Some 
research interviewees noted that the ensuing outcry over insecurity forced the government to take 
excessive reactionary measures to appease the public. Nina (Kenyan citizen, personal 
communication, February 16, 2017) for example, stated, ‘If an attack happens, people want to see 
action’. Besides the threats of camp closure, the government raided the camp and Somali 
neighbourhoods to flush out ‘suspected terrorists’. This in turn had a backlash effect as the victimised 
community mobilised on social media to challenge government response and floated counter-
measures. Further, inflammatory public opinion was reported to be influenced by journalistic ineptitude 
and poor research. These proximate factors underlie biased media reportage that in turn spawn 
resentment within the Somali community and reinforce stereotypes that could potentially radicalise 
refugees as John observes: 
 
The mainstream media has one problem. They always want to capture the big story forgetting that the big story 
might not be true or might be making things worse. …when such a story is covered in that manner, it triggers 
some emotions from the public, it sways public opinion and leads to stigmatisation of refugees. Very negative 
stereotypes. So, you find the public in Kenya hates refugees, hates Somalis. … When you put me in a 
bandwagon and condemn me, what am I supposed to do? (John – IGAD Security Expert, personal 
communication, February 6, 2017) 
 
Some respondents reported Al Shabaab’s infiltration of Dadaab refugee camp. Fettered access to 
some areas of the camp posed a challenge to policing and by extension the overall camp security. 
Others described their changes in perception towards refugees as influenced by the recent terrorist 
attacks, government conflation of refugees with terrorism, and their personal and professional 
interactions with refugees. Those who incriminated refugees for the attacks noted the negligibility of 
the refugee population involved and in part, faulted the culture of Somali clan protection that promotes 
secrecy and shelters offenders. The evidence further suggests that Al Shabaab attacks have modelled 
public perception and discourse. Moreover, they have propelled the pursuance of stringent measures 
of refugee containment as Nina, a Kenyan citizen points out: 
 
Generally, my perception is they (refugees) are ungrateful tenants in Kenya. We have hosted them although I 
know not all of them are bad and we are paying the price. …Of course, it (perception) changed. Before the 
attacks started, we did not have a problem with refugees and Dadaab. But when the attacks begun and the 
government started the process of repatriation, I encouraged them to close. ...In fact, if they could build a wall 
between Kenya and Somalia, I would support them. My perception definitely changed during the attacks… If 
you go to the Kenyan communities and ask the ordinary man in a kibanda (shop) what he thinks about refugees 
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he will tell you they need to go back to their homes. They will tell you, ‘Uganda can host them’’… (Nina – Kenyan 
citizen, personal communication, February 16, 2017) 
 
Such statements are suggestive of the effectiveness of terrorist communication that has oxygenated 
their campaigns and visibility, polarised the public and asphyxiated refugees who in the Kenyan case 
have borne the brunt of their attacks. In addition, Muslims have faced increased public pressure to 
condemn terrorist actions (Greenslade, 2015). In particular, the carefully choreographed Westgate 
attack (Ross, 2013) displayed Al Shabaab’s tactical adaptability. In beguiling the Muslim audience, 
they enacted public display of religiosity by taking turns to pray even as they sustained the massacre. 
Further, the Garissa attack (Lee, 2015) employed market segmentation by separating Muslims from 
non-Muslims and targeting the latter. This sequestration tactic was designed to cultivate loyalty and 
trust within their support base by highlighting the object of brutality. While this tactical chimera 
attempted to mask the impact of Al Shabaab attacks on Muslims in Somalia, it obviated the image of 
target indiscretion aimed to increase appeal among Islamic adherents. Nevertheless, this 
sequestration of victims was particularly noteworthy and generated social media chatter across the 
globe, evoked response from former Islamists (Nawaz, 2015) and Pope Francis (Pullella, 2015), and 
gained coverage on international Christian websites (see Lee, 2015). Al Shabaab’s unbridled 
adventurism in the predominantly Somali North Eastern province in Kenya that hosts Dadaab refugee 
camp portends long term territorial and relational schisms, considering the province was originally part 
of Greater Somalia. These clear public messages additionally aimed to stoke religious tensions, 
animated public discourse and resuscitated anti-Islam and Somali arguments as already discussed.  
 
The impact of the Al Shabaab attacks on the Kenyan government’s resolve to repatriate Somali 
refugees cannot be understated. To begin with, the government’s belligerence towards refugees 
particularised in-outgroup dynamics. The diffusion of radical views into the public domain indeed 
increased the precarity of refugee subsistence. Subsequent isolated foreign decisions also had a direct 
impact on refugees awaiting resettlement in Dadaab. A protection staffer reported that one woman 
attempted suicide when the Trump administration back-pedalled on the resettlement of about 200 
refugees from Dadaab. Having sold their entire material possessions, they were dispatched back to 
the camp to start from scratch. Some respondents further described the desperation and resentment 
resulting from the cumulative maligning discourse and policies as potentially radicalising. Terrorism 
communication therefore precipitates radicalisation when a manifold of factors and actors interact in a 
choreography that generates an overwhelming ripple effect beyond the lone refugee. 
 
8.5 An Evaluation of Stagecraft: Islamicalisation or Not? 
 
In a revealing book (2007), Husain, a former Islamist and second-generation British migrant, describes 
his motivations for joining ‘radical Islam’, his role in Hizb ut-Tahrir, what he witnessed and reasons for 
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disengagement. He acknowledges the political agenda behind Islamism and deplores the movement’s 
fixation on secrecy. He reports that Hizb members were often inspired by discussions on the 
establishment of the caliphate but neither the mechanism nor the time was relayed (pp. 164, 167). 
Husain subsequently contends that the ‘tolerance of intolerance’ by the West has bolstered Islamism. 
He provides the example of the British government subsidy for the expansion of the infamous East 
London mosque and its official launch by Prince Charles (pp. 275-80). Multiculturalism, he continues, 
has created mono-cultural outposts (p. 282) typified by mushrooming migrant enclaves that this thesis 
conceives as ‘camps’. In advancing the idea of the transplantation of spaces of expression from public 
to private arena as discussed in the previous chapter, his account of his struggles with internal self-
conflict upon leaving the movement presents a mosaic of self-censorship.  
 
Husain recounts his struggles with nonviolent radicalisation and the self-doubt associated with 
personal conflict. The conflict is indicative of cognitive dissonance that results in shifts in public-private 
representations and rooted in impression management. He suggests that at some point, he had shed 
the movement’s doctrines but also learned that thoughts were not always linked to action (p. 164). He 
also confirms the research respondents’ views on Islamic scholars’ public representation that is 
suggestive of the suppression of divergent opinions to deflect public retribution: 
 
They (Islamic scholars) don’t attend interviews because they fear. If I’m going for an interview, I will have a 
different perspective. The problem is that the government wants you to say what they want. So, if you say 
something different you will be targeted. (Islamic Scholar, personal communication, March 15, 2017). 
 
In posing a dilemma to deradicalisation efforts, Husain submits that he had left the movement but 
questions whether the movement had left him. He remembers a phrase that his mentor frequently 
emphasised on the lifelong espousal of the movement’s dogmas, ‘You will carry the concepts forever’ 
(p. 169). As discussed, this poses challenges to deradicalisation programmes, for example, when 
micro interventions neglect broader structural drivers of radicalisation, potentially leading to 
disengagement without deradicalisation, recidivism and ultimately the preservation of an invisible 
constituency sympathetic to Islamism. Husain further recollects that although he had disengaged from 
the movement, he still entertained the criticism of other religions in Muslim gatherings. He describes 
the guilty conscience that accompanies his actions when he believes he should have vocalised his 
reservations, particularly in light of his theological erudition (p. 171). He captures the dynamic of the 
bandwagon effect, also common in mainstream political movements, as already discussed when he 
admits: 
 
Instead, I was now leading a different kind of double life. In private I was a free thinker. Among Islamists I was 
a ‘brother’. I was not to dispute our unquestioned perceptions: hatred of Jews, Hindus, Americans, gays, the 
subordination of women. I still had two faces, two personalities. Outside the classroom I switched off my critical 
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faculties and accepted the religious and political assumptions that were dominant in the events I attended (p. 
171) ...I led this double life between mild Islamism and free thinking, switching off my brain at Islamist 
gatherings…believing that somehow, someday, we would Islamize Britain… (Husain, 2007, 175) 
 
At one point in his spiritual journey, even though Husain was strongly drawn to the teachings of Imam 
Hanson, considered a ‘moderate’, his past ties with Islamist movements prevented the acceptance of 
Hanson’s teachings. As an outsider to Islamism, the Imam evoked suspicion as Husain questioned 
the ‘rightness’ of his teachings (pp. 175, 259). Thus, besides a hooded society, the orientations in 
different aspects of public life premised on exceptional claims to rightness has bred a ‘rightist’ society 
embedded in spiritual correctness.  
 
Besides the self-doubt associated with personal conflict, some Islamist movements also experience 
periods of identity crisis punctuated with ideological realignments, infighting and splits. Such 
factionalism notwithstanding, the movements maintain a common vision of global political dominance 
that advocates among other mechanisms, perpetual confrontation, indiscriminate jihadism, a rejection 
of the West, government and business infiltration and the ousting of governments (Husain, 2007, 159, 
172-73, 176). Other shortcomings in Islamist organisations that have been exposed include Muslim 
exceptionalism and the application of double standards in holding the Muslim ummah to higher 
standards that these movements contravene (pp.133, 142, 147). While numerous Hizb members for 
example did not know how to pray, others with a cursory knowledge of the Quran exhibited ‘pretentious 
counterfeit intellectualism’ (pp.146-147). For the most part, Islamism has resulted in the fundamental 
misconstruction and debauchery of the Islamic faith.   
 
Roy (2017), a professor of secularisation and Islam, similarly examines the immersion of the new wave 
of radicals into youth culture. He describes them as typically second-generation migrants and Islamic 
converts with rudimentary religious knowledge, at least prior to being smothered with religious ideology 
as demonstrated by Hizb ut-Tahrir. They engage in substance use and petty crime, pick up women, 
dress in streetwear, listen to rap music, are gaming enthusiasts, frequent night clubs and watch violent 
American movies. In re-examining religious radicalisation, Roy observes that these radicals tend not 
to be initially radicalised by religious movements. If they are, they are likely to have been radicalised 
outside the framework of Salafi mosques, belatedly and fairly suddenly.  He further contests the 
assertion that religious radicalisation precedes political radicalisation and acknowledges the 
complexity of the dynamics involved. The scriptural exegesis disseminated by Islamist movements 
therefore does not cause radicalisation but provides theological rationalisations for action (see also 
Armstrong, 2014; Kundnani, 2015, 7). While this thesis largely endorses Roy’s views, it disputes his 
assertion that young radicals’ identification with truth is supported by smattering clerical utterances. 
On the contrary, their internalisation of the prevailing public discourse, coupled with their convictions 
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in misguided religious precepts alongside other contextual factors are significant influences. Roy 
however compellingly concludes that in bolstering the strategic psychological impact of attacks, 
Islamists play on society’s principal fears, which is the fear of Islam.  
 
On his part, Kundnani (2015, 7-11) questions the dominant body of literature that has conceived 
radicalisation as largely driven by radical religious ideology. He argues that journalists and various 
experts have firmly placed radicalisation on the media agenda (p.8) and by extension the public 
theatre. The dominant interpretation of the espousal of certain forms of religious ideology as indicative 
of early warning signs of radicalisation has underpinned policy-making processes. Similarly, the 
abandonment of intellectual analytical tools for political violence in the face of ‘new terrorism’ (pp. 15, 
26) has led to flawed policies. Linked to this are various governments’ claims of radicalisation as 
symptomatic of lack of allegiance to Western values yet some Westerners also hold anti-democratic 
and illiberal views. As a result, qualifications for citizenship currently demand the declaration of oaths 
and a pass in values as well as language tests for immigrants. He maintains that the causes of 
radicalisation are far more complex and calls for the re-examination of the dominant analytic models. 
Post-9/11 radicalisation literature has particularly neglected pre-9/11 terrorism explanations on 
decision making and strategy and the role of broader political and social contexts.  
 
In referencing Mark Sedgwick (2010, 481), Kundnani (p. 14) argues that the emphasis on individual 
and to some extent ideological and organisational dynamics de-emphasise the root causes that 
became downplayed post-9/11. The currency of such an analytical model therefore bolsters the 
characterisation of the Islamist as a ‘rebel without a cause’. In fact, Bartlett et al.’s (2010, 13) study 
among violent and non-violent radicals found that some strands of extremist ideology within Islamism 
are subsidiary and do not constitute sufficient grounds for the engagement in violence. Similarly, Roy 
(2008, 3) contends that the dominant narratives on radicalisation blur the difference between radical 
religious ideas and the propensity to violence, which is why this thesis consistently references 
(non)violent radicalisation and maintains that extremist beliefs do not necessarily culminate into 
violence. Roy continues by de-emphasising the role of religion in radicalisation. He conceives the ‘leap 
into terrorism’, in the same way this thesis has shown, as sharing similarities with other forms of 
rebellion such as the Ultra-Left and the Columbine syndrome in random school shootings. Kundnani 
(p. 23) concludes that Islamists articulate their narrative through Salafi ideology but religion per se is 
not constitutive of a single causal factor of radicalisation. Rather, ‘theological references provide a 
veneer of legitimacy’ (p. 23) and solidify group cohesion while ‘politics provides the impetus’ (p. 25). 
 
The above arguments suggest that when radicalisation is cited, ‘Islamicalisation’ is implied. Research 
respondents similarly observed and described this linkage as emanating from the reductivist and 
spectacularist construction of the Islamic narrative in radicalisation that continues to dominate and 
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inform public discourse. Yet in interrogating this restrictive frame of radicalisation, an existing body of 
literature reveals other forms of radicalisation for example, on right and left-wing terrorism and eco-
terrorism (see Laquer, 2000) that is instructive of the radicalisation experience in other groups. That 
said, the conceptual and applied minimalism in radicalisation persists in public discourse, as expressed 
by Hassan below, in as much as its application in academia may be more expansive: 
 
Israel is one of the biggest terrorist organisations demolishing Palestinian houses and doing other things. So, 
state acts sometimes are not seen as terrorism yet they are. Russia is killing people, U.S. drones have killed 
civilians and there has also been extra-judicial killings in Kenya. If you look at Rwanda, I painted a positive 
picture in the beginning but on the negative, everybody is mentally radicalised. The Hutu-Tutsi indoctrination (in 
Rwanda genocide) is a good example. (Farah – INGO Programme Manager, personal communication, February 
23, 2017) 
 
Amina further argues that when people are uprooted from their homes, they experience significant 
material and mental loss. Camps particularly become fertile drafting grounds when recruiters promise 
the recovery of material loss in God’s name. She highlights examples of camps that have harboured 
radicalised refugees that also reflect the political and economic dimensions of radicalisation. 
Considering the consistency of these views among majority of interviewees, it can be postulated that 
individuals may be drawn to certain aspects of Islamist messaging that resonates with and ameliorates 
their individual circumstances, even though they may be influenced by and act within a group or 
broader ideological framework. While Islamist narratives interweave religious and other content, an 
individual in economic privation may be attracted to the economic aspect of a message while another 
with low self-worth may be attracted to the sense of purpose that jihadism presents without necessarily 
embracing the entirety of the belief system or narrative. Whether a matter of selective response or 
meaning making, religious messages may appeal to and impact political, economic, social and 
environmental lifestyles: 
 
You should also look at Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps if you are interested in examining radicalisation 
further. You will find arms and bombs and all sorts of things in these camps. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Goma 
there are no religious aspects there. There is also the LRA in Uganda which is political… Burundian camps in 
Rwanda. (Amina – UNHCR Protection Officer, personal communication, February 18, 2017) 
 
The ongoing debate on ‘new terrorism’ versus ‘old terrorism’ offers further insights on the role of 
religion in radicalisation. The proponents of new terrorism (Hoffman, 1989; Laquer, 2000; Rapoport, 
2004; Neumann, 2009) among other contentions, posit that contemporary terrorism is more religiously 
than politically motivated. These assertions are advanced by the four-wave theory of evolution of 
terrorism: from anarchic, to anti-colonial, to extreme left-wing, to religious. The opponents of new 
terrorism (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Abrahms, 2006) maintain that the primary objectives of extremist 
organisations are less religiously oriented and premised on politics, territory and the consolidation of 
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power. A study by Jones and Libicki (2008) found that the biggest contributor to the decline of terrorist 
organisations was change in the political environment involving regime, policy or territorial 
reconstruction. Interestingly, some recent empirical studies (Mair, 2017; Bowie & Schmid, 2013) have 
examined the communication content of terrorist organisations and found no significant difference in 
the numbers between political and religious messages. In both cases, religious communication did not 
outnumber political content. That said, certain contextual nuances may modulate the expression of 
religion in radicalisation, in which case religion remains firmly relevant.  
 
While this thesis has applied a political violence lens and partly supports Kundnani’s views on Islamic 
reductionism, it does not entirely reject the role of religion in radicalisation. It recognises the existence 
and convictions of radical Islamist ‘authorities’ who shepherd open and underground movements, and 
their role in proselytisation. The hypnotic influence they have on their followers has fostered the 
instrumentality of religion for political ends. The role of religion is therefore incidental. At the same 
time, the Islamic orientation of the radicalisation concept continues to be (re)constructed in the arena 
of public stagecraft, as this chapter has shown. It is within this context that Donnatella della Porta 
(2009, 9) conceives radicalisation as ‘relational’, ‘constructed’ and ‘dynamic’. Apart from the beliefs 
and actions of opposition groups, radicalisation also involves the governments with which they conflict. 
Violence is therefore not the outcome of one side’s ideology but of the interaction of the constructed 
perceptions of the actions of the opposition groups and the state. However, this thesis has extended 
the network of actors to include those in chapter seven conceived as the agents of radicalisation in 
speech-act. It is also perhaps within this framework that Kundnani (2015, 24) and (Schmid, 2013, 4, 
37-39) argue that the struggle between the state and opposition groups has legitimised violence and 
also caused the radicalisation of both state and public opinion. The constructed argument on 
radicalisation proposes the inclusion of macro factors in analytical models and the examination of 
divergent perceptions of these conditions by various actors. This will facilitate the creation of cultural 
and symbolic political opportunities, as discussed in the current and previous chapter. With regard to 
the dynamic nature of radicalisation, the analysis of macro conditions and their impact on radicalisation 
is as important as the impact of radicalisation on the environment (della Porta, 2009, 9) as both 




This chapter, has demonstrated the agency of religion in radicalisation beyond the singular role of 
terrorist organisations, symphonious with other actors discussed in chapter seven. The application of 
radicalisation and terrorism terminology within the framework of political violence has imparted a 
conceptual burden. Usage inconsistencies, selective applications and associated connotations in 
academic and broader public discourse have delineated both restrictive and indeterminate conceptual 
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boundaries. Contemporary representation of the Islamic faith in public discourse suggests that 
although religion is salient in radicalisation, its portrayal has been fairly reductivist and contrived 
particularly when the interplay with other factors is considered. More importantly, its factorisation draws 
attention to among other constitutive aspects, the underlying rationalisation (the why) and the 
mechanics deployed (the how) in its (mis)representation. The enabling actors as also discussed in 
chapter seven have become incognisant agents of radicalisation through the reconstruction of reality 
in which perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and actions are moulded within different societal strata. While 
Islamists form part of the cogs in this complex interplay, they also capitalise on the histrionics of 










































Chapter 9 – Conclusion: Opportunity for Learning and Adapting to an Evolving Context  
 
Protracted encampment as a measure of securitisation, among other techniques that have been 
discussed, creates a zone of social, political and economic exclusion. The emerging humanitarian gap 
in turn kindles liminal existence, as is the case in Dadaab. While the camp strips freedoms, it similarly 
creates an environment permissive to adverse freedoms. The convergence of opposing forms of 
agency in a highly securitised camp environment represents a protection conundrum that attracts 
various forms of coping. This environment provokes tension between the boundaries of resilience and 
vulnerability. While the majority of refugees adapt with difficulty, some remain vulnerable to 
radicalisation, particularly in contexts in which polarisation and political violence is prevalent. It is not 
so much that humanitarianism has evolved to securitarianism but the fact that prevailing global 
developments have accentuated securitarianism, already ingrained in the institutions of protection. 
This dynamic highlights the challenges, dilemmas and contradictions within refugee protection in which 
securitisation and humanitarianism inevitably coexist. It is an environment that must be reasonably 
negotiated to ensure the protection of refugees.  
 
Undoubtedly, the camp is no place for a human being. Protracted encampment is a blatant 
contravention of the existing instruments of protection and as such constitutes a gross violation of 
rights. Subjecting human beings to a protracted state of limbo under deplorable conditions while 
palliative in the short term, is fundamentally flawed and inevitably counterproductive. The thesis has 
discussed numerous themes emerging from the theology of encampment and the implications for 
refugees and the broader migration milieu. This section synthesises and further develops the dominant 
themes with the aim of informing future research and policy. The main thrusts include a methodological 
review of poststructuralism; vulnerabilities to radicalisation in a liminal and securitised migrant context; 
media, technology and power; identity and belonging; and the construction of power and security in 
the context of migration. 
 
9.1 To Like or Unlike Poststructuralism?   
 
As discussed in the methodology section in chapter two, poststructuralism is important in as far as it 
provides a framework to analyse and understand the security construct within the broad architecture 
of language and signification. The discursive frames of ‘post-truth politics’ and implications on security 
is also another important dimension of the utility of poststructuralist thought in the prevailing global 
context. Post-truth denotes ‘circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public 
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ (Oxford, 2016). Accordingly, the subjectivity of 
facts and reality is an important element underpinning the poststructuralist framework. Further, 
poststructuralism provides the basis for the analysis of how abstractions, representations and 
interpretations of unverified ideas and theories become legitimised and ultimately factualised. By 
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examining the construction, representation and normalisation of reality, poststructuralism exposes the 
unequal power relations that further reinforce unequal power relations. The goal of poststructuralism 
is not the creation of problems or the rejection of facts but the identification of issues that pervade 
social structures. Poststructuralism therefore informs the examination of representations and their 
influence in the production of knowledge, identities, power and ensuing actions. President Trump for 
example is significantly constructivist therefore, the import of poststructuralism in this context would 
be the deconstruction of ‘alternative facts’ and transformation of society (Crilley and Chatterje-Doody, 
2018, 1-2). In the prevailing context, poststructuralism provides an important framework to decipher 
the construction of ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’, conspiracy theories and poor fact-checking for 
example, the ‘Momo Challenge’ (see BBC, 2019). Not to mention reconstructed realities, for example, 
Trump’s unsubstantiated claims about the Mexican migrant caravan carrying ‘unknown Middle 
Easterners’ advancing towards the U.S. 
 
Despite its progressivist contributions, the philosophical tenets of poststructuralism have also enabled 
the political Right, for example, in the context of ‘post-truth’ politics as discussed. The epistemic cultural 
relativism of poststructuralism has been the subject of numerous scholarly disputations. Therefore, the 
thesis revisits and reinforces its initial arguments on the shortcomings of relativism in culturally 
dominant ideas that include morality, reality and science. In some cases, the subjectivity of truth and 
plurality of meaning have blurred the boundaries between reality and illusion. The ensuing social 
reordering has precipitated disillusioned sub-cultures that continue to challenge existing 
metanarratives. Conspiracy and counter-theories have permeated the mainstream and are validated 
through popular consensus for example in online communities. Occasionally, the dramatisation of 
issues diminishes their complexity and leads not only to (mis)representations but also (re)constructions 
as has been demonstrated on radicalisation in migrant contexts. Poststructuralism has disrupted 
conventional norms and increasingly so in the context of technology. Technology will continue to 
dominate every aspect of society in the coming years therefore, the current gap between STEM, 
humanities and the social sciences needs to be addressed. The arising fundamental question for future 
research therefore is, ‘how will society reorganise and respond to the dynamic, innovative sources of 
technological disruption to human lives?’. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of some poststructuralist conceptions, certain elements of the framework 
have been useful to this study in highlighting the issue of representation and how dominant framings 
(re)produce power relations. Beyond this, poststructuralism has also demonstrated the dynamics of 
intersubjective identity construction in the context of threat representation that in turn legitimates action 
and stimulates further discourse. The remodelling of perceptions, attitudes and behaviour is an 
important motif that underscores the primacy of history. Over time, speech and act become reinforcing 
205 
 
feedback loops that construct and reinforce dominant narratives. A good example is the common 
representation of piracy in Somalia that neglects its root causes and evolution. The history of Somalia 
similarly highlights latent factors that evolve over time, including the interaction between structural 
drivers and triggers that are ostensibly benign. Correspondingly, poststructuralism has disambiguated 
the furtive constructions and representations of obscured historical, ideological and identitarian 
artefacts that underpin societal structures. The systemic securitisation of refugee protection regimes 
that inadvertently spawn liminality is a good example. Moreover, security laws apply broad language 
to criminalise radicalisation and pose challenges for fair and just application of the law. This research 
has not only demonstrated the cultural constructions of knowledge but has grounded its own 
constructions in the real and lived experiences of refugees. In that regard, it interrogates the notion of 
infinite relative truths and the plurality of meaning. The utility of some philosophical underpinnings of 
poststructuralism cannot be emphasised enough, and so is the value of science.  
 
9.2   Vulnerabilities to Radicalisation: Liminality and Securitisation in the Context of Migration 
 
This research has traced the migration trajectory of refugees in three phases, encapsulating the 
homeland, second and third countries of resettlement. The findings demonstrate that while existing 
scholarship on liminality typically designates three liminal phases (pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal), 
liminality in the forced migration context tends to begin in the homeland upon eruption of conflict or 
crisis (see also Van Gennep, 1960, 21). The examination of the Somali PRS shows that the pre-mid-
post liminal phases represent a progression of interlinkages and overlaps, and the stages are not 
discrete as such. This is essentially a testament to the inter-connectedness of the present, past and 
even prospective refugee lived experiences in time and space. It is also what informs the memory of 
conflict and intergenerational narratives and trauma. The liminal state seems to peak in the mid 
(transitional-camp) phase before either waning or gaining momentum post-liminality, if at all. The 
patterns of fluctuations in liminality as refugees shift from one context to the next suggests non-linearity 
while experiences are significantly subjective. In addition, social isolation in the first expression of 
encampment may have an impact on mental and physiological health similar to trauma arising from 
exposure to conflict in the homeland. It can therefore be deduced that the onset of liminality is also the 
onset of suppressed freedoms. It is within this backdrop that the study has also explored the 
intersections of freedom and radicalisation within the humanitarian context. 
 
The international refugee protection regime has served and positively impacted millions of lives. While 
the regime continues to work for the greater good, the internal contradictions, challenges and 
dilemmas that confront it has occasionally bred spaces inimical to freedoms. Encampment as a form 
of securitisation, including other discursive and structural aspects of securitisation related to 
encampment have been examined. The concepts of globalisation, statehood and belonging have 
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provided the bedrock to explore the extent to which the international instruments of protection have 
been responsive to the refugee problem. These instruments are inherently securitising and as such 
inflame liminality. While responsive to security threats in a migrant context, they mask undercurrents 
of what Gaventa (2006, 29) terms as ‘invisible power’. Lukes’ (2005, 84-6) conception of hidden power 
as the least visible form of power is similarly apt. In the migrant context, hidden power subsumes the 
dimensions of both domination and beneficent power.  
 
The 2018 Global Compact for Migration, for example, is aimed at safe, orderly and regular migration. 
The power to enforce the goal to stem the tide of migration to the West lies in the invisible, unwritten 
print in the text of the compact. Further, the fact that this instrument is humanitarian, voluntary and 
non-binding accords it both beneficent and dominant powers. Meanwhile, those subject to the invisible 
text attempt to resist this domination by literally surfing the wave of migration despite the risks and 
institutional barriers. The concerns around security are valid while the dilemmas arising from balancing 
the humanitarian imperative and security against a backdrop of rising populism persist. The 
stabilisation of refugee-producing countries and particularly, the strengthening of domestic 
accountability mechanisms should be key priorities. Significantly, sustainable change comes from 
within. Any external forms of support should complement pre-existing internal efforts for change. 
 
The application of the liminal triad (temporal, spatial and human dimensions) has been instructive in 
the deconstruction and reconceptualisation of liminality based on refugees’ lived experience. The 
deplorable conditions at Dadaab and refugee detention facilities have exposed the self-contradicting 
character of the camp as an instrument of freedom and bondage. These conditions further convey the 
paradox of turbulent homelands and unstable places of refuge, the inevitable intensification of liminality 
and the institutionalisation of securitisation in the protection system. The link between these liminal 
spaces and migrant enclaves in the West demonstrates the interconnectedness of liminality, security 
and securitisation as refugees migrate and manoeuvre between spaces. The assessment of 
humanitarianism in practice and the emerging contradictions besides strengthening these links, also 
reveals potential vulnerabilities to radicalisation. The paradox of turbulent homelands and unstable 
safe havens has been amplified by the 2019 terrorist attack on the New Zealand mosque that also 
claimed the lives of refugees. 
 
In the third manifestation of the camp in the West, the literal interpretation additionally constructs 
commonplace factions of allied and opposing actors. Relationships are informed by patterns of 
cooperation and hostilities between hosts and refugees with smattering knowledge of each other. At 
this point, it is important to revisit Nina’s (interviewee) reflections on how her interactions with Muslims 
eventually transformed her mindset that had created its own reality: ‘Our brains absorb a lot so the 
more I feed (information) the more I believe and create a reality.’ As discussed, technology has shaped 
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relationships through traditional and social media with limited currency on physical or direct interaction. 
These simulated relationships ingrain superficial mentalities or campmentalities based on real and 
media-constructed experiences. Some marginalised populations in the West similarly experience 
liminal campian conditions that animates the dialectic between migrant enclaves and the host camps. 
The boundaries between both camps are fluid, intersectional with intermittent forms of physical and 
virtual interaction on traditional and social media. Both camps are punctuated with better integrated 
and marginalised communities. The study has also demonstrated the patterns of interaction between 
refugees and economically marginalised hosts. Some in both camps are dependent on social welfare 
programmes in a similar fashion to their counterparts in the South who rely on humanitarian aid. So 
how do refugees cope with this dynamic environment? 
 
The insufferable conditions that typify the liminal state more broadly portray liminality as the violation 
of freedoms, which arouse coping impulses. The limits on freedoms creates an environment for other 
unorthodox forms of freedom to emerge, that may include radicalisation. Comparisons of conceptions 
of freedom between the encampment and decampment phases highlight the relativity of freedom, that 
casts freedom as illusive and elusive. Upon deconstruction and beyond the common depictions around 
political and religious orientations, radicalisation also appears as a form of coping mechanism. This is 
partly supported by the findings on messaging resonance.  Individuals are not necessarily drawn to 
the entirety of a belief system, narrative or message. In some cases, they are attracted to aspects of 
messaging that resonate with and ameliorate their individual circumstances. But organisational 
structures do not permit piecemeal commitment. Therefore, joining an organisation may give the 
impression of full conversion when that is not the case. The youth who left Dadaab Refugee Complex 
to join Al Shabaab, which is an Islamist organisation were largely motivated by economic reasons. The 
study also shows that in some cases, the Far-right’s endorsement of economic arguments does not 
constitute full commitment to extremist ideology. However, the prevailing conditions bridge the 
ideological gap for some while others dispute economic links to the threat of migration. Not to mention 
the interplay with psychological factors (see Garcia, 2015). Islamist narratives, interwoven as they are 
with religious and other messages, therefore appeal to specific social, economic, political, 
psychological and environmental circumstances. The monolithism of conversion or ideological 
espousal, and by extension radicalisation should be further examined. This can be framed within the 
broader question of ‘What constitutes radicalisation?’. Additionally, the thesis calls for further empirical 
studies on the recent phenomenon of the migration of foreign fighters and their families to the so-called 
Islamic State. Their subsequent displacement to camps, and the ensuing policy and other related 
challenges posed to the host states and original homelands is an important area for future research, 




The memory of conflict and the transmission of inter-generational narratives and trauma constitutes 
an important finding. Prior exposure to war and trauma connects the past with the present and can 
influence posterity. The reproduction of conflict in migrant neighbourhoods in part represents the 
contagion of trauma and liminality. Inter-generational memorialisation of grievances and exposure to 
injustices through the media enhances inter-contextuality and shapes world views. Digital technology 
has indeed facilitated the exposure of individuals to historical narratives and global political 
developments. Certain stressors emanating from discrimination strengthen solidarity with in-groups in 
remote locations perceived to be at risk. Therefore, piecemeal interventions that address structural 
factors but neglect historical grievances, foreign policy injustices and polarising host community 
environments may achieve limited success. While effective in the short term, these efforts mask latent 
systemic conflict that over time becomes cyclical and intractable. Linked to another key finding on 
radicalisation as relational (della Porta, 2009), CVE interventions should target embedded and 
neglected structures and actors in order to build confidence within marginalised communities. An 
examination of vulnerabilities to radicalisation in the migrant context that neglects the host environment 
is problematic. The causes of radicalisation are dynamic, complex and demand adaptive analytic 
models. A strategic and holistic approach open to interventions targeted towards inter-generational 
social transformation is therefore invaluable.  
 
9.3 Media, Technology and Power 
 
There have been weak linkages between security, politics and technology, particularly the political 
component or the emerging field of technopolitics (see Kurban et al., 2017). Technology has emerged 
as one of the dominant themes, in part because it is an important vehicle through which language is 
transmitted and social interactions are mediated. More importantly, advances in technology will 
continue to revolutionise the world in coming years. It is therefore important to evaluate the 
intersections and component of security in technopolitics.  
 
The thesis has discussed the character and import of algorithms and demonstrated constructivism in 
the context of technology. Algorithms are inherently discursive and therefore an important aspect of 
language within some poststructuralist frameworks. Underlying language and the visible forms of 
online human interaction is the soft, invisible, sophisticated power of the algorithm that along with other 
contextual factors discussed, condition human affect, thinking and behaviour. Gaventa (2006, 29) 
describes invisible power as the most insidious form of power that configures ‘psychological and 
ideological boundaries of participation’. It is ‘the internalisation of powerlessness’ through dominant 
ideologies, values and behaviour. Invisible power in technology is therefore visibilised through 
behavioural patterns that may include engagement in constructive or confrontational online discourse 
and Internet addiction. At the same time, algorithms convey and execute actor goals and are therefore 
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virtual interlocutors in online-offline environments. Besides possessing relative power and significant 
value, algorithms are similarly deficient but are they also discerning?  
 
As algorithms enhance their capabilities, they can strengthen social cohesion and also empower the 
marginalised, who can be transformed into the ‘radical other’. They are not only predictive but also 
shape the future and have the potential for unintended effects. Mainstream media has for long attuned 
the masses to competing political ideologies and dominant narratives that have engendered conformity 
to prevailing political structures. Additionally, articulations and struggles over power have traditionally 
been displayed in the media. The media has constructed power relationships and determined power 
positions through representation as shown in this research. The manipulation of perceptions through 
representation has either maintained or transformed unequal power structures. Meanwhile, the 
interactive character of social media, buttressed by algorithms has promoted access to alternative 
sources of knowledge and information that continue to challenge the ‘truths’ in the mainstream. Social 
media has also nurtured counter-cultures as discussed later. 
 
There is a growing body of research on cyberwarfare between the big powers and cyberthreats from 
radical organisations. Increasingly, at the root of these conflicts is an emerging technopolitical conflict 
between government and the tech industry over social media misinformation and, threats to 
democracy and autocracy. The use of encrypted applications complicates government surveillance 
efforts of illegal activities by non-state actors. To illustrate, there have been reports of online 
radicalisation on encrypted applications such as Skype and Telegram that facilitated foreign fighter 
travels to Syria (see Burke, 2015; Erelle, 2015). What is also shaping up in the margins of mainstream 
technology is a borderless online state with its own subculture that poses a threat to the nation-state. 
As an example, the dark web, accessed through a downloadable software supports encrypted 
communication and is associated with licit and illicit activity (Viney, 2017). Finally, social media 
platforms host disillusioned communities that aim to ‘take back control’. Media users commune around 
popular subjects ranging from the deep state, Reptilian colonisation, the Aquarian Age, race and 
migration, flat earth theory, ‘Pizzagate’, climate engineering, ‘anti-vaxxer’, ‘the great replacement’ red-
pill antifeminism (manosphere), cryptocurrency, among others. At the same time, Facebook and 
Twitter continue to monitor and take down graphic images, videos, misleading messages and 
deactivate the accounts of radical figures and organisations disgruntled with the status quo. An 
important area of study would therefore be the examination of the role of technology in subcultural 
constructivism and the technological freedoms that support the articulation of grievances, likely to be 
repressed in the offline world.  
 
Nevertheless, an emerging question is how technology can be further harnessed for good since the 
problems it presents offers opportunities to interrogate and improve established systems that have 
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induced popular disaffection. The argument that social media is toxic, while attractive and valid to 
some extent, masks the structural problems underlying adversarial social media interactions, 
communicated via social media. Government regulation of social media would therefore represent 
reductivism in its suppression of root causes of problems that manifest through social media, which is 
why a holistic approach is important. Notwithstanding their shortcomings, the space for technology 
companies to manoeuvre is increasingly under threat. There are latent power struggles between 
governments and the tech industry that on the surface manifest as concerns over data privacy, antitrust 
violations and spread of misinformation. These struggles have subsumed the political ideological 
tensions between the Left and Right in the U.S. and threats to fair political competition exacerbated by 
technological setbacks. These struggles, besides constituting a shift in the balance of power, have 
also eclipsed attention from other neglected deep-seated causes of radicalisation.  
 
The tech industry is increasingly becoming an establishment inimical to the raison d’etre of the nation-
state. The study has highlighted the use of technology in the South-North migration. Additionally, some 
forms of technology have facilitated radicalisation and advanced securitisation by hosting forums on 
migration and providing platforms to organise protests against migrants who have been conflated with 
terrorists. Notably, artificial intelligence (AI) continues to solve problems that have plagued 
governments, related to security and service delivery. In some cases, government inefficiency has 
resulted in public discontent and as such, the intervention of AI may threaten state legitimacy. Twitter 
and Facebook were for example instrumental in galvanising the masses during the Arab Spring, 
popularly known as the ‘Facebook Revolution’. In some countries, these protests consolidated 
authoritarianism and oxygenated Islamist movements (Hempel, 2016). Consequently, governments 
may tighten the noose on technology in order to contain any disruptions to public order as technology 
continues to reconfigure the power calculus in the (inter)national order of things. The 2018 U.S. 
congressional hearings on Facebook and Google and stricter regulatory environment in Europe 
(Lapowsky, 2018a, 2018b) for example point to the securitisation of technology. A British parliamentary 
committee report (House of Commons, 2019) compared Facebook to ‘digital gangsters’ (p. 42) and 
stated: 
 
‘…the dominance of a handful of powerful tech companies has resulted in their behaving as if they were 
monopolies in their specific area… (independent regulator) should also have access to tech companies' security 
mechanisms and algorithms, to ensure they are operating responsibly... Only governments and the law are 
powerful enough to contain them.’ 
 
Regulation stifles innovation yet at the same time, responsible conduct in research and innovation is 
crucial. It is therefore important to assess and mitigate the risks around technological innovations that 
may inadvertently threaten human existentiality, the very precept it works to preserve. This means 
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exercising foresight in the assessment of the impact of technology on current and future generations 
while maintaining an enabling environment for innovation. The popularity and overreach of some social 
media platforms and the diversity of actors they accommodate thrive on incentives and theatrics that 
feed addiction. In as much as social media platforms may inevitably be subjected to stricter regulation, 
terrorist organisations will roam alternative platforms. Radical algorithms constitute just one among 
other drivers of radicalisation in the context of migration that have been examined. The thesis therefore 
reinforces its initial argument that counter-radicalisation efforts will remain void as long as broader 
contextual factors and actors in other sub-systems that drive radicalisation pervade. Ironically, this 
includes the polarising actions of the policing political class. A multi-pronged approach that tackles 
issues at both refugee and host community levels is recommended.   
 
9.4 Identity and Belonging  
 
Issues of identity and belonging are inextricably intertwined with other drivers of radicalisation. The 
relativity of the identity construct enables the modelling of perceptions and attitudes and the 
delimitation of ‘us-them’ boundaries. Secondly, the malleability of identity signifies the instrumentality 
of identity construction and representation. Fluid and shifting identities in part respond to evolving 
contexts that magnify aspects of identity to address security threats, gain political mileage, seek 
retribution, reclaim values, among other goals. The study has demonstrated aspects of overlapping, 
masked, situational, and other forms of identity. Underlying racial identity struggles in the context of 
migration are real and perceived fears that also threaten economic identity. Further, it can be argued 
that the vilification of the Muslim and coloured identity on the account of the transgressions of a minority 
instructed the identification with and travel of youth to countries like Syria and Somalia. Situational 
identities motivated by impression management such as those of Husain (former Islamist) and the 
silent Left can be partly attributed to the diminishing space for open and genuine engagement. People 
will therefore seek refuge in contrived identities that conform to group consensus in public and are 
reconciled in private.  
 
Besides consumption or identification with a cause, individuals also gain utility from their own 
behaviour that conforms with their sense of identity and compatible group behaviour. Essentially, as 
individuals identify with a group, they (un)consciously enact and conform to its social norms that they 
have internalised through self-stereotyping. A diminished social status may motivate an individual to 
relinquish their primary identity for a more acceptable identity. Though insincere, these actions are 
premised on strategic considerations. Shared grievances transform into collective grievances 
prompting the individual to act upon collective grievances. As collective identity increases proclivity to 
radicalisation, religion may become a strategic instrument for certainty and self enhancement. Group 
discrimination increases in-group identification and detachment from the majority group. Ultimately, 
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passive individuals not only identify with a cause but also find significance in its active furtherance 
(Murshed and Pavan, 2009, 11-15; Louis, 2009, 437). It is for these reasons that religious extremist 
organisations exploit cultural identities to magnify the dichotomy between the religious core and victims 
of attacks who are not co-disciples thus regarded as ‘other’ (Klein, 2016, 870).  
 
Individuals do not often respond to the immediate experience of their environment but to the symbolic 
interpretation of their situation. Thus, in interpreting their situation, people assign and similarly 
interchange meaning to their environmental symbols (Arena and Arrigo, 2005, 491). The interpretation 
of a situation is not a passive process but entails some degree of self-activity that accepts and rejects 
these interpretations. Ultimately, an individual’s life history and evolving personality is premised on the 
cumulative synthesis of ongoing interpretations. At the same time, the sense of collective victimisation 
is not only shared but reinforced within the group and transmitted inter-generationally (Flaherty, 2003, 
50). This yet again underlines the significance of conflict memory and the transmission of 
intergenerational narratives and trauma. This being the case, constraining contextual conditions 
constitute fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideologies (Flaherty, 2003, 56). As discussed in 
chapter seven, white supremacists for example express their loss of freedom as resulting from 
discrimination, loss of rights, economic disempowerment and the inability to celebrate their racial 
heritage. 
 
The actors examined in the discursive and performative formulations of the securitisation of migration 
can be conceived as forms of identity. It has been argued that radicalisation is relational therefore the 
relationships between these identities should be evaluated within the broader context of socialisation. 
Socialisation and role-taking as components of identity formation describe the interpretation of symbols 
and situations and the roles individuals play. Socialisation per se is the process by which individuals 
create the social self and strengthen attachments through interactions in social systems. The agents 
of socialisation ranging from peers to clerics inspire the adoption of the worldview of the ‘other’ and 
may include institutionalised indoctrination as a process of meaning making in the context of role-
taking. The multiplicity of identities in an individual engenders salience and increased commitment. 
Therefore, in certain situations, an identity is more likely to be dominant and become activated due to 
its salience over others. The internal self similarly models society through behaviour (Arena & Arrigo, 
2005, 495-96; Al Raffie, 2013, 77). At the same time, the process of self-categorisation enables 
individuals’ reinforcement of social identity through the accentuation of intragroup similarities and 
intergroup differences. The pronounced group boundaries and meaning systems establish behavioural 
codes that become the model for individual identity and behaviour. This process of ‘depersonalisation’ 
necessitates the adoption of a collective identity that overrides personal identity (Al Raffie,2013, 77). 
Perceptions of threat create a victim mentality that symbolises harm and innocence and also justifies 
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a sympathetic response that may involve violence. Subsequently, an individual’s attempt to ‘secure 
justice, equality, and self-determination—is the point at which the act of terrorism is committed, 
embraced, and endorsed’. Radicalisation as relational is therefore a biproduct of marginalisation, 
domination and victimisation (Arena and Arrigo, 2005, 496, 501; Fishman, 2010, 19). 
 
9.5 The Construction of Power and Security in the Context of Migration  
 
The concept of power in poststructuralist thought was briefly introduced in chapter two. This section 
synthesises the thesis main findings on power and further develops the theme to guide future research. 
The concept of power is central to the understanding of societal structures and relations. Foucault 
(1980, 95) submits that ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ that inspires transformation. This 
study has indeed validated the view of power as observable and latent in its examination of the 
humanitarian paradox. While Foucault’s representation of power and resistance bears some validity, 
power relations should similarly be understood in the context of conformity to prevailing norms as the 
research has demonstrated, and as Lukes (2005, 100-105) postulates. Social norms are therefore 
both liberating and constraining. Interestingly, the subjects of domination are tactical and strategic 
actors who disguise the veil of rebelliousness to survive (Scott, 1990, x, 20). Repressed grievances 
on power relations are articulated in private settings while hiding behind anonymity and the harmless 
perceptions of demeanour. Dominant ideology therefore misrepresents these dynamics of social 
relations that may jeopardise elite interests. Subjects typically avoid open displays of non-compliance 
while maintaining an interest in resistance. This dialectic is mediated by the pursuit of forms of 
resistance that shun open confrontation and in part explains coercion as producing conformity (pp. xi-
xiii, 72-86).  
 
Another form of adaptation is contentment with the status quo as a way to reduce cognitive dissonance. 
Adaptive preferences are shaped not by the intentional pursuit of aspirations (Elster, 1983, 116-17) 
but by the lack of alternatives. Adaptation includes the deliberate exclusion of possible choices (Lukes, 
2005, 135), character planning among other strategies that result from ‘habituation and resignation’ 
(Elster, 1983, 113). This has also been termed as ‘socialisation’, ‘internalisation’, ‘incorporation’ 
(Lukes, 2005, 141), social engineering, conditioning and indoctrination and is an important dynamic in 
the discursive construction of radicalisation. Therefore, power may be at work in influencing beliefs 
and aspirations that induce compliance when allies are made out of the exploited (Lukes, 2005, 136-
7). The more effective form of power is one that originates from unconscious processes without ‘any 
conscious intention of distinction or explicit pursuit of difference’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 479, 246, 255), 
which may be pre-discursive – physiological/bodily (Lukes, 2005, 142). For example, holders of 
educational credentials impose scale of values that favour their products. They monopolise institutions 




The dominant framings and narratives on migration and security (re)produce power relations. The 
‘internalisation of powerlessness’ configures ‘psychological and ideological boundaries of participation’ 
and makes invisible power the most insidious form of power (Gaventa, 2006). In addition, the relativity 
of identity facilitates the reconstruction of perceptions and reality around notions of security. In the 
context of migration and violent radicalisation, identities may transform to respond to evolving security 
threats and legitimise extraordinary interventions. The skilful manipulation of language reconstructs 
migrants as threats and models the public’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. As the migrant 
identity transforms into a ‘criminal’ or ‘radical’ other, the criminal acts of a minority are ascribed to the 
broader collective who share similar characteristics with the ‘radical other’.  
 
Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya was once characterised as a breeding ground and nursery for 
terrorism following the 2015 Garissa University terrorist attack. This implies that places of protection 
can potentially lose their identity and become radical spaces. When political actors transform safe 
spaces into radical safe spaces and link ‘radical others’ to radical safe spaces, they inadvertently 
construct radical public spaces where emotions override reason and restraint. As a result, public 
pressure in some cases compels and justifies excessive counter-terrorism measures. The claim and 
actual use of extraordinary measures of intervention in fact represent the expression and exercise of 
power by actors in position of authority. Identity and security constructs are therefore in part, products 
of power relations.  
 
Besides extraordinary state intervention, radical public spaces also precipitate extraordinary 
intervention among citizens in the form of reprisals, which may include hate crimes and terrorist 
attacks. The 2019 terrorist attack at Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand answers the 
question posed in section 2.4. The attacker’s manifesto (Tarrant, 2019, 16) states that he views Trump 
as ‘a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose’. He further states (p. 17) that he was 
‘radicalized …the most’ by Candace Owens, an African American political activist and Trump 
supporter. Al Shabaab’s 2019 terrorist attack in Kenya was also partly inspired by Trump’s recognition 
of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. These examples highlight the instrumentality of securitised 
discursive and nondiscursive practices as motivations and justifications for acts of terrorism. In 
considering other examples in chapters seven and eight, this thesis concludes that extraordinary 
measures include the agency exercised by other actors, for example, the distribution of hate posters 
and leaflets, the dissemination of online hate speech and terrorism programmes since such acts do 
not constitute the norm. While extraordinary measures may not generate formal policies, they may 
transform political rhetoric into violent action. Violent radicalisation (terrorist attack) is therefore a 
strategic, broader long-term programme encapsulating the interplay of a constellation of actors, drivers 
and strategies that culminates into a visible act of terror, as this thesis has shown. Terrorism is 
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processual and programmatic because even in the absence of visible acts of violence, the pursuance 
of other terrorism-related activities continues as effects on society take hold. This constitutes the 
convergence of violent and nonviolent radicalisation and further reinforces the thesis’ argument on the 
plurality and intersubjective construction of radicalisation in the public space beyond the immediate 
migrant sphere. If recent scholarship supports the expansion of securitising agents beyond the political 
elite, it is only logical that extraordinary measures include the practices of other actors. Finally, the fact 
that some terrorist attacks are partly motivated by revenge, for example, in the New Zealand exemplar 
signifies the mutually reinforcing character of Islamism and right-wing terrorism, and the importance of 
holistic interventions. 
 
In the global context, migrants, the subjects of discourse and domination, are strategic and may 
disguise rebelliousness to survive. Others resort to open resistance, perceived as wielding the power 
to control their circumstances to reset power relations. Resistance is an expression of power 
emanating from unresolved real and perceived grievances and injustices. Actors with inferior military 
capability that does not match their opponents’ superior firepower employ discursive and physiological 
power. The element of surprise in the unpredictability of weapons of choice and targets, localised 
attacks that demand minimum logistical investments, and the command of a dispersed invisible 
constituency are all expressions of power. Significantly, the capability to claim casualties and inflict 
public fear not only demonstrates lethality, relevance and resilience but also represents power. 
Opposing sides typically engage in the reconstruction or reinforcement of dominant narratives that re-
educate, indoctrinate as well as attract and distract respective disciples. The resurgence of populism 
in the West and the goals of ‘InfoWars’, ‘taking back control’, ‘MAGA’, ‘winning hearts and minds’, and 
terrorist organisation propaganda should be understood within and beyond this context.  
 
Social and alternative media platforms are powerful tools that opponents use to access and influence 
the critical mass and, in some cases, access and exert power. They have also fed the public’s 
burgeoning appetite for spectacle and alternative truths. Not to mention public discontentment with 
mainstream media, limited access to scientific research, political and economic disillusionment, among 
other factors. Nevertheless, parallel positive developments and a steadfast wave of constructive 
agents of change provide some degree of stability. Suffice it to say that actors, including those 
constructed as ‘passive’ as well as institutions possess and exercise some form of power. 
Indoctrination and official government policies for example, on migration and security constitute 
invisible power. Other expressions of visible and hidden power include martyrdom, religious symbols 
(see Timeline, 2017), narratives of military capability, military interventions, and the deployment of 
humanitarian aid and development assistance. Notably, whoever controls the narrative wields the 
power to not only control the minds of the masses but also reconstruct reality. Such is the power of 
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language to animate public discourse and condition mentalities. The poststructuralist philosophy 
related to infinite relative truths and the plurality of meaning could therefore not resonate more in the 
prevailing context of ‘post-truth politics’. There is clearly some degree of loss of public confidence in 
traditional knowledge institutions. As a recommendation, academia should increasingly consider open 
access to mitigate the proliferation of conspiracy theories. Further, in acknowledging the potential for 
unintended effects for this particular research, in upholding the principle of do-no-harm, and based on 
the research findings, a proposed area of study would be a review of language and representation in 
existing radicalisation and terrorism scholarship and media. In addition, a study on scholars’ 
perspectives on radicalisation and terrorism research, and recommendations on mitigating unintended 
effects represents another interesting area of exploration. 
 
This research has found that discursive practices shape social structures while social conditions inform 
discourse that either maintain the status quo or transform it. Discourse therefore gives rise to important 
notions of power through the production and reproduction of unequal power relations. Discursive 
practices have significant ideological effects (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258) through the moulding 
of attitudes, perceptions and beliefs that sustain dominant narratives. Further, they (re)construct 
identities that inform social interactions based on unequal power relations. Researchers are embedded 
in the societal hierarchy of power and status and not outside of it (See Bourdieu, 1984). This implies 
that they have the power to influence knowledge in the advancement or disruption of dominant 
narratives that sustain unequal power relations. Discourse as demonstrated in this study not only 
shapes how the world has been but also dictates how it should be.  
 
More broadly, the study has examined the vulnerabilities to and dynamics of radicalisation and 
concludes that radicalisation is intersubjective. Radicalisation in the migrant context should therefore 
be examined within the broader context in which it develops. In addition, deradicalisation and social 
cohesion interventions that focus on ideological counter-messaging and small-scale interventions at 
the micro-level, while effective in the short-term, are also largely reductivist. Unacknowledged root 
causes of conflict are therefore likely to remain intact. This band-aid approach serves to at best 
ameliorate immediate threats and at worst repress drivers with the potential for future implosion. 
Policies should be grounded on sound problem analysis, a multi-actor approach and address specific 
causes indiscriminately. In other words, the adoption of a holistic, contextualised, long-term and 
strategic approach will go a long way to progressively reduce the vulnerabilities to radicalisation in the 






Appendix: Overview of Interviews 
 
No. Pseudonyms Position  Date (2017) 
1 DANIEL Policy Analysis, Research, Communications and Knowledge 
Director - thinktank 
26th January 
2 SAMUEL Protection Assistant - UN 27th January 
3 RICHARD Security Expert – Anti-terrorism  30th January 
4 LOLA Deputy Manager – French national 31st January 
5 HANS Executive Director of XXX Academy – German National 2nd February 
6 WEKESA Executive Director of thinktank / Government Advisor 3rd February 
7 SULEIMAN Security Expert / former General Service Unit (GSU) officer 4th February 
8 OKELO Security Expert 4th February 
9 JOHN Conflict Advisor (security expert) – Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) 
6th February 
10 MIA Senior Project Officer and Expert on Mixed Migration  7th February 
11 MAINA Safety and Security Coordinator - INGO 7th February 
12 TABAN Security Advisor at UN / former military 7th February 
13 CHEGE Acting Coordinator for legal institute (provides pro bono legal 
services for refugees) 
8th February 
14 HERA Security Advisor at INGO / former military 8th February 
15 ALI Deputy Head of Security - INGO 9th February 
16 TEDESE Missionary / Pastor – working with refugees 10th February 
17 ZENEBE Missionary / Pastor – working with refugees 10th February 
18 GITARI Host community - businessman 14th February 
19 OMAR Journalist covering security issues 14th February 
20 OGOLA Area Programme Manager - INGO 15th February 
21 NINA Host community - administrator  16th February 
22 AMINA Protection Officer on Mixed Migration - UN 18th February 
23 MARYAM CVE expert / Refugee Outreach Officer at NGO 18th February 
24 FATIMA Former Dadaab teacher/NGO work 19th February 
25 DAVID Chief 19th February 
26 ISMAIL Outreach Officer - INGO 19th February 
27 ABDUL Executive Director - NGO 21st February 
28 KIPLAGAT Expert in CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) 22nd February 
29 FARAH Kenya Programme Manager - INGO 23rd February 
30 AVA National Project Manager - UN 23rd February 
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